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THE IMPACT OF MANAGERIAL OVERCONFIDENCE 
AND INVESTOR SENTIMENT ON BIDDERS’ 
ABORMAL RETURNS  
 
 
By EVANGELOS VAGENAS-NANOS 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate takeover gains for UK bidding firms 
and offer a behavioural approach to empirical analysis. The main issues and key 
findings of the three empirical chapters are summarised as follows. Chapter 3 
empirically investigates the hubris hypothesis for corporate takeovers (Roll (1986)). 
This thesis examines whether overconfident managers destroy shareholder value (in 
public deals) or whether their actions generally lead to lower wealth effects (in private 
deals) relative to rational bidders. Bidders‘ short and long-term performance is also 
examined by employing, for the first time in a UK study, three different measures of 
overconfidence namely Stock Options, Multiple Acquirers and Business Press proxies. 
The results indicate that managers infected by hubris fail to generate superior returns 
than those generated by rational bidders, for all three proxies of overconfidence after 
controlling for various bidder and deal characteristics. We therefore argue that the well-
documented destructive effect upon shareholder wealth of managerial overconfidence is 
not sensitive to the measure used for this behavioural bias (i.e. overconfidence). The 
Hubris hypothesis assumes a rational market-irrational manager framework while 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) offer rational manager-irrational market framework and 
suggest that takeovers are driven by overvalued markets. Chapter 4 empirically 
investigates the proposal of Baker et al. (2007) who claims that ‗the irrational manager 
and irrational investor stories can certainly coexist’. Findings show that rational 
managers who announce takeovers in high valuation periods enjoy the highest abnormal 
returns while overconfident managers who announce takeover bids in low valuation 
periods cannot hide the poor quality or possible overpayment of their deals ending up 
suffering the highest losses. Lastly, Chapter 5 offers a behavioural approach to explain 
short –run bidder gains. Neoclassical theories suggest that the market reaction following 
the announcement of a takeover bid reflects either synergy or revaluation gains. Chapter 
5 suggests that acquirers‘ abnormal returns reflect a market overreaction. Results 
suggest that under conditions of low information uncertainty when investors do not 
possess private information, the market reaction is complete (zero abnormal returns) for 
any type of acquisition. On the other hand, under conditions of high information 
uncertainty, investors overweight their private information and overreact to takeover 
announcements. Therefore, they generate highly positive and significant gains 
following the announcement of private stock and public cash deals (considered to be 
‗good‘ news), positive gains following private cash acquisitions (also defined as ‗good‘ 
news) while investors heavily punish public stock deals (classified as ‗bad‘ news). 
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Takeovers are large investment projects undertaken by firms in order to either grow the 
size of the firm, restructure the firm‘s operations or in order to penetrate new markets. 
In a short period of time, the structure of these firms (in terms of the firm‘s fundamental 
figures and competitive environment) can change dramatically. Small firms can use 
takeovers to grow larger whilst national firms can become multinational after M&A 
activity.  
 
Neoclassical and behavioural explanations have been proposed to help explain why 
mergers and acquisitions occur. Neoclassical theories suggest that managers are rational 
with the aim to maximize shareholders wealth. Mergers therefore serve as a way for 
managers to increase their firm‘s market power and efficiency. Economies of scale can 
also be sought in the reduction of costs with the potential creation of synergies gains. 
The main rational motive behind M&As is the potential value creation it offers through 
synergies. This theory assumes that the value of the new merged firm will exceed the 
sum of the value of its previously separate entities (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). This is, 
however, not always supported by the empirical evidence relating to bidders‘ returns. 
Furthermore, neoclassical explanations regarding merger waves suggest that takeover 
activity clusters in time due to economic, technological and regulatory shocks (Gort 
(196), Mitchell and Mulherin (1996)). In other words, merger activity is instigated by 
what is commonly termed an economic disturbance.  
 
A second school of thought pertains to the agency theory as suggested by Jensen 
(1986). This theory posits that managers rationally attempt to pursue their own 
objectives at the expense of shareholders‘ interests. A third motivation relaxes this 
restriction of managerial rationality and has recently been intensively debated. It is 
termed managerial hubris and was first introduced by Roll (1986). Roll‘s (1986) hubris 
hypothesis assumes that financial markets are strong-form efficient. Managers, in this 
setting, engage in acquisitions with an overly optimistic opinion of their own ability to 
create value and extract potential synergies from a proposed takeover deal. As a result, 
they overbid for target firms destroying the wealth of their own shareholders. Other 
behavioural explanations, such as market misvaluations, managerial motives and 
sentiment, could serve as the other driving force for takeover activity. Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) suggest that managers ‗time the market‘ to take advantage of their 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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overvalued equity to allow for the acquisition of undervalued target firms. Similarly, 
Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009) and Rosen (2006) report that acquisitions undertaken 
during high valuation periods generate higher abnormal returns due to high investor 
sentiment. Furthermore, managerial envy (Goel and Thakor (2008)) or the pursuing of 
the manager‘s personal objectives (Morck, Scheifer and Vishny (1990)) are also driving 
forces for M&A activity. Managerial decisions in these aspects seem to play a 
significant role in the initiation and completion of a takeover bid. 
 
This thesis focuses mainly on the cognitive biases that affect the decisions of the 
various participants in the market. One of the well-documented cognitive biases 
discussed in the psychological literature, which has been proven to affect financial 
decisions, is overconfidence. Overconfidence is usually presented in the form of 
miscalibration (Oskamp (1965)), a ‗better-than-average‘ effect (Taylor and Brown 
(1988)), an illusion of control (Langer and Roth (1975)) and an unrealistic optimism 
(Weinstein (1980)). Glaser and Weber (2007) claim that the ‗better-than-average‘ effect 
influences an investor‘s trading activity by causing these individuals to trade higher 
volumes, more frequently than would be considered normal. Odean (1998) also writes 
that investor overconfidence increases the market‘s trading volume and depth. Daniel et 
al. (2001) and Chuang and Lee (2006) model investors‘ behaviour and claim that 
investors are highly influenced by their biases and resultantly over and underreact to 
their private signals rather than to available public information. 
 
Managerial decisions appear to play a significant role in corporate takeovers. Roll 
(1986) claims that takeover deals may also be driven by overconfidence. Managers 
infected by hubris believe that due to their own superior abilities, they can create value 
for the shareholders of their firms through engaging in various investment projects. The 
hubris hypothesis predicts why managers undertake takeovers even when there are no 
synergy gains. Roll (1986) suggests that overconfident managers are likely to 
overestimate the synergy gains on offer, if they exist at all, resulting in the payment of 
high premiums for the target firms. Despite the extensive theoretical work regarding 
investor and managerial biases, there still remains limited empirical evidence in the 
related areas. 
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Extensive literature has discussed the cost and benefits of M&As both for the target and 
the bidding firms. While there is unanimous agreement that the shareholders of the 
target firm enjoy significant gains following the announcement of a takeover deal
1
, 
there is high controversy over whether takeovers are value-enhancing or value-
destroying projects for the shareholders of the bidding firm. An unanswered question 
still remains in that do shareholders of the acquiring firm actually benefit from takeover 
bids? An extensive part of the corporate finance literature has examined various factors 
that affect and could help explain the market‘s reaction following the announcement of 
a takeover bid. Initially, a great number of studies failed to account for the target firm‘s 
public status. A large body of research
2
 examines the short-run abnormal returns only 
for acquisitions of public target firms. It finds that acquirers either suffer losses or, at 
best, break-even. On the other hand, acquisitions of privately held firms generate 
positive and significant abnormal returns around the announcement of the takeover
3
. 
The short-run reaction to takeovers of subsidiary targets
4
 is similar to the evidence 
provided for private targets. The managerial motive, the liquidity and the bargaining 
power hypotheses have all been proposed to help explain the differences for bidder 
gains in acquisitions of private versus public target firms. Further investigation has 
revealed that that the method of payment along with the target firm‘s status can also 
help explain acquirers‘ gains. Stock offers for public targets suffer significant losses 
(Travlos (1987)) while stock offers for privately held targets generate positive and 
significant gains (Chang (1998)). Cash offers generate marginally positive gains for 
both private and public targets. The corporate monitoring and the information 
asymmetry hypotheses explain the difference between the various methods of payments 
                                                 
1
 See Dodd and Ruback (1977), Langetieg (1977), Bradley (1980), Dennis and McConnell (1986), 
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989), Frank, 
Harris and Titman (1991), Servaes (1991), Bannerjee and Owers (1992), Conrad and Niden (1992), 
Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992), Kaplan and Weisback (1992), Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993), 
Eckbo and Thorburn (1993), Smith and Kim (1994), Schwert (1996), Loughran and Vijh (1996), 
Maquieira, Megginson and Nail (1998) 
2
 See Jensen and Ruback (1983), Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), , Kaplan 
and Weisbach (1992), Servaes (1991), Lang et al. (1991), Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992), Mulherin 
and Boone (2000), Agrawal et al. (1992), Hansen and Lott (1996), Fuller et al. (2002), Higson and Elliot 
(1998), Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996), Dodds and Quek (1985), Firth (1980), Limmack (1991), 
Holl and Kyriazis (1997), Draper and Paudyal (2006),and Eckbo (1986). 
3
 See Hansen and Lott (1996), Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002), Ang and Kohers (2001), Draper and 
Paudyal (2006), Chang (1998), Antoniou, Petmezas and Zhao (2007), Conn, Cosh, Guest and Hughes 
(2005), Faccio, McConnell and Stolin (2006) and Hertzel and Smith (1993). 
4
 See Fuller et al. (2002), Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004), Conn, Cosh, Guest and Hughes 
(2005), Antoniou, Petmezas and Zhao (2007) and Faccio and Masulis (2005). 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
5 
 
employed by the bidding firm in order to acquire the target firm. Literature has also 
explored other factors which affect short-run bidder gains. Moeller, Schlingemann and 
Stulz (2004) find that small bidders enjoy higher gains than large ones. There is also 
unanimous consent that the higher the relative size of the deal, the higher the gains 
obtained for the bidding firm (Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983), Londerer and 
Martin (2001), Fuller et al. (2002)). Moreover, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and 
Sudarsaman and Mahate (2003) show that value (low MTBV ratios) outperform 
glamour (high MTBV ratios) acquirers. Additionally, research has also focused on 
bidders who diversify across industries and countries and bidders who undertake 
multiple takeover bids. Extensive evidence and analysis of the findings of this research 
is presented in Chapter 2 (Literature Review).  
 
Despite the extensive theoretical and empirical work on investor biases, there is still 
limited empirical evidence in the application of these findings to the field of M&As. 
This thesis contributes to the behavioural finance literature by empirically investigating 
issues such as managerial overconfidence, investor sentiment and investor biases in a 
M&As framework. 
 
More specifically, Chapter 3 empirically investigates the hubris hypothesis introduced 
by Roll (1986) in the UK takeover market. The hubris hypothesis assumes that financial 
markets are strong-form efficient. Manager‘s engage in acquisitions with an overly 
optimistic opinion of their own ability to create value and extract potential synergies 
from a proposed takeover. As a result, they overbid for target firms destroying value for 
their own shareholders. While there is substantial work on investor irrationalities, there 
is limited evidence of the effect of managerial overconfidence on shareholders‘ wealth. 
Evidence is limited to the US market (Hayward and Hambrick, (1997), Heaton, (2002) 
and Malmendier and Tate, (2008)) but nonetheless, it suggests nonetheless that 
overconfident managers are more likely to destroy value when involved in takeover 
activity. The UK merger market is an ideal testing ground for managerial 
overconfidence. Almost nine out of ten takeovers involve privately-held target firms 
with the method of payment used to finance the takeover predominantly being cash 
(Draper and Paudyal (2006)). In a private bid, information is limited regarding the 
target firm and hence managers‘ personal evaluations and estimations are required more 
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than they would be in acquisitions of public targets, where an abundance of available 
information helps the process. With this unique characteristic of the UK market, it more 
likely that the phenomenon of overconfidence is observed in M&As. Furthermore, 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) show that overconfident managers are more likely to 
proceed to undertake takeovers when they have an abundant of internal resources at 
their disposal. 
 
To capture managerial overconfidence, we employ three hand-collected datasets used 
for the first time for the UK market. The stock options proxy is based on managerial 
compensation packages. We identify the CEO at the time of deal announcement and 
classify them as overconfident if they hold their stock options until the last year before 
the expiration date. The multiple acquisitions proxy is based on the notion that 
managers who perform multiple acquisitions are subject to self-attribution bias and 
overconfidence. Previous studies (Doukas and Petmezas (2007), Billett and Qian 
(2008)) have employed similar proxies and observed the behaviour of bidding firms 
which have undertaken multiple bids within a specified period of time. It could be the 
case that bidding firms which undertake different deals have different managers at 
different points in time. We focus on individual CEOs and classify them as 
overconfident if they undertake five or more acquisitions within a period of three years. 
Finally, the chapter also employs the business press proxy which is based on the 
individual CEOs. We extract managers that are portrayed as ‗confident‘, ‗optimistic‘, 
‗overconfident‘ and ‗overoptimistic‘ within the press and classify them as 
overconfident. The main findings suggest that overconfident managers fail to generate 
superior abnormal returns compared to rational managers, both in the short and long-
run. Chapter 3 confirms that the hubris hypothesis is robust outside of US as well and is 
not sensitive to the choice of proxies used. Overall, we observe that managerial 
overconfidence plays a significant role in determining bidder gains. The chapter 
contributes to the existing literature by providing clear evidence of the personal effect 
of CEO‘s irrationalities upon bidder gains.  
 
The hubris hypothesis, as tested in Chapter 3, assumes that managers are irrational 
while the market is modelled rational, able to recognise and capture this human 
irrationality. Irrationality has been separately studied in the literature for managers and 
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the broader investor groups and market. Baker et al. (2007, p. 48) in a review paper 
argues that ―the irrational manager and irrational investor stories can certainly coexist‖. 
Chapter 4 of this thesis attempts to reconcile these two theories, providing direct 
evidence regarding the role of managerial overconfidence in high and low market 
valuation periods, documenting the effect on bidders‘ shareholder wealth.  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggest an irrational market-rational manager framework. 
Rational managers are believed to ‗time the market‘ to take advantage of their 
overvalued equity in order to acquire undervalued target firms. Consistent with this 
theory, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) and Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) show that more 
acquisitions take place during bullish markets. Bouwman et al. (2009) find that 
acquisitions announced during high valuation periods generate higher abnormal returns 
for the bidding firm‘s shareholders than those announced during low valuation periods. 
Chapter 4 simultaneously investigates both market conditions and the managerial trait 
of overconfidence.  
 
Rosen (2006) argues that managers may be infected with the same optimism as 
investors during bullish periods. If this is the case, then managers might overestimate 
the potential synergies from the merger, which is likely to influence negatively the 
quality of the deal undertaken during a hot period. On the contrary, given that high-
valuation periods are associated with an increase in bidder returns, rational managers, 
who assess a deal more carefully and negotiate more efficiently than those who are 
irrational, may time the announcement of bids to further enhance the positive effect 
upon shareholders‘ wealth. Furthermore, when overconfident bidders conduct deals in 
depressing markets, it is unlikely that they will be able to hide the quality of the deal or 
the possible overpayment. Investors in low valuation markets are substantially more 
careful in assessing the future prospects of the deal and therefore are more likely to 
react more unfavourably upon the realization of a bad deal, depreciating the bidder‘s 
stock price.  
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We employ the stock options and the multiple acquirers proxies
5
 as described in chapter 
3 and examine the bidding firm gains managed by rational and overconfident managers 
in high and low valuation periods, as classified by the methodology of Bouwman et al. 
(2009). We find that rational managers who announce takeover deals during high 
valuation periods enjoy the highest abnormal returns. Conversely, when bids are 
undertaken and announced by overconfident managers during low valuation periods, 
investors assess the deal more carefully and heavily punish bidding firms with 
overconfident managers. Rational managers tend to generate positive abnormal returns 
in most cases, irrespective of the market conditions. Furthermore, overconfident 
managers who take advantage of positive investor sentiment do not destroy shareholder 
value when they announce takeovers during high valuation periods. Our results are 
robust to a multivariate analysis which controls for factors known to affect acquiring 
firms‘ returns, such as the method of payment used, the listing status of the target firm 
as well as the size and book-to-market ratios of the acquiring firm. Our findings suggest 
that the interaction of market conditions and managerial behavioral traits play a 
significant role in identifying the differences in acquirers‘ short-run abnormal returns. 
Chapter 4 contributes by providing clear evidence of the superior of rational managers 
regardless of market conditions through simultaneously investigating an irrational 
manager-irrational market framework. 
 
Neoclassical theories suggest that the motive for M&As should predominantly be to 
extract synergistic gains as a result of economies of scale achieved after the 
combination of the two companies. The subsequent market reaction at the time of deal 
announcement should reflect these potential synergy gains on offer. Fuller et al. (2002) 
and Draper and Paudyal (2008) claim that the short-run market reaction to bidder‘s 
following takeover announcements may also reflect revaluation gains. Even the hubris 
hypothesis itself assumes that overconfident managers overpay for their targets 
resulting in the erosion of potential synergy gains. The market, which is assumed to be 
rational in the hubris setting, realizes such actions and punishes overconfident takeover 
activity. 
 
                                                 
5
 The business press proxy reveals similar evidence with the other two proxies, but is excluded due to 
small sample limitations. 
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Chapter 5 offers an alternative behavioural approach to explain the market‘s reaction 
following the announcement of takeover bids. Experimental evidence suggests that 
investors tend to overestimate the precision of their information especially when they 
are personally involved in its collection (Odean (1998)). Daniel et al. (1998, 2001) 
suggest that investors are overconfident particularly regarding their private information 
and tend to become even more overconfident under conditions of information 
uncertainty. Zhang (2006) posits that under conditions of high information uncertainty, 
the market should react more positively (negatively) following the announcement of 
good (bad) news while when uncertainty is low, the market reaction should be complete 
(i.e. zero abnormal returns). Zhang (2006) notes that his work does not incorporate the 
private information of investors in its analysis and offers that further investigation is 
required.  
 
Motivated by the above theoretical and empirical evidence, we examine the market‘s 
reaction following the announcement of takeover bids under both conditions of high 
information uncertainty and when investors possess private information. By information 
uncertainty, we refer to ambiguity regarding the bidding firm‘s value (Zhang (2006)). 
Travlos (1987) suggests that stock acquisitions for public target firms convey ‗bad‘ 
news to the market regarding the intrinsic value of the bidding firm while cash offers 
signal ‗good‘ news. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) extend this idea proposing that bidders 
use equity offers when they know that their equity is overvalued.  On the other hand, 
Chang (1998) and Draper and Paudyal (2006) suggest that takeovers for private targets 
paid for with stock reveal positive news to the market. The concentrated ownership of 
privately held firms is posited to have more of an incentive to carefully evaluate the 
intrinsic value of the bidder before accepting to become an owner of a large amount of 
the bidders stock. Hence, it is quite unlikely that acquirers‘ stock would be overvalued 
and accepted by the target in this setting. Conversely, private acquisitions paid for with 
cash are considered to be fairly positive indication of the bidder by the market but do 
not directly reveal any information about the bidder‘s true stock value.  
 
In Chapter 5, we hypothesise that under conditions of information certainty, investors 
overweight the precision of their private information and hence there should be a 
positive market reaction following the announcement of private stock, public cash and 
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private cash acquisitions (considered to be ‗good‘ news) while the market reaction 
should be negative following the announcement of public stock deals (considered ‗bad‘ 
news). When information uncertainty is low, and investors are less likely to possess 
private information, there should be no market reaction.  
 
To capture information uncertainty for bidding firms, we employ four proxies including 
the bidding firm‘s age, size, sigma and trading volume. To capture whether investors 
are more likely to possess private information or not, we employ stock price 
(non)synchronicity as developed by Morck et al. (2000) and Chen et al. (2007). Our 
findings provide support for our hypotheses. We find that under high information 
uncertainty, bidders enjoy positive abnormal returns for private stock, public cash and 
private cash acquisitions. These returns are even more positive after we control for 
investors‘ private information. Under the same conditions, we observe negative 
abnormal returns following the announcements of public stock deals. Once again, these 
returns are amplified when investors are likely to possess and overweight their private 
information. Conversely, when uncertainty about the intrinsic value of the bidding firm 
is low, and investors are less likely to possess private information, the market reaction 
is complete (zero abnormal returns). Furthermore, we provide evidence that the market 
responds asymmetrically following bad and good news. The negative reaction 
following ‗bad‘ news is stronger than the positive reaction following ‗good‘ news. 
Finally, our findings indicate that the differences in the method of payment between 
cash and stock acquisitions for public (Travlos (1987)) and private (Chang (1998)) 
deals hold only under conditions of information uncertainty. When uncertainty is low, 
there are no significant differences between the two methods of financing an 
acquisition. In summary, Chapter 5 contributes to the existing literature by investigating 
the performance of bidding firms‘ reactions under different conditions of information 
uncertainty when investors possess private information.  
 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature on 
the various factors that have been proven to affect bidders‘ performance. Chapter 3 
empirically investigates the hubris hypothesis. Chapter 4 examines the bidder gains for 
rational and overconfident bidding firms in high and low valuation periods.  Chapter 5 
offers a behavioural approach of the market reaction following the announcement of 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
11 
 
various takeover deals. Chapter 6 concludes the work, discussing the main findings and 
contributions of this thesis. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
Takeover bids are one of the most important events that occur for both the firm and the 
wider economy. As a result, they have been subject to extensive investigation within the 
finance literature. Although there is unanimous agreement for the benefits obtained by 
target firms, there remains a lot of ambiguity regarding the returns earned by the 
bidding firm around the announcement date. 
 
It has been widely documented in the corporate finance literature that bidder gains 
around the announcement date of an acquisition are dependent upon a number of 
bidder-specific factors or other deal characteristics. In particular, the existing evidence 
suggests that factors such as the target firm‘s listing status (i.e. private, public or 
subsidiary), the method of payment used to finance the takeover (i.e. cash, stock or 
mixed offers of cash and stock) or, even more specifically, the combination of the target 
firm‘s listing status with the method of payment used, can help explain acquiring firms‘ 
short-run abnormal returns. Furthermore, the size of the bidding firm, the growth 
opportunities (measured using the market-to-book value ratio) of the bidding firm and 
the relative size between the target and bidder are also determining factors that can 
explain short-term bidder gains. The literature also explores the differences in acquiring 
firms‘ abnormal returns when acquirers bid for target firms within the same industry 
(non-diversifying deals) or in industries other than the one in which the acquirer 
operates (diversifying deals). In addition, research has focused on the effect upon return 
generation when the target firm operates domestically in the same nation as the acquirer 
or whether they reside in foreign country. This chapter extensively reviews the 
literature on the above factors and mainly focuses on the target firm‘s listing status and 
the method of payment for the deal as being the most important factors which affect a 
bidder‘s short-term performance. 
 
The merger and acquisition game is a complicated puzzle which has invoked a great 
number of researchers to attempt to identify and explain the reasons behind the 
observed variation in the acquiring firm‘s abnormal returns. Apart from the factors 
mentioned above, which are further extended later in this chapter; behavioral 
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explanations have also been proposed to interpret acquirers‘ underperformance. The 
hubris hypothesis (Roll (1986)) is one of them.  
 
The hubris hypothesis suggests that managers infected by hubris overestimate their 
abilities and the future outcome of the project‘s they undertake as they underestimate 
the risk involved in a possible acquisition. Consequently, managers end up offering 
high premiums to the target companies which resultantly destroys value for their own 
company. There is limited empirical evidence in the literature related to this hypothesis. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis extensively discusses this issue. Furthermore, a growing part of 
the literature relates M&As and its wealth effects to various market-wide conditions 
such as market misvaluations and investor sentiment. Chapter 4 of this thesis further 
discusses the literature on the related topics and empirically investigates the effects of 
investor and managerial sentiment on bidders‘ shareholders wealth. Finally, Chapter 5 
also provides a behavioral approach to explain the way in which the market reacts to 
M&As announcements. 
 
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Section 2.2 details the various 
factors that affect short-run bidders‘ performance. More specifically, Section 2.2.1 
discusses the target firm‘s listing status, Section 2.2.2 reviews the existing studies on 
the method of payment and Section 2.2.3 analyzes other factors such as the size of the 
bidding firm, the relative size of the deal, the growth opportunities of the acquirer, 
whether the bidder diversifies across industries/countries as well as the gains from 
multiple acquisitions. Finally, Section 2.3 reviews the literature regarding the long-run 
post-merger gains before Section 2.4 concludes.  
 
2.2 Short-Run Bidder Gains from Acquisitions 
 
This section reviews the literature on various factors that have been rendered 
explanatory over short-term bidder gains. The Merger and Acquisition (M&A) field is a 
complicated puzzle that has been widely examined in the finance literature. There have 
been great attempts to explain and understand the creation and destruction of 
shareholders‘ wealth for both parts of the takeover (i.e. for the acquiring and acquired 
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firms). Although it is unanimously agreed
6
 that the target firm‘s shareholders enjoy 
significantly positive gains around the announcement of a takeover bid, it has been 
observed that bidding companies suffer losses or obtain zero abnormal returns. In a few 
cases it has also been shown that bidders can enjoy significant profits around the 
announcement date. We review studies which discuss factors such as the target firm‘s 
listing status, the method of payment, the size and market-to-book ratio of the acquirer, 
the relative size of the deal, diversifying versus non-diversifying deals, domestic versus 
foreign targets as well as the gains for acquirers that are involved in multiple bids. 
 
2.2.1 Target Firm’s Listing Status 
 
It has been empirically observed that the market‘s reaction following the announcement 
of a takeover is significantly different for a takeover of a listed or an unlisted target 
firm. Takeovers for publicly listed target firms either suffer losses or at best break-even. 
On the other hand, the evidence suggests that takeovers of privately held or subsidiary 
targets generate positive abnormal returns for the bidder‘s shareholders. The following 
three subsections (2.2.1.1, 2.2.1.2 and 2.2.1.3) present the main studies which provide 
this evidence regarding acquisitions for public, private and subsidiary target firms 
respectively. 
 
2.2.1.1 Bidder Gains from Public Target Firm Acquisitions 
 
This subsection concentrates on the studies that document empirical evidence regarding 
bidder gains around the announcement of a takeover for a listed target firm. One of the 
seminal papers which investigate shareholders‘ wealth from takeover activity is by 
Jensen and Ruback (1983). They show that listed target firm shareholders enjoy 
positive abnormal returns while the shareholders of the acquiring firm do not suffer 
                                                 
6
 See Dodd and Ruback (1977), Langetieg (1977), Bradley (1980), Dennis and McConnell (1986), 
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989), Frank, 
Harris and Titman (1991), Servaes (1991), Bannerjee and Owers (1992), Conrad and Niden (1992), 
Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992), Kaplan and Weisback (1992), Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993), 
Eckbo and Thorburn (1993), Smith and Kim (1994), Schwert (1996), Loughran and Vijh (1996), 
Maquieira, Megginson and Nail (1998), Draper and Paudyal (1999), Leeth and Borg (2000), Mulherin 
and Boone (2000), Mulherin (2000), DeLong (2001), Houtson et al. (2001), Beitel et al. (2002), Billett, 
King and Mauer (2003) and Goergen and Renneboog (2004). 
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losses following the announcement of the takeover. More specifically, bidders generate 
zero abnormal returns in the case of a merger while they report small positive 
statistically significant abnormal returns in the case of a tender offer. Jensen and 
Ruback (1983) examine US takeovers for the period 1962 to 1985 and find that bidding 
firms obtain small positive and significant gains (1% to 2%) in the whole sample 
period. However, the results are slightly different when splitting the sample into sub 
periods and losses (albeit statistically insignificant) are observed in the ‗80s. 
 
Likewise, Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) investigate the case of tender offers where 
many acquirers bid for the same target. The sample consists of firms listed either in the 
NYSE or the AMEX at the time of the acquisition over the period 1963-1984. Target 
firms‘ shareholders enjoy the largest part of the gains while bidder shareholders enjoy 
small positive gains only during unregulated periods. At other times the evidence shows 
that they suffer great losses especially the period 1981-1984. Finally, Bradley, Desai 
and Kim (1988) find that the combined value of the new firm increases when a 
successful tender offer takes place whilst the target firm realizes great profits when the 
competition among the bidding firms increase. Hence, they claim that their findings are 
inconsistent with Roll‘s hubris hypothesis but offer support for the synergy hypothesis.  
 
Equally, Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) study the effect of tender offers on acquirers‘ 
shareholders wealth. 450 tender offers from 1963-1986 are examined and they report 
positive and significant abnormal returns for bidding firms which are much lower than 
those obtained by target firms. However, in the decade of the 1980s, these abnormal 
returns become negative but statistically insignificant. They suggest that the 
competition among acquirers for the target firm nullifies the gains for the acquirer from 
the takeover but the target firm achieves the highest benefit by receiving a high 
premium. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) also suggest that the relative size between the 
target and the bidder plays a significant role in observing low abnormal returns to the 
acquiring firm. If the size of the deal is relatively small compared to the size of the 
acquirer, then the market‘s reaction to the announcement of the takeover will not have a 
large effect on the bidder‘s share price. Moreover, the wealth effects may not be 
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incorporated in the stock price on the date of announcement but rather on the actual day 
of the takeover. 
 
Similar evidence is provided by Kaplan and Weisbach (1992). They examine large 
acquisitions that take place between 1971 and 1982. While large looses are reported for 
bidders‘ shareholders, target firms‘ shareholders experience large gains during the same 
period. Servaes (1991) examines 704 acquisitions in the period 1972-1987 and reports 
negative abnormal returns (-1.07%), which decline even more (-4.71%) in the case of a 
hostile takeover.  
 
The evidence also suggests that bidders‘ abnormal returns around the announcement of 
the acquisition depend on Tobin‘s Q as well. If Tobin‘s Q is considered as a measure of 
the quality of the management of the firm then the highest returns are observed for well 
managed bidders who acquire poorly managed targets. In the same respect, Lang et al. 
(1991) in a sample of 101 mergers and tender offers between 1968 and 1986 report 
negative abnormal returns (-0.4%) for the overall sample, which is largely driven by 
low Q bidders (-1.6%) versus the positive abnormal returns (3.5%) generated by high Q 
acquirers. Takeover gains further decline for low Q firm relative to high Q ones as the 
cash flow of low Q firms increases.  
 
On the other hand, Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) examine the 50 largest US 
takeovers in the period 1979-1984. They find a positive relationship between cash flow 
improvements and takeover abnormal returns following the announcement of the 
merger. Additionally, Mulherin and Boone (2000) examine 1305 firms from 59 
different industries in the period between 1990 and 1999 and claim that gains are 
created both from acquisitions and divestures. The gains are shown to be positively 
related to the relative size of the deal. Likewise, Agrawal et al. (1992) examine U.S. 
takeovers for the period 1955-1987, controlling for size and dividend yield. They find 
that bidders suffer losses at the level of 10% over the five years following the 
completion of a takeover. 
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A number of studies report negative gains to acquirers when they compare the takeover 
of listed and unlisted target firms. Hansen and Lott (1996), for a sample of takeovers for 
the period 1985-1990, report significant losses of -0.98% for 151 acquisitions of public 
targets while private deals generate 1.51%. Similar evidence is reported by Fuller et al. 
(2002). They compare multiple deals and claim that bidder shareholder gain when they 
acquire private or subsidiary target firms while they suffer losses (-1.00%) for 
acquisitions of listed target firms. Chang (1998) provides similar findings. He reports 
negative abnormal returns surrounding the acquisition of a listed target, especially when 
the acquirer uses stock as a method of payment while positive returns are reported for 
unlisted target firms. Finally, another study that compares gains from private and public 
acquisition is that of Ang and Kohers (2001). They also find negative abnormal returns 
following the acquisition of a public firm for the period 1984-1996. The above literature 
has presented the gains obtained by US acquiring firms following the takeover of a 
listed target company. We further focus on the evidence pertaining to UK takeover 
activity for listed target firms. 
 
Higson and Elliot (1998) examine the abnormal returns for bidders following the 
takeover of U.K. listed companies for 16 years from 1975-1990. They find zero 
abnormal returns on a value-weighted base (due to very few large takeovers) and 
negative abnormal returns in an equally-weighted portfolio for the period of three years 
post-completion of the takeover. However, there are variations to these findings during 
the sample period. Moreover, there is no sign of a relationship between the abnormal 
returns and the dividend-yield or past return factors.  
 
Similarly, Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996) investigate the UK merger market 
investigating the synergy and agency hypotheses, particularly focusing on the way the 
outcome of the takeover is affected. More specifically, they examine 429 UK listed 
companies from 1980 to 1990 and find that financial synergies tend to prove more 
profitable than operational synergies. Furthermore, it is shown that bidders suffer losses 
over highly rated target firms than when acquiring less highly rated targets. This 
outcome is supportive of the hubris hypothesis and managerial overreaction literature 
concerning a lower profile target company.  
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Great losses are also reported by Firth (1980) who finds that mergers and acquisitions in 
the UK market are profitable projects for target firms while the acquiring firm suffers 
great losses. The value of the combined firms is also found to be slightly positive. Firth 
(1980) supports the notion that takeovers are initiated and motivated by managers who 
are driven by their desire of maximizing their personal profits. Analyzing the 
remuneration levels of managers, he finds that there is a significant increase in their 
personal benefits. Two main theories are put forward to explain these results. First, the 
neoclassical profit maximization theory is offered, which suggests that firms wish to 
maximize their profits by engaging in a takeover. However, the competition by many 
bidding firms for the same target results in a decrease in profits due to a lack of 
monopoly power, synergy gains and restructuring. Second, the maximizing 
management utility theory is explained, which claims that bidders sometimes acquire 
another company not to maximize shareholder‘s wealth but rather to maximize 
managers‘ personal benefits. 
 
Another study that examines UK merger activity is the one by Dodds and Quek (1985) 
who study 70 listed companies for the period 1974-1976, which is considered to be the 
peak of the seventies merger wave. The findings suggest that firms that proceeded to 
conduct takeovers suffer losses compared to those who did not. Similarly, Limmack 
(1991) investigates 448 successful UK takeovers over the period of 1977 and 1986. He 
reports that the shareholders of acquirers suffer significant losses while the shareholders 
of target firms enjoy positive abnormal returns.  
 
In a comparative study between US and UK acquiring firms, Franks and Harris (1989) 
examines 1800 UK bidders over the period 1955-1985. They claim that shareholders of 
target firms gain while those of bidding firms suffer losses. They also report that gains 
to target firms have increased over time for both US and UK target firms while losses 
are similar for US and UK bidding companies. Holl and Kyriazis (1997) study a sample 
of 178 successful UK bids and also report losses for the acquiring firm. More 
specifically, bidders have no gains over the period two months before, while they suffer 
losses (-1.7%) following, the takeover announcement. More recent studies also report 
losses for UK bidding firms. Draper and Paudyal (2006) in a comparative study 
between private versus public UK takeovers in the period 1981 to 2001, suggest that 
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either there are no gains to bidding firms acquiring listed targets or small losses are 
incurred. 
 
In contrast to the evidence presented above for US and UK bidding companies, Eckbo 
(1986) the case of 1900 Canadian mergers between 1964 and 1983 reports significant 
large gains both for bidders and targets following the announcement of a takeover. They 
also claim that there is no significant difference between horizontal and non-horizontal 
mergers and besides, the location of the bidding firm plays a significant role in the 
differences of bidder gains. Contrary to Eckbo‘s (1986) finding, Pettway and Yamada 
(1986) examine 50 Japanese acquirers and report insignificant gains. However, their 
results are in contrast to the US findings in respect to the relative size of the deal. While 
the US evidence claims that gains from acquisitions are positively related to the relative 
size of the deal, Pettway and Yamada (1986) find higher gains in smaller relative size 
deals in the Japanese market. 
 
While the vast majority of the literature suggests that gains from acquisitions of listed 
target acquisition generate negative or zero abnormal returns to shareholders, 
Alexandridis, Petmezas and Travlos (2010) examine a global merger and acquisition 
dataset and claim that bidders in countries apart from the UK, US and Canada enjoy 
significant positive abnormal returns. Acquiring firms in less competitive countries pay 
lower premia and therefore enjoy higher returns surrounding the acquisition 
announcement date. For the same reason, they find that targets in these countries 
receive lower premia and hence experience lower abnormal returns compared to US, 
UK and Canadian target firms. 
 
Overall, the vast majority of studies regarding gains from takeovers of listed target 
firms report either losses or no gains for the shareholders of the acquirers. The 
following subsection reviews the studies that investigate short-term bidder gains from 
acquisitions of privately held target firms. 
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2.2.1.2 Bidder Gains from Private Target Firms 
 
Hansen and Lott (1996) examine the auction theory and use data from M&As to show 
that market imperfections, along with portfolio diversification, leads to the 
shareholders‘ rejection of value maximizing corporate decisions. They study 252 deals 
of listed and unlisted target firms over a window of 20 days (-14, +5) for the period 
1985-1991. Consistent with their hypotheses, they find that the shareholders of bidding 
firms experience higher gains (2% more) when they acquire privately held target firms. 
They claim that the gain differences are not driven by the degree of competition for 
private and public targets. They suggest that public targets have difficulty in choosing 
the auction methods due to the legal requirements. For example, target firms could be 
sued by shareholders for not considering a higher, but later, bid. On the other hand, 
privately held firms have more freedom in creating a more competitive auction 
environment. They also note that cash offers enjoy 0.6% more gains than equity ones 
do.  
 
The study of Hansen and Lott (1996) reveals that gains to acquirers from privately held 
targets are not negative. The seminal work of Chang (1998) focuses on bidder gains 
when the target firm is an unlisted company as well as the method of payment
7
 used. 
The study investigates 281 US private deals for a window of two days before the 
announcement of the acquisition (-1, 0) and report positive and significant gains for 
private stock deals (2.64%) while they find insignificant gains for cash offers (0.09%). 
On the contrary, he reports negative abnormal returns for acquisitions of public targets. 
These findings are supported by the limited competition hypothesis. In other words, in a 
perfectly competitive market a takeover should be a zero net present value project. 
However, it is assumed that the competition among private companies is limited and as 
a result the probability of underpayment is higher.  
 
In the same respect, Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) examine bidder gains for 
acquirers that are involved in multiple acquisitions within a small period of time. They 
examine 3135 takeovers during the period 1990-2000 and argue that the announcement 
of a takeover may reveal information about different factors associated with the bidding 
                                                 
7
 The method of payment in private acquisitions will be discussed extensively in Section 2.2.2.2. 
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firm and hence the market reaction might not be solely attributed to the potential 
synergy gains created. By examining multiple acquisitions, they are able to extract the 
effect related solely to the deal and target characteristics. The findings suggest that 
acquirers that bid for privately held targets experience significant gains irrespective of 
the method of payment used. The explanation provided lies in the liquidity effect. 
Private target firms are not bought and sold as easily as public firms are and therefore 
this liquidity problem makes these companies less valuable resulting in them being 
acquired at a discount. This is argued to be incorporated into the market reaction and 
the bidding firm‘s stock price. Further explanation based on the method of payments 
used to explain the positive reaction to private acquisitions is further developed in 
Section 2.2.2.2. 
 
Similar evidence is provided by Ang and Kohers (2001). They examine 7070 US 
private acquisitions comparatively with 5302 US public acquisitions. The results reveal 
that gains to acquirers and targets are significantly positive when the target is a 
privately held firm. They find that private targets receive higher premia relative to 
public ones, attributing this to the stronger bargaining power of private targets as well 
as to timing options.  
 
Draper and Paudyal (2006) extensively investigate the UK merger market and mainly 
focus on the difference between private and public targets. Using a large sample (1981-
2001) of listed companies that acquire unlisted ones, they find that bidders, in general, 
enjoy positive abnormal returns around the announcement date. These are found to vary 
when taking into consideration the target‘s listing status, the method of payment used 
and the relative size between the two companies. Various hypotheses have been put 
forward to explain this fact. Draper and Paudyal (2006) support the liquidity hypothesis 
which is in accordance with Chang (1998) (limited competition hypothesis). Besides 
this explanation, according to the managerial motive hypothesis, managers, driven by a 
desire of empire building, are willing to pay higher premiums for large, prestigious 
companies (listed companies) while this is not the case for smaller private companies.  
 
Antoniou, Petmezas and Zhao (2007) present similar evidence for a sample of 4173 UK 
M&As for the period 1985-2004. They report significant gains to private acquisitions 
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while public deals suffer losses. Their results are robust for various deals 
characteristics. Another UK study that examines private acquisitions is provided by 
Doukas and Petmezas (2007). The study includes multiple private acquisitions for the 
period 1980-2004. They report positive and significant gains for private deals, which 
are higher for bidders who do not get involved in multiple acquisitions. They also find 
that the gains to bidders decline as acquirers proceed to conduct more and more 
acquisitions. Doukas and Petmezas (2007) claim that the decline of multiple deals is 
driven by managerial overconfidence and self attribution bias. In the same respect, 
Conn, Cosh, Guest and Hughes (2005) examine 4000 acquisitions and report positive 
gains for private deals both from domestic and cross border acquisitions.  
 
In a comparative study of acquisitions for listed and unlisted target firms for 17 
European countries between 1996-2001, Faccio, McConnell and Stolin (2006) find 
insignificant returns for public deals (-0.38%) and positive and significant returns for 
acquisitions of private targets (1.48%). Their results remain consistent after controlling 
for factors such as Tobin‘s Q, the method of payment, the acquirer‘s size, blockholder 
creation as well as whether the target firm was from a domestic or foreign nation. The 
explanations are consistent with the ones presented in the previous studies. 
 
The above M&As literature shows that private targets prove to be value enhancing for 
the shareholders of the bidding firm which is consistent with the general finance 
literature that argues that private placements of equity are profitable for the investors‘ 
shareholders (Hertzel and Smith (1993)). Monitoring efficiency and information 
releases are the explanations provided for the increase in shareholders wealth signaled 
from the investments on private equity. Moreover, such investments can be received as 
signs of undervaluation and a potential profitable opportunity for investors (Myers and 
Majluf (1984)). 
 
2.2.1.3 Bidder Gains from Takeovers of Subsidiary Target Firms 
 
Gains to acquirers of subsidiary target firms have drawn limited attention in the 
corporate finance literature. However, there are a few studies which examine the effect 
of subsidiary targets on the announcement abnormal returns of bidding firms. Fuller et 
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al. (2002) study US multiple acquirers of listed, unlisted and subsidiaries targets. They 
find that acquisitions for subsidiary targets generate positive and significant abnormal 
returns (2.75%) around the announcement of the acquisition. Gains remain positive and 
significant for cash deals (2.56%) but are insignificant for stock-financed ones (3.23%). 
Abnormal returns are also positive both for single and multiple acquirers irrespective of 
the method of payment used. The only exception for multiple acquirers is when they 
use equity as the method of payment. They report negative but insignificant results (-
1.02%). We have to note that this stock-financed portfolio consists only of 12 deals. 
Besides, Fuller et al. (2002) write that one of the motives for selling a subsidiary firm is 
because the firm desires to become more focused in its operations. Therefore, they 
examine the gains generated by diversified and non-diversified parent companies. 
Diversified parent companies might accept a lower price for a subsidiary firm, termed 
the ‗diversification discount‘. However, their results provide weak evidence for this 
argument. The gains are similar for subsidiary firms acquired by diversified or non-
diversified parents.  
 
Another US study that examines bidder gains is by Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 
(2004). Their main focus is the size of the acquirer but they examine the gains from 
listed, unlisted and subsidiary firm acquisitions. With respect to subsidiary targets, they 
find positive abnormal returns irrespective of the method of payment used or the size of 
the bidding firm. Similarly, Conn, Cosh, Guest and Hughes (2005), in a UK study about 
foreign and domestic acquirers, include subsidiary targets as well. They claim that the 
acquisition of a subsidiary firm is an easy and straightforward way to conduct foreign 
direct investments. Their findings suggest that the impact of domestic subsidiary targets 
and those in related industries on bidder gains are positive but not significant. Besides 
this, domestic public subsidiaries generate higher returns than acquisitions of domestic 
public non-subsidiaries do.  
 
Similarly, evidence regarding the impact of UK subsidiary targets is provided by 
Antoniou, Petmezas and Zhao (2007). Results suggest that gains to acquirers for 
subsidiary target firms are positive and significant for the overall sample, for the first as 
well as for higher-order acquisitions (i.e. the 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
, 5
th
 bids, etc). Shareholders of 
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bidders enjoy positive and significant gains irrespective of the method of payment 
(1.23% for cash and 0.27% for non-cash deals).  
 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) examine the method of payment used for M&As among 
European countries. They find that the frequency of cash deals is much higher for 
unlisted and subsidiary targets than for listed ones. Bidders seem to be more reluctant to 
issue equity to corporate sellers to acquire subsidiary firms whilst corporate sellers are 
also not willing to accept bidder stock as a method of payment along with other deal 
characteristics. 
 
Conclusively, the evidence suggests that the shareholders of bidding firms enjoy 
positive and significant gains around the announcement of an acquisition for a 
subsidiary target firm. They appear to share similar properties as discussed for private 
acquisitions. 
 
2.2.2 Method of Payment 
 
This section reviews the literature on studies that discuss the fact that the method of 
payment used in mergers and acquisitions plays a significant role in explaining acquirer 
abnormal returns around the announcement of a takeover. The methods of payment that 
can be used to finance a takeover are cash, stock or a combination of the two known as 
mixed (i.e. cash and stock). There are various reasons provided to explain the market 
reaction around the announcement of an acquisition. Information asymmetries between 
managers and investors, managerial ownership of the acquirer and the target firm and 
taxation considerations are the main explanations for the effect of the various methods 
of payments on bidder gains. The above section presented the findings the effect on 
bidder gains around the announcement of a deals focusing on the target firm‘s listing 
status. Some studies include the method of payment as a determinant factor. This 
section discusses the effect of the method of payment used to finance an acquisition for 
listed and unlisted target firms respectively. It would not be wise to examine the effect 
of the means of financing a takeover without simultaneously considering the target firm 
listing status. There is unanimous agreement that equity financing has a completely 
different effect on the acquisition of listed and unlisted target firms. Hence, in this 
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section we review the literature on the method of financing taking into consideration the 
target firm‘s listing status. 
 
2.2.2.1 Method of Payment for Public Target Firms 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) construct a model which describes firms‘ corporate 
investment decisions in cases where managers have information that investors do not 
(i.e. high information asymmetry). The main predictions of the model suggest that in 
cases of high information asymmetry, firms are advised to use debt to finance their 
investment decisions rather than issuing equity. Furthermore, firms that are unable to 
internally finance investment projects and have difficulty to raise low-risk debt may 
decide to forego good investment decisions instead of issuing equity. Firms are 
advocated to not pay dividends in order to create higher cash reserves and enable the 
firm to undertake projects when the opportunity do so arises. On the other hand, by not 
paying dividends, the firm is unable to reduce the information asymmetry between 
managers and investors. The model also predicts that when managers have information 
that investors do not, then issuing equity to raise cash will result in a decline in the 
stock price. Finally, the firm is always better-off issuing low-risk debt to finance its 
investments.  
 
Triggered by the predictions of Myers and Majluf‘s (1984) model, Travlos (1987) 
examines the way that the method of payment (i.e. common stock exchange or cash 
offers) affects the stock returns of the bidding firms when they announce the acquisition 
of a listed (public) target. It is reported in the literature that mergers are usually 
common stock exchange offers while tender offers are usually cash offers. His findings 
suggest that bidding firms suffer significant losses (-2.09%) when the exchange takes 
place using common stocks (merger) while they experience small positive abnormal 
returns (0.31%) when they offer cash (tender offer). The method of payment used by 
bidders to acquire public targets may signal important information to the market. For 
instance, when managers believe that the intrinsic value of their stock is lower than the 
market value (i.e. overvalued stocks), they would prefer to acquire another firm by 
offering stocks in order to take advantage of the mispricing effect. Consequently, this 
information is interpreted as bad news regarding the true value of the bidding firm‘s 
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stock. The opposite happens in the case when the manager offers cash to acquire the 
target firm. This information is considered as good news for the market, which realizes 
that the bidders‘ firm stock is undervalued (information asymmetry hypothesis). 
Additionally, Travlos (1987) provides evidence that the method of payment is the most 
influential factor since his results show that cash offers are associated with positive 
returns both in mergers and tender offers while common stock exchanges in mergers, as 
well as a combination of common stock and cash in tender offers, are associated with 
negative returns. An additional explanation provided by Travlos (1987) suggests that 
the cash and equity offers have different tax implications for the bidding firm. The 
taxation issue is a puzzling one. In cash offers, the shareholders of the target firm have 
the obligation to pay capital gains tax, but the bidding firm can raise the depreciation 
value of the acquired assets. In stock exchange offers, the target firm bears no tax 
obligations and the depreciation value of the acquired assets is not affected. Therefore, 
in cash offers, the bidding firm has the benefit of the higher depreciation value of the 
acquired assets but needs to pay a higher acquisition price to the shareholders of the 
target firm (Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983)). The opposite is true in the case of stock 
exchange offers. Hence, it is not clear whether the acquiring firm has a net benefit from 
a cash takeover due to taxation/depreciation implication since a higher acquisition price 
is required to be paid. 
 
The third hypothesis is related to the co-insurance effect of the combination of the two 
firms after the acquisition. In stock offers, there is no cash flow from one company to 
the other resulting in an increase in the default risk of the new entity. Hence, the 
benefits from the takeover are transferred from the shareholders to the bondholders of 
the firm leading to a decline in the stock price. In contrast, a cash offer might balance 
the negative changes in the acquiring firm‘s stock prices, caused by the co-insurance 
effect, resulting in a neutral effect. Conclusively, according to the findings of Travlos 
(1987), the negative effect of stock acquisitions and the neutral effect of cash deals 
support the information signalling hypothesis as well as the co-insurance effect 
hypothesis. 
 
Furthermore, Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1990) examine whether corporate control is 
related to the means of investment financing. They support the idea that the capital 
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structure of a company may be related to the way in which managers choose to finance 
a project (e.g. M&A). One possible explanation is that managers want to maintain 
control of the firm. In this case, they most probably would choose to use internal 
sources (i.e. cash) or issue debt instead of issuing stock, which could weaken their 
control over the firm. However, issuing debt increases the likelihood of bankruptcy. 
Additionally, they test the tax and the information asymmetry hypotheses. They claim 
that stock payment is preferred when there is no willingness to pay taxes, since cash 
exchanges involve tax payment. With respect to the information asymmetry hypothesis, 
managers who have more information than outsiders would prefer to finance a possible 
acquisition with equity if they know that their stocks are overvalued or in cash if the 
opposite is true.  Conclusively, they argue that the two hypotheses are not completely 
supported by their results but they do find that the higher the managerial ownership 
fraction of the acquiring firm, the larger the probability is of the acquisition being 
financed using cash rather than equity.  
 
Similarly, Blackburn, Dark and Hanson (1997) examine the method of payment also 
taking into consideration the way in which the company is controlled and report that 
manager-controlled companies suffer significant losses when they make mixed offers 
while in the same case, owner-controlled companies enjoy significant profits. Based on 
the asymmetric information hypothesis, Hansen (1987) presents a model which predicts 
that in a presence of asymmetric information, the target firm knows its value better than 
the potential acquirer does. In this way, the bidding firm is more likely to choose equity 
as a means of financing the acquisition.  
 
The impact of the method of payment regarding the target company is taken into 
consideration by Fishman (1989) who constructs a model and reports various 
differences that are observed between cash and stock offers. He finds that the 
management of the target company is more likely to reject a stock offer than a cash one. 
Additionally, equity offers may increase the competition among bidders while cash 
offers serve as a deterrent to further competition. 
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Choice between Cash and Equity 
 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) explore the factors and determinants that lead managers to 
choose between cash, equity or a combination of them both in order to finance possible 
mergers or acquisitions reporting that their main objective is the trade-off between 
bidder corporate control threats, which discourages stock financing, and bidder 
financial constraints, which encourages stock financing. The study investigates 
European bidders, both publicly and privately held, for the period 1997-2000. The 
choice to study European bidding firms is explained for a number of reasons such as the 
wide range of ownership structures, the variations in corporate governance rules and 
differences in the laws and regulations. The factors that mainly affect the bidders‘ 
decision concerning the method of payment are the debt capacity and the existing 
leverage. Additionally, in many cases managers do not want to change the existing 
corporate governance structure. In cases where the corporate governance control is 
threatened, managers would prefer to finance the acquisition with cash, as opposed to 
offering to exchange stock, where the ownership is concentrated. Furthermore, cash 
offers are preferable in cases when the bidder wants to overcome problems such as the 
admission of the target‘s shareholders approval or regulatory costs of stock offers. Cash 
is an optimal choice when the bidder believes that their stock is undervalued. Other 
factors such as excess liquid assets, many tangible assets and little unused debt capacity 
can lead a bidder to use stock instead of cash. Moreover, Faccio and Masulis (2005) 
find that when a bidder has special access to bank borrowing, then cash financing is 
more likely to be used while when the target can be easily influenced by the bidder then 
stock offers are used for the acquisition. On the other hand, sellers (target owners) may 
swing between stock offers, which do not involve tax payments, and cash financing, 
which enables them to minimize the risk faced and provides them with liquidity 
benefits. From the seller‘s point of view, cash is preferable in order to avoid becoming a 
minority shareholder in a bidder with concentrated ownership. Conclusively, they 
support the notion that both the bidder‘s financial condition and corporate control 
concerns have a clear influence on European M&A financing choices. They find that 
factors such as prior stock price run-up‘s and the market to book value of a bidder‘s 
assets can influence the bidder‘s choice concerning the method of payment. 
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Carleton et al. (1983) divide acquisitions into: no acquired, acquired in cash takeover 
and acquired in an exchange of securities believing that cash takeovers have differently 
initiated and motivated than stock exchange takeovers. Cash offers are usually used 
because mergers financed in such a way are tax deductible, which proves to be a very 
crucial factor in the decision over the method of payment. Market imperfections and 
agency considerations urge managers to use cash in order to acquire firms. Cash is also 
used as a method of financing an acquisition in the case of hostile mergers in which 
bidders can overcome more efficiently obstacles brought up by the target firm‘s 
management. In addition, accounting implications also support the wide range of 
acquisitions financed using cash. Some of their findings relating the medium of 
exchange with the market to book ratio are particularly interesting. They find a positive 
relationship between higher market to book ratio companies and the probability of stock 
exchange offers which is consistent with the tax implication explanation. Low market to 
book companies are considered to incur higher capital gains and consequently they have 
to pay more taxes. As a result, it is expected that cash takeovers should be used more 
often. Finally, Carleton et al. (1983) support the view that low dividend paying 
companies should prefer stock exchange offers since the owners of such companies are 
people who belong to high tax brackets. Nonetheless, the opposite is proved in the 
results.  
 
Martin (1996) also examines the motives that make a company choose between cash 
and stock offers. Their findings show that tender offers are usually cash financed 
projects due to the fact that their completion is faster than mergers. According to 
Fishman‘s proposition (1989), bidders tend to choose cash to avoid competition. 
Furthermore, Martin (1996) supports the idea that bidders with high growth 
opportunities are more likely to choose equity as a means of financing a takeover since 
managers are more flexible with stock offers and better serve their own long-run 
investment plans. 
 
Mixed offers (both cash and equity) 
 
A mixed offer using both cash and stock is another way to finance a takeover. Eckbo, 
Giammarino and Heinkel (1990) build a theoretical model examining the medium of 
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exchange in takeovers and then empirically test it using data from Canadian 
transactions where mixed offers are not so much related with taxation. They show that 
an optimal choice of cash and equity can be achieved through the information 
asymmetries that the two parties (the bidder and the target) face. This optimal choice is 
justified by the data which show that bidders‘ abnormal returns are higher for mixed 
offers than they are for either pure-cash or pure-equity offers. A theoretical approach is 
also attempted by Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990) who create a model to examine the 
method of payment in takeovers, taking into consideration the competition among 
bidders for the same targets. Their results are in complete agreement with Travlos 
(1987) (i.e. that bidders earn more when they offer cash than they do for equity). 
However, they also provide evidence that cash offers, or the proportion of cash used in 
mixed offers, is positively correlated with the competition among bidders. Likewise, 
Brown and Ryngaert (1991) prove that low valuation bidders are more likely to make 
an offer including at least fifty percent stock in order to avoid capital gains taxes while 
high valuation ones make cash offers to avoid issuing undervalued stock. Additionally, 
they show that the method of financing an acquisition depends on taxation and taxation 
regulations. 
 
Conclusively, the main findings regarding the method of payment used to acquire listed 
target firms suggests that stock offers generate negative abnormal returns while cash 
offers obtain zero insignificant returns. Mixed offers seem to have a more positive 
effect on bidder‘s shareholders wealth. Taxation implications and information 
asymmetry are the main hypotheses developed to explain the effects that different 
methods of payment cause. 
 
2.2.2.2 Method of Payment for Private Target Firms 
 
In contrast to the findings of Travlos(1987) that stock acquisitions suffer losses around 
the announcement of listed acquisitions while cash acquisitions generate small positive 
gains for the acquirer‘s shareholders, Chang (1998) reports significant gains (2.64%) 
for private acquisitions when the bidder uses stock as a method of payment and small 
insignificant positive gains (0.09%) for cash offers. Chang (1998) offers three 
hypotheses to explain his results. The limited competition hypothesis proposes that in a 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
32 
 
competitive market a takeover is a zero net present value project. However, if we 
assume that the competition is limited concerning privately held targets, the likelihood 
of underpayment is higher resulting in positive abnormal returns. The monitoring 
hypothesis suggests that firms acquiring privately held targets using common stocks 
create block holders because the target firms are typically owned by a small number of 
stockholders. Therefore, these new stockholders in the combined firm can monitor the 
manager‘s performance more effectively leading to a higher firm value. Finally, Chang 
(1998) reports the information asymmetry hypothesis which, for public target 
acquisitions, predicts that stock exchanges convey bad news to the market. For privately 
held targets, the information asymmetry hypothesis predicts the opposite effect. When 
stocks are offered to acquire a private firm, the shareholders of the target firm, who are 
usually small in number, have an incentive to examine carefully the intrinsic value of 
the bidding firm before ending up with a substantial number of stocks in the newly 
combined entity. The willingness of the target‘s shareholders to hold bidder‘s stock 
after examining the true value of the bidder conveys positive news to the market, 
indicating that the acquirer‘s equity is not overvalued. Likewise, Draper and Paudyal 
(2006) extensively study the U.K. merger market, which is vastly dominated by 
acquisitions of privately held firms (they constitute 80% of total acquisitions). Their 
sample consists of 8597 deals (7,499 private and 1,098 public targets) from 1981-2001. 
They use the simple CAPM model and a 3-factor Fama-French model. They find 
positive and significant gains for the entire sample of private targets and even higher 
returns when stock is used as the method of payment. These results give support to both 
the monitoring and managerial motive hypotheses.  
 
To briefly summarize the literary findings, we observe from the existing empirical 
evidence that takeover bids for public targets generate positive abnormal returns when 
cash is offered as the means of financing, while bidders suffer losses in the case of 
equity offers. On the other hand, when examining the performance of bidders after the 
acquisition of a privately held target, cash offers generate zero abnormal returns while 
stock exchange offers become profitable for bidders‘ shareholders wealth. Chapter 5 
extends this empirical evidence and offers a behavioral approach to explain the market 
reaction for takeover announcements between cash and stock offers for private and 
public target firms. 
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2.2.3 Other Determinants of Bidder Gains 
 
Aside from the target firm‘s listing status and the method of payment used, there are 
also other deal and bidder characteristics that have been detected and proven as 
explanatory factors to affect bidder gains around the announcement of an acquisition. 
This section reviews the literature on these features. The bidding firm‘s size, the 
relative size between the target and bidding firm, the market-to-book ratio of the bidder 
and the origin of the target firm (i.e. domestic vs. cross-border acquisitions) have all 
been recognized as some of the key factors that affect a bidder‘s abnormal returns 
around the announcement of the deal. Lastly, we also review studies that discuss 
acquirers‘ abnormal returns who engage in multiple acquisitions. 
 
2.2.3.1 Size of the Acquiring Firm 
 
M&As are typically sizeable investments for the firm that undertakes them. Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2002) examine the impact of the size (MV) of the acquiring 
firm on the abnormal returns surrounding the takeover. They examine 12,023 
acquisitions during 1980-2001. They report significant gains (2.318%) for small bidders 
and insignificant gains (0.076%) for large ones. The returns for small acquirers are two 
percentage points higher than large acquirers irrespective of the method of payment 
used and whether the target is public or private. Various reasons are provided to explain 
this size effect. Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2002) write that only one quarter of 
the firms acquiring public firms are small while half of those that acquire private target 
firms are small. It has been shown in the above sections that gains to acquirers of 
private targets are higher than gains from acquisitions of public target firms (Fuller et 
al. (2002)). Therefore, the positive gains to small firms may be driven by the fact that 
there is a higher percentage of small firms buying private rather than public targets. 
Another explanation presented is that small bidders usually pay with cash rather than 
with equity. Travlos (1987) shows that acquiring target firms using cash generates 
higher abnormal returns for bidding companies than when equity is used as a method of 
payment. On the other hand, Fuller et al. (2002) and Chang (1998) find that acquisitions 
for private targets generate positive returns both for cash and equity offers. A third 
explanation is based on the different characteristics of small and large firms. More 
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specifically, large firms have more competition than small firms do when they bid for 
the same target and, as has been observed, competition decreases the returns earned by 
the acquirer. Furthermore, in small firms, managers‘ incentives are better aligned with 
those of shareholders as they have more firm ownership than is the case in large firms, 
where managers are more prone to being infected with hubris. Large firms offer larger 
acquisition premiums than smaller firms do and thus enter acquisitions with negative 
dollar synergy gains. 
 
2.2.3.2 Relative Size of the Deal 
 
Another factor that affects bidder gains around the announcement of an acquisition is 
the size of the target firm relative to the bidding firm. The higher the relative size of the 
target to the bidder, the higher the effect exerted on acquirers‘ abnormal returns (Jensen 
and Ruback (1983) and Jarrell and Poulsen (1989)). Asquith, Bruner and Mullins 
(1983) test this ratio on the observed abnormal returns and claim that if a bidder‘s value 
is affected by a merger, then the abnormal returns should be related to the relative size 
of the bidding and target firms. This proposition is supported by their results that show 
that the higher the relative size of the target in comparison to the bidding firm, the 
larger the gains observed. In other words, they report that a target half the size of the 
bidder generates 1.8% more profit for the bidder that a target one-tenth the size of the 
acquiring firm.  
 
Similarly, Londerer and Martin (1997) relate a bidder‘s abnormal returns with the size 
of the two parties in a M&A. They split their sample by relative acquisition value 
(measured as the payment for the target divided by the market value of the common 
stocks of the bidder) into two parts and show that the lowest part of the sample 
produces smaller returns (0.2%) than the highest part which generates returns at a level 
of 1.6%. It is obvious that large acquisitions have a considerably higher effect on the 
acquiring firm‘s abnormal returns than smaller ones do.  
 
The findings of Jarell and Poulsen (1989) are consistent with the previous studies and 
show that as the size of the target firm increases with respect to that of the acquiring 
firm, so does the abnormal returns earned by the acquiring firm. Lastly, Grullon, 
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Michaely and Swary (1997) examine the case of mergers in the US banking sector and, 
more specifically, the factors that affect the method of payment used to obtain the target 
company, claiming that relative size is one of the determinants. More specifically, they 
report that the larger the target compared to the bidder, the stronger the likelihood that 
the acquisition will be financed using stock.  
 
On the contrary to the above findings, Pettway and Yamada (1986) argue that the 
reverse phenomenon is observed for Japanese M&As. Shareholders of acquiring firms 
gain more in small relative size ratio deals. They suggest that when the size of the target 
firm is more than 20% relative to the acquiring firm‘s size, agency costs are likely to be 
higher. The losses could also be attributed to the great cultural and environmental 
differences between Japanese and US managerial objectives. It becomes obvious that 
the larger the relative size of the target firm to the acquiring firm, the higher the realized 
returns for the bidder which show that a large acquisition for a large bidder will have a 
greater impact than a smaller takeover. 
 
2.2.3.3 Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
Several studies attempt to explain the interaction between the pre-bid valuation of the 
acquirer (i.e. glamour or value) and the performance of the acquisition. Glamour firms 
are highly valued firms due to past high stock market performance. These firms have 
high past growth in sales and earnings and, consequently, ratios such as the price to 
earning (P/E) ratio, are relatively high while book to market value‘s (BTMV) are low. 
The opposite is observed in value firms which are mainly firms with low stock market 
performance where the book value to market value ratio is high.  
 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) examine acquirers‘ performance by controlling for factors 
such as the type of merger, the pre-bid valuation and the method of payment. They 
show that bidders in tender offers outperform bidders in mergers over the long-run 
horizon. They find that acquirers in mergers underperform up to 4% over a period of 
three years while those in tender offers earn positive abnormal returns of 9% over the 
same period. They support the idea that the underperformance in mergers is due to the 
poor performance of the low book-to-market ‗glamour‘ firms. According to the 
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extrapolation hypothesis, in companies with low book-to-market ratio‘s, i.e. ‗glamour‘ 
firms, managers are more likely to overestimate their own abilities (i.e. they are infected 
with hubris). This is a natural consequence of these organizations, since glamour firms 
are those with high past stock returns who also benefit from a high past growth in cash 
flows and earnings. This superior past performance increases the hubris of the managers 
worsening the effect. However, the opposite is true for value firms, in which managers 
are more careful in the valuation process of a takeover since they want to create 
shareholder value in order to survive the firm. Moreover, their results support the 
method of payment hypothesis. 
 
Similarly, Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) study the post-acquisition performance of 
acquirers both in the short and the long-run periods. They examine whether the 
acquirers‘ performance is related to the pre-bid status of the firm (i.e. glamour or value) 
as well as the interaction of the acquirers‘ status and the method of payment. 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) examine the price to earnings ratio (P/E), which is a 
measure of the esteem in which the company is held by investors, and find that 
companies with low P/E ratios (i.e. value firms) outperform those with high P/E ratios 
(i.e. glamour firms). The explanation may lie in the fact that glamour firms may be 
infected with hubris and their stocks may correspondingly be overvalued. The authors 
further divide the sample into value and glamour firms according the book to market 
ratio and find that low MTBV firms (value) experience larger gains than high MTBV 
firms (glamour) do. Concerning the interaction between the method of payment and the 
status of bidder, they support the notion that glamour firms‘ stocks (i.e. firms with high 
past stock returns) must be overvalued resulting in the decision to offer equity as means 
to acquire another firm. This is supported by their findings which indicate that glamour 
acquirers are more likely to use equity as a means of payment than value acquirers are. 
Lastly, their findings suggest that value acquirers outperform glamour acquirers in both 
cash and equity financed takeovers in the long run (a three year period). In accordance 
with Rau and Vermaelen (1998), they also claim that their findings mostly support the 
method of payment hypothesis rather than the extrapolation hypothesis, since cash 
acquirers generate higher returns than equity ones do. 
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In general, studies investigating acquirer‘s market to book ratios, a specific 
characteristic of the firm, conclude that value firms (i.e. a low BTMV ratio or a high 
MTBV ratio) outperform glamour ones. This fact is in accordance with Fama and 
French (1992) who agree that the book to market ratio is a proxy for unobservable 
common risk factors affecting the firm. Overall, this ratio has a significant relation with 
the realized returns for bidders. 
 
2.2.3.4 Bidder Gains from Domestic vs. Foreign Target Firm Acquisitions 
 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) through M&As is a relatively fast way for 
companies that want to expand abroad to do so at a reasonable level of risk. Companies 
can mainly take advantage of the imperfections in the product and factor markets, 
differences in taxation levels and imperfections in the international financial markets. 
By exploiting their abilities to arbitrage institutional restrictions while taking advantage 
of informational externalities, firms can make the most of expanding out of their 
domestic markets. Moreover, companies which involve in foreign acquisitions serve the 
purposes of international portfolio diversification. In other words, a bidding company 
reduces the variability and risk it faces in relation to earnings when it expands 
internationally, providing diversification for the stockholders of the company. 
Additionally, foreign companies, due to technological variation, advanced technological 
knowledge or managerial expertise, can manage to reduce the overall costs for the 
company giving the firm the comparative advantage over domestic rivals. It is evident 
that M&As are a way for firms to exploit the above advantages. As a result, there are a 
significant number of studies that investigate this issue from the bidder and target 
companies‘ point of view. 
 
Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983) test the way in which foreign and domestic merger 
bids are perceived by the US stock market. In particular, they examine the abnormal 
returns of acquiring firms involved in domestic and foreign bids respectively. Their 
results give evidence to the fact that acquirers tend to pay higher premiums for foreign 
targets than they do for domestic ones. After splitting their sample by the merger type 
and the method of payment, they find that the results remain the same in the case of 
cash acquisitions. The explanation offered lies in the fact that cash acquisitions involve 
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additional tax liabilities and higher premiums should therefore be given to compensate 
for this increased cost. However, although foreign bids seem to outperform domestic 
ones, when taking into consideration the t-statistics, we can observe that the difference 
in the premiums between these two kind of acquisitions are statistically insignificant, 
especially in the case of conglomerate mergers where cash is used to finance the 
project.  
 
Similarly, Eun, Kolodny and Scheraga (1996) examine the case of foreign firms 
acquiring U.S. companies and test the synergy and internalization hypotheses. They 
find that both the acquiring and the acquired firms enjoy statistically significant profits 
giving support to the synergy hypothesis. Furthermore, acquired firms have profits 
irrespective of the nationality of the acquirer. For instance, on the one hand, Japanese 
acquirers have the largest benefits among acquirers, while on the other hand, British 
bidders do not enjoy any gains out of the acquisitions. Kang (1993) also examines 
whether Japanese bidders and US targets benefit when they are involved in M&As in 
the quest to uncover the reasoning for Japanese firms to expand in to the US market. 
His findings suggest that both parts of the transaction enjoy statistically significant 
earnings. More specifically, the large gains earned by Japanese bidders are attributed to 
firm-specific characteristics as well as to the depreciation of the dollar relative to the 
Japanese yen. Moreover, political stability in the US and the size of the market could be 
one more reason for Japanese firms‘ abnormal returns. Lastly, the authors claim that US 
target companies have significantly higher abnormal returns when acquired by Japanese 
bidders than USA ones do. 
 
Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) show that gains obtained by US companies acquired by 
foreign companies are higher that those acquired by domestic ones. Moreover, they find 
cross-border takeovers are more frequent in research and development industries while 
the cross-border gains are certified to exchange rate movements in FDIs. Similar results 
are presented by Cakici, Hessel and Tandon (1996) who examine cross-border 
acquisitions and report that foreign companies that acquire US targets experience 
positive and significant abnormal returns while US firms that acquire foreign 
companies earn zero profits. Moreover, they prove that the abnormal returns remain 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
39 
 
unaffected by the relative size of the target to the bidding firm and that they decrease 
when competition among bidders for the same target increases. 
 
Another perspective is provided in the study by Doukas and Travlos (1988) which 
mainly finds that companies which announce takeovers in a country in which they 
already operate suffer insignificant losses. On the other hand, bidders‘ stock prices 
increase when they acquire firms in countries where an acquisition is their first project 
within that specific country, which is consistent with the positive multinational network 
hypothesis. The greatest abnormal returns are obtained by companies which diversify 
simultaneously across geographical and industry areas. 
 
Although the above literature shows that foreign acquisitions are more profitable both 
for the acquiring and the target, Georgen and Renneboog (2004), surprisingly and 
contrary to FDI theories, find that domestic M&As tend to be more profitable than 
cross-border operations for companies involved in M&As within the European 
boundaries. 
 
2.2.3.5 Diversifying vs. Non-diversifying Acquisitions 
 
Existing empirical evidence suggests that differences exist in the gains earned between 
bidders who engage in acquisitions within the same industry (non-diversifying) and for 
those who chose to expand their business in unrelated industries (diversifying). Doukas 
and Kan (2008) find that firms choose to expand within the same industry when cash 
flows of the core business are quite high. On the other hand, when cash flows of the 
core business are lower than those from other activities, firms choose to invest in 
industries outside of their specialization. Additional findings suggest that when the 
growth opportunities are high in the bidders industry, these firms keep expanding 
internally while in the opposite case they get involved in diversifying takeovers.  
 
In a similar work, Doukas and Kan (2004) examine the impact of a firm expanding in to 
other industries on the firm‘s cash flow and excess value. They find a direct relationship 
between cash flow and valuation changes with diversification. The work shows that 
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acquiring firms who expand and acquire targets in industries unrelated to the bidder 
suffer higher cash flow decreases and valuation discounts.  
 
Doukas and Travlos (1988) examine 301 US acquirers who engage in foreign 
acquisitions for the period 1975-1983. Their findings suggest those acquirers who 
engage in foreign acquisitions experience positive and significant gains when they 
expand for the first time in to that foreign country. These findings are consistent with 
the positive multinational network hypothesis. Bidder gains are also shown to be even 
higher when the takeover activity takes place in less developed economies and 
particularly when these firms simultaneously diversify across industries. 
 
2.2.3.6 Multiple Acquisitions 
 
In many cases, companies make more than one merger bid. There are different ways to 
expand. Companies may choose to acquire two or three targets in the same industry or 
may decide to merge into other areas as well. This section attempts to review the 
findings for cases where a bidder acquires many target firms. 
 
Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) conduct a thorough study in M&As and test the 
case where a single bidder makes multiple acquisitions, i.e. five or more, in a short 
period of time (three years) aiming to prove that since the bidding company remains 
constant, the variation in returns should be due to the targets characteristics. Their 
findings suggest that firms gain when they acquire a private or a subsidiary firm while 
they lose when they choose a public target firm. Controlling for other factors as well, 
they conclude that acquiring companies enjoy higher abnormal returns when they bid 
for large targets and offer stock as a means of financing.  
 
Similar results are reported for the US market for a period between 1965 to 1984 in the 
study of Loderer and Martin (1990). They support the idea that first-order acquisitions 
of bidders tend to be more profitable than higher-order ones are suggesting that bidders 
are better off by announcing only one acquisition. For instance, the average cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) for the first deal announced is around 1% while it goes down 
by 2% and 3% for the second and third deal respectively. The same results are found by 
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Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) but they provide a different explanation and claim 
that successive mergers of one bidder should be not considered as unique, separate 
events but rather are part of an integrated long-term strategy of the firm. As a result, the 
outcome of this project should be captured in the first deals when most of the 
uncertainty is resolved. However, this proposition (known as the capitalization effect) is 
not supported by the results which reveal that the CARs 20 days prior to the 
announcement for the first deal are lower (2.8%) than the average of the CARs for the 
next three deals conducted (3.1%). 
 
An interesting explanation regarding multiple acquisitions is provided by Doukas and 
Petmezas (2007) who study bidders that make many acquisitions (five or more) in a 
short period of time, defined as three years (i.e. multiple acquisitions). They show that 
first-order deals (1
st
 or 2
nd
) tend to generate higher abnormal returns for the acquiring 
firm than later ones do (5
th
, 6
th
, 7
th
, etc.). Additionally, they also find that single bidders 
(i.e. firms which acquire less than five companies within three years) obtain higher 
wealth effects than multiple acquirers do attributing these results to managers‘ 
decisions. They support the idea that managers make more careful transaction in the 
beginning but are infected by hubris later on.  
 
On the other hand, Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2009) report the same results for serial 
acquisitions but provide a different explanation for these results. They claim that it is 
not managers who are affected with hubris but rather the returns are a result of a 
learning experience. Hence, managers who perform many takeover projects accumulate 
the experience throughout. The first acquisition is profitable as it involves higher risk 
while the deals which follow, since are based on a more careful selection, involve less 
risk and consequently deliver less returns.  
 
In the same way, Haleblian and Filkelstein (1999) test organizational experience and 
claim that experienced acquirers (defined as those who have performed many 
acquisitions in the past) perform better than inexperienced ones do, as they are able to 
distinguish between more and less valuable target companies. Moreover, superior 
performance is achieved by bidders who choose to bid for companies similar to the ones 
they have acquired in the past. Similarly, Doukas and Kan (2004) claim that bidders 
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that perform unrelated acquisitions are prone to larger excess cash flow declines and 
valuation discounts than those who engage in related acquisitions. 
 
On contrast to the previous evidence, Rovit and Lemire (2003) suggest that multiple 
acquirers (i.e. 20 or more deals within 1986-2001) perform best when they make 
systematic deals taking into consideration the economic cycle of the economy. Studying 
724 bidders making 7,475 deals within 15 years, they report that those who make 20 or 
more deals enjoy almost 1.7 times more returns than those who perform 1 to 4 
acquisitions and almost twice as much as those who do not get involved in the merger 
game. 
 
As we have observed, most studies provide evidence that companies that get involved 
in many acquisitions enjoy some profits for the first few deals but these gradually 
decline the more deals which are undertaken. A number of explanations varying from 
hubris to learning are put forward as explanations for these results. 
 
2.3 Long-Run Bidder Gains from Acquisitions 
 
This section reviews the literature for studies that discuss the long-run post merger 
performance of bidding firms. The vast majority of studies show that the possible gains 
obtained around the announcement of the acquisition are cancelled out by the long-run 
negative performance of bidding firms. Despite the findings that suggest that bidding 
firms suffer losses in the long-run, there is still an ongoing debate over the issues that 
cause this underperformance. Methodological issues have also caused debate over the 
way which most appropriately captures a long-run bidder‘s performance. 
 
Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) examine the short and long run performance of 
US bidders. For the period of three years following the announcement of the 
acquisition, they report significant losses for the overall sample (-5%), driven by the 
highly significant losses of stock acquisitions (-9%) contrary to the insignificant 
negative returns of cash deals (-1.4%). They also observe insignificant losses for growth 
(-6.5%) and value bidders (-2.9%).  
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Similarly, Loughran and Vijh (1997) examine the performance of 947 public-to-public 
US deals in the five-years following the completion of the acquisition during the period 
1970-1989. On average, they find that tender offers where cash was used as the method 
of payment generate higher returns (61.7%) than their peer matching firms. On the 
contrary, acquirer returns for stock acquisitions underperform matching firms (-25%). 
The two hypotheses that support the above evidence are offered as follows. Tender 
offers are usually hostile and therefore the wealth gains experienced emanate from the 
replacement of a more efficient management team (Martin and McConnell (1991)). The 
second explanation suggests that bidders usually choose to proceed to undertake stock 
acquisitions when their equity is overvalued while they use cash when they are 
undervalued. 
 
Along the same lines, Malatesta (1983) and Asquith (1983) claim that acquirers suffer 
significant losses one year after the announcement of the acquisition. Andre, Kooli and 
L‘Her (2004) examine the three-year post merger performance of 267 Canadian deals. 
Their results show that in the long-run, bidders suffer significant losses, giving support 
to the extrapolation hypothesis (i.e. that glamour acquirers underperform value 
acquirers). Moreover, they also find evidence that stock acquisitions underperform cash 
deals which is consistent with the overvaluation hypothesis.  
 
Similar evidence is provided by Rau and Vermaelen (1998). They examine 3,169 
mergers and 348 tender offers between 1980 and 1991 and show that during the three 
year post-acquisition performance, tender offers outperform (8.56%) while mergers 
suffer losses ((-2.58%) for bidders acquiring public targets. However, the losses for 
mergers are mainly driven by glamour firms. Glamour public merger deals suffer losses 
of -10.82% while value public merger deals generate positive abnormal returns (9.87%) 
three years following the announcement. In tender offers, both value and glamour 
bidders enjoy positive gains, but value firms (9.81%) are shown to outperform glamour 
ones (4.92%). Rau and Vermaelen (1998) argue that the market extrapolates the past 
performance of the bidder‘s management. Managers of value bidders are less likely to 
be affected by hubris and thus this is why they outperform those defined as glamour. 
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A number of studies present the long-run performance of UK acquirers. Firth (1980) 
finds that the shareholders of the bidding firm suffer losses three years after the 
acquisition while the managers of these firms do not, providing support to the 
management maximization motivation of mergers. Similarly, Franks and Harris 
examine 1800 UK deals between 1955-1985. They report a loss of -13% two years after 
the announcement. Along the same lines, Gregory (1997) examines large (i.e. 
acquisitions with a deal value more than £10 million) UK acquisitions‘ long run 
performance between 1984 and 1992, using six different benchmarks. He uses a simple 
CAPM model, Dimson-Marsh risk and size adjusted model, a simple size-control 
portfolio, a multi-index model using small minus large decile returns, a value weighted 
multi-index model using Hoare-Govett Index as a measure of the smaller companies 
performance and finally a Fama and French (1996) value-weighted three factor model. 
He shows that the long-run performance of UK bidders is unambiguously negative for 
all benchmarks used. He concludes that his results are more consistent with Roll‘s 
(1986) hubris hypothesis or with managerial theories of mergers. 
 
Alexandridis, Antoniou and Zhao (2007) present a different explanation about UK 
acquirers‘ long-run underperformance. They examine whether institutional ownership 
plays a significant role in explaining a bidder‘s long-run performance. They show that 
low, moderate and non-persistent institutional ownership bidders suffer higher losses 
than high, excessive and persistent ones respectively. Checking for market-to-book and 
method of payment factors, they conclude that institutional ownership is a key 
determinant in explaining the long-run negative performance of UK acquirers. 
Similarly, Alexandridis, Antoniou and Petmezas (2007) also study the post-merger 
performance of UK bidders. They suggest acquirers who are subject to lower 
divergence of opinion earn higher post-merger gains. According to Miller‘s (1977) 
theory, high divergence of opinion causes systematic overpricing in the short-run which 
is later corrected in the long-run. 
 
Conclusively, most studies find that bidders suffer post merger losses in the long-run 
and it is only in a very few cases where positive abnormal returns are documented. In 
this thesis, we propose alternative evidence to explain the short and long-run bidder 
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gains as well as other potential factors that may play a role in determining the market‘s 
reaction following the announcement of a takeover bid. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
The evidence from the literature reviewed suggests that bidder gains are affected by 
various bidder, target and deal characteristics both in the short and long-term. More 
specifically, in the short-run, the target firm‘s listing status, the method of payment, the 
size and growth opportunities of the bidding firm, the relative size of the deal as well as 
whether the bidder diversifies across industries/countries  affects shareholders wealth 
around the announcement of a takeover bid. It has also been observed that acquirers 
who engage in multiple bids usually generate positive gains from the first-order deal 
and thereafter a declining trend is observed for the following higher-order deals. The 
long-run post-merger performance tends to reveal negative abnormal returns for the 
shareholders of the acquiring firm. 
 
Recent literature has attempted to model a behavioral approach to explain bidder gains 
around the announcement date. This focuses on behavioral issues to shed more light on 
puzzling aspects of acquirers‘ short and long-run gains. More specifically, Chapter 3 
empirically investigates Roll‘s (1986) hubris hypothesis by employing three hand-
collected unique proxies for the UK merger and acquisition market. Chapter 4 
incorporates market valuations and investor sentiment along with rational and 
overconfident managers as determining factors that could affect short-run bidder gains. 
Finally, Chapter 5 offers a different behavioral approach to how the market and 
investors overreact/underreact under conditions of information uncertainty following 
the announcement of takeover deals. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
A large body of the literature has so far been dedicated to exploring the motivation of 
and shareholders‘ wealth effects in mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Most of the 
studies conclude that bidders suffer a loss around the announcement date or at 
maximum break-even while negative returns are experienced in the long-run.
8
 A natural 
question that usually arises is why then do managers use this corporate action in a 
considerably increasing trend?
9
 In other words, why would firms undertake 
acquisitions, if not to create value? There are 3 main motivations documented in the 
literature. The first is the potential value creation of M&A activity through the 
realization of synergies, which assumes that the value of the newly combinedfirm will 
exceed the sum of the value of its previously separate entities (Jensen and Ruback, 
1983). This is, however, not supported by the empirical evidence relating to bidders‘ 
returns. The second motivation is explained with agency theory as suggested by Jensen 
(1986). This theory posits that managers rationally attempt to pursue their own 
objectives at the expense of shareholders‘ interests. Finally, the third school of thought, 
which has recently been intensively debated, is managerial hubris. Firstly introduced by 
Roll (1986), the hubris hypothesis assumes that financial markets are strong-form 
efficient and managers engage in acquisitions with an overly optimistic opinion of their 
personal ability to create value and extract potential synergies from a proposed 
takeover. As a result, they overbid for target firms as they overestimate the benefits on 
offer from the deal and consequently harm their own shareholders wealth.  
 
Unlike investor overconfidence, which has been significantly analyzed in the asset 
pricing literature, the effect of managerial overconfidence on shareholders‘ wealth has 
attracted the attention of very few studies, mainly in the US (for example, Hayward and 
                                                 
8
 For evidence on announcement period gains to acquirers see Dodd and Ruback (1977) and Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) for the US and Draper and Paudyal (2006) for the UK.  For evidence on 
acquirer‘s long run underperformance see Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Loughran and Vijh (1997) for 
the US and Gregory (1997) for the UK. However, Bradley and Jarrell (1988) and Franks, Harris and 
Titman (1991) do not find any significant underperformance of acquirers in the long run. Recent evidence   
shows that the announcement period gains to bidders are dependent on the listing status of targets: 
acquirers of listed targets tend to lose, while unlisted target acquirers gain (Faccio, McConnell and Stolin, 
2006; Draper and Paudyal, 2006).   
9
 ―The UK mergers and acquisitions market was valued at £93bn for the first six months of 2005 
following a sharp year-on-year rise of 11.8 percent. The world market saw $2 trillion worth of deals made 
globally, up 39 percent on the previous year‖ (Statistics presented in Financial Times, July 2005). 
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Hambrick, 1997, Heaton, 2002 and Malmendier and Tate, 2008). The US evidence 
suggests that managers infected by hubris are more likely to destroy value. Merger 
announcements signal important new information to the capital markets. Under the 
hubris hypothesis, the announcement of either cash or stock financed offers indicates 
the level of overconfidence of the bidder‘s management team and thereby delivers 
negative news to the market.
10
 Billett and Qian (2008) suggest that overconfident 
acquirers (in other words, overconfident managers), defined as firms which are engaged 
in many acquisitions during a short span of time, credit their initial success to their own 
personal ability and as a consequence exhibit worse performance compared to ‗rational‘ 
acquirers at the announcement and suffer poor long-term returns. As a result this leads 
to the following testable proposition: If managers’ hubris theory holds, overconfident 
bidders should generate negative abnormal returns since a rational stock market would 
react to a merger announcement as evidence that a firm may think its stock is 
overvalued. This would lead to a negative announcement reaction with no long-run 
drift. 
 
Quantifying overconfidence is problematic as there is no instrument readily available to 
use in order to directly measure a personality trait. Malmendier and Tate (2008) use two 
measures of overconfidence in a sample of US acquisitions. The first relies on the 
propensity of managers of the acquiring firm to hold in-the-money stock options; that 
is, the timing of option exercises is used to identify managerial overconfidence. The 
second is the level of press coverage for the firm and manager and in particular, the way 
business articles characterize managers. Doukas and Petmezas (2007) propose a 
different measure of overconfidence which is based on managerial acquisitiveness (i.e., 
the propensity to acquire companies) within a short period of time. In particular, they 
classify overconfident managers as firms that make 5 or more acquisitions within a 3-
year period. 
 
In this chapter, we examine, for the first time in a UK study, the effect of managerial 
hubris on shareholders‘ wealth both in the short- and long-run by exhaustively 
employing 3 different measures of overconfidence: i) stock options, ii) press coverage 
                                                 
10
 Under hubris hypothesis, stock offer signals management overconfidence infected by excellent pre-bid 
performance and high valuation of bidder‘s stock; while cash offer signals management hubris infected 
by excess cash flows of the bidder. 
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and iii) a developed measure of multiple acquisitions. More specifically, we focus on 
individual managers and not on firms, classifying overconfident managers as those that 
initiate five or more acquisitions within 3 years. It might be the case that a CEO has left 
a company for different reasons within a 3-year period, so focusing on the acquisition 
decisions of individual CEOs provides a more direct and pure evidence of managerial 
overconfidence. 
 
We use a sample of 3,223 UK mergers and acquisitions between 1990 and 2005. The 
country choice was dictated by the fact that the U.K. has the most active merger market 
following the U.S., representing more than 65% of merger transactions within Europe. 
In addition, another interesting characteristic of a U.K. data set is that only 5.3% of UK 
M&A activity is 100% stock financed (Doukas and Petmezas, 2007). Since the 
preference of internal financing is indicative of overconfident managers (Malmendier 
and Tate (2008)), who tend to perceive their firm to be undervalued, the U.K. 
acquisitions data provides a unique opportunity to test the overconfidence hypothesis. 
This distinctive feature of the U.K. sample in comparison to U.S. merger deals that are 
primarily stock financed naturally controls for acquisitions motivated by equity 
overvaluation, market timing and merger waves.  
 
The short-term results obtained from all three proxies fully support the hubris 
hypothesis and its link with value-decreasing M&A projects. Bidders experience 
negative returns at the announcement period when acquiring public firms while fail to 
experience superior returns over rational acquirers for private acquisitions. We also 
examine the long-term performance of acquirers subsequent to the acquisition 
announcement to detect whether the performance of acquirers is consistent with the 
market‘s reaction surrounding acquisition announcements. Our results are, in general, 
consistent with managerial overconfidence. Our study has several contributions. Firstly, 
it provides evidence that the effect of managerial overconfidence is robust outside the 
US and is not sensitive to the quantitative measure of overconfidence. Secondly, it adds 
to the empirical literature of behavioral finance by documenting evidence that 
overconfidence plays an important role in mergers and acquisitions. Thirdly, it adds to 
the empirical literature of mergers and acquisitions by illustrating the well-documented 
value-destruction from actions initiated by managers infected by hubris. Fourthly, it is 
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one of the very first studies that examines individual CEOs‘ (as opposed to firms‘) 
acquisition decisions and documents that CEOs‘ prior actions, either on undertaking 
mergers (through multiple acquisitions proxy) or other actions (as presented in the 
business press or by their decision to hold stock options), have a significant influence 
on their future acquisition decisions and consequently upon shareholders‘ wealth 
effects.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature 
before 3.3 develops the hypotheses. Section 3.4 describes the data, the measures for 
overconfidence and the empirical methodology. Section 3.5.1 presents and interprets 
the short-term results. Section 3.5.2 illustrates the multivariate analysis and Section 
3.5.3 reports long-term performance results. Section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
 
This section reviews existing evidence from the psychology literature that highlights 
various human irrationalities and cognitive biases. We also present evidence where 
psychological findings have been incorporated into the financial world in order to help 
explain various financial anomalies driven by market participants. The theoretical paper 
of Roll (1986), who introduced the famous hubris hypothesis, is also analyzed. Finally, 
we present studies related to managerial overconfidence and proxies for 
overconfidence. 
 
3.2.1 Psychological Evidence about Human Irrationalities 
 
A great part of the psychological literature investigates human biases, irrationalities and 
cognitive behaviour. This section summarizes the psychologists‘ findings concerning 
human beings‘ illusions about reality, about themselves and about the future. 
Unrealistic positive views of the self, illusion of control and unrealistic optimism are 
analyzed further in this section. 
 
The psychology literature has shown that human beings tend to believe that they are 
better than others and that they have more affirmative elements than average. They 
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overestimate their features and attribute more positive than negative descriptions for 
themselves (Greenwald (1980), Alice (1985), Brown (1986)). Greenwald (1980) claims 
that people tend to have positive unrealistic beliefs about themselves. Evidence suggests 
that human beings have a natural tendency to believe that they are better than average 
and better than their peers (Taylor and Brown (1988), Svenson (1981)). Additionally, 
people consider things at which they are good at as more important than things at which 
they lack expertise (Harackiewicz, Sansone and Manderlink (1985), Lewicki (1984), 
Rosenberg (1979). An additional misconception observed in human beings is that they 
think that they have personally improved the skills and abilities they consider important 
to them, even though their overall performance remains unaffected (Conway and Ross 
(1984)). Considering the way in which individuals perceive other people‘s actions, 
many studies support the notion that individuals give less credit for success and more 
blame for failure to others involved in the event considered (Forsyth and Schlenker 
(1977), Green and Gross (1979), Schlenker and Miller (1977)). The above findings are 
supported by an experiment performed by Taylor and Brown (1988). In short, the 
experiment asks a group of observers to rate another group of individuals according to a 
number of personality dimensions (i.e. by whether they are ‗friendly‘, ‗warm‘ or so 
forth). This same group of people also rated themselves and the results showed that 
self-ratings were significantly more positive than an observer‘s assessment. In other 
words, people attributed more favorable phrases to themselves as compared to the 
observer‘s average opinions. Additional support is provided by an experiment 
performed on drivers by Svenson (1990), who reported that it is in a human‘s nature to 
consider themselves as more skilful and less risky when they undertake tasks. 
 
Frank (1935) suggests that people tend to become more overconfident when they are 
personally involved in a task. They overestimate their ability regarding the success of 
the task outcome. When individuals receive positive feedback from an outcome they 
previously expected to be positive, so that their prior belief was confirmed as correct, 
then these individuals tend to also overestimate their personal contribution to the 
success achieved (Miller and Ross (1975)). There are some cases in which the outcome 
of an event with human‘s abilities/skills are positively related. However, in some other 
cases, success is nothing more than a matter of chance and luck. It is in these cases that 
man has no control over the outcome. Langer (1975) discusses the issue of whether 
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people recognize and admit that the outcome of an event is purely due to luck or 
whether they believe that it is due to their own abilities. Let‘s assume that the outcome 
of an certain event being favorable or unfavorable is purely as a result of a matter of 
luck. If, for this same event, an inidivudal believes that he/she could affect the outcome 
due to his/her abilities and skills, then this person is defined as experiencing a 
phenomenon known as the  illusion of control. In other words, if the outcome of a task 
depends on practice or distraction, that means that the task is skill-orientated. However, 
if someone believes that the outcome of a game based on luck, such as the tossing of a 
coin, depends also on practice or distraction then the person in question is experiencing 
illusions of control. Langer and Roth‘s (1975) experiment concerning the prediction of 
coin tosses is a characteristic example. The work reports that 25% percent of the sample 
believes that the outcome gets worse by distraction while 40% of the sample believe 
that the outcome could be improved after practicing. It is obvious that these 
interviewees suffer from the illusion that they have control over the outcome of the 
coin, even though the outcome is nothing more than a matter of luck. Similarly, 
Fleming and Darley (1990) claim that people believe that they have a higher more 
probability of throwing a favorable dice if they throw the dice themselves than if 
someone else does it for them. Conclusively, the more involved people are in a task, the 
more likely it is that these indiviudals will experience an illusion of control (Langer 
(1975), Langer and Roth (1975)). 
 
Future is another aspect of life that individuals cannot subjectively evaluate (Kunda 
(1987)). Tiger (1979) reports that future predictions are always affected by optimism. 
Individuals have the misconception and a constant belief that the present is better than 
the past and that the future will be even better (Brickman, Coates and Janoff-Bulman 
(1978)). Weinstein (1980) performs two experiments and shows that people believe that 
they personally are unlikely to be victims of misfortune while they simultaneously 
believe that this is more possible for their peers. This error in judgment as a result of an 
underestimation of negative and positive events, is termed unrealistic optimism. 
Individuals who are believed to experience unrealistic optimism, usually have a series 
of common beliefs about themselves. They tend to believe that the probability of 
themselves experiencing a negative event is less than average while on the other hand 
the probability of enjoying a positive event is believed to be higher than average. 
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Additionally, the more unwanted an event is, or the more control these indiviudals think 
they have over it, then the stronger these people think that they have a less than average 
chance  of experiencing it and vice versa. Unrealistic optimism has been reported even 
for chance-oriented events, similar to the events discussed for the illusion of control 
(Irwin (1953), Langer and Roth (1975), Marks (1951)). Fischhoff et al. (1982) suggests 
that people tend to believe that they had a higher contribution than the actual level they 
had on past successful events. On the contrary, these same individuals underestimate 
the extent of their involvement in events considered to be failures. 
 
There is a great number of studies which suggest that human being‘s also have the 
natural tendency to overestimate the precision of their personal information/knowledge 
(Alpert and Raiffa (1982), Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein (1977)). This cognitive 
bias has been detected in various professions. For instance, Oskamp (1965) examines 
clinical psychologists while Christensen-Szalanski and Bushyhead (1981) perform 
experiments with physiotherapists and nurses, both finding it‘s existant prevalent in 
these respective fields. Additionally, Stael von Holstein (1972) examines investment 
bankers finding further support whilst Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg (1988) show that 
entrepreneurs also suffer from this bias. Russo and Schoemaker (1992) add to the 
literature finding the same results for managers. Similarly, results confirm the 
overestimation of the precision of information for engineers (Kidd (1970)), for lawyers 
(Wagenaar and Karen (1986)) and for negotiators (Neale and Bazerman (1990)). 
 
The above evidence shows that human being‘s psychological state is constructed such 
that it leads them to wrongly evaluate their actions and most of the times, they 
overestimate (rather than underestimate) the results and outcomes of some events. As a 
result, we have to consider seriously all these important psychological factors before 
assuming that human beings always act rationally, especially in relation to serious 
decisions made regarding future outputs. Most importantly to note is that it has been 
argued that people do not improve their judgment with experience, failing to support the 
view regarding a person‘s ability to learn through experience (Brehmer (1980)). 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Managerial Overconfidence and Corporate Acquisitions 
54 
 
3.2.2 Psychology and Finance 
 
Although there is vast research in the psychological literature available on the issues 
devoted to explaining an individual‘s behavior and perceptions about their environment, 
it is only recently that studies have truly started to connect the psychological evidence 
with wide financial phenomena and subsequently on financial market reactions. 
Financial researchers have begun to employ psychological evidence relating to human 
irrationalities and employing it in an attempt to explain investors‘ behavior to help 
unearth information potentially related to the anomalies present in the world of finance. 
 
Englmaier (2004) summarizes the evidence provided by psychologists arguing that 
known phenomena, such as  narrow confidence intervals, self-serving bias, illusion of 
control and over-optimism, all come under the umbrella of overconfidence. Too narrow 
confidence intervals indicates that people tend to overestimate the precision of their 
predictions under uncertainty. Self-serving bias is documented as a human being‘s 
tendency to attribute their success mainly to their own ability, disregarding the 
possibility that it may be due simply to luck. In the case of the illusion of control, CEOs 
who undertake an investment project usually tend to underestimate the likelihood of it‘s 
failure. Finally, over-optimism is described as the phenomenon whereby individuals are 
very overconfident about projects which they are highly committed to. Another 
cognitive bias, also associated with overconfidence, is the fact that people tend to be 
more overconfident in situations when they are confronted with hard-to-answer 
questions (Fischhoff et al. (1977), Yates (1990) and Griffin and Tversky (1992)). 
 
Additionally, Englmaier (2004) claims that in financial terms, overconfidence suggests 
an individual being too optimistic (invoking negative connotations) about the precision 
of signals received. Given this evidence, overconfidence has been employed in order to 
help explain existing market anomalies (such as momentum in stock returns). 
Moreover, overconfidence levels increase as success is attributed to someone‘s own 
abilities whilst evidence shows that it is related to age with younger individual‘s  being 
more likely to act overconfident. For instance, Heaton (2002) focuses on managerial 
optimism in the corporate finance world regarding their view of projects in general and 
primarily shows that optimistic managers believe capital markets usually undervalue 
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risky securities. Hence managers are prone to undervaluing positive net present value 
projects that are financed externally whilst also overvaluing their own corporate 
projects. This may result in the firm investing in negative net present value projects. 
 
In Heaton‘s (2002) study, the application of evidence observed in the psychology 
literature to help explain managers‘ irrational/overconfident behavior is apparent. 
Heaton (2002) argues that optimistic (i.e. confident or overconfident) managers 
systematically overestimate the probability of the future performance of the firm being 
good while they simultaneously underestimate the probability of the firm performing 
badly. In general, people feel more optimistic in cases they believe that they have 
control over, and can make a significant contribution to, the final outcome (i.e. an 
illusion of control). It is as Adam Smith wrote, the possibility of gaining in the future is 
overvalued whilst the possibility of incurring losses is undervalued.  
 
Similarly, Forbes (2005) reports that overconfidence is a decision-making bias which 
refers to an individual‘s tendency to overestimate the accuracy of their initial estimates. 
Forbes (2005) suggests that it could serve as a measure of the degree to which people 
‗do not know what they do not know‘. Overconfidence can influence managerial 
behavior in different ways such as in forecasting procedures, in their response to the 
arrival of new information and events whilst also in the way in which they present their 
prospects to others. Furthermore, overconfident managers tend to be more prone to 
introducing new products. Forbes (2005) specifically examines whether some 
entrepreneurs are more confident than others and the factors that lead them to suffer 
from such a cognitive bias
11
. He reports some interesting findings related to 
entrepreneurs cognitive biases in terms of individual and firm characteristic factors. 
More specifically, he finds that new venture managers who were the founding 
individual of their ventures, will be more overconfident than those who were not 
involved in the set-up of their firms. Moreover, demographic differences among 
entrepreneurs may also affect the degree of overconfidence exhibited. In particular, 
Forbes (2005) finds that younger entrepreneurs will be more likely to be overconfident 
than older ones will be. Similarly, entrepreneurs with higher levels of ESE 
                                                 
11
 Cognitive biases are thought processes that involve erroneous inferences or assumptions. One of these 
biases is overconfidence. 
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(entrepreneurial self-efficacy, which captures the degree to which individuals believe 
they are capable of performing a task) are more overconfident than those with lower 
levels of ESE. Concerning organizational factors, entrepreneurs managing smaller firms 
are more overconfident than those managing larger ones. This could be because 
managers of small firms possess more information relating to the firm and therefore 
they are more prone to adapt cognitive biases. Additionally, entrepreneurs managing 
younger firms are found to be more overconfident than those managing older firms. 
This could be due to the fact that older firms have some standard and routine processes 
while in younger firms, the managers have to rely on their own perceptions and 
interpretive abilities. Additionally, entrepreneurs whose firms exhibit higher levels of 
decision comprehensiveness will be less overconfident than those whose firms are less 
comprehensive. Lastly, it is shown that entrepreneurs whose firms have attracted 
external equity investment will be less overconfident than those whose firms have not. 
This fact is based upon the monitoring hypothesis. 
 
Finally, there are some interesting observations concerning the role of overconfidence 
in financial markets and trading. Empirical research has shown a positive relation 
between the level of overconfidence and trading in financial markets (Englmaier 
(2004)). Since the trading volume depends on the precision of the signal received, the 
hiring of overconfident managers leads to more aggressive trading. Research has proved 
that overconfident investors trade more. Adopting a dynamic perspective of this 
viewpoint, over time overconfident traders converge back to a realistic assessment of 
the situation. Periods in which the market is performing well invoking overconfident 
traders to pursue more aggressive strategies are found to be followed by periods of high 
trading volume. However, periods with high trading volume are largely associated with 
lower profits.  
 
Although, the evidence largely indicates that overconfidence has a relatively negative 
effect in the financial world, Heaton (2002) argues that optimistic managers (irrational) 
may in fact be preferable to rational managers in some cases. Heaton (2002) reasons 
that irrational managers tend to take larger risks which lower their expected utility 
simultaneously increasing the probability of winning the ‗tournament‘ in which they are 
involved. 
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In summary, phenomena such as ‗illusion of control‘ and ‗overoptimism‘ regarding the 
future, as observed in individuals in psychology research, can be used effectively in the 
world of finance to help us understand deeper the processes and effects of executed 
financial decisions.  
 
3.2.3 The Hubris Hypothesis 
 
The completion of a takeover is quite complicated in that there are different stages that 
companies must go through before reaching a decision to become combined firm with a 
prospective target. Firstly, a bidding company must select an appropriate company that 
could possibly be acquired. The difficult stage of target valuation then follows requiring 
the bidding company to assess the target company‘s assets. This involves the bidder 
taking into consideration different parameters of the target‘s operations, which 
predominantly are difficult to accurately evaluate. Factors such as private information 
relating to the target company or the potential synergy gains on offer from the deal, 
which include a lot of subjective uncertainty, make the valuation process an obscure 
process in which the final estimated value of the target company can be unreliable. 
Nevertheless, once the bidder has calculateda valuation estimate for the potential target, 
the firm then compares it with the target‘s current market price. If the estimated value is 
below the market price, then the bid will be abandoned. Conversely, if the target is 
perceived to be undervalued by the market then the bidder will proceed to make an 
offer. However, this estimated valuewill not form the initial bid offer since issues, such 
as rival bids, future bargaining and valuation errors, should also be taken into account. 
It is obvious that the calculation of the target‘s value is a integral part of the takeover 
process. 
 
Due to this valuation puzzle, Roll (1986) argues that takeover gains may be 
overestimated, if they exist at all. He also notes that there is little evidence proving that 
humans behave rationally. However, he assumes that the market behaves rationally 
since it reflects the aggregate, in which case irrational extreme behavior can be 
considered to cancel each other out. Furthermore, Roll‘s (1986) beliefs regarding 
irrational individual behaviours are supported by great evidence from the field of 
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Psychology. Recent empirical psychological evidence supports the view that individuals 
do not always make rational decisions under uncertainty (Odean (1998)). 
 
Additionally, Roll (1986) writes that managers who are involved in corporate decisions 
will continue undertaking takeover bids even though they may have made valuation 
errors in the past. Despite the fact that some companies may get involved in multiple 
acquisitions, this doesn‘t necessarily indicate that only one manager performed all of 
these firm‘s takeovers given evidence indicating high managerial turnover in firm‘s 
post-acquisition. In fact, it has been shown that an individual manager is involved in 
very few acquisitions over his career. 
 
Connecting the psychological evidence that discusses human irrationality to the fact 
that takeovers reflect individual decisions based on the valuation process, Roll (1986) 
introduces the Hubris hypothesis. Managers convince themselves that the value they 
estimate for the potential target company is correct believing that the market has failed 
to reflect the full economic value of the combined firm. As a result, managers infected 
by hubris overvalue their target firms and consequently pay high premiums. Although 
there may be no actual synergy gain to execute after the takeover, the high premiums 
offered to the target company can be explained by the existence of valuation errors or in 
other words, by hubris. Roll (1986) manages to give reasonable explanations to explain 
why managers proceed with a takeover, even if there are no actual gains to be extracted. 
 
According to Roll (1986), the hubris hypothesis predicts that the value of the bidding 
firm should decline post-acquistion whilst the value of the target should rise. The value 
of the combined firm is predicted to decline also. There is believed to be a higher 
reduction for the bidder‘s value than increase experienced for the target and this causes 
the overall decline for the combined firm. Furthermore, Roll (1986) claims that if all 
takeovers are motivated by hubris, then the shareholders of the bidding firms should 
forbid managers to participate in such ventures. However, shareholders seemingly do 
not prevent merger activity and thus hubris alone cannot explain the takeover puzzle.  
 
Finally, we have to distinguish the concept and the motives between the hubris 
hypothesis and Jensen‘s (1986) agency theory. As has been noted, managers infected by 
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hubris believe that they act for the interests of their shareholders even though they over-
invest and destroy value. On the other hand, in Jensen‘s (1986) agency theory, 
managers are motivated by the private benefits of control and undertake M&As for their 
own personal utility. They overinvest to create the so-called empire building at the 
expense of stockholders because they value private benefits of control. This chapter 
focuses upon the existence and effects of overconfidence as per the hubris hypothesis 
and does not directly test Jensen‘s (1986) agency theory.  
 
3.2.4 The Hubris Hypothesis as an Explanation in M&As 
 
In some circumstances, the hubris hypothesis has been used as a potential reason to 
explain bidding firms‘ underperformance. Financial research has used the work to help 
explain why bidders‘ abnormal returns are negative, low or, certainly lower than the 
expected level, in M&As. Although it has previously employed as a potential 
explanation, the empirical research that directly tests this human irrationality remains 
limited. This section presents some studies that have proposed hubris as an 
interpretation of acquirers‘ underperformance. 
 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) examine the size of the acquiring firm in a 
takeover deal and suggest that small firms outperform large firms by 2.24%, 
irrespective of the status of the target firm (i.e. listed or unlisted) and the method of 
payment (i.e. cash, stock or mixed). Among the reasons given to support the lower 
abnormal returns for large firms, Moeller et al. (2004) claim that managers of large 
firms may be affected by hubris resulting in the offering of large premiums (i.e. 
overpaying) for targets. In this way, these firms enter acquisitions with negative dollar 
synergy gains. In other words, managerial overconfidence may be sourced from the fact 
that either managers have high status, have accomplished the target of growing the 
company to its large size or indeed because they have encountered fewer obstacles in 
completing the acquisition due to the abundance of financing sources offered to large 
firms.  
 
In later work, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005), when examining bidders‘ 
returns for the period 1998-2001, reach the conclusion that the large losses incurred are 
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driven mainly by a small number of highly valued firms, claiming that their findings are 
consistent with the literature pertaining to managerial overestimations for the target‘s 
value (i.e. hubris). 
 
Additionally, studies which examine the performance of bidders by controlling for the 
book-to-market ratio (Rau and Vermaelen (1998) for the US market and Sudarsanam 
and Mahate (2003) for the UK market) show that value firms (high book-to-market 
ratios) outperform glamour firms (low book-to-market ratios) . Glamour firms are firms 
with high past stock returns which have experienced high past growth in cash flows and 
earnings. As a result, managers in such firms are more prone to act out of hubris, 
overestimate their abilities due to the good past performance of the firm (individuals 
attribute good performance more to their own abilities than to luck) and proceed to 
conduct takeovers which are not value increasing for the company. On the contrary, 
value firms are governed by managers who have previously experienced poor 
performance and consequently prove to be prudent and more careful before deciding to 
carry on a project which might be fatal for both the survival of company and their 
position within it. In other words, managers in value firms are unlikely to be affected by 
hubris in adopting value-destroying projects. Similarly, the fact that highly rated firms 
suffer losses when they acquire firms with lower ratings is credited to managers 
infected by hubris. In other words, bidders who are highly rated in the stock market 
overestimate their own abilities and their managerial skills, resulting in the 
overpayment of targets. 
 
The hubris hypothesis is also not rejected by the findings of Jennings and Mazzeo 
(1991) who examine the way in which managers think about their information set and 
the information provided by the market. In short, they support the view that managers 
do not learn from stock price movements since they consider their personal information 
to be superior. 
 
Roll‘s (1986) introduction of the hubris hypothesis was of vital importance in providing 
a different way of viewing and explaining financial phenomena, especially in the world 
of corporate finance. Although as a concept it was introduced more than two decades 
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ago, there is limited proof or direct empirical examination of this human irrationality. 
This chapter aims to fill this void. 
 
3.2.5 Overconfidence in M&As 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions are very important corporate decisions that require the direct 
involvement of managers (CEOs). In this way, they are ideal corporate events with 
which to use to measure or investigate the phenomenon of overconfidence. In addition, 
psychologists propose that M&As are a particular type of corporate decision which is 
directly related to overconfidence. This proposition is based on the fact that individuals 
who participate in such projects have complete control over the task and invariably are 
highly committed to it‘s completion. In other words, managers run the risk of suffering 
from an illusion of control over the outcome with the potential to underestimate the 
potential  failure of the project. 
 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) show that overconfident CEOs overestimate their abilities 
to generate abnormal returns for their shareholders. This results in them overpaying for 
targets resulting in the engagement of mergers that destroy value. Moreover, 
overconfident CEOs believe that their firm is undervalued by the market. There seems 
also to be a positive relationship between overconfident CEOs and their level of 
acquisitiveness. It is shown that overconfident CEOs have a 65% stronger likelihood of 
being involving in a merger than those considered to be rational. Another interesting 
feature is that the effect of overconfidence is observed more often in firms that have an 
abundance of internal financing sources. Additionally, the market reacts four times 
more negatively for mergers undertaken by overconfident CEOs than it does to the 
announcement of deals from rational CEOs. In contrast to those managers who act to 
serve their own benefits (agency theory), overconfident CEOs believe that they act for 
the interests of their shareholders. 
 
Doukas and Petmezas (2007) examine the performance of overconfident managers 
involved in mergers and acquisitions of privately held U.K. targets. They report that 
overconfident managers generate less abnormal returns both around the announcement 
date and in the long run. Consistent with the psychological evidence, this study also 
Chapter 3: Managerial Overconfidence and Corporate Acquisitions 
62 
 
shows that overconfident managers believe that they have superior managerial skills 
and are more competent than their counterparts. This results in these firms being 
involved in multiple acquisitions believing each time that that they are working towards 
the shareholders best interests. This work explains that the reason for investigating the 
phenomenon of overconfidence in takeovers that involve private targets is due to the 
fact that there is limited information available related to these firms. As a result the 
decision to acquire is mainly based on managers‘ personal beliefs about the potential 
synergies in offer. In this way, overconfidence is more pronounced. Doukas and 
Petmezas (2007) also find that the first bids made are more profitable than higher order 
deals leading to the conclusion that managers attribute the success of the initial bids to 
their own abilities and subsequently become overconfident, continuing  to acquire more 
companies. This finding suggests that self-attribution bias encourages overconfidence.  
 
Similarly, Billett and Qian (2008) study US takeovers investigating the  self-attribution 
bias. A past successful performance on the part of the firm leads to the creation of 
overconfident managers. Their findings show that acquirers involved in multiple bids 
destroy value for their shareholders. After controlling for the order of the deal, they find 
that the negative performance is driven by the higher order deals, while first order 
acquisitions enjoy higher abnormal returns. Their logit analysis reveals that managers 
who performed successful acquisitions in the past are more likely to be involved in 
future takeover activity. Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2007) provide similar 
findings about overconfidence in terms of corporate decisions in general. Regarding 
takeovers, they report that overconfident CFOs invest more and engage in more 
acquisitions, with the consequences coinciding with the previous studies (i.e. negative 
market reactions). 
 
A different approach is presented by Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2007) in order to explain 
the declining short-run market performance of multiple acquisitions. They also find that 
in multiple acquisitions the first order deals are more profitable than the later deals but 
do not attribute this fact to hubris but rather to risk averse managers who learn from the 
investor‘s reaction from past deal announcements. In other words, managers learn while 
making acquisitions. Therefore, later deals that follow are more careful due to the 
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experience of the performance of earlier deals. The learning experience and the risk 
associated with acquisitions decreases resulting in lower returns. 
 
Apart from Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2007) study, most of the literature is in agreement 
holding the view that there is a close connection between the corporate decisions, 
especially M&As decisions, and the level of overconfidence present. These works 
mainly conclude that overconfident managers, despite believing that they act for their 
shareholders best interests, actually end up destroying value, as observed by the market 
reaction. 
 
3.2.6 Proxies for Overconfidence 
 
This section discusses the various proxies employed within empirical research in 
attempts to capture managerial overconfidence. 
 
Stock options proxy 
The stock options proxy exploits the notion of the non-tradability of CEOs executive 
stock options along with the fact that these individuals cannot diversify against the firm 
specific risk faced. As part of their compensation plans, CEOs receive large amounts of 
stocks and options. However, the concept of the stock options granted to the CEOs is 
different from the stock options as described by the Black and Scholes (1973) model. 
Black and Scholes (1973) claim that rational investors can reduce their idiosyncratic 
risk by diversifying their option. Additionally, they claim that CEOs‘ stock options 
should not be exercised early, a fact that does not apply to executive stock options. This 
is because managers cannot diversify the firm specific risk faced since they are not 
allowed to short-sell their company stocks. Because of this restriction, risk-averse 
CEOs should exercise their options early, in advance of the expiration date, given a 
considerably high stock price (Hall and Merphy (2000), (2002)). Usually, executive 
stock options have a duration of ten years and are fully exercisable after the first three. 
Given this, after the third year, managers can exercise the option, receive the stock and 
can immediately cash-out. 
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The rationale of this proxy is that if the CEO is optimistic enough to hold the option 
until expiration even though the stock option is ―in-the-money‖ at some earlier point 
during these seven years (from the third until the tenth year), then he/she is classified as 
overconfident. This is because the CEO, in holding the option, endures the firm specific 
risk faced because he/she believes that the stock will continue to rise further under 
his/her personal leadership. As a result, the future expectations of the manager must be 
high enough to compensate for the cost of not diversifying (Malmendier and Tate 
(2005), (2008)). 
 
Business Press proxy 
Another interesting way to approach overconfidence is the Business Press proxy as 
introduced by Malmendier and Tate (2008). In brief, this proxy takes into consideration 
the way in which the media (newspapers mainly) portrays the behaviour, attitude or 
actions of CEOs. Malmendier and Tate (2008) count the number of articles that refer to 
the manager as ‗confident‘, ‗overconfident‘, ‗optimistic‘ or ‗overoptimistic‘ against the 
number of articles that portray him as ‗reliable‘, ‗cautious‘, ‗conservative‘, ‗practical‘, 
‗frugal‘, ‗steady‘, ‗not confident‘ or ‗not optimistic‘. They then construct an indicator 
for each CEO for each year by comparing these two groups of article and viewing 
which outweighs the other. If the first (second) group of articles outnumbers the second 
(first), then the managers is considered as overconfident (rational). This procedure is 
repeated for each CEO separately up until the year before his/her first merger is 
conducted. This is for two reasons. Firstly, this method helps to avoid press biases since 
the press may have an overconfident attitude towards the manager after he/she starts 
engaging in takeovers. Secondly the manager his/her self may want to convey 
overconfident signals for his/her performance and may thus try to manipulate the 
market. 
 
Multiple Acquisitions 
Overconfident managers tend to underestimate the risks and overestimate the synergies 
involved in takeovers. Moreover they have an inclination to acquire target companies 
quickly and frequently (Doukas and Petmezas (2007)). As a result, overconfident 
managers are argued to be involved in multiple acquisitions because they believe 
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shareholders can have large and quick benefits from doing so. Doukas and Petmezas 
(2007) adopt the multiple acquisition proxy reporting that firms that acquire five or 
more target companies in a short span of time (set at three years) are considered to be 
overconfident. However, this proxy could be subject to criticism due to the fact that 
multiple acquirers could be those who perform three or four acquisitions in a shorter or 
longer period of time rather than three years. For instance, Billet and Qian (2007) 
employ the same rationale and characterize those managers as frequent acquirers who 
acquire at least two public targets within a period of five years. Nevertheless, the 
interpretations are similar. Those firms which engage in multiple acquisitions are 
largely considered to be overconfident.  
 
3.3 Hypotheses Development 
 
Existing literature within corporate finance shows that target firms enjoy significant 
gains after a takeover bid
12
. Conversely, the evidence is mixed regarding the wealth 
effect for acquiring firm shareholders. There is extensive literature which examines the 
factors that drive the short and long term performance of bidding firms following the 
announcement of an acquisition. For instance, Jensen and Ruback (1983), Bradley, 
Desai and Kim (1988), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Agrawal et al. (1992), Higson and 
Elliot (1998) and Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996) report that acquisitions for listed 
targets suffer losses around the announcement of the takeover while on the other hand, 
Chang (1998), Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002), Ang and Kohers (2001), Draper 
and Paudyal (2006) and Conn, Cosh, Guest and Hughes (2005) find that acquisitions for 
privately held target firms generate positive and significant gains following the 
announcement of a takeover deal. Hence this evidence suggests that the target firm‘s 
listing status seems to play a significant role in determining bidder gains. Travlos 
(1987) shows that the means of financing a takeover also affects bidder gains. He 
                                                 
12
 See for example Dodd and Ruback (1977), Langetieg (1977), Bradley (1980), Dennis and McConnell 
(1986), Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989), 
Frank, Harris and Titman (1991), Servaes (1991), Bannerjee and Owers (1992), Conrad and Niden 
(1992), Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992), Kaplan and Weisback (1992), Berkovitch and Narayanan 
(1993), Smith and Kim (1994), Schwert (1996), Loughran and Vijh (1996), Maquieira, Megginson and 
Nail (1998), Leeth and Borg (2000), Mulherin and Boone (2000), Mulherin (2000), DeLong (2001), 
Houtson et al. (2001), Billett, King and Mauer (2003), Draper and Paudyal (1999), Eckbo and Thorburn 
(1993), Beitel et al. (2002) and Goergen and Renneboog (2004).  
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reports losses for acquisitions of listed targets paid for with stock while when cash is 
used as a means of financing the deal, there are insignificant gains. On the other hand, 
Chang (1998) argues that stock acquisitions generate positive abnormal returns for 
acquirers bidding for a private target while cash-financed deals do not produce any 
significant gains. Therefore, the method of payment used to finance a takeover is 
largely considered to be another determining factor of shareholder gains. Moeller, 
Schlingemman and Stulz (2004) report that small bidders enjoy higher abnormal returns 
while Rau and Vermaelen (1997) and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) report that value 
acquirers outperform those classified as glamour. Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983), 
among others, report that the higher the size of the target relative to the bidder‘s size, 
the higher the short-run abnormal returns earned. Hence, we observe that a number of 
different factors seem to affect the bidder‘s performance following the announcement 
of a takeover. 
 
We argue that a key determinant in the performance of acquiring firms should also be 
what we term the ‗human‘ factor. CEOs are highly involved in the decision-making 
process of undertaking and executing takeover bids. Therefore their role and personal 
rationality should not be ignored in empirical assessment of M&A activity. Managers 
play highly influential roles and thus their personal rationality and it‘s effects warrant 
further investigation.  
 
There is substantial evidence in the psychology literature indicating that human beings 
suffer from various cognitive biases which result in errors and overestimations of the 
precision of our own abilities or judgments regarding decisions. More specifically, 
Englmaier (2004) claims known phenomena such as narrow confidence intervals, self-
serving bias, illusion of control and over optimism all come under the umbrella of 
overconfidence. CEOs suffering from an illusion of control usually underestimate the 
probability of the potential  failure for a certain project of which they are involved. One 
of the strong beliefs that managers have about their own firm is that the market has 
undervalued it given it‘s potential for further growth under their leadership (Heaton 
(2002)). Forbes (2005) writes that overconfidence is a decision-making bias and 
influences managerial behavior in different ways such as in forecasting the future or in 
response to new information and events.The essence of overconfidence and the 
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rationale of those infected by it is summarized perfectly by Adam Smith who writes that 
‘the chance of gain is by every man more or less overvalued, and the chance of loss is 
by most men undervalued’. 
 
Roll (1986) documented the psychology literature pertaining to overconfidence and 
used it to form the famous ‗hubris hypothesis‘ developed to help to explain corporate 
takeovers. Hubris can explain why managers undertake takeover bids even when there 
are no synergy gains. Roll (1986) assumes that markets are rational and that managers 
infected by hubris overestimate the potential synergy gains to be extracted proceeding 
to conduct takeover deals which result in a negative market reaction. 
 
A relatively substantial part of the existing literature models investors and traders 
behavior based on various cognitive biases, in particular focusing on the presence and 
effects of overconfidence (Odean (1998), Daniel et al. (1998), (2001), Hirshleifer 
(2001)). However, there is limited evidence available empirically examining Roll‘s 
(1986) hubris hypothesis regarding managerial overconfidence in M&As. 
 
We empirically investigate Roll‘s (1986) hubris hypothesis in a UK M&As context. 
The UK merger market is an ideal market in which to test the hubris hypothesis. This 
takeover deals are predominantly for private targets financed using cash. Privately held 
target firms are usually smaller firms for which information is usually limited. In such 
cases, the acquiring manager needs to employ his/her personal judgement to a higher 
degree, in which cases overconfidence would be more pronounced. In addition, UK 
takeovers are mainly financed using cash. Malmendier and Tate (2008) report that 
overconfident managers usually prefer to finance takeovers with internal sources as 
they believe their company is undervalued by the market. For these two reasons, the UK 
M&A market serves as an ideal testing ground to empirically investigate managerial 
overconfidence in corporate takeovers. 
 
To capture managerial overconfidence we employ three proxies. One of the proxies 
which arguably most appropriately captures overconfidence is the stock options proxy 
as introduced by Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008). It is based on a CEO‘s personal 
portfolio and his/her decisions regarding their executive stock option grants. As part of 
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a manager‘s compensation plan, they receive huge grants of stocks and non-tradable 
options. Managers cannot diversify away the firm specific risk faced since they are not 
allowed to short-sell company stocks. Therefore, as soon as these stock options are ―in-
the-money‖ (that is, the stock option value is currently higher in the market than the 
strike price of the option) then managers should cash out. Managers who feel that due to 
their own abilities, they can drive the stock price even higher will refrain from 
selling/exercising their stock option until they are very close to expiration date and are 
considered to be overconfident. This proxy has never previously been used to examine 
overconfidence within the UK M&A market. We have hand collected data from 
bidders‘ annual reports regarding the bidding firm‘s CEO‘s portfolio to form the 
following hypothesis. 
 
H1: Managers who hold their stock options until the last year before the expiration 
date should destroy more or create less value for their shareholders following the 
announcement of a takeover deal than their counterpart who exercise their options 
well in advance. This effect should hold both in the short-term and in the long-term. 
 
A second proxy employed in this study to capture managerial overconfidence is the 
multiple acquirer proxy. Managers tend to attribute past successes to their own abilities, 
causing them to become overconfident and resulting in them proceeding to undertake 
more and more takeover deals. Doukas and Petmezas (2007) suggest that managers who 
perform five or more acquisitions within a short period of time (three years) are infected 
by hubris. Billet and Qian (2008) adopt a similar rationale and propose that managers 
who acquire at least two public target firms within five years are overconfident. Both 
studies mention multiple acquirers as particular firms that acquire target firms. Roll 
(1986) writes that the individual manager has limited changes to make multiple 
acquisitions during his career. We employ a similar approach as Doukas and Petmezas 
(2007) and Billett and Qian (2008) but propose that individual managers who acquire at 
least five target firms within three years are considered to be overconfident. This leads 
us to the testable proposition: 
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H2: Managers who are involved in multiple (five or more) acquisitions within a 
period of three years should create less or destroy more value for their shareholders 
following the announcement of a takeover deal than their rational counterparts who 
do not engage in multiple acquisitions. This effect should hold both in the short-term 
and in the long-term. 
 
We also employ a third proxy to measure managerial overconfidence. Malmendier and 
Tate (2008) identify whether managers are portrayed by the press using key words such 
as ‗overconfident‘ or ‗optimistic‘ versus those characterized with adjectives such as 
‗reliable‘, ‗cautious‘, ‗conservative‘, ‗practical‘, ‗frugal‘ and ‗steady‘. We follow a 
similar approach and create a unique hand-collected dataset for UK acquirers. We 
identify in the UK press which bidding firm CEO‘s are more often described using 
adjectives such as ‗confident‘, ‗confidence‘, ‗optimistic‘, ‗optimism‘, ‗certain‘ and 
‗positive‘ and which are more often characterized as ‗reliable‘, ‗cautious‘, ‗prudent‘, 
‗conservative‘, ‗practical‘, ‗sensible‘, ‗frugal‘, ‗careful‘ or ‗steady‘. 
 
H3: Managers who are portrayed by the press as overconfident should create less or 
destroy more value for their shareholders following the announcement of a takeover 
deal than their rational counterparts who are viewed as prudent and cautious. This 
effect should hold both in the short-term and in the long-term. 
 
This study employs three unique hand-collected datasets to examine the effects of 
managerial overconfidence on bidding firm shareholders wealth following the 
announcement of UK bidders‘ M&A deals. In addition, we control for various bidder 
and deal characteristics highlighted by the existing literature as important factors 
affecting bidder gains. 
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3.4 Data and Methodology 
 
3.4.1 Data 
 
3.4.1.1 The sample 
 
The sample consists of takeover bids announced by U.K. firms for the period 
01/01/1990 to 31/12/2005, collected from the Thomson One Banker. The collection of 
bids announced during this period are subject to the availability of the Thomson One 
Banker at the time of the data collection. To be included in the final sample, the deals 
should meet the following criteria: 
 
o The acquirer is a U.K. firm publicly traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
with five days of return data around the announcement date of the takeover and 
one to three years return data on the DataStream database. 
o The target company is either a listed or unlisted company and can be either a 
domestic or a foreign company. 
o The acquiring firm purchases at least 50% of the target‘s shares. 
o The deal value is ₤1 million or more. 
o The deal value represents at least 1% of the market value of the acquirer. 
o Multiple deals announced within a 5 days period are excluded (after estimating 
the multiple acquisitions proxies)
13
. 
o Financial and utility firms, for both bidders and targets, are excluded from the 
sample (Fuller et al. (2002)). 
 
We further split the sample according to the method of payment into three groups - a) 
Cash acquisitions including those deals financed purely using cash; b) stock 
acquisitions  financed by offering shares to the target firm; and c) mixed acquisitions 
which are financed using a combination of cash and stock (Martin (1996)). Our final 
sample consists of 1,281 unique bidders who performed 3,223 deals. 
 
                                                 
13
 The multiple acquirers proxy classifies managers as overconfident if that particular manager acquires 
five or more target firms within three years. Once this has been calculated, the multiple deal 
announcements are excluded. 
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3.4.1.2 Sample Characteristics 
 
[Insert Tables 3.1 and 3.2 about here] 
 
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics by year for the overall sample and the three 
proxies of overconfidence respectively. The results are consistent for all measures of 
overconfidence, except for the business press proxy. There is a bias towards 
overconfidence due the selection process. The reasons for this are discussed in detail in 
the next section (3.4.1.3). We also observe that M&A activity experienced a gradual 
increase and reached its peak at the end of the 90‘s. Table 3.2 displays the activity of 
acquisitions among public and private targets, the mean and median values of acquirers 
and the value of deals stratified by the different types of managers (i.e. overconfident 
versus rational). The acquirer‘s market capitalization equals the price per share one-
month prior to the bid announcement times the number of common shares outstanding. 
The target‘s firm size is measured as the deal value of the bid at the announcement. For 
the entire sample in Panel A, the mean (median) size of the acquirer is 517.73 million 
pounds (88.53 million pounds) for 1,281 unique acquirers, while for 3,223 targets the 
mean (median) size is 64.49 million pounds (6 million pounds). An interesting 
observation that emerges from the sample is that private firms comprise the vast 
majority of targets (2,839 or 88%) in contrast to the small number of publicly traded 
targets (384 or 12%)
14
.  The mean value of acquirers in public acquisition is by far 
larger than the mean value of bidders in private acquisitions (more than six times the 
market capitalization). In deal value terms, public targets exhibit a disproportional 
percentage of the total deal value (74%) when considering their small contribution to 
the total number of acquisitions in the sample (12%). This finding could be attributed to 
manager‘s who suffer from overconfidence/hubris and consequently buy large 
companies taking on the risk that such a transaction can entail
15
. In addition, the 
summary statistics for overconfident and rational bidders are qualitatively similar for all 
                                                 
14
 In line with our finding‘s for the respective sample period, Conn, Cosh, Guest and Hughes (2005) 
report that  privately held targets account for more than 80% of domestic acquisitions for the period 
1985-1998 while Faccio and Masulis (2005) report a level of 90% of private target acquisitions for the 
period 1997-2000. Moreover, Doukas and Petmezas (2007) document that 91% of UK deals between 
1980 and 2004 were privately held acquisitions. 
15
 It can be seen in the sample statistics that public firms are by far larger than private firms by almost 
three times their market capitalization. 
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proxies (Panels B, C and D) enhancing the robustness and reliability of the sub-samples 
used in the return analysis for the three different measures of overconfidence. 
 
3.4.1.3 Measures of Overconfidence 
 
To capture overconfidence, we employ various classification methods to ensure the 
robustness and reliability of the results. We use a number of proxies commonly 
accepted as reliable in the finance literature while we also modify others believing that 
they can better capture the irrationality of onverconfident human behavior. This section 
describes the rationale of these proxies as well as the way in which we collected the 
data necessary to calculate these proxies. 
 
Stock Options Proxy 
 
The main proxy employed in this chapter to classify managers as overconfident or 
rational is based on the managers‘ personal portfolio decisions. More specifically, we 
examine the actions these individuals  take concerning their executive stock options 
(Malmendier and Tate (2008)). CEOs usually receive huge grants of stock and non-
tradable options as part of their compensation plans. It has been proved that risk averse 
CEOs should exercise their stock options before the expiration date if they are 
sufficiently ―in-the–money‖ since they are exposed to enormous firm-specific risk 
which cannot be diversified. Upon exercise, the managers receive shares of company 
stocks which are always immediately sold (Ofek and Yermack (2000)). In other words, 
CEOs who persistently choose to maintain their stock options until expiration are 
consistently exposing themselves to high levels of risk in the belief that the stock of the 
company can perform better due to their leadership. These CEO‘s matching this criteria 
are defined as overconfident. 
 
We predominantly adopt this approach for measuring overconfidence. The first step of 
calculation is to identify the CEO‘s16 who managed the bidding company of our sample 
around the announcement date of the deal in question. After creating a list of the names 
                                                 
16
 First we look for the CEO of the company around the announcement date. If there is no such post in the 
company we identify the managing director. In the UK market, the title for the CEO position was 
‗Managing Director‘ prior to 1995. If a company has no positions with these titles  then we note the 
person that occupies the Chairman post. 
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of CEOs who decided to undertake a takeover, we observe their personal portfolios. In 
paericular, we investigate the decisions these individuals  make concerning their stock 
options. We note down the date that the stock option was granted to the manager, the 
date that exercise of the option could begin, the expiration date of the option and 
finally, the strike price. Predominantly, executive options in the U.K. have a life span of 
ten years with a vesting period of three years, that is they are exercisable three years 
after the date of initially being granted. Following Malmendier and Tate (2008), if 
managers hold the option until the expiration date or until the last year before the 
expiration date, he/she is classified as overconfident. Moreover, we check whether the 
company stock price is higher than the strike price throughout the entire life of the 
option. When a manager holds the options to expiration, because he is previously 
unable to exercise the option as the strike price is consistently higher than the stock 
price, then he is not classified as overconfident but rather is defined as a rational being. 
In our sample there are  few cases where this takes place. Mostly, the options are highly 
―in–the-money‖ (stock price is much higher than the strike price) , for considerably 
long periods of time (i.e. longer than one year). Consequently, we employ this way of 
checking the ability of the manager to exercise without involving any benchmarks. The 
above data collected, such as the name of the manager, the dates regarding the life of 
the options and the strike price, were obtained through the annual reports of the 
companies. The annual reports are obtained either by databases such as Lexis-Nexis and 
Northcote.com or alternatively, by directly requesting copies from the company itself. 
Finally, we manage to obtain data for 848 deals representing more than a quarter of the 
initial sample (Table 3.1). Following the Stock Options Proxy, 601 (70%) of these deals 
are identified as rational and 247 (30%) are classified as overconfident. 
 
Multiple Acquisitions Proxy 
 
Extensively studied in the literature, multiple acquirers are classified as firms that 
acquire more than one company. Fuller et al. (2002) develop further introducing a more 
specific definition for multiple acquirers. They write that firms which acquire five or 
more targets in a period of three years are classified as multiple acquirers. Doukas and 
Petmezas (2007) use this definition to measure overconfidence. In this study, we adopt 
a similar approach but differentiate it in a very significant way. We do not refer to 
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companies in this work as overconfident but classify the managers themselves. 
Therefore, managers who perform multiple acquisitions (five or more) in a small period 
of time (three years) are defined as overconfident individuals. Since we focus on 
managerial overconfidence, it is appropriate to adopt this proxy from the perspective of 
the manager/CEO himself. A company may have conducted five or more acquisitions in 
a three-year period of time, but managerial turnover could have been high and thus 
various individuals could be responsible for undertaking these these projects. Table 3.1 
presents the distribution of the data collected employing this proxy throughout the 
sample period. In total, we manage to obtain data for 3,099 deals (96% of the initial 
sample). Out of these, 2,256 (72%) acquisitions are classified as rational and 843 (27%) 
as overconfident. 
 
Business Press Proxy 
 
A third proxy to distinguish overconfident managers is based on the way in which 
outsiders perceive their personalities. In other words, we observe how the press, mainly 
newspapers, portrays respective manager‘s characters (Malmendier and Tate (2008)). 
To achieve that, we use the Factiva.com database which documents newspaper articles. 
By defining some key words, we attempt to capture the way in which journalists portray 
managers. We count the number of articles which include these specific words. In short, 
we create two indices - one with the total number of articles that described the manager 
using adjectives such as ‗confident‘, ‗confidence‘, ‗optimistic‘, ‗optimism‘, ‗certain‘ 
and ‗positive‘17 and one with total number of articles that refer to the manager as 
‗reliable‘, ‗cautious‘, ‗prudent‘, ‗conservative‘, ‗practical‘, ‗sensible‘, ‗frugal‘, ‗careful‘ 
or ‗steady‘. All of these articles produced by the search-machine are hand-checked one 
by one to ensure that these words refer specifically to the manager and are not irrelevant 
citations. This procedure is repeated for each manager for each sample year. In 
summary, for each year the managers is characterized as rational or overconfident 
depending upon which group of articles outnumbers the other group for each CEO 
                                                 
17
 In the overconfident side, we have to note down that article, spotted by the searching machine, that 
include the words confident, confidence, optimistic e.t.c in phrases like ‗……we are confident/optimistic 
or remain confident/ optimistic about the future……‘ and similar phrases quoting managers‘ talks are 
excluded since most of the article include such phrases and an overconfidence biases could be created. 
Additionally, article that contain the words ‗certain and positive‘ are including in the counting process 
only when they have a superlative concept. 
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examined. At the end of the manager‘s period, we observe the number of years 
outstanding and we reach to a decision concerning his personality. The purpose of this 
analysis year-by-year is to avoid overconfident biases that could be created if we simply 
calculated the total number of articles for each group of words and for each manager. 
For example, if a manager had taken an overconfident action at one point in time, then 
the total number of articles would have a bias towards overconfidence. To further 
ensure that no bias is inherent in the calculations, this procedure continually takes place 
five years before the beginning of the sample period until the year before the manager 
proceeds to conduct his first takeover . The year of announcement is excluded since the 
CEO could try to convey confidence and optimism to the press just before and during 
the acquisition. Despite all the efforts undertaken to reduce biases towards 
overconfidence, the number of deals identified as overconfident outnumber those 
deemed to be rational ones. Table 3.1 shows that we obtained data for 530 deals (almost 
17% of the initial sample) out of which 196 (37%) are classified as rational and 334 
(63%) as overconfident. Although, the two previous proxies graded the rational-
overconfident ratio at around 7:3, the business press proxy indicates a ratio of 4:6. A 
possible explanation is that it is more common to find articles discussing poor 
behaviour characterizing managers as ‗confident‘ or ‗optimistic‘ rather than praising 
rational decisions. Consequently, the higher number of deals classified as overconfident 
is not because there is a bias towards overconfidence in the methodology, but rather is 
due to the difficulty of identifying rational managers. 
 
3.4.2 Methodology 
 
3.4.2.1 Short-Run Event Study Methodology 
 
To calculate the acquiring firms‘ performance and identify the impact of rational and 
overconfident management, we employ standard event study methodology (Fuller et al. 
(2002)) to calculate the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for the five-day period 
(-2, +2) surrounding the announcement date, as given by both DataStream and 
Thomson One Banker. We estimate the abnormal returns using a modified market 
model as follows:  
i,t i,t m,tAR   R –  R  
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where ARi,t is the excess return of bidder i on day t;  Ri,t is the return of bidder i on day t 
measured as the percentage change in the return index including dividends of bidder i; 
Rm,t is the market return estimated as the percentage change in FT-All share Index 
(value-weighted) on day t. The CARs are then calculated as the summation of the 
Abnormal Returns (ARi,t) for the five days surrounding the announcement of the bid as 
indicated by the following equation: 
2
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T-statistics are used to test the null hypothesis that the mean CAR is equal to zero for a 
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Where 
,i tCAR  denotes the sample average, and ,( )i tCAR  denotes the cross-sectional 
sample standard deviations of abnormal returns for the sample of n firms. 
We do not report the t-statistic in tables but the p-value instead. The p-value provides a 
sense of strength of the evidence against the null hypothesis. The lower the p-value, the 
stronger the evidence that the mean CAR is different from zero. 
 
Moreover, to make sure the event window (-2,+2) is the appropriate one, we calculate 
Abnormal Returns (ARs) for each day in a peiod of -10 to +10 days around the 
announcement date of the acquisitions (Table 3.3). In table 3.3, we obtain significant 
abnormal returns for days -2, -1, 0, 0, 1, 2 and 3 surrounding the acquisition 
announcement. Therefore to have a symmetrical window, we choose to employ CARs 
for -2 to +2 days for the rest of the short-run analysis. For the period 3 days before and 
4 days after the announcement day, we observe abnormal returns which are both highly 
statistically insignificant and economically close to zero. 
 
To further enhance the robustness of our window, in Table 3.4, Panels B, C and D, we 
report the overall picture of our sample by using different event windows such as (-
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1,+1), (0, +1) and (-1,0). Further more, In Table 3.5, we recalculate our results for four 
different windows (-2,+2), (-1,+1), (,+1) and (-1,0) by employing Buy-Hold Abnormal 
Returns (BHARs) in addition to CARs. The overall picture by both approaches and all 
different windows remains similar to the one given by CARs (-2,+2). The analysis of 
these results is explained in further detail in Section 3.5.1. 
 
The BHAR for company i is computed as: 
 
 
T
mt
T
iti RRBHAR 11 )1()1(  
 
where Rit is the daily return for company i, and Rmt is the daily return of the market 
index. 
[Insert Table 3.3 about here] 
 
3.4.2.2 Long-Run Methodology 
 
The long run analysis undertaken in this chapter examines the bidder‘s excess returns 
which occur over a 12- and 36- month post-event period. Following Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000) we employ Calendar Time Portfolio Regressions (CTPRs) analysis. The 
portfolios are rebalanced each month to include firms that performed a takeover during 
the previous month while also to remove firms that have reached the end of the 12- or 
36-month period. The average monthly excess returns for the three-year post acquisition 
period is the intercept from the time-series regression of the calendar portfolio on the 
Fama and French three-factor model as follows: 
 
ittitiftmtiiftpt HMLhSMBsRRaRR   )(  
 
Where Rpt is the average monthly return of the calendar portfolio at time t; Rft is the 
monthly risk free rate of return at time t; Rmt is the monthly return on the market index 
(value-weighted); SMBt is the monthly return on small minus large firms (value-
weighted); and HMLt is the monthly return on high book-to-market minus low book-to-
market firms (value-weighted). βi, si, hi, are the regression parameters and εit is error 
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term. The intercept (αi) measures the monthly average excess returns of acquiring firms 
after controlling for the effect of the three risk factors. 
 
3.5 Empirical Evidence 
 
This section presents the short-run, the multivariate and the long-run analyses for 
bidders whose managers are likely to suffer from hubris against those whose managers 
are considered to be rational. Our hypotheses suggest that rational acquirers should 
outperform overconfident ones both in the short-term and in the long-term. 
 
3.5.1 Short-Run Analysis 
 
This section examines the short-term bidder performance around the announcement of 
the takeover deal for acquisitions performed by rational and overconfident managers. 
We present 5 days CARs for bidding firm managed by rational managers as opposed to 
those managed by overconfident managers as classified using the three proxies. 
 
Table 3.4, Panel A presents the five-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the 
entire sample as sorted by the target‘s listing status (i.e. private or public) and by the 
method of payment used to finance the deal (cash, stock or mixed) in order to obtain a 
broader perspective for the sample. The overall CAR for all bids is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level (1.47%) mainly driven by the 
positive performance obtained by acquisitions for private target firms. As indicated by 
the summary statistics the magnitude of these acquisitions dominate the U.K. merger 
market with 2,839 private bids reported over the 384 public ones. Private acquisitions 
enjoy 1.83% significant gains. After controlling for the method of payment, stock 
acquisitions gain 7.31% abnormal returns following the announcement of the deal while 
cash deals generate 1.28% abnormal returns, all statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level. This evidence is in accordance with the existing literature. Chang 
(1998), Ang and Cohers (2001), Draper and Paudyal (2006) and Fuller, Netter and 
Stegemoller (2002) show that bidders enjoy positive and significant abnormal returns 
around the announcement date when acquiring privately held targets. Gains are much 
Chapter 3: Managerial Overconfidence and Corporate Acquisitions 
79 
 
higher in the case of stock offers supporting the limited competition 
18
, the monitoring 
19
 and the information hypotheses
20
. On the other hand, bids for listed target companies 
generate negative and significant returns (-1.20%). When we further separate the public 
sample according to the method of payment, we observe that the CARs are even more 
negative and significant for stock exchanges (-2.42%) while they are marginally 
positive and insignificant for cash offers (0.28%). This evidence is consistent with the 
finance literature. Numerous studies, such as those from Higson and Elliot (1998), 
Sudarsanam Holl and Salami (1996) and Firth (1980), provide evidence that 
acquisitions for public target firms generate negative abnormal returns. Additionally, 
Travlos (1987) reports that stock offers for public targets result in negative and 
significant abnormal returns while cash offers enjoy insignificant gains. This evidence 
is in accordance with the signalling hypothesis
21
 and is supported by our sample. In 
general, the overall findings from our sample are in line with the existing evidence 
available. Furthermore, Panels B, C and D present Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CARs) for three alternative windows such as (-1,+1), (0,+1) and (-1,0). The abnormal 
returns for the overall sample is 1.18%, 1.08% and 0.89% regarding the three 
alternative windows respectively. Acquisitions for private deals generate positive 
(1.50%, 1.39% and 1.15%) and significant gains while takeovers for public target firms 
suffer significant loses (-1.20%, -1.19% and -1.06%) respective for the three alternative 
event windows. When controlling for the method of payment, the overall picture 
remains similar to the one presented by the (-2,+2) windows and consistent with the 
literature. For robustness reasons, apart from CARs, we also report BHARs for 4 
alternative windows (Table 3.5). No significant differences are observed. In table 3.5, 
                                                 
18
 The Limited Competition hypothesis suggests that the bidding competition among private targets may 
be less intense and a resultant higher likelihood of underpayment can lead to higher returns for the 
bidder (Chang (1998)). 
19
 The Monitoring hypothesis implies that through stock offers the small number of owners of the 
private firm will become blockholders of the newly-combined firm. The resultant effect is close 
monitoring of the managerial performance by this group of stockholders leading to an increase in firm 
value (Draper and Paudyal (2006) and Chang (1998)). 
20
 According to the Information hypothesis, the owners of private firms have high incentives to assess 
properly the value of the stock of the bidding firm since they will end up owning large amounts of stock 
if they accept a stock offer. This fact conveys favourable news to the market about the acquirer’s value 
and prospects resulting in a rise in the stock price of the bidders surrounding the announcement date 
(Chang (1998), Draper and Paudyal (2006)). 
21
 The Signalling hypothesis suggests that bidding firms are more willing to offer stock as a medium of 
exchange in takeovers when they believe that their stock is overvalued. This piece of information is 
perceived by the market as having adverse impacts upon the bidder returns. 
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Panels A, B, C and D, we also report positive and significant gains for private takeovers 
(1.82%, 1.51%, 1.39% and 0.90% respectively). On the other hand, takeovers for public 
target firms experience significant losses (-1.17%, -1.15%, -1.16% and -1.05% 
respectively). Similar eveidence is observed when portfolios are split according to the 
method of payment. For instance, private stock acquisitions generate 7.31%, 7.03%, 
6.54% and 6.86% Cumulative Abnormal Returns for (-2,+2), (-1,+1), (0,+1) and (-1,0) 
windows respectively (Table 3.4). Similarly, when BHARs are calculated (Table 3.5), 
acquisitions for private targets paid for with stock enjoy 7.09%, 6.98%, 6.28% and 
7.17% BHARs for all four windows [(-2,+2), (-1,+1), (0,+1) and (-1,0) respectively]. 
Conclusively, our results are not sensitive neither to the method (CARs or BHARs) nor 
to the event window ((-2,+2), (-1,+1), (0,+1) and (-1,0)) used to analize the short-run 
performance of takeovers. The rest of the analysis is based on CARs (-2,+2). 
 
[Insert Table 3.4 and 3.5 about here] 
 
3.5.1.1 Announcement Abnormal Returns for Rational and Overconfident 
Acquirers as Classified by the Stock Options Proxy according to both the Target 
Status and Methods of Payment 
 
This section presents the evidence relating to the short-term bidder performance for 
acquisitions announced by rational versus overconfident managers as classified by the 
stock options proxy. Malmendier and Tate (2008) support the view that managers that 
hold their stock option grants until the last year before the expiration date of the 
contract are considered to be overconfident. As outlined earlier, we also control for the 
target firm‘s listing status and the method of payment used. 
 
Table 3.6, Panel A reports the five-day CARs obtained by rational and overconfident 
managers for the whole sample. Acquiring companies governed by rational managers 
obtain 1.26%, statistically significant abnormal returns surrounding the announcement 
date of the acquisition, while their overconfident counterparts generate only 0.16% 
abnormal returns, statistically insignificant. The mean difference is 1.10% statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level. In other words, rational managers create 1.10% 
more value for their shareholders around the announcement date of a takeover than 
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overconfident ones do. Furthermore, when controlling for the method of payment used 
to finance the takeovers, we observe that rational managers outperform overconfident 
ones across all different methods of payments, including cash (0.79% for rational versus 
0.08% for overconfident managers) and mixed (1.72% for rational versus 0.56% for 
overconfident managers). It is interesting to note the large difference between rational 
and overconfident bids in the case of stock exchanges. The negative abnormal returns (-
0.91%) observed for the whole stock options subsample for stock exchanges is mainly 
driven by the very negative performance of overconfident managers (-3.36% 
statistically significant at the 15% significance level) against the marginally positive 
(0.37%) performance of rational bidders. This large difference (3.73%) between the two 
sample means is statistically significant at the 15% significance level despite the small 
number of observations (23 for rational and 12 for overconfident bids). So far, our 
results indicate that the market views bids undertaken by rational managers more 
favorably than those undertaken by those classified as overconfident. To further 
confirm these results, we differentiate our sample according to the target‘s listing status 
in order to examine the case of private and public takeovers separately. 
 
[Insert Table 3.6 about here] 
 
Table 3.6, Panel B presents the performance for bidders who acquire private targets. 
Rational managers achieve 1.61% significant abnormal returns while overconfident 
ones generate only 0.72% gains. The mean difference is 0.90% and is statistically 
significant at the 10% level of significance. In addition, when examining the different 
methods of payment used, we notice that rationally behaved managers outperform 
overconfident ones in all cases, although the differences are only economically 
significant. Regarding acquisitions for public targets, we would expect bidders to suffer 
losses given the existing literature. Furthermore, after incorporating the hubris 
hypothesis, the market reaction should be even more negative for acquirers managed by 
overconfident CEOs. Table 3.6, Panel C illustrates on average negative abnormal 
returns for rational bidders (-1.09%) and an even more negative performance for 
overconfident ones (-2.22%). This evidence indicates that rational managers destroy 
less value for their shareholders in support of hypothesis one. Nevertheless, the mean 
differences between the rational and overconfident deals (1.14%) are only economically 
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significant. Despite the small number of observations for stock acquisitions (13 for 
rational and 8 for overconfident), the mean difference between rational (0.10%) and 
overconfident deals (-5.24%) is statistically significant at the 15% significance level. 
The market depicts a significant underreaction to overconfident managers who bid for 
public targets offering stock as a means of payment. A possible explanation is provided 
by Myers and Majluf (1984) who explain  the information hypothesis. It writes that 
companies that offer stock as a means of exchange in order to acquire public targets are 
perceived to be overvalued. The market underreacts to such news and our findings 
indicate that the market underreacts even more when overconfident managers take this 
action. 
 
Conclusively, the results indicate that the market reaction is more positive or less 
negative to deals announced by rational rather than overconfident managers irrespective 
of the target‘s status and the method of payment used. Additionally, the statistically 
significant mean differences in the private targets sub-sample against the economically 
significant mean differences in the public one suggests that the phenomenon of 
overconfidence is more pronounced when manager‘s are bidding for private targets. 
This is not surprising if we consider the fact that information asymmetries are more 
intense for private firms. Managerial abilities and skills are therefore highly crucial in 
the valuation of these privately—held targets. It means that managers need to engage 
their personal estimations and evaluations to a higher extent and therefore 
overconfidence should be, and is, more pronounced when CEO‘s bid for privately held 
target firms. 
 
3.5.1.2 Announcement Abnormal Returns for Rational and Overconfident 
Acquirers as Classsified by the Stock Options Proxy according to the Other Bidder 
and Deal Characteristics 
 
We further control for the rational-overconfident effect by accounting for various 
bidder and deals characteristics that have been documented in the literature as 
influential factorsaffecting the bidder‘s performance. We divide our sample into sub-
portfolios according to the acquiring firm‘s MTBV, size (MV) and the relative size 
between the acquirer and the target firm. Furthermore, we investigate whether the 
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bidders acquire a domestic (U.K.) or a foreign company and also whether the target 
firm is in the same or different industry from the bidding firm.   
 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) show that value firms (low MTBV ratio) underperform 
glamour firms (high MTBV ratio) in the short-run. However, this relationship is 
reversed in the long run supporting the notion that the good past performance of 
glamour firms is not persistent in future, especially in the case of a corporate takeover. 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) explain their results based on the extrapolation hypothesis. 
It writes that managers in glamour firms may attribute the high past performance of the 
firm to their own personal abilities and skills and may thus act out of overconfidence 
and hubris in the future having adverse consequences for the shareholders involved 
through destroying value for the firm. In spite of the fact that Sudarsanam and Mahate 
(2003) for a U.K. study find similar results in the long run, in the short run they show 
that value U.K. bidders perform better than glamour ones. Irrespective of the 
contradiction between these two studies, we would expect rationally behaved managers 
to outperform overconfident ones among value and glamour companies respectively. 
 
Table 3.5, Panel A illustrates the CARs for value companies. Value companies with 
rational managers slightly outperform (0.31%) value companies with overconfident 
managers with a difference which is only economically significant. A similar result is 
found for private targets while the reverse is true for public targets. On the other hand, it 
becomes more obvious and pronounced that the phenomenon of overconfidence plays 
an important role in explaining bidders abnormal returns among glamour firms (Panel 
b, Table 3.7). Panel B demonstrates the five-day CARs for high MTBV firms 
(glamour). Rational bidders obtain positive abnormal returns (1.36%) around the 
announcement day while overconfident ones suffer losses (-0.66%). The mean 
difference is 2.02%, statistically significant at the 1% significance level. The same 
pattern holds for private and public deals. Rational bidders that bid for private target 
firms perform better than overconfident ones by 1.46%, statistically significant at the 
5% significance level, while rational managers who acquire public targets obtain 
abnormal returns of –0.99% and are in a better position when compared with the very 
negative and marginally significant performance of overconfident directors (-5.27%). 
Nevertheless, the mean difference is only economically significant. Similar results are 
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reported for the various methods of payment, except for stock deals in which the 
number of observations is very low. Conclusively, overconfidence is more pronounced 
in glamour firms. With this in mind, our findings contribute to the Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998) and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) puzzle. It is not necessarily that glamour 
bidding firms outperform value ones or vice versa. Rather it may be that glamour firms 
governed by rational directors (1.36%) outperform value rational firms (1.15%) while 
glamour overconfident firms (-0.66%) underperform value overconfident ones (0.85%). 
Firms with good past performance and high returns are not necessarily driven by 
overconfidence. But when managers infected by hubris lead such companies, 
overconfidence is amplified and the short-run performance can be highly destructive. 
Furthermore, the stock options proxy may not be able capture the overconfidence trait 
for value firms. Value firms have low growth opportunities and low MTBV ratios. The 
stock price is low relative to the book value. Therefore, managers may justifiably wait 
for some time until the firm‘s growth further and the stock prices increases. 
Consequently, managers may not exercise their stock options on justifiable basis. 
Conversely, the stock options proxy is an ideal proxy to capture overconfidence in 
glamour firms (high MTBV ratios). A rational manager should know that the firm‘s 
stock price is high enough to exercise his/her stock option grants. His/her anticipating 
for the stock price to increases more and more due to his/her abilities is highly likely to 
be driven by overconfidence. 
 
[Insert Table 3.7 about here] 
 
In terms of the size effect, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) find that small 
acquirers outperform large ones by 2%, irrespective of the method of payment and the 
target‘s listing status. A number of explanations have been put forward to help explain 
this size effect and the difference in abnormal returns between small and large firms. 
Among these explanations, one claims that managers infected by hubris may be 
responsible for this outcome. Managers‘ incentives in small firms are believed to be 
better aligned with those of the shareholders‘ interests. This is largely because 
managers in small firms have a higher proportion of stock ownership than those in large 
firms (Demsetz and Lehn (1985)). Conversely, managers in larger firms seem to have a 
tendency to be victims of overconfidence and the hubris effect. Influenced by factors 
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such as their social status, the fact that they have grown the companies large as well as 
the fact they can use the company‘s power and the resources to proceed with fewer 
difficulties in acquisitions, managers in larger firms are more prone to attribute the 
success of the firm‘s investment projects to their own abilities, subsequently 
underestimating the possible risks involved in the takeover pursued. 
 
Table 3.7, Panel C illustrates the five day CARs for managers who run small bidding 
firms. Rational managers enjoy 0.94% (1.92% for rational and 0.98% for 
overconfident) more abnormal returns than their overconfident counterparts. The mean 
difference between rational and overconfident managers for private deals (1.12%) is 
statistically significant at the 15% significance level while there is no statistical 
difference between rational and overconfident public deals. In terms of the method of 
payment, it is worth noting  that despite the small number of observations for stock 
bids, the 5.01% statistically significant difference between the two types of managers is 
impressively large, mainly driven by the very bad performance of overconfident 
directors (-5.55% statistically significant). We also examine large acquiring firms. In 
Table 3.7, Panel D, the 1.44% statistically significant difference (5% significance level) 
shows that the phenomenon of overconfidence is stronger amongst managers in larger 
firms. This becomes even more obvious when we notice the abnormal returns earned by 
each group of managers. Overconfident managers seem to destroy value for their 
shareholders (-0.80%) while their rational counterparts enjoy small but significant 
profits (0.64%). Similarly, controlling for private, public, cash, stock and mixed bids, 
the same pattern robustly holds with economically significant differences (Note: for 
private deals, the differences are also statistically significant at the 15% significance 
level). It is evident that the overconfidence phenomenon is more profound in the 
portfolio of large firms. Our findings are in line with the results of Moeller et al. (2004). 
The rational managers of small firms (1.92%) outperform the rational managers of large 
firms (0.64%). Similarly the overconfident managers of small firms (0.98%) outperform 
the overconfident managers of large ones (-0.80%). It is shown that rational managers 
in small firms have the best performance while the overconfident CEO‘s of large firms 
perform the worst. This indicates that the size effect exists for all the reasons as offered 
by Moeller et al. (2004). However, the overconfidence phenomenon cannot be ignored. 
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The results show that along with the other effects accepted, overconfidence can also be 
used to explain part of the bidders‘ abnormal returns. 
 
An additional parameter that has been shown to affect bidders‘ abnormal returns is the 
relative size of the deal. Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983) 
and Fuller et al. (2002) report that the relative size between the acquirer and the target 
firm can explain part of the abnormal returns reported. More specifically, they support 
the view that the higher the size of the bidding firm compared to the size of the target 
firm, the higher the abnormal returns for the bidder around the announcement date. In 
other words, there is a positive relation between the relative size of the deal and the 
abnormal returns earned by the acquiring firm. 
 
Table 3.7, Panel E shows the five day CARs for low relative size ratio acquirers. The 
0.90% gains earned by rationally managed firms compared with the 0.38% for those 
managed by overconfident CEO‘s shows that rationally managed companies perform 
slightly better. The same pattern appears to hold even when we further differentiate the 
sample controlling for private deals. However, a reversal for public deals is observed. In 
terms of the method of payment, all the mean differences are highly insignificant. Panel 
F illustrates the five-day CARs for high relative size deals. Rationally behaved 
managers generate positive and significant returns (1.65%) for their shareholders while 
their overconfident counterparts obtain no gains (-0.03%). The mean difference 
between rational and overconfident managers (1.68 %) is highly significant (5% 
significance level) Similarly, rational bidders perform better for private, cash and stock 
deals while there are no significant differences for public or mixed offers.  
 
A large percentage of the acquisitions that are executed in the U.K. market are cross-
border deals. Cross-border M&As are an easy vehicle to allow U.K. companies to 
invest abroad (Foreign Direct Investment) whilst they also serve as an efficient way to 
exploit the benefits of diversification (Doukas and Travlos (1988)). Although, 
diversifying across countries should prove beneficial for the shareholders of the bidding 
firm, the empirical evidence at this stage remains inconclusive
22
. To examine whether 
                                                 
22
 Moeller and Schlingemann (2005), Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) and Goergen and Renneboog (2004) 
support the view that acquirers enjoy less abnormal returns when they acquire foreign target firm, while 
Chapter 3: Managerial Overconfidence and Corporate Acquisitions 
87 
 
overconfidence plays a role, we control for the phenomenon within domestic and 
foreign deals. Table 3.7, Panel G presents the CARs for acquirers that bid for firms that 
operate domestically (U.K.). Rational managers generate 1.25%, statistically significant 
returns, while overconfident ones enjoy only 0.46% insignificant gains. The difference 
is 0.80% and is only economically significant. Economically significant differences in 
favor of rational acquirers are observed after controlling for the target firm‘s listing 
status and the method of payment. The only statistical difference obtained is for stock 
acquisitions (5.13%) at the 10% significance level.. Similar but stronger and more 
intense results are observed for bidders who acquire foreign (non-U.K.) target firms. 
Table 3.7, Panel H demonstrates the five day CARs for cross-border acquisitions 
conducted by rational and overconfident managers. The difference between rational and 
overconfident managers (1.80%) is much higher and statistically significant at the 5% 
significance level in the case of foreign takeovers. Rational bidders generate positive 
and significant abnormal returns (1.27%) while overconfident managers suffer losses              
(-0.53%). We obtain more or less the same results, statistically significant at the 5% 
level, for private target acquisitions (1.29% for rational and -0.53% for overconfident). 
Rational managers keep generating higher returns following the announcement of a deal 
for public targets as well as cash or mixed deals, although the differences are 
insignificant. Due to the small number of observations for stock-financed deals, we 
cannot draw any meaningful inferences from the results in this case.  
 
 The above results provide evidence for our hypothesis, especially in the case of foreign 
acquisitions. Overconfident managers who are involved in cross-border acquisition 
generate the lowest abnormal returns for their shareholders. Additionally, our results are 
consistent with Moeller and Schlingemann‘s (2005) explanation given for the 
underperformance of bidders involved in cross border acquisitions. They support the 
notion that an increase in integration followed by a reduction in cost may provide good 
grounds for an increase of hubris. This becomes even more apparent if we compare 
domestic with foreign acquisitions. Rational bidders generate more or less similar 
abnormal returns whether they bid for domestic or foreign acquisitions while the 
                                                                                                                                               
Wamsley, Lane and Yang (1983) claim that acquiring foreign companies is more profitable for bidding 
firms. 
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negative performance of foreign acquirers is predominantly driven by the negative 
performance of overconfident managers. 
 
Finally, we control for acquisitions of targets operating within the same or different 
industry to the acquiring firm. The existing literature argues that diversification has 
adverse results for the shareholders of the acquiring firm. Doukas and Kan (2004) 
report that there are reductions in cash flow and valuation discounts in cases where 
bidders choose ‗unrelated‘ (diversifying) targets. Similarly, Berger and Ofek (1995, 
1996) and Servaes (1996) report that there are no diversification benefits to be achieved 
and acquirers may create less profit from diversifying targets. At this stage, it is worth 
mentioning the explanation offered by Hadlock, Ryngaert and Thomas (2001). They 
argue that it is more likely that diversified companies are governed by managers who 
have the tendency to overinvest. Overinvesting is one of the main drawbacks in the 
behavior decision-making of overconfident managers. Table 3.7, Panel I  presents the 
five-day CARs for bidders that opt to acquire firms in industries other than their 
primary sector. Rational managers earn 1.36% significant abnormal returns for their 
shareholders while overconfident ones generate only 0.20% gains. The difference of 
1.15% is statistically significant at the 15% significance level. The same pattern seems 
to hold for private and public targets as well as for cash, stock and mixed deals. This 
evidence provides support to the overconfident hypothesis as well as lending support to 
the postulations of Hadlock, Ryngaert and Thomas‘ (2001) who predict overinvestment 
by firms who opt for diversifying targets. Similar evidence is provided in Table 3.7, 
Panel J for non-diversifying acquisitions. 
 
In summary, we observe that managers who hold their stock options until the last year 
before the expiration date systematically underperform those who exercise their options 
well in advance around the announcement of the acquisition date. After controlling for 
various bidder and deal characteristics, we show that the phenomenon of 
overconfidence is more pronounced for acquisitions of privately held targets than for 
listed target firms. We reason that information is more likely to be limited for privately 
held targets. As a result, managers are required to engage their own personal skills and 
judgment in the valuation process of the target firm. In the setting of UK M&A deals, 
whereby privately-held firms constitute the majority of the targets purchased, 
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overconfidence can be more clearly detected if managers are infected by hubris. The 
evidence additionally indicates that overconfidence seems to be more prominent for 
glamour and large acquirers as well as for managers operating abroad and acquiring 
firms in industries other than the one in which their company primarily operates. 
 
3.5.1.3 Announcement Abnormal Returns for Rational and Overconfident 
Acquirers as Classified by the Multiple Acquirer Proxy stratified by the Target 
Status and Method of Payment 
 
One of the drawbacks of examining a sensitive issue such as managerial overconfidence 
is securing the correct measure to capture the existence of this human irrationality. For 
robustness reasons, and to ensure that the results are not sensitive to the choice of the 
measure employed, we employ a second proxy, termed multiple acquirers. This section 
presents the five day acquirers‘ CARs for managers who engage in multiple (at least 
five acquisitions within three years) deals against those who perform less acquisitions. 
 
Table 3.8 reports the performance of rational and overconfident managers as classified 
by the multiple acquirers proxy. The results for the whole sample favour deals 
undertaken by rational managers. Table 3.8, Panel A shows that the market views 
takeovers undertaken by rational managers more favorably with a statistically 
significant outperformance at the 1% significance level over overconfident managers of 
0.77% (1.65% for rational managers and 0.88% for overconfident ones). Similar 
findings emerge after controlling for the method of payment used. Rational managers 
earn 0.93%, 1.17% and 0.52% more than overconfident managers do for cash, stock and 
mixed bids respectively. The initial view indicates that the results support our main 
hypothesis, inferring that rationally behaved managers create more value than 
overconfident ones do. 
 
[Insert Table 3.8 about here] 
 
To further test our hypothesis, we split the sample on the basis of the target status. The 
evidence suggests that rational managers continue to outperform overconfident ones 
earning 1.10% more abnormal returns, a difference which is statistically significant at 
the 1% significance level (Table 3.8, Panel B). This is robust after controlling for the 
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method of payment. Rational managers earn 0.88%, 6.40% and 0.79% more than 
overconfident ones do for cash, stock and mixed bids respectively, all of which are also 
statistically significant at the 1% and 5% significance levels. This evidence is in line 
with Doukas and Petmezas (2007) as well as supporting the hypothesis of this work. 
We notice that the highly positive abnormal returns of stock offers in the entire private 
sample (7.46%) are mainly driven by the outstandingly high performance of rational 
managers (8.79%). 
 
The above pattern does not seem to be so strong for acquisitions for listed target firms. 
The results prove to be mixed. Rational managers outperform overconfident ones by 
2.13% (statistically significant at the 10% significance level) only in cash acquisitions 
(Table 3.8, Panel C). However, in the overall sample for public acquisitions, rational 
managers invoke higher losses for their shareholders than overconfident ones do, driven 
predominantly by the exceedingly poor performance of rational managers conducting 
stock-financed acquisitions (-2.96%).  
 
There are several possible explanations to support these findings. In public firms there 
is less information asymmetry in terms of the target firm. It is much easier for managers 
to estimate and evaluate their target firms. In the case of acquiring a privately-held 
target, the task of evaluation becomes more ambiguous. This indicates that in private 
acquisitions, managers should depend more on their personal estimations and beliefs. 
As a result, the outcome of their decisions is more likely to be influenced by the 
confidence/overconfidence inherent in their personality. Not only this, but it is 
reasonable to suggest that managers may act more rationally in the case of public 
acquisitions as they are able to think and plan more carefully based on publicly 
available information before undertaking such serious corporate decisions.  
 
At this stage, it is useful to clearly distinguish the difference between the hubris 
hypothesis and the agency cost theory. In the latter, empire builders who act for their 
own interest may be more prone to acquire to acquire large, listed target firms. 
However, overconfident managers infected with hubris believe that since they act on 
behalf of their shareholders‘ interest, they  resultingly may be more careful when 
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considering a public, large takeover. Our proxies attempt to capture overconfident 
managers, not empire builders. 
 
3.5.1.4 Announcement Abnormal Returns for Rational and Overconfident 
Acquirers as Classified by the Multiple Acquirer Proxy according to the Other 
Bidder and Deal Characteristics 
 
This section examines the short-run performance of multiple versus single acquirers 
while controlling for various bidder (i.e. MTBV, size) and deal (i.e. relative size, cross-
border and diversifying) characteristics. 
 
Table 3.9, Panel A shows the five-day CARs for low M/B firms (value firms). Single 
acquirers (rational) earn 2.12% abnormal returns while multiple (overconfident) bidders 
only generate returns of 0.94%. The mean difference (1.17%) is statistically significant 
at the 1% significance level. The same pattern holds for acquisitions of private targets 
whilst also for deals financed using either cash or mixed sources. There is no significant 
difference for stock-financed deals. Additionally, rational managers conducting public 
acquisitions generate lower abnormal returns than those classified as overconfident 
undertaking acquisitions of publicly listed targets (insignificant difference).  
 
In Table 3.9, Panel B we examine the performance of high M/B ratio firms (glamour 
firms). The results indicate that rational managers of glamour firms earn 1.16% 
abnormal returns while those classified as overconfident generate 0.82% abnormal 
returns. Similar results with small differences between the two groups are observed for 
acquisitions of both private and public targets whilst also for all methods of financing 
(i.e. cash, stock and mixed). In general, for the overall sample and for bids announced 
to acquire privately-held targets, rational managers create more value for their 
shareholders, both in glamour and value firms, with statistically significant differences 
for the latter. 
 
[Insert Table 3.9 about here] 
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As noted ealier, the existing literature suggests that small acquirers outperform large 
acquirers (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004)). We revisit this issue controlling 
for the overconfidence phenomenon using the multiple acquirers proxy. Table 3.9, 
Panel C presents the five-day CARs for small bidders. The findings show that the 
overall performance of bidders indicates that the market rewards rational bids (2.58%) 
by 1.56% more abnormal returns, statistically significant at 1%, than those announced 
by overconfident managers (1.02%). Similar results with large mean differences are 
obtained for acquisitions of private targets whilst also for  cash and mixed-financing 
(differences of 1.78%, 1.65%, and 1.35% respectively, all statistically significant). 
Rational managers using stock-financing generate higher abnormal returns but the mean 
difference is insignificant while there is no economical or statistical difference between 
single and multiple acquirers for takeovers of listed firms.  
 
Table 3.9, Panel D illustrates the five-day CARs for large firms governed by rational 
and overconfident managers. In general, we can note that there are very small and 
insignificant differences between the rational and irrational managers in the subsample 
of large firms. As a result we cannot reach any meaningful conclusion about the 
overconfidence effect in this respect. 
 
Our analysis continues for the overconfidence effect based on the relative size of the 
deal. Table 3.9, Panel E reports the abnormal returns for low relative size deals. 
Rational managers outperform, or at least marginally outperform, overconfident ones by 
0.25%, 0.23%, 2.32%, 0.44%, 3.01% and -0.31%, all statistically insignificant, for the 
entire sample of private targets, public targets, cash, stock and mixed financed deals 
respectively. Stronger evidence for the overconfidence hypothesis is presented when 
controlling for the high relative size portfolio. Table 3.9, Panel E shows that rational 
managers (2.33%) earn 0.90% (statistically significant at the 10% significance level) 
more abnormal returns for their shareholders than their overconfident counterparts 
(1.43%). Higher mean differences of 1.46%, statistically significant at 1% significance 
level, are observed for unlisted target acquisitions while the opposite occurs for 
acquisitions of listed firms. Single acquirers underperform those which conduct 
multiple deals by 1.53% abnormal returns, statistically significant at the 15% 
significance level. Comparable differences are observed for cash and mixed-financed 
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bids, while single and multiple acquirers perform equally well for stock-financed 
acquisitions. In line with the stock options proxy, we find there to be only a statistical 
difference between the two types of managers for high relative size deals. 
 
Table 3.9, Panel G illustrates the bidder gains for managers who acquire companies in 
the same country (U.K.) (i.e. domestic acquisitions) against those who acquire in 
countries outside of the U.K. (foreign/cross-border acquisitions). Both rational and 
overconfident managers generate positive and significant abnormal returns (1.68% and 
0.94% respectively) but rational ones earn 0.74% (statistically significant at the 5% 
significance level) more than their overconfident counterparts. The same pattern holds 
for private-target bids and also for cash and mixed financed acquisitions, with all of the 
differences being statistically significant. For public listed target and stock-financed 
deals, rational managers seem to suffer higher losses, but the differences are statistically 
insignificant. The pattern is similar for cross-border acquisitions (Table 3.9, Panel H). 
In the overall sample, rational managers obtain positive and significant abnormal 
returns (1.59%) whilst overconfident ones also display positive and significant returns 
(0.76%). Overconfident managers are outperformed by those deemed to be rational by 
0.83%, a difference which is marginally significant at the 10% significance level. 
Similar performance is observed for bids to acquire unlisted targets while in public 
target acquisitions, both types of managers perform equally poor, obtaining small and 
negative returns, although they are statistically insignificant. No statistical differences 
are observed for cash or mixed financed offers. Once again, the number of stock-
financed deals is low and thus it is not possible to draw any reasonable inferences from 
these acquisitions. However, we can see that after controlling for domestic and foreign 
acquisitions, the above results are consistent with the main hypothesis of this work 
concerning overconfidence. 
 
Finally, we examine deals whereby a firm acquires another that belongs to the same or 
to a different industry as themselves. Table 3.9, Panel I shows that rational managers 
who choose a target firm from an industry other than the one in which they 
predominantly operate enjoy 1.73% positive and significant profits. Moreover, those 
same deals conducted by overconfident managers obtain 1.06% positive and significant 
profits, an underperformance of 0.67% when compared to those of rational managers. 
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Rationally managed bidders acquiring privately-held targets enjoy 2.10% abnormal 
returns, 0.93% higher than those obtained by overconfident managers (0.93%). Both 
differences are statistically significant at the 10% and 5% significance levels 
respectively. No statistical differences are observed for deals of publicly listed targets 
or after we control for the method of payment used.  
 
The same pattern holds for non-diversifying acquisitions whereby the bidder and target 
operate in the same industry (Table 3.9, Table J). Rational managers in the overall 
sample earn 0.87% abnormal returns. For private targets they earn 1.27% and for bids 
to acquire publicly listed targets, rational managers generate 0.45% more abnormal 
returns than overconfident ones do. The differences are statistically significant for the 
overall sample and for acquisitions of private targets. Similar evidence is observed after 
controlling for the different methods of payment used. The overall results indicate that 
both portfolios, for diversifying and non-diversifying bids, support our hypothesis. This 
result is consistent with the existing literature, with the exception of publicly listed 
target bids. 
 
In conclusion, after employing the multiple acquirers proxy to classify managers who 
perform multiple acquisitions in a short period of time as overconfident, we observe 
that, in general, firms which are governed by rational managers create more or destroy 
less value for their shareholders than overconfident managers do. This evidence is 
consistent with both our earlier proposition as well as with the existing literature 
((Malmendier and Tate (2008), Doukas and Petmezas (2007)). The performance of 
rational versus overconfident managers is persistent after controlling for the various 
methods of payment, for portfolios according to the M/B ratio, the bidder‘s size, the 
relative size of the deal and to whether or not the acquirer is bidding for a target in the 
same or different industry or country as themselves. The multiple acquirers proxy 
shows that the difference between rational and overconfident managers is more 
pronounced in high relative size deals, in domestic, foreign, diversifying and non-
diversifying deals. Finally, the overall superior performance of rational bidders can be 
attributed to the superior performance of rational bidders in private acquisitions, while 
insignificant results are found for deals of public targets. We infer that it may be 
reasonable to assume that managers may act more rationally in the case of public 
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acquisitions as they have more available information with which to use to think and 
plan more carefully than they have at their disposal for private target acquisitions. As 
noted earlier, the hubris hypothesis has a different theoretical background to the agency 
cost theory. Empire builders may be more prone to acquire large, listed companies who 
act predominantly to maximize their own personal utility. However, overconfident 
managers believe that they act for their shareholders‘ best interests and as a result may 
be more careful when considering a the acquisition of a listed firm. Our proxies attempt 
to capture overconfident managers, not empire builders. Moreover, and most 
importantly, there is less information asymmetry for the acquisition of listed targets. It 
is much easier for managers to estimate and evaluate these target firms. The task of 
evaluation becomes more difficult and increasingly ambiguous in the case of deals to 
acquire privately-held firms. This suggests that in private target acquisitions, managers 
depend much more on their own personal estimations and beliefs, resulting in their 
decisions being more likely to be influenced by the confidence/overconfidence they 
exhibit in their personality. 
 
3.5.1.5 Announcement Abnormal Returns for Rational and Overconfident 
Acquirers as Classified by the Business Press Proxy according to the Target Status 
and Method of Payment 
 
Overconfidence is a debatable and sensitive issue, which as noted is hard to truly 
capture. To avoid proxy biases and to ensure that the results are not sensitive to the 
choice of measure used, we employ a third proxywhich serves as an additional 
robustness test. The proxy employed in this section is the Business Press proxy. It is 
based on the characteristics attributed to the managers by the press. Following 
Malmendier and Tate (2008), we identify the management of the firms as rational or 
overconfident by counting the number of articles describing them as either
23
. The 
number of observations obtained for this proxy is relatively smaller compared to the 
other two proxies examined. The small number of observations for this proxy may be 
attributed to the limited number of articles we manage to obtain portraying managers as 
rational. Journalists and newspapers have the tendency to emphasise and focus on the 
optimistic and overconfident side of the managers without giving the same importance 
                                                 
23
 See the Data and Methodology section for further clarification.  
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for rational corporate decisions. This section discusses overconfidence using this third 
proxy controlling for the same bidder and deal characteristics as before. 
 
[Insert Table 3.10 about here] 
 
Table 3.10 illustrates the overall performance of bidding companies for the deals 
obtained for the Business Press Proxy. When dividing the sample into rational and 
overconfident managers, we observe that rational directors obtain 1.28% positive and 
significant abnormal returns while their overconfident counterparts generate only 0.62% 
positive and significant returns (Table 3.10, Panel A). Furthermore, this remains true for 
bids to acquire private targets (Table 3.10, Panel B). Both types of managers obtain 
positive CARs (2.02% and 1.29% for rational and overconfident managers respectively) 
but rational managers achieve 0.73% higher returns. Likewise, for public target 
acquisitions (Table 3.10, Panel C), both types of managers suffer losses (1.36% and -
3.37% for rational and overconfident managers respectively) but rational managers 
destroy less value (2.01%) for their shareholders. These differences are economically 
but not statistically significant. These findings further reinforce  our main finding that 
rational managers create more or destroy less value compared to their overconfident 
counterparts. 
 
3.5.1.6 Announcement Abnormal Returns for Rational and Overconfident 
Acquirers as Classified by the Multiple Acquirer Proxy according to the Other 
Bidder and Deal Characteristics 
 
This section discusses rational and overconfident managers‘ firm performance as 
classified by the business press proxy,controlling for various bidder and deal 
characteristics (Table 3.11). Table 3.11, Panel A reports the five-day CARs for the two 
types of managers for low MTBV ratio firms (value firms). Rational managers 
outperform those infected by hubris by 0.69%, 0.76%, 1.73%, 0.31%, -0.95% and 
1.34% for the full sample and for acquisitions of private and public targets, with cash, 
stock and mixed financing respectively. All mean differences are statistically 
insignificant. The overall finding remains robust after examining the performance of 
glamour bidders (high MTBV ratio) (Table 3.11, Panel B). Overconfidence affects 
bidders‘ shareholder wealth by 0.54%, 1.89% and 1.95% for the overall sample as well 
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as for bids to acquire unlisted and listed targets respectively. However, insignificant 
differences are obtained when controlling for the method of payment. 
 
Table 3.11, Panels C and D present the results regarding the size effect. Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) suggest that small firms perform better on average than 
larger ones do. By splitting the sample into small and large firms, we isolate this factor 
and examine overconfidence as classified by the Business Press Proxy. Table 3.11, 
Panel C reports the five day CARs for small firms. Rational managers obtain 1.22%, 
0.98% and 4.10% more abnormal returns for their shareholders than managers affected 
by hubris for the overall sample as well as for deals for private and public targets 
respectively. These differences are economically but not statistically significant. 
Although, the mean differences are smaller and insignificant between the two types of 
managers in the large firms sample (Table 3.11, Panel D), they  still favor rational 
managers. The negative effect of the existence of managerial overconfidence appears to 
hold after controlling for the bidders size. 
 
The relative size between the bidder and target is another deal characteristic shown in 
the literature to affect the bidder‘s performance. The higher the relative size of the deal, 
the higher the abnormal returns for the bidders‘ shareholders (Asquith, Bruner and 
Mullins (1983)) that are generated.Table 3.11, Panel E presents the performance of low 
relative size deals. No significant statistical or economical difference is observed for 
bidders managed by either rational or overconfident managers after controlling for both 
the target firm‘s status and for the method of payment employed. Conversely, 
overconfidence is shown to be more pronounced in high relative size deals (Table 3.11, 
Panel F). Rational managers obtain 1.75% abnormal returns, an outperformanceof 
1.45% over overcfonident managers (marginally statistically significant at the 10% 
significance level), who earn 0.30% abnormal returns. Similarly, for private target bids, 
the difference between the two types of managers is 1.83%, statistically significant at 
the 10% level. Despite the relatively small number of observations for public bids (35 
and 35 observations respectively), rationally managed firms lose 2.45% (statistically 
significant at the 15% significance level) less than firms infected by hubris. In high 
relative size ratio acquisitions, we find strong evidence indicating that overconfident 
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managers perform much worse than rational ones do, consistent with the results as 
obtained using the earlier two proxies. 
 
[Insert Table 3.11 about here] 
 
Table 3.11, Panel G and H present the performance of bidders who acquire targets 
which operate within the same country of origin (U.K., domestic bids) or outside of it 
(foreign bids) respectively. Panel G, Table 3.11 shows that rationally behaved managers 
earn 1.97% positive and significant returns for their shareholders, 1.37% (marginally 
statistically significant at the 5% significance level) more than the performance of 
managers infected by hubris (0.60%). Similar evidence is obtained when controlling for 
the target status. Rational directors generate 1.18% (marginally statistically significant 
at the 10% significance level) for private target bids or destroy 2.87% less 
(economically significant) for bids to acquire public target. Regarding foreign takeovers 
(Panel H, Table 3.11), there are small and insignificant mean differences between 
rational and overconfident bidders. 
 
The performance of rational versus overconfident managers does not change after 
controlling for firms expanding within the same or different industries from the one in 
which they mainly operate. Table 3.11 shows that managers infected by hubris and 
choose targets operating in other industries to their own in order to expand their 
activities perform 0.30%, 1.32% and 1.33% worse than rational managers do for all, 
private and public target bids respectively. This remains the true for non-diversifying 
acquisitions. Rational companies keep performing better, achieveing 1.02%, 1.04% and 
2.55% higher returns for all, private and public target bids respectively. The 
outperformance of rational managers continues to remain robust even after controlling 
for the target industry. 
In general, despite the small number of observations obtained for the business proxy, it 
provides extra support to the findings presented so far by the other two proxies. 
Employing this proxy as well, we further certify that the results presented are not 
subjective or sensitive to the choice of proxy. After controlling for various bid and 
acquirer characteristics, the overall finding suggests that the market views takeovers 
undertaken by rational managers more favorably than those announced by 
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overconfident ones. In many cases for this proxy, the mean differences may be 
insignificant but the small number of observations is offered as a likely explanation. 
 
3.5.1.7. Summary of Short-Run Results  
 
This section has presented the performance of bidders‘ surrounding the announcement 
date of a takeover for both rational and overconfident managers. Three different proxies 
have been employed to measure the human characteristic of overconfidence to ensure 
the reliability and robustness of the results. To conclude, the results show that in most 
deals, there is a significant difference in the bidder gains generated by firms that are 
governed by rational versus overconfident managers. Rational directors have been 
found to generally create more or destroy less value for their shareholders than those 
infected by hubris, irrespective of the method of payment chosen or the target status. 
 
Additionally, we identify several patterns in the CARs. Irrespective of the bidder‘s past 
performance (i.e. good or bad performances, or in other words glamour or value firms 
respectively), the results indicate that rational bidders generate superior abnormal 
returns. Moreover, overconfident managers in glamour firms create the least value for 
their shareholders. These results are consistent among all three proxies used. The 
evidence indicates that it is not necessarily true that firms with good past performance 
and high past returns (glamour firms) underperform firms with poor past performance 
(value firms). Rather, the glamour bidders performances is infected by the hubris of 
their managers. The separation between rational and overconfident managers, as 
conducted in this chapter, indicates that the phenomenon of overconfidence is both 
magnified and triggered by directors infected by hubris who manage glamour firms. 
 
Regarding the size of the bidder, we notice that the size effect has a stronger influence 
in explaining the bidder‘s abnormal returns once the rationality of the manager has been 
controlled for. In the existing literature, small firms have been shown to outperform 
large ones (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004)). We find similar results and 
additionally show that small rationally managed firms perform better than large firms 
managed by overconfident CEO‘s, who exhibit the worst performance. Similarly, when 
controlling for the relative size between the bidder and the target firm, we observe that 
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in high relative size deals, overconfident managers generate the least abnormal returns. 
In other words, the higher the size of the target firm in relation to the bidder, the higher 
the impact made by overconfidence on the bidders‘ abnormal returns. Furthermore, 
when this impact is negative, then even more negative returns are observed. Irrespective 
of the type of takeover (i.e. whether they acquire a foreign or domestic target firm or 
indeed whether the deal is diversifying or not), rational managers keep generating 
superior abnormal returns for their shareholders. 
 
Finally, we have to note that there is some mixed and confusing evidence from the 
results for public target takeovers, especially in the evidence generated by the multiple 
acquirer proxy. Mostly, multiple acquirers (overconfident) enjoy higher abnormal 
returns than single ones (rational) do when bidding for a public firm. This evidence may 
be attributed to a weakness of the proxy in effectively capturing overconfidence. A 
possible explanation may be that there is less information asymmetry regarding publicly 
listed firms and it is therefore much easier for managers to estimate and evaluate the 
firm in question. The task of evaluation becomes more ambiguous in the case of private 
firms where the manager does not have information readily available. This means that 
in private acquisitions managers depend much more on their own personal estimations 
and beliefs. As a result, the outcome of their decisions is more likely to be influenced 
by the confidence/overconfidence they may or may not exhibit. This evidence is 
supported by the economically but not statistically significant difference observed 
among rational and overconfident managers regarding public acquisitions. Overall, it is 
clear that overconfidence plays an important role in explaining part of the bidder‘s 
abnormal returns earned in the case of M&As. 
 
3.5.2 Multivariate Analysis    
 
The results generated so far in the univariate analysis signify that overconfident 
managers realise considerably lower announcement returns for their shareholders than 
rational ones do. However, the univariate analysis does not take into consideration the 
multiple effects that can impact on the short-run bidders‘ abnormal returns. For that 
reason, we adopt a multivariate regression framework whereby the bidders five day 
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CARs are regressed on a number of explanatory variables that have been proven in the 
literature to affect bidder‘s performance, as per the following specification: 
1
N
i i i
i
CAR a X 

  
 
In regression (1) we include both a dummy that takes the value of one if the target is 
unlisted and zero otherwise and a dummy that takes the value of one if the acquisition is 
cash (stock) financed and zero otherwise. To control for the bidder‘s size effect, the log 
of the acquirer‘s market value is modelled. The size of acquirers is measured by the 
market value one month before the deal‘s announcement date. Other variables included 
in the regressions conducted, as indicated by the existing literature, are as follows:  
 The bidder‘s book-to-market value as measured by the bidder‘s net book value 
of assets divided by its market value one month before the announcement of the 
deal. 
 A variable to account for the deal‘s relative size, as measured by the ratio 
between the target and bidder‘s size. 
 A dummy variable for diversifying deals which takes the value of one when the 
acquirer‘s two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target, and zero 
otherwise. 
 A merger activity dummy variable which takes the value of one if the deal is 
announced during a high activity M&A period, and zero otherwise. This 
categorization is based on aggregate quarterly M&A statistics from the UK 
National Statistics Office. Each quarter is categorised as an active period if the 
number of deals is more than the median and passive otherwise.  
 
In addition, other explanatory variables include the acquirer‘s lagged excess return for 
180 days prior to the bid‘s announcement as well as the market portfolio return (FT-All 
Share) for the same 180-day period prior to the announcement. 
 
Table 3.12 presents the correlation coefficients of each pair of variable used in the 
multivariate analysis. The highest correlation observed (0.34) is between the dummy 
variables of the stock options and the multiple acquirers proxies. However, these two 
variables are not used in the same regression in the multivariate analysis. 
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[Insert Table 3.12 about here] 
 
Table 3.13 presents the results of the multivariate analysis for the three proxies of 
managerial overconfidence. The coefficients of regression (1) show that private target 
acquisitions (0.032) and the market‘s returnst-180 (0.059) exhibit a positive relationship 
with the bidder‘s announcement returns, while the coefficient of size (-0.010) carries a 
negative and significant sign, consistent with the literature. To capture managerial 
overconfidence, in regression (2) we include only a dummy variable that takes the value 
of one if the deal is conducted by a firm‘s manager who holds stock options until the 
year before the expiration date and zero otherwise. We refer to this binary variable as a 
stock options dummy. Consistent with the results from the univariate analysis 
overconfident bidders as proxied by the stock options dummy have a negative and 
statistically significant (-0.011) association with the bidder‘s announcement returns at 
the 2% level. The significant negative relationship between overconfident managers and 
bidder‘s 5-day CARs remains in regression (3), after including all other explanatory 
variables, at 6% level. The stock options dummy carries a coefficient that takes the 
value of -0.009, suggesting that the market discounts overconfident bids by about 
0.90% over the five-day window.  
 
[Insert Table 3.13 about here] 
 
Similar results are obtained for the multiple acquisitions proxy in regressions (4) and 
(5) while as expected, given the smaller number of observations, the results are weaker 
when we use the business press proxy in regressions (6) and (7). More specifically, in 
regressions (4) and (6) we consider the relationship between the 5-day CARs and 
overconfident managers as proxied by the multiple acquirers and business press 
classifications respectively. In regression (4) we include a dummy that takes the value 
of one if the deal is conducted by a manager who made five or more acquisitions within 
a three-year period or zero otherwise. The coefficient carries a negative (-0.007) and 
significant value which supports the predictions of the hubris hypothesis. In regression 
(6) we include a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the business press 
characterizes managers using key words such as, ‗confident‘, ‗confidence‘, ‗optimistic‘, 
‗optimism‘, ‗certain‘ and ‗positive‘ and classify these individuals as overconfident or 
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zero otherwise. The coefficient is negative (-0.006) but statistically insignificant. In 
regressions (5) and (7), we include the remaining control variables and we report a 
significant negative association between the level of bidder returns and managerial 
overconfidence. More specifically, in regression (5), the multiple acquirer 
overconfident dummy carries a negative (-0.006) and significant value. Similarly, in 
regression (7), the respective overconfident dummy for the business press proxy is also 
negative (-0.010) and significant. In regressions (3), (5) and (7), we control for various 
explanatory variables and find that the coefficients of the overconfident dummy 
variable remain negative and statistically significant. Overall, the results obtained from 
the multivariate analysis confirm the findings of the univariate discussions and further 
reinforce the negative effect managerial overconfidence exhibits on a bidder‘s 
announcement returns, consistent with the predictions of our proposed hypotheses. 
 
3.5.3 Long-Run Analysis 
 
The short run analysis has indicated that overconfident bidder generate significantly 
lower abnormal returns than rational acquirers do. This evidence holds after controlling 
for a number of different bidder and deal characteristics. We have attributed this result 
to the market‘s anticipation that mergers initiated by overconfident bidders are less 
likely to result in efficiency and synergy gains. To examine whether the market‘s 
reaction to acquisition announcements by overconfident bidders is correctly anticipating 
their future prospects we investigate their long-term performance.
24
 If the market 
underestimates the synergy gains on offer while overestimating the value destructive 
effects of actions undertaken by overconfident managers, the firm‘s long-term 
performance should improve. If, on the other hand, managerial overconfidence is the 
driving force behind mergers, then the future performance of firms managed by 
overconfident CEO‘s should deteriorate. Intercepts are estimated using the CTPRs 
approach for one and three years subsequent to the acquisition announcement. 
 
[Insert Table 3.14 about here] 
                                                 
24
 Rau and Vermaelen (1998) argue that the short-term event study analysis of abnormal returns might 
not capture the full effect of market‘s reaction. 
Chapter 3: Managerial Overconfidence and Corporate Acquisitions 
104 
 
Table 3.14, Panel A reports the regression results for the stock options proxy. Rational 
managers generate 0.11% abnormal returns per calendar month for twelve months 
following the announcement of the deal while overconfident managers suffer significant 
losses (-0.69%). The mean difference is 0.80%, statistically significant at the 5% 
significance level, in favour of bids announced by rational managers. Similar evidence 
is observed for cash-financed deals and for those acquiring privately held targets. 
Rational cash deals outperform overconfident cash acquisitions by 0.84%, statistically 
significant at the 10%. The findings also show that acquisitions for private targets 
announced by rational managers break-even for the twelve months following the deal 
announcement while private acquisitions announced by overconfident managers suffer 
significant losses (-0.86%). This difference amplifies for private target acquisitions 
financed using cash. Rational managers outperform overconfident ones by 1.13% 
(significant at the 2% level) per calendar month for the twelve months after the deal is 
announced. We observe no statistical difference for stock and mixed financed deals 
either for the overall or the private target subsample. The three year post-merger 
performance shows that rational managers outperform those who are overconfident, but 
the differences are statistically insignificant for the overall, private and public 
subsamples. 
 
[Insert Table 3.15 about here] 
 
Table 3.15 illustrates the long-run performance for rational and overconfident  
managers one year (Panel A) and three years (Panel B) following the announcement of 
the deal within the various portfolios according to the bidder and deal characteristics. 
Overall, deals announced by rational managers tend to generate higher monthly returns 
than those announced by overconfident ones for all ten portfolios (value and glamour, 
small and big bidders as well as for low and high relative size, domestic, foreign, 
diversifying and non-diversifying deals). The mean differences are statistically 
significant for the small (1.35%), big (0.99%), foreign (0.87%) and non-diversifying 
(1.10%) portfolios. This is also true for the three year post-merger performance (Panel 
B). Rational managers generate higher monthly returns but we observe fewer significant 
mean differences. 
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[Insert Table 3.16 about here] 
 
Table 3.16 analyzes the long-run performance of rational and overconfident managed 
firms according to the multiple acquirer proxy. Panel A shows that single acquirers 
(rational) gain marginally more abnormal returns than multiple acquirers do twelve 
months following the acquisition announcement for the entire sample and also when 
controlling for the method of payment. The three year post-merger performance reveals 
that rational managers significantly outperform overconfident ones by 0.47%, 1.09% 
and 0.53% per calendar month for the entire, cash and mixed samples respectively. No 
significant differences are observed for stock-financed acquisitions. Similar evidence is 
observed when controlling for acquisitions of unlisted targets. There are no significant 
differences for one and three years following the deal (Panel B). Panel C illustrates the 
long-run performance of public target acquisitions. The one year post-merger 
performance shows that rational managers for the entire and cash samples significantly 
outperform overconfident ones by 1.18% and 1.15% respectively. This is also true for 
cash deals conducted three years after the acquisition. The rest of the mean differentials 
are in favour of rational managers but are statistically insignificant. In Table 3.17, we 
control for various bidder and deal characteristics. Rational managers seem to 
outperform overconfident ones but the mean differences are statistically insignificant 
twelve months after the deal announcement (Panel A). The only deviation from the 
pattern observed so far is observed for the small size portfolio. The same results holds 
for the three years post-merger apart from the big size, low relative size and 
diversifying portfolios. In these portfolios, rational managers significantly outperform 
overconfident ones. 
 
[Insert Tables 3.17/3.18/3.19 about here] 
 
Finally, Tables 3.18 and 3.19 illustrate the long-run performance for the business press 
proxy. We observe that most of the mean differences between rational and 
overconfident managers are statistically insignificant apart from the overall sample, 
where there a small reversal is observed. When controlling for the target‘s listing status 
(Panels B and C), there are some cases where rational managers marginally outperform 
overconfident ones or vice versa. However, most of the mean differences are 
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statistically insignificant. Similar evidence is presented when controlling for the various 
acquirer and deals characteristics as discussed earlier (Table 3.19). The findings 
presented for the business press proxy are not fully in accordance with the two previous 
proxies. We do not find a significant outperformance of rational managers relative to 
overconfident ones. This could be because of various reasons. Firstly, the number of 
observations collected for this proxy is quite limited. We managed to collect data for 
only 530 deals. When controlling for various factors, the number of observations in 
each portfolio reduces significantly. Therefore, the size of this subsample could 
possibly be a limitation. Secondly, we discussed earlier the possibility of a bias towards 
overconfidence given the nature of press articles, and in general, this proxy may not be 
the most appropriate to use in order to capture overconfidence. 
 
Overall, apart from the business press proxy which does not provide a clear and 
significant indication of the performance of the two types of managers, the stock 
options and the multiple acquirer proxies suggest that the initial market reaction 
remains consistent in the long-term as well, inferring that the market correctly reacts at 
the time of deal announcement. In the short-run, acquisitions announced by rational 
managers are favoured more than those announced by overconfident managers. We 
hypothesized earlier that if the market underestimates the synergy gains and 
overestimates the value destructive effects of actions undertaken by overconfident 
managers, there should be a long-run reversal whilst if managerial overconfidence is the 
driving force behind mergers, then the future performance of these bidders should 
continue to deteriorate. The stock options and the multiple acquirer proxies suggest that 
the initial market response holds in the long-run providing extra support to our 
hypothesis that overconfident managers destroy more, or create less value, for their 
shareholders than rational ones do. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions are motivated either for synergy gains (Jensen and Ruback 
(1983)), empire building motives as suggested by the agency theory (1986) or by hubris 
(Roll (1986)). The hubris hypothesis suggests that markets are rational and managers 
engage in acquisitions with an overly optimistic attitude believing that due to their own 
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abilities, they can create value through potential synergies. Investor overconfidence has 
extensively drawn the attention of the literature both on an empirical and theoretical 
bias. However, there is limited empirical evidence on managerial overconfidence and 
evidence is limited to the US market (Malmendier and Tate (2008), Heaton (2002)). 
The hubris hypothesis posits that overconfident managers who engage in corporate 
takeovers tend to create less or destroy more value than their rational counterparts. 
 
This study employs three hand-collected proxies used for the first time for the UK 
markets. The stock options proxy is based on CEO compensation packages. Managers 
who hold their stock option grants until the last year before the expiration date are 
classified as overconfident. The multiple acquirers proxy suggests that individual CEOs 
(not firms as has been used in other studies) who perform five or more acquisitions 
within three years are classified as overconfident. Finally, the business press proxy 
takes into consideration the way the media portray managers. Those described as 
overoptimistic and overconfident are classified as overconfident. 
 
The UK M&As market is an ideal testing ground for the behavioural trait of 
overconfidence. It is the most active merger market following the US. Among European 
countries, the 65% of the takeover activity takes place in the UK (Doukas and Petmezas 
(2007)). Furthermore, almost 90% of acquisitions involve private targets (Draper and 
Paudyal (2006)). Information is limited regarding privately held firm. It is much more 
difficult for managers to estimate and evaluate their target firms and the task of 
evaluation becomes more ambiguous. Hence, overconfidence is more prominent. 
Moreover, the vast majority of the method of payment used is cash. Malmendier and 
Tate (2008) write that overconfident managers prefer to use internal sources to finance 
takeovers. These features of the UK M&As market position such a database to be the 
ideal testing ground for the presence and effects of the human trait of overconfidence. 
 
Our results provide evidence that overconfident bidders destroy more or create less than 
their rational counter parts. In the univariate analysis, we control for various bidder, 
target and deal characteristics such as the target firms public status (private or public), 
the method of payment used (cash, stock and mixed), the size and growth opportunities 
of the bidder, the relative size of the deal and whether the bidder diversifies across 
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industries/countries. The general picture across three proxies suggests that rational 
managers are rewarded more than overconfident managers following the announcement 
of a takeover. The overconfidence effect is more pronounced for acquisitions for private 
targets due the limited information available to the managers of the bidding firm. This 
is more evident for the multiple acquirers proxy. The business press proxy offers a 
similar but weaker picture regarding overconfidence. We have to note that the number 
of observation achieved for the business press proxy is limited compared to the other 
two. The multivariate analysis simultaneously controls for all the various factors that 
affect bidder gains and provides support to the hypothesis that overconfidence 
managers destroy more value for their shareholders wealth. Lastly, the long-run 
performance confirms that the initial market reaction holds in the long-run. 
Overconfident managers as classified by the stock options proxy significantly 
outperform rational ones. Mean differentials are in favour of rational managers as 
approached by the multiple acquiers proxy. No statistical differences are observed for 
the business press proxy in the long-run. 
 
Overall, the finding provides additional support to the theoretical predictions of 
previous US studies indicating that the effect of managerial overconfidence on bidders‘ 
returns is not sensitive neither to the overconfidence measure nor is it limited to the US 
market. Our evidence implies that the conventional executive pay structure is unlikely 
to mitigate the harmful effects of managerial overconfidence, reinforcing the 
importance of strong corporate governance systems in the health of organizations. 
 
The hubris hypothesis posits that managers are overoptimist about their own abilities 
and the markets which are strong-form efficient capture this effect by punishing bidders 
when they announce takeovers. Other studies (Odean (1998)) suggest that investors are 
also overconfident, especially in booming periods. Rosen (2006) argues that managers 
may be infected with the same optimism as investors during bullish periods. As Baker 
et al. (2007, p. 48) argue, ―the irrational manager and irrational investor stories can 
certainly coexist‖. The chapter that follows (chapter 4) examines the interaction of 
managerial overconfidence across various market conditions. 
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics of Acquisitions by Year 
The table presents the number of acquisitions by year and the percentage of total number of acquisitions by bidder type (rational versus overconfident). 
The summary statistics are provided on the basis of a sample of 3,223 acquisitions from 1990 to 2005 undertaken by 1,281 unique bidders. Acquirers 
are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Targets include both domestic and foreign public and private firms. 
Overconfident and rational managers are classified based on 3 different proxies: 1) Stock Options: Managers who hold stock options until the year 
before the expiration date are classified as overconfident. All others are classified as rational. 2) Multiple Acquirers: Individual CEOs who made 5 or 
more acquisitions within a 3 year period are called overconfident. All others are rational. 3) Business Press: Managers characterized by the business 
press with the words ‗confident‘, ‗confidence‘, ‗optimistic‘, ‗optimism‘, ‗certain‘ and ‗positive are classified as overconfident managers. Those 
characterized as ‗reliable‘, ‗cautious‘, ‗prudent‘, ‗conservative‘, ‗practical‘, ‗sensible‘, ‗frugal‘, ‗careful‘ or ‗steady‘ are classified as rational managers. 
Proxy Stock Options Multiple Acquirers Business Press 
Year All All Rational Overconfident All Rational Overconfident All Rational Overconfident 
1990 124 18 8 10 121 98 23 19 2 17 
1991 100 20 14 6 98 70 28 19 8 11 
1992 91 23 14 9 90 64 26 18 5 13 
1993 103 29 19 10 101 71 30 21 7 14 
1994 169 52 35 17 167 130 37 27 10 17 
1995 177 47 31 16 175 119 56 28 5 23 
1996 195 56 41 15 187 129 58 26 11 15 
1997 272 76 49 27 260 158 102 29 10 19 
1998 292 77 58 19 281 187 94 54 15 39 
1999 310 88 64 24 295 214 81 50 23 27 
2000 344 98 64 34 319 233 86 69 29 40 
2001 266 73 50 23 252 187 65 40 14 26 
2002 212 60 51 9 200 148 52 32 13 19 
2003 171 43 31 12 167 130 37 25 10 15 
2004 204 52 44 8 195 161 34 38 18 20 
2005 193 36 28 8 191 157 34 35 16 19 
Total 3,223 848 601 247 3,099 2256 843 530 196 334 
Total (%) 100.00% 26.31% 70.87% 29.13% 96.15% 72.80% 27.20% 16.44% 36.98% 63.02% 
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics of Acquisitions by Stock Options, Multiple Acquirers, and Business Press Proxies 
The table presents the number of acquisitions, the mean and median market value of acquirers and the mean and median values of targets. The last three 
columns list the total deal value and the percentage of total value of transaction and number of acquisitions, respectively. The summary statistics are 
provided on the basis of a sample of 3223 acquisitions from 1990 to 2005 undertaken by 1281 unique bidders. Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed 
on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Targets include both domestic and foreign public and private firms. Overconfident and rational managers are 
classified based on 3 different proxies: 1) Stock Options: Managers who hold stock options until the year before the expiration date are classified as 
overconfident. All others are classified as rational. 2) Multiple Acquirers: Individual CEOs who made 5 or more acquisitions within a 3 year period are 
called overconfident. All others are rational. 3) Business Press: Managers characterized by the business press with the words ‗confident‘, ‗confidence‘, 
‗optimistic‘, ‗optimism‘, ‗certain‘ and ‗positive are classified as overconfident managers. Those characterized as ‗reliable‘, ‗cautious‘, ‗prudent‘, 
‗conservative‘, ‗practical‘, ‗sensible‘, ‗frugal‘, ‗careful‘ or ‗steady‘ are classified as rational managers. Panel A presents statistics for all deals, Panel B 
for stock options‘ proxy, Panel C for multiple acquirers‘ proxy and Panel D for business press, respectively. The mean and median size for each 
acquirer and each target is the firm size at the year the deal was announced. The acquirer‘s market capitalization equals the price per share one-month 
prior to the bid announcement times the number of common shares outstanding. The target‘s firm size is measured as the deal value of the bid. 
Type of Acquisition 
Number of 
Acquisitions 
Mean 
Acquirer 
Value (£ mil) 
Median 
Acquirer Value 
(£ mil) 
Mean Target 
Value (£ mil) 
Median Target 
Value (£ mil) 
Total Deal 
Value (£ 
mil) 
% of 
Total 
Deal 
Value 
% of Total 
Number of 
acquisitions 
Panel A: All Deals 
All Deals 3,223 517.728 88.53 64.485 6 207,834.564 100.00% 100.00% 
Private 2,839 305.481 80.66 18.876 5 53,589.777 25.78% 88.09% 
Public 384 2,086.918 209.52 401.679 50.04 154,244.787 74.22% 11.91% 
Panel B: Stock Options Proxy 
All Deals 848 638.333 154.29 59.236 8.325 50,232.57 100.00% 100.00% 
Rational 601 617.915 161.47 62.349 8.276 37,471.76 74.60% 70.87% 
Overconfident 247 688.014 137.85 51.663 8.4 12,760.81 25.40 29.13% 
Private Deals 722 409.887 147.13 21.677 6.16 15,651.123 31.16% 85.14% 
Rational 522 386.482 154.695 22.415 6.5 11,700.672 74.76% 72.30% 
Overconfident 200 470.974 111.735 19.752 5.701 3,950.451 25.24% 27.70% 
Public Deals 126 1,947.363 362.99 274.456 81.125 34,581.446 68.84% 14.86% 
Rational 79 2,147.128 362.92 326.216 79 25,771.089 74.52% 62.70% 
Overconfident 47 1,611.588 363.06 187.454 87.113 8,810.357 25.48% 37.30% 
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Table 3.2-Continued         
Type of Acquisition 
Number of 
Acquisitions 
Mean Market 
Equity (£ mil) 
Median 
Market Equity 
(£ mil) 
Mean 
Transaction 
Value (£ mil) 
Median 
Transaction 
Value (£ mil) 
Total Deal 
Value (£ mil) 
% of 
Total 
Deal 
Value 
% of Total 
Number of 
acquisitions 
Panel C: Multiple Acquirers Proxy 
All Deals 3,099 522.98 88.02 66.229 6 205,242.726 100.00% 100.00% 
Rational 2,256 572.805 73.055 78.506 6.088 177,110.472 86.29% 72.80% 
Overconfident 843 389.64 137.85 33.372 5.694 28,132.254 13.71% 27.20% 
Private Deals 2,723 301.527 80.16 18.949 5 51,596.911 25.14% 87.87% 
Rational 1,953 294.847 65.21 17.49 4.912 34,157.642 66.20% 71.72% 
Overconfident 770 318.469 127.675 22.648 5.001 17,439.269 33.80% 28.28% 
Public Deals 376 2126.75 212.14 408.632 50.795 153,645.815 74.86% 12.13% 
Rational 303 2,364.398 214.07 471.792 49.089 142,952.83 93.04% 80.59% 
Overconfident 73 1,140.348 202.69 146.479 59.35 10,692.985 6.96% 19.41% 
Panel D: Business Press Proxy 
All Deals 530 1,534.5 214.97 210.717 10.715 111,679.955 100.00% 100.00% 
Rational 196 2,499.179 218.775 441.371 10.35 86,508.646 77.46% 36.98% 
Overconfident 334 968.402 213.49 75.363 11.227 25,171.309 22.54% 63.02% 
Private Deals 439 661.194 152.53 31.72 7.772 13,925.008 12.47% 82.83% 
Rational 153 849.772 152.54 42.357 6.27 6,480.601 46.54% 34.85% 
Overconfident 286 560.311 149.68 26.029 8.5 7,444.407 53.46% 65.15% 
Public Deals 91 5,747.484 1,635.45 1074.23 247.2 97,754.947 87.53% 17.17% 
Rational 43 8,367.999 3467.2 1,861.117 492.312 80,028.045 81.87% 47.25% 
Overconfident 48 3,399.939 1,241.94 369.31 174.525 17,726.902 18.13% 52.75% 
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Table 3.3 Abnormal Returns (ARs) of All Acquirers 
This table present the Abnormal Returns (ARs) t days before and after the announcement date 
of all acquirers included in the full sample.  Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified 
market-adjusted model: 
AR = Ri,t - Rm,t 
where Ri,t is the return on firm i at time t and Rm,t is the value-weighted Market Index Return 
(FT-All share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). a, b, c denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. P-values are presented 
in brackets. The full sample size is 3,223 deals. 
 
Days before/after announcement AR p-value 
-10 0.02% (0.595) 
-9 0.12%
b 
(0.021) 
-8 0.06% (0.133) 
-7 0.00% (0.992) 
-6 0.08%
c 
(0.063) 
-5 0.05% (0.257) 
-4 0.09%
b 
(0.037) 
-3 -0.01% (0.836) 
-2 0.13%
a 
(0.008) 
-1 0.10%
b 
(0.038) 
0 0.79%
a 
(0.000) 
1 0.30%
a 
(0.000) 
2 0.15%
a 
(0.004) 
3 0.09%
b 
(0.030) 
4 0.00% (0.960) 
5 0.08%
c 
(0.070) 
6 0.01% (0.892) 
7 -0.03% (0.544) 
8 0.03% (0.484) 
9 0.01% (0.774) 
10 -0.05% (0.274) 
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Table 3.4 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of All Acquirers 
This table present the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for various windows. Panel A 
presents CARs during five days (-2,+2) surrounding the announcement of all acquirers included 
in the full sample.  Panels B, C, D and E present CARs for (-1,+1), (0,+1) and (-1,0) windows 
respectively surrounding the announcement day. Abnormal returns are calculated using a 
modified market-adjusted model: 
AR = Ri,t - Rm,t 
where Ri,t is the return on firm i at time t and Rm,t is the value-weighted Market Index Return 
(FT-All share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). This table illustrates the gains to acquirers included in the full sample of all, private and 
public targets. The CARs are reported on the basis of the method of payment as well. ‗Cash‘ 
indicates only cash deals, ‗Stock‘ refers only to share deals and ‗Mixed‘ includes all other 
transactions financed by a combination of cash and shares. a, b, c denote significance level at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. P-values are presented in brackets. The sample size n is 
presented below the p-value. 
Panel A: CARs (-2,+2) 
  All Cash Stock Mixed 
All 1.47%
a
 1.17%
a
 2.63%
b
 1.58%
a
 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.044) (0.000) 
n 3,223 1,351 208 1,664 
Private 1.83%
a
 1.28%
a
 7.31%
a
 1.88%
a
 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
n 2,839 1,194 108 1,537 
Public -1.20%
a
 0.28% -2.42%
a
 -2.06%
a
 
p-value (0.006) (0.646) (0.009) (0.009) 
n 384 157 100 127 
Panel B: CARs (-1,+1) 
  All Cash Stock Mixed 
All 1.18%
a 
0.89%
a 
2.55%
c 
1.24%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.053) (0.000) 
n 3,223 1,351 208 1,664 
Private 1.50%
a 
0.98%
a 
7.03%
a 
1.52%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
n 2,839 1,194 108 1,537 
Public -1.20%
a 
0.27% -2.28%
a 
-2.17%
a 
p-value (0.002) (0.625) (0.006) (0.001) 
n 384 157 100 127 
Panel C: CARs (0,+1) 
  All Cash Stock Mixed 
All 1.08%
a
 0.82%
a 
2.29%
c 
1.15%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.068) (0.000) 
n 3,223 1,351 208 1,664 
Private 1.39%
a 
0.90%
a 
6.54%
a 
1.41%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
n 2,839 1,194 108 1,537 
Public -1.19%
a 
0.20% -2.30%
a 
-2.04%
a 
p-value (0.001) (0.654) (0.004) (0.001) 
n 384 157 100 127 
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Table 3.4-continued 
Panel D: CARs (-1,0) 
  All Cash Stock Mixed 
All 0.89%
a 
0.59%
a 
2.85%
b 
0.88%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) 
n 3,223 1,351 208 1,664 
Private 1.15%
a 
0.71%
a 
6.86%
a 
1.10%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
n 2,839 1,194 108 1,537 
Public -1.06%
a 
-0.24% -1.47%
b 
-1.75%
a 
p-value (0.001) (0.569) (0.038) (0.001) 
n 384 157 100 127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Managerial Overconfidence and Corporate Acquisitions 
115 
 
Table 3.5 Buy-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) of All Acquirers 
This table present the Buy-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) for various windows. Panel A 
presents BHARs for five days (-2,+2) surrounding the announcement of all acquirers included 
in the full sample.  Panels B, C, D and E present BHARs for (-1,+1), (0,+1) and (-1,0) windows 
respectively surrounding the announcement day. The BHAR for company i is computed as: 
 
T
mt
T
iti RRBHAR 11 )1()1(  
where Rit is the daily return for company i, and Rmt is the daily return of the market index. All 
acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). This table 
illustrates the gains to acquirers included in the full sample of all, private and public targets. 
The BHARs are reported on the basis of the method of payment as well. ‗Cash‘ indicates only 
cash deals, ‗Stock‘ refers only to share deals and ‗Mixed‘ includes all other transactions 
financed by a combination of cash and shares. We use their skewness adjusted bootstrap t-
statistics procedure to compute the statistical significance of the abnormal returns (1000 
replications). a, b, c denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. P-values are 
presented in brackets. The sample size n is presented below the p-value. 
Panel A: BHARs (-2,+2) 
  All Cash Stock Mixed 
All 1.46%
a 
1.16%
a 
2.50%
b 
1.57%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) 
n 3,223 1,351 208 1,664 
Private 1.82%
a 
1.28%
a 
7.09%
a 
1.87%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
n 2,839 1,194 108 1,537 
Public -1.17%
b 
0.31% -2.45%
a 
-2.00%
a 
p-value (0.014) (0.619) (0.007) (0.008) 
n 384 157 100 127 
Panel B: BHARs (-1,+1) 
  All Cash Stock Mixed 
All 1.19%
a 
0.92%
a 
2.54%
b 
1.25%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) 
n 3,223 1,351 208 1,664 
Private 1.51%
a 
1.00%
a 
6.98%
a 
1.52%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
n 2,839 1,194 108 1,537 
Public -1.15%
a 
0.33% -2.26%
a 
-2.12%
a 
p-value (0.009) (0.554) (0.005) (0.002) 
n 384 157 100 127 
Panel C: BHARs (0,+1) 
  All Cash Stock Mixed 
All 1.09%
a 
0.83%
a 
2.17%
b 
1.16%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.049) (0.000) 
n 3,223 1,351 208 1,664 
Private 1.39%
a 
0.91%
a 
6.28%
a 
1.42%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
n 2,839 1,194 108 1,537 
Public -1.16%
a 
0.23% -2.27%
a 
-2.00%
a 
p-value (0.002) (0.618) (0.003) (0.001) 
n 384 157 100 127 
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Table 3.5-continued 
Panel D: BHARs (-1,0) 
  All Cash Stock Mixed 
All 0.90%
a 
0.60%
a 
3.01%
a 
0.88%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
n 3,223 1,351 208 1,664 
Private 1.16%
a 
0.71%
a 
7.17%
a 
1.09%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
n 2,839 1,194 108 1,537 
Public -1.05%
a 
-0.23% -1.48%
b 
-1.74%
a 
p-value (0.002) (0.657) (0.042) (0.002) 
n 384 157 100 127 
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Table 3.6 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Rational and Overconfident 
Acquirers by the Stock Options Proxy 
This table present the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) 
surrounding the announcement of rational and overconfident acquirers as classified by the Stock 
Options Proxy. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
AR = Ri,t - Rm,t 
where Ri,t is the return on firm i at time t and Rm,t is the value-weighted Market Index Return 
(FT-All share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). Managers who hold stock options until the year before the expiration date are classified 
as overconfident. All others are classified as rational. Panel A illustrates the gains to acquirers 
of all targets as classified whether the acquirer‘s manager is rational or overconfident. Panel B 
and C shows the CARs for acquirers acquiring private and public targets respectively. The 
CARs are reported on the basis of the method of payment as well. ‗Cash‘ indicates only cash 
deals, ‗Stock‘ refers only to share deals and ‗Mixed‘ includes all other transactions financed by 
a combination of cash and shares. a, b, c denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. P-values are presented in brackets. The sample size n is presented below the p-
value. At the end of each panel, the differential (1)-(2) between rational minus overconfident 
means is presented. 
 
 
Stock Options Proxy   
  All Cash Stock Mixed 
Panel A: All Targets 
 
 
All 0.94%
a 
0.58%
b 
-0.91% 1.38%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.041) (0.365) (0.000) 
N 848 372 35 441 
Rational (1) 1.26%
a 
0.79%
b 
0.37% 1.72%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.014) (0.701) (0.000) 
N 601 263 23 315 
Overconfident (2) 0.16% 0.08% -3.36% 0.56% 
p-value (0.729) (0.890) (0.148) (0.423) 
n 247 109 12 126 
Differential (1)-(2) 1.10%
b 
0.71% 3.73% 1.16% 
p-value (0.031) (0.291) (0.134) (0.136) 
Panel B: Private Targets 
 
 
All 1.37%
a 
0.82%
a 
0.63% 1.84%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.004) (0.442) (0.000) 
n 722 318 14 390 
Rational (1) 1.61%
a 
1.05%
a 
0.72% 2.11%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.002) (0.153) (0.000) 
N 522 230 10 282 
Overconfident (2) 0.72%
c 
0.22% 0.40% 1.13%
c 
p-value (0.096) (0.699) (0.896) (0.078) 
n 200 88 4 108 
Differential (1)-(2) 0.90%
c 
0.83% 0.32% 0.98% 
p-value (0.067) (0.210) (0.917) (0.180) 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Managerial Overconfidence and Corporate Acquisitions 
118 
 
Table 3.6-Continued 
Panel C: Public Targets 
 
 
All -1.51%
b 
-0.81% -1.94% -2.07% 
p-value (0.039) (0.417) (0.225) (0.122) 
n 126 54 21 51 
Rational (1) -1.09% -1.01% 0.10% -1.63% 
p-value (0.149) (0.352) (0.955) (0.215) 
N 79 33 13 33 
Overconfident (2) -2.22% -0.50% -5.24% -2.89% 
p-value (0.144) (0.799) (0.103) (0.341) 
n 47 21 8 18 
Differential (1)-(2) 1.14% -0.50% 5.33% 1.26% 
p-value (0.498) (0.823) (0.128) (0.699) 
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Table 3.7 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Rational and Overconfident Acquirers by Stock Options Proxy and Deal Features 
This table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) surrounding the announcement of rational and overconfident 
acquirers by stock options‘ proxy. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
ARit = Rit - Rmt 
where Rit is the return on firm i at time t and Rmt is the value-weighted Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms 
listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Managers who hold stock options until the year before the expiration date are classified as overconfident. 
All others are classified as rational. All Panels shows the returns to rational and overconfident bidders by target‘s ownership status (public or private) 
and the method of payment (all-cash and non-cash (i.e., any other type of offer)). Panels A (B) shows the CARs for value (glamour) bidders. Acquirers 
with higher (lower) than median book-to-market ratio (a month prior to bid announcement) are categorized as value (glamour) bidders. Panels C (D) 
shows the CARs for small (big) bidders. Acquirers with larger (smaller) than median size (a month prior to bid announcement) are categorized as big 
(small) bidders. Panels E (F) shows the CARs for high (low) relative size deals. The relative size of the deal is defined as the deal value divided by the 
market value of the acquirer a month before the announcement date. Deals above (below) the median relative size are classified as high (low) RS. 
Panels G (H) shows the CARs for domestic (foreign) bidders. Acquisitions with bidders and targets originated from the same (different) country are 
defined as domestic (foreign) acquisitions. Panels I (J) shows the CARs for diversifying (non-diversifying) bidders. An acquisition is defined as 
diversifying (focused) when the acquirer‘s two-digit SIC code is different (the same) from that of the target. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are 
represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘, respectively. The Differential (1)-(2) represents the differences in mean CARs for the five days (-2, +2) around the 
acquisition announcement of rational versus overconfident bidders. P-values are reported in brackets. The sample size n is presented below the p-value. 
 
Panel A: Value Bidders Panel B: Glamour Bidders 
 
 
 
 
  All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed   All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed 
Rational 1.15%
a 
1.55%
a 
-1.17% 0.61% 2.63% 1.57%
a 
Rational 1.36%
a 
1.68%
a 
-0.99% 0.98%
b 
-0.85% 1.84%
a 
p-value (0.001) (0.000) (0.234) (0.155) (0.193) (0.005) p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.399) (0.041) (0.398) (0.000) 
n 290 248 42 135 8 147 n 311 274 37 128 15 168 
Overconfident 0.85% 1.17%
c 
-0.33% 0.52% -4.74%
c 
2.03%
b 
Overconfident -0.66% 0.21% -5.27% -0.46% 3.54% -0.96% 
p-value (0.150) (0.080) (0.791) (0.498) (0.062) (0.026) p-value (0.348) (0.684) (0.129) (0.623) (0.617) (0.363) 
n 134 105 29 60 10 64 n 113 95 18 49 2 62 
Differential (1)-(2) 0.31% 0.37% -0.84% 0.09% 7.38%
b 
-0.45% Differential (1)-(2) 2.02%
a 
1.46%
b 
4.29% 1.44% -4.39% 2.80%
b 
p-value (0.652) (0.621) (0.593) (0.920) (0.022) (0.663) p-value (0.009) (0.017) (0.235) (0.170) (0.557) (0.015) 
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Table 3.7-Continued 
 
Panel C: Small Bidders Panel D: Large Bidders 
 
 
 
 
 
  All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed   All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed 
Rational 1.92%
a 
2.37%
a 
-1.59% 1.11%
b 
-0.54% 2.81%
a 
Rational 0.64%
b 
0.88%
a 
-0.72% 0.54% 4.66% 0.64% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.122) (0.022) (0.534) (0.000) p-value (0.035) (0.004) (0.499) (0.211) (0.224) (0.144) 
n 291 258 33 116 19 156 n 310 264 46 147 4 159 
Overconfident 0.98% 1.24%
c 
-1.09% 0.89% -5.55%
c 
1.80%
c 
Overconfident -0.80% -0.04% -2.75% -0.74% 1.02% -0.99% 
p-value (0.116) (0.052) (0.646) (0.271) (0.066) (0.054) p-value (0.225) (0.939) (0.163) (0.396) (0.781) (0.340) 
n 133 118 15 55 8 70 n 114 82 32 54 4 56 
Differential (1)-(2) 0.94% 1.12% -0.50% 0.23% 5.01%
c 
1.02% Differential (1)-(2) 1.44%
b 
0.92% 2.03% 1.27% 3.64% 1.63% 
p-value (0.187) (0.124) (0.846) (0.808) (0.099) (0.337) p-value (0.048) (0.122) (0.360) (0.189) (0.458) (0.149) 
Panel E: Low Relative Size Deals 
 
 
 
 
Panel F: High Relative Size Deals 
 
 
 
  All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed   All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed 
Rational 0.90%
a 
0.94%
a 
-0.38% 0.87%
a 
0.32% 0.96%
b 
Rational 1.65%
a 
2.56%
a 
-1.18% 0.66% 0.39% 2.38%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.813) (0.008) (0.669) (0.011) p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.155) (0.298) (0.776) (0.000) 
n 313 304 9 159 7 147 n 288 218 70 104 16 168 
Overconfident 0.38% 0.18% 2.66% 0.89% 1.26% -0.24% Overconfident -0.03% 1.27%
c 
-3.38%
b 
-0.81% -4.90%
c 
1.10% 
p-value (0.473) (0.723) (0.428) (0.282) (0.769) (0.726) p-value (0.969) (0.069) (0.048) (0.340) (0.084) (0.308) 
n 111 102 9 57 3 51 n 136 98 38 52 9 75 
Differential (1)-(2) 0.52% 0.76% -3.04% -0.02% -0.94% 1.19% Differential (1)-(2) 1.68%
b 
1.28% 2.20% 1.47% 5.29%
c 
1.28% 
p-value (0.376) (0.181) (0.409) (0.983) (0.828) (0.126) p-value (0.039) (0.122) (0.237) (0.165) (0.085) (0.289) 
Panel G: Domestic Target Firms 
 
 
 
 
Panel H: Foreign Target Firms 
 
 
 
 
  All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed   All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed 
Rational 1.25%
a 
1.79%
a 
-1.98%
b 
0.92%
b 
0.41% 1.55%
a 
Rational 1.27%
a 
1.29%
a 
1.10% 0.62% -0.07% 2.11%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.025) (0.697) (0.000) p-value (0.001) (0.002) (0.432) (0.225) (0.960) (0.001) 
n 394 338 56 149 21 224 n 207 184 23 114 2 91 
Overconfident 0.46% 1.28%
a 
-2.87% 0.51% -4.72%
c 
0.98% Overconfident -0.53% -0.53% -0.53% -0.72% 3.43% -0.55% 
p-value (0.379) (0.007) (0.101) (0.442) (0.077) (0.207) p-value (0.560) (0.555) (0.868) (0.538) (0.139) (0.713) 
n 172 138 34 71 10 91 n 75 62 13 38 2 35 
Differential (1)-(2) 0.80% 0.51% 0.89% 0.41% 5.13%
c 
0.57% Differential (1)-(2) 1.80%
c 
1.82%
c 
1.63% 1.34% -3.50% 2.66% 
p-value (0.179) (0.352) (0.644) (0.596) (0.070) (0.517) p-value (0.071) (0.066) (0.640) (0.295) (0.226) (0.103) 
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Table 3.7-Continued 
 
Panel I: Diversifying Deals 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel J: Non-Diversifying Deals 
 
 
 
 
  All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed   All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed 
Rational 1.36%
a 
1.74%
a 
-0.97% 0.73%
c 
1.14% 1.93%
a 
Rational 1.15%
a 
1.47%
a 
-1.24% 0.86%
c 
-1.09% 1.49%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.300) (0.071) (0.372) (0.000) p-value (0.002) (0.000) (0.324) (0.094) (0.438) (0.006) 
n 325 279 46 146 15 164 n 276 243 33 117 8 151 
Overconfident 0.20% 0.70% -3.12% 0.05% -0.85% 0.38% Overconfident 0.11% 0.73% -1.76% 0.10% -5.88% 0.79% 
p-value (0.761) (0.219) (0.363) (0.924) (0.784) (0.718) p-value (0.857) (0.262) (0.257) (0.911) (0.114) (0.330) 
n 122 106 16 44 6 72 n 125 94 31 65 6 54 
Differential (1)-(2) 1.15% 1.03% 2.15% 0.69% 1.99% 1.54% Differential (1)-(2) 1.03% 0.74% 0.52% 0.76% 4.78% 0.70% 
p-value (0.114) (0.111) (0.542) (0.292) (0.554) (0.182) p-value (0.152) (0.323) (0.793) (0.478) (0.203) (0.470) 
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Table 3.8 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Rational and Overconfident 
Acquirers by the Multiple Acquirers Proxy 
This table present the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2,+2) 
surrounding the announcement of rational and overconfident acquirers as classified by the Stock 
Options Proxy. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
AR = Ri,t - Rm,t 
where Ri,t is the return on firm i at time t and Rm,t is the value-weighted Market Index Return 
(FT-All share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). Individual CEOs who made 5 or more acquisitions within a 3 year period are called 
overconfident. All others are rational. All others are classified as rational. Panel A illustrates the 
gains to acquirers of all targets as classified whether the acquirer‘s manager is rational or 
overconfident. Panel B and C shows the CARs for acquirers acquiring private and public targets 
respectively. The CARs are reported on the basis of the method of payment as well. ‗Cash‘ 
indicates only cash deals, ‗Stock‘ refers only to share deals and ‗Mixed‘ includes all other 
transactions financed by a combination of cash and shares. a, b, c denote significance level at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. P-values are presented in brackets. The sample size n is 
presented below the p-value. At the end of each panel, the Differential (1)-(2) between rational 
minus overconfident means is presented. 
 
  All Cash Stock Mixed 
Panel A: All Targets 
 
 
 
 
All 1.44%
a 
1.11%
a 
2.76%
b 
1.54%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) 
n 3,099 1,295 204 1,600 
Rational (1) 1.65%
a 
1.37%
a 
2.98%
c 
1.68%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.064) (0.000) 
N 2,256 931 166 1,159 
Overconfident (2) 0.88%
a 
0.44%
c 
1.81% 1.16%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.082) (0.130) (0.000) 
n 843 364 38 441 
Differential (1)-(2) 0.77%
a 
0.93%
a 
1.17% 0.52% 
p-value (0.005) (0.005) (0.555) (0.169) 
Panel B: Private Targets 
 
 
All 1.80%
a 
1.22%
a 
7.46%
a 
1.84%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
n 2,723 1,141 106 1,476 
Rational (1) 2.11%
a 
1.48%
a 
8.79%
a 
2.06%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
N 1,953 805 84 1,064 
Overconfident (2) 1.01%
a 
0.60%
b 
2.38% 1.27%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.022) (0.122) (0.000) 
n 770 336 22 412 
Differential (1)-(2) 1.10%
a 
0.88%
a 
6.40%
b 
0.79%
b 
p-value (0.000) (0.010) (0.050) (0.042) 
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Table 3.8-Continued 
Panel C: Public Targets 
 
 
All -1.18%
a 
0.28% -2.31%
b 
-2.11%
a 
p-value (0.007) (0.636) (0.014) (0.008) 
n 376 154 98 124 
Rational (1) -1.34%
a 
0.67% -2.96%
a 
-2.62%
a 
p-value (0.009) (0.336) (0.005) (0.007) 
N 303 126 82 95 
Overconfident (2) -0.51% -1.46% 1.03% -0.44% 
p-value (0.489) (0.148) (0.604) (0.711) 
n 73 28 16 29 
Differential (1)-(2) -0.83% 2.13%
c 
-3.99%
c 
-2.17% 
p-value (0.351) (0.081) (0.082) (0.157) 
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Table 3.9 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Rational and Overconfident Acquirers by Multiple Acquirers Proxy and Deal Features 
This table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) surrounding the announcement of rational and overconfident 
acquirers by stock options‘ proxy. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
ARit = Rit - Rmt 
where Rit is the return on firm i at time t and Rmt is the value-weighted Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms 
listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Individual CEOs who made 5 or more acquisitions within a 3 year period are called overconfident. All 
others are rational. All Panels shows the returns to rational and overconfident bidders by target‘s ownership status (public or private) and the method of 
payment (all-cash and non-cash (i.e., any other type of offer)). Panels A (B) shows the CARs for value (glamour) bidders. Acquirers with higher 
(lower) than median book-to-market ratio (a month prior to bid announcement) are categorized as value (glamour) bidders. Panels C (D) shows the 
CARs for small (big) bidders. Acquirers with larger (smaller) than median size (a month prior to bid announcement) are categorized as big (small) 
bidders. Panels E (F) shows the CARs for high (low) relative size deals. The relative size of the deal is defined as the deal value divided by the market 
value of the acquirer a month before the announcement date. Deals above (below) the median relative size are classified as high (low) RS. Panels G (H) 
shows the CARs for domestic (foreign) bidders. Acquisitions with bidders and targets originated from the same (different) country are defined as 
domestic (foreign) acquisitions. Panels I (J) shows the CARs for diversifying (non-diversifying) bidders. An acquisition is defined as diversifying 
(focused) when the acquirer‘s two-digit SIC code is different (the same) from that of the target. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented 
by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘, respectively. The Differential (1)-(2) represents the differences in mean CARs for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition 
announcement of rational versus overconfident bidders. P-values are reported in brackets. The sample size n is presented below the p-value. 
 
Panel A: Value Bidders 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Glamour Bidders 
 
 
 
 
 
  All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed   All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed 
Rational 2.12%
a 
2.65%
a 
-1.02%
c 
1.75%
a 
3.90% 2.15%
a 
Rational 1.16%
a 
1.57%
a 
-1.75%
b 
0.91%
a 
1.79% 1.26%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.100) (0.000) (0.127) (0.000) p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.041) (0.005) (0.281) (0.000) 
n 1,153 985 168 512 94 547 n 1,103 968 135 419 72 612 
Overconfident 0.94%
a
 1.01%
a 
0.26% 0.62%
c 
3.97%
b 
0.96%
b 
Overconfident 0.82%
a 
1.01%
a 
-1.22% 0.21% -0.58% 1.28%
a 
p-value (0.001) (0.000) (0.781) (0.052) (0.010) (0.038) p-value (0.002) (0.000) (0.284) (0.602) (0.750) (0.000) 
n 397 362 35 202 20 175 n 446 408 38 162 18 266 
Differential (1)-(2) 1.17%
a
 1.64%
a 
-1.27% 1.12%
a 
-0.07% 1.19%
c 
Differential (1)-(2) 0.34% 0.56% -0.54% 0.70% 2.37% -0.03% 
p-value (0.004) (0.000) (0.255) (0.009) (0.981) (0.052) p-value (0.347) (0.131) (0.704) (0.177) (0.335) (0.953) 
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Table 3.9-Continued 
 
Panel C: Small Bidders 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Large Bidders 
 
 
 
 
 
  All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed   All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed 
Rational 2.58%
a 
2.93%
a 
-1.13% 2.15%
a 
3.75%
c 
2.64%
a 
Rational 0.54%
b 
1.02%
a 
-1.46%
b 
0.72%
a 
1.10% 0.30% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.262) (0.000) (0.083) (0.000) p-value (0.011) (0.000) (0.011) (0.006) (0.515) (0.361) 
n 1,226 1121 105 425 118 683 n 1,030 832 198 506 48 476 
Overconfident 1.02%
a 
1.15%
a 
-1.08% 0.50% 1.96% 1.29%
a 
Overconfident 0.79%
a 
0.92%
a 
-0.31% 0.41% 1.61% 1.07%
a 
p-value (0.001) (0.000) (0.512) (0.211) (0.274) (0.003) p-value (0.001) (0.000) (0.708) (0.212) (0.292) (0.003) 
n 324 305 19 130 22 172 n 519 465 54 234 16 269 
Differential (1)-(2) 1.56%
a 
1.78%
a 
-0.05% 1.65%
a 
1.79% 1.35%
b 
Differential (1)-(2) -0.25% 0.10% -1.15% 0.31% -0.51% -0.77% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.980) (0.002) (0.519) (0.018) p-value (0.445) (0.761) (0.252) (0.455) (0.819) (0.112) 
Panel E: Low Relative Size Deals 
 
 
 
 
Panel F: High Relative Size Deals 
 
 
 
 
  All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed   All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed 
Rational 0.81%
a 
0.87%
a 
-0.04% 0.79%
a 
1.77% 0.74%
a 
Rational 2.33%
a 
3.29%
a 
-1.67%
a 
2.08%
a 
3.39% 2.29%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.959) (0.001) (0.176) (0.010) p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.108) (0.000) 
n 1,010 949 61 513 42 455 n 1,246 1,004 242 418 124 704 
Overconfident 0.57%
a 
0.63%
a 
-2.36% 0.35% -1.24% 0.87%
a 
Overconfident 1.43%
a 
1.83%
a 
-0.15% 0.67% 3.40%
b 
1.58%
a 
p-value (0.010) (0.004) (0.331) (0.229) (0.526) (0.008) p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.847) (0.184) (0.023) (0.001) 
n 540 528 12 264 13 263 n 303 242 61 100 25 178 
Differential (1)-(2) 0.25% 0.23% 2.32% 0.44% 3.01% -0.13% Differential (1)-(2) 0.90%
c 
1.46%
a 
-1.53% 1.41%
b 
0.00% 0.70% 
p-value (0.391) (0.416) (0.364) (0.240) (0.203) (0.770) p-value (0.062) (0.007) (0.114) (0.027) (0.999) (0.255) 
Panel G: Domestic Target Firms 
 
 
 
 
Panel H: Foreign Target Firms 
 
 
 
 
  All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed   All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed 
Rational 1.68%
a 
2.24%
a 
-1.76%
a 
1.49%
a 
1.02% 1.90%
a 
Rational 1.59%
a 
1.84%
a 
-0.25% 1.18%
a 
10.32%
b 
1.06%
b 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.550) (0.000) p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.797) (0.002) (0.012) (0.031) 
n 1,561 1,341 220 571 131 859 n 695 612 83 360 35 300 
Overconfident 0.94%
a 
1.10%
a 
-0.68% 0.33% 2.48%
b 
1.20%
a 
Overconfident 0.76%
b 
0.83%
b 
-0.11% 0.60% -1.15% 1.06%
c 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.382) (0.269) (0.012) (0.000) p-value (0.035) (0.023) (0.946) (0.178) (0.825) (0.059) 
n 561 510 51 216 31 314 n 282 260 22 148 7 127 
Differential (1)-(2) 0.74%
b 
1.14%
a 
-1.08% 1.16%
a 
-1.46% 0.70% Differential (1)-(2) 0.83% 1.00%
c 
-0.14% 0.58% 11.47%
c 
0.00% 
p-value (0.023) (0.001) (0.271) (0.004) (0.454) (0.114) p-value (0.102) (0.057) (0.943) (0.318) (0.092) (0.996) 
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Table 3.9-Continued 
 
Panel I: Diversifying Deals 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel J: Non-Diversifying Deals 
 
 
 
 
  All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed   All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed 
Rational 1.73%
a 
2.10%
a 
-1.03% 1.30%
a 
6.02%
c 
1.56%
a 
Rational 1.57%
a 
2.12%
a 
-1.58%
b 
1.44%
a 
0.82% 1.79%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.202) (0.000) (0.073) (0.000) p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.552) (0.000) 
n 1,101 971 130 466 69 566 n 1,155 982 173 465 97 593 
Overconfident 1.06%
a 
1.17%
a 
0.23% 0.89%
b 
1.36% 1.17%
a 
Overconfident 0.70%
a 
0.86%
a 
-2.03% 0.02% 2.68%
b 
1.15%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.799) (0.014) (0.428) (0.002) p-value (0.010) (0.002) (0.103) (0.949) (0.038) (0.006) 
n 417 368 49 176 25 216 n 426 402 24 188 13 225 
Differential (1)-(2) 0.67%
c 
0.93%
b 
-1.27% 0.42% 4.66% 0.39% Differential (1)-(2) 0.87%
b 
1.27%
a 
0.45% 1.42%
a 
-1.86% 0.65% 
p-value (0.091) (0.026) (0.299) (0.356) (0.213) (0.436) p-value (0.022) (0.002) (0.742) (0.004) (0.303) (0.255) 
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Table 3.10 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Rational and Overconfident 
Acquirers by the Business Press Proxy 
This table present the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2,+2) 
surrounding the announcement of rational and overconfident acquirers as classified by the Stock 
Options Proxy. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
AR = Ri,t - Rm,t 
where Ri,t is the return on firm i at time t and Rm,t is the value-weighted Market Index Return 
(FT-All share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). Managers characterized by the business press with the words ‗confident‘, ‗confidence‘, 
‗optimistic‘, ‗optimism‘, ‗certain‘ and ‗positive are classified as overconfident managers. Those 
characterized as ‗reliable‘, ‗cautious‘, ‗prudent‘, ‗conservative‘, ‗practical‘, ‗sensible‘, ‗frugal‘, 
‗careful‘ or ‗steady‘ are classified as rational managers. All others are classified as rational. 
Panel A illustrates the gains to acquirers of all targets as classified whether the acquirer‘s 
manager is rational or overconfident. Panel B and C shows the CARs for acquirers acquiring 
private and public targets respectively. The CARs are reported on the basis of the method of 
payment as well. ‗Cash‘ indicates only cash deals, ‗Stock‘ refers only to share deals and 
‗Mixed‘ includes all other transactions financed by a combination of cash and shares. a, b, c 
denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. P-values are presented in brackets. 
The sample size n is presented below the p-value. At the end of each panel, the Differential (1)-
(2) between rational minus overconfident means is presented. 
 
  All Cash Stock Mixed 
Panel A: All Targets 
 
 
All 0.86%
a 
0.93%
a 
-2.04% 1.05%
a 
p-value (0.001) (0.005) (0.156) (0.010) 
n 530 249 23 258 
Rational (1) 1.28%
a 
1.32%
b 
-1.76% 1.52%
b 
p-value (0.006) (0.022) (0.357) (0.043) 
N 196 92 9 95 
Overconfident (2) 0.62%
b 
0.70%
c 
-2.22% 0.78% 
p-value (0.047) (0.081) (0.291) (0.102) 
n 334 157 14 163 
Differential (1)-(2) 0.66% 0.62% 0.47% 0.74% 
p-value (0.231) (0.373) (0.865) (0.399) 
Panel B: Private Targets 
 
 
 
All 1.54%
a 
1.48%
a 
0.70% 1.64%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.674) (0.000) 
n 439 199 12 228 
Rational (1) 2.02%
a 
1.49%
b 
-1.21% 2.78%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.026) (0.471) (0.001) 
n 153 72 6 75 
Overconfident (2) 1.29%
a 
1.48%
a 
2.62% 1.07%
b 
p-value (0.000) (0.001) (0.394) (0.019) 
n 286 127 6 153 
Differential (1)-(2) 0.73% 0.01% -3.82% 1.71%
c 
p-value (0.216) (0.992) (0.271) (0.062) 
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Table 3.10-Continued 
Panel C: Public Targets 
 
 
 
 
 
All -2.42%
a 
-1.27%
c 
-5.03%
b 
-3.39%
b 
p-value (0.001) (0.088) (0.030) (0.025) 
n 91 50 11 30 
Rational (1) -1.36% 0.72% -2.85% -3.22%
b 
p-value (0.164) (0.530) (0.632) (0.048) 
N 43 20 3 20 
Overconfident (2) -3.37%
a 
-2.59%
a 
-5.85%
b 
-3.73% 
p-value (0.001) (0.007) (0.030) (0.272) 
n 48 30 8 10 
Differential (1)-(2) 2.01% 3.31%
b 
3.00% 0.52% 
p-value (0.136) (0.026) (0.642) (0.886) 
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Table 3.11 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Rational and Overconfident Acquirers by Stock Options Proxy and Deal Features 
This table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) surrounding the announcement of rational and overconfident 
acquirers by stock options‘ proxy. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
ARit = Rit - Rmt 
where Rit is the return on firm i at time t and Rmt is the value-weighted Market Index Return (FT-All Share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms 
listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Managers characterized by the business press with the words ‗confident‘, ‗confidence‘, ‗optimistic‘, 
‗optimism‘, ‗certain‘ and ‗positive are classified as overconfident managers. Those characterized as ‗reliable‘, ‗cautious‘, ‗prudent‘, ‗conservative‘, 
‗practical‘, ‗sensible‘, ‗frugal‘, ‗careful‘ or ‗steady‘ are classified as rational managers. All Panels shows the returns to rational and overconfident 
bidders by target‘s ownership status (public or private) and the method of payment (all-cash and non-cash (i.e., any other type of offer)). Panels A (B) 
shows the CARs for value (glamour) bidders. Acquirers with higher (lower) than median book-to-market ratio (a month prior to bid announcement) are 
categorized as value (glamour) bidders. Panels C (D) shows the CARs for small (big) bidders. Acquirers with larger (smaller) than median size (a 
month prior to bid announcement) are categorized as big (small) bidders. Panels E (F) shows the CARs for high (low) relative size deals. The relative 
size of the deal is defined as the deal value divided by the market value of the acquirer a month before the announcement date. Deals above (below) the 
median relative size are classified as high (low) RS. Panels G (H) shows the CARs for domestic (foreign) bidders. Acquisitions with bidders and targets 
originated from the same (different) country are defined as domestic (foreign) acquisitions. Panels I (J) shows the CARs for diversifying (non-
diversifying) bidders. An acquisition is defined as diversifying (focused) when the acquirer‘s two-digit SIC code is different (the same) from that of the 
target. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘, respectively. The Differential (1)-(2) represents the differences in 
mean CARs for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of rational versus overconfident bidders. P-values are reported in brackets. 
The sample size n is presented below the p-value. 
 
Panel A: Value Bidders 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Glamour Bidders 
 
 
 
 
  All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed   All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed 
Rational 1.51%
b 
2.12%
a 
-0.66% 1.53%
b 
-1.42% 1.88% Rational 0.98% 1.89%
a 
-2.25% 0.96% -2.44% 1.20% 
p-value (0.017) (0.004) (0.589) (0.038) (0.593) (0.112) p-value (0.145) (0.008) (0.169) (0.308) (0.474) (0.217) 
n 110 86 24 59 6 45 n 86 67 19 33 3 50 
Overconfident 0.82%
c 
1.36%
a 
-2.40% 1.21%
b 
-0.47% 0.54% Overconfident 0.44% 1.22%
a 
-4.20%
a 
0.26% -3.20% 0.99%
c 
p-value (0.091) (0.008) (0.110) (0.037) (0.896) (0.496) p-value (0.274) (0.002) (0.002) (0.642) (0.255) (0.078) 
n 155 133 22 73 5 77 n 179 153 26 84 9 86 
Differential (1)-(2) 0.69% 0.76% 1.73% 0.31% -0.95% 1.34% Differential (1)-(2) 0.54% 0.67% 1.95% 0.70% 0.76% 0.21% 
p-value (0.386) (0.385) (0.361) (0.734) (0.828) (0.342) p-value (0.486) (0.403) (0.329) (0.521) (0.850) (0.852) 
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Table 3.11-Continued 
 
Panel C: Small Bidders 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Large Bidders 
 
 
 
 
  All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed   All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed 
Rational 2.47%
a 
2.58%
a 
1.31% 2.27%
b 
-2.54% 3.20%
a 
Rational 0.10% 1.24%
c 
-1.97%
b 
0.42% -0.78% -0.13% 
p-value (0.001) (0.001) (0.688) (0.024) (0.401) (0.005) p-value (0.850) (0.055) (0.044) (0.478) (0.782) (0.894) 
n 97 89 8 45 5 47 n 99 64 35 47 4 48 
Overconfident 1.25%
a 
1.59%
a 
-2.79% 1.35%
b 
-3.79% 1.64%
b 
Overconfident -0.03% 0.92%
b 
-3.59%
a 
0.11% -0.14% -0.17% 
p-value (0.005) (0.000) (0.134) (0.017) (0.250) (0.012) p-value (0.946) (0.034) (0.003) (0.849) (0.957) (0.809) 
n 168 155 13 75 8 85 n 166 131 35 82 6 78 
Differential (1)-(2) 1.22% 0.98% 4.10% 0.91% 1.25% 1.56% Differential (1)-(2) 0.13% 0.32% 1.62% 0.31% -0.64% 0.04% 
p-value (0.147) (0.250) (0.276) (0.417) (0.765) (0.220) p-value (0.849) (0.679) (0.270) (0.706) (0.863) (0.975) 
Panel E: Low Relative Size Deals 
 
 
 
 
Panel F: High Relative Size Deals 
 
 
 
  All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed   All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed 
Rational 0.75% 0.95%
c 
-1.33% 0.49% 0.00%
a 
1.36% Rational 1.75%
b 
3.36%
a 
-1.37% 2.50%
b 
-0.98% 1.63% 
p-value (0.135) (0.078) (0.285) (0.374) (0.000) (0.149) p-value (0.020) (0.000) (0.246) (0.030) (0.612) (0.137) 
n 93 85 8 54 1 38 n 103 68 35 38 8 57 
Overconfident 0.91%
b 
1.10%
a 
-1.88% 0.34% 3.36% 1.43%
b 
Overconfident 0.30% 1.52%
a 
-3.82%
a 
1.18%
c 
-4.45%
c 
0.16% 
p-value (0.015) (0.003) (0.367) (0.492) (0.216) (0.014) p-value (0.548) (0.005) (0.001) (0.079) (0.095) (0.827) 
n 172 161 11 89 4 79 n 162 125 37 68 10 84 
Differential (1)-(2) -0.16% -0.15% 0.55% 0.15% 0.00%
 
-0.07% Differential (1)-(2) 1.45% 1.83%
b 
2.45% 1.33% 3.48% 1.47% 
p-value (0.798) (0.812) (0.813) (0.841) (0.000) (0.946) p-value (0.107) (0.079) (0.122) (0.308) (0.266) (0.265) 
Panel G: Domestic Target Firms 
 
 
 
 
Panel H: Foreign Target Firms 
 
 
 
 
  All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed   All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed 
Rational 1.97%
a 
2.58%
a 
-1.03% 2.08%
a 
-2.50% 2.40%
b 
Rational -0.12% 0.64% -1.71% 0.19% 0.00%
 
-0.71% 
p-value (0.001) (0.000) (0.511) (0.007) (0.220) (0.012) p-value (0.853) (0.410) (0.157) (0.826) (0.000) (0.496) 
n 131 109 22 55 8 68 n 65 44 21 37 1 27 
Overconfident 0.60% 1.39%
a 
-3.90%
a 
0.45% -3.81%
c 
1.15%
b 
Overconfident 0.65% 1.06%
c 
-2.09% 1.07% 7.29% -0.36% 
p-value (0.106) (0.000) (0.003) (0.373) (0.079) (0.031) p-value (0.255) (0.089) (0.109) (0.111) (0.260) (0.734) 
n 227 193 34 92 12 123 n 107 93 14 65 2 40 
Differential (1)-(2) 1.37%
c 
1.18% 2.87% 1.64%
c 
1.31% 1.26% Differential (1)-(2) -0.77% -0.43% 0.39% -0.87% 0.00%
a 
-0.35% 
p-value (0.051) (0.102) (0.151) (0.069) (0.634) (0.243) p-value (0.373) (0.665) (0.820) (0.423) (0.000) (0.810) 
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Table 3.11-Continued 
 
Panel I: Diversifying Deals 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel J: Non-Diversifying Deals 
 
 
 
 
  All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed   All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed 
Rational 0.66% 1.32%
b 
-2.13% 0.22% 0.00% 1.46% Rational 1.92%
a 
2.81%
a 
-0.75% 2.82%
b 
-0.38% 1.58% 
p-value (0.239) (0.022) (0.191) (0.657) (0.000) (0.162) p-value (0.009) (0.002) (0.541) (0.016) (0.780) (0.150) 
n 100 81 19 53 1 46 n 96 72 24 39 8 49 
Overconfident 0.36% 0.88%
b 
-3.46%
b 
0.87%
c 
-2.06% -0.11% Overconfident 0.90%
c 
1.77%
a 
-3.30%
b 
0.47% -2.29% 1.63%
b 
p-value (0.371) (0.030) (0.019) (0.079) (0.631) (0.872) p-value (0.062) (0.000) (0.016) (0.493) (0.384) (0.018) 
n 176 155 21 92 4 80 n 158 131 27 65 10 83 
Differential (1)-(2) 0.30% 0.44% 1.33% -0.65% 0.00% 1.56% Differential (1)-(2) 1.02% 1.04% 2.55% 2.35%
c 
1.90% -0.05% 
p-value (0.661) (0.527) (0.525) (0.354) (0.000) (0.202) p-value (0.243) (0.291) (0.155) (0.077) (0.512) (0.969) 
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Table 3.12 Correlation Matrix of Control Variables 
This Table presents the correlations coefficient among all the variable that are used in 
the multivariate analysis. Overconfidence variables include the following dummies: Stock 
Options dummy which takes the value of 1 if the manager holds the options until the year 
before the expiration date and 0 otherwise. Multiple acquirers‘ dummy which takes the value of 
1 if a manager conducts five or more acquisitions within a 3-year period and 0 otherwise. The 
interaction proxy variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1, if managers are classified as 
overconfident with both the stock options and the multiple acquirers‘ proxies and zero 
otherwise. Business Press dummy which takes the value of 1 if managers are characterized by 
the business press with the words ‗confident‘, ‗confidence‘, ‗optimistic‘, ‗optimism‘, ‗certain‘ 
and ‗positive and zero otherwise. Target ownership status dummy takes the value of one if the 
target is private and zero otherwise; cash (stock) deals is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 for acquisitions financed with 100% cash (stock) and 0 otherwise. The size of 
acquirers (Log MV) is the natural logarithm of bidder‘s market value a month before the deal‘s 
announcement. Diversifying deals is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the acquirer‘s 
two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target and 0 otherwise. Bidder‘s book-to-market 
is measured by the bidder‘s net book value of assets divided by its market value a month before 
the announcement of the deal; a deal‘s relative size is the ratio between target and bidder size. 
Merger activity dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the deal is announced during a high 
activity M&A period, and zero otherwise. This categorization is based on aggregate quarterly 
M&A statistics from the UK National Statistics Office.  Each quarter is categorised as an active 
period if the number of deals is more than the median and passive otherwise. Finally, other 
explanatory variables include: the acquirer‘s lagged excess return for 180 days prior to the bid‘s 
announcement; and the market portfolio return (FT-All Share) for the same 180-day period 
prior to the announcement
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Table 3.12-contniued 
  
Overconfident 
(Stock Options) 
Overconfident 
(Multiple 
Acquirers) 
Overconfident 
(Business 
Press) 
Private Cash Stock 
Log 
(MV) 
BTMV 
Relative 
Size 
Diversifying 
Merger 
Activity 
(1=Active, 
high) 
FTALLSH 
Ri-
Rm 
Overconfident 
(Stock Options) 
1 
            
Overconfident 
(Multiple 
Acquirers) 
0.340 1 
           
Overconfident 
(Business 
Press) 
-0.037 0.157 1 
          
Private -0.075 0.097 0.065 1          
Cash 0.003 0.001 0.017 0.008 1         
Stock 0.024 -0.009 -0.051 -0.293 -0.223 1        
Log (MV) -0.026 -0.094 0.140 -0.228 0.137 -0.099 1       
BTMV 0.060 -0.108 -0.030 -0.062 0.024 0.066 -0.223 1      
Relative Size 0.034 -0.037 -0.088 -0.108 -0.095 0.121 -0.231 0.255 1     
Diversifying -0.043 0.016 0.006 0.008 0.014 -0.016 -0.003 0.004 -0.008 1    
Merger 
Activity 
(1=Active, 
high) 
-0.032 0.031 -0.040 0.042 0.032 -0.027 -0.022 -0.010 0.016 0.013 1 
  
FTALLSH 0.033 -0.051 0.027 -0.012 0.042 0.001 0.023 -0.053 -0.008 0.038 0.288 1  
Ri-Rm -0.028 0.041 -0.002 -0.002 -0.087 0.074 0.003 -0.041 0.005 0.002 -0.047 0.026 1 
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Table 3.13 Regressions of CARs on Proxies of Managerial Overconfidence and Deal 
Features 
This table presents regression estimates of the acquirer‘s five-day cumulative abnormal return 
controlling for managerial overconfidence effect and other deal and acquirer characteristics. 
Overconfidence variables include the following dummies: Stock Options dummy which takes 
the value of 1 if the manager holds the options until the year before the expiration date and 0 
otherwise. Multiple acquirers‘ dummy which takes the value of 1 if a manager conducts five or 
more acquisitions within a 3-year period and 0 otherwise. The interaction proxy variable is a 
dummy that takes the value of 1, if managers are classified as overconfident with both the stock 
options and the multiple acquirers‘ proxies and zero otherwise. Business Press dummy which 
takes the value of 1 if managers are characterized by the business press with the words 
‗confident‘, ‗confidence‘, ‗optimistic‘, ‗optimism‘, ‗certain‘ and ‗positive and zero otherwise. 
Target ownership status dummy takes the value of one if the target is private and zero 
otherwise; cash (stock) deals is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for acquisitions 
financed with 100% cash (stock) and 0 otherwise. The size of acquirers (Log MV) is the natural 
logarithm of bidder‘s market value a month before the deal‘s announcement. Diversifying deals 
is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the acquirer‘s two-digit SIC code is different from 
that of the target and 0 otherwise. Bidder‘s book-to-market is measured by the bidder‘s net book 
value of assets divided by its market value a month before the announcement of the deal; a 
deal‘s relative size is the ratio between target and bidder size. Merger activity dummy variable 
takes the value of 1 if the deal is announced during a high activity M&A period, and zero 
otherwise. This categorization is based on aggregate quarterly M&A statistics from the UK 
National Statistics Office.  Each quarter is categorised as an active period if the number of deals 
is more than the median and passive otherwise. Finally, other explanatory variables include: the 
acquirer‘s lagged excess return for 180 days prior to the bid‘s announcement; and the market 
portfolio return (FT-All Share) for the same 180-day period prior to the announcement. P-
values are reported in brackets. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ‗a‘, 
‗b‘ and ‗c‘, respectively.  
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Table 3.13-Continued 
       
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept -0.003 0.012
a
 0.029
b
 0.016
a
 -0.005 0.013
a
 0.045
b
 
 
(0.868) (0.000) (0.042) (0.000) (0.836) (0.003) (0.014) 
Overconfident deals (stock options) 
(Dummy = 1, if the acquirer‘s manager 
is overconfident) 
 
-0.011
b
 -0.009
c
 
    
  
(0.017) (0.058) 
    
Overconfident deals (multiple acquirers) 
(Dummy = 1, if the acquirer‘s manager 
is overconfident) 
   
-0.007
a
 -0.006
b
 
  
    
(0.026) (0.028) 
  
Overconfident deals (business press) 
(Dummy = 1, if the acquirer‘s manager 
is overconfident) 
     
-0.006 -0.010
c
 
      
(0.217) (0.067) 
Private target deals (Dummy = 1, if the 
target is a private firm) 
0.032
a
 
 
0.014
c
 
 
0.033
a
 
 
0.020
b
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.013) 
Cash deals (Dummy = 1, if the deal is 
settled either in cash and/or debt) 
0.001 
 
-0.007
c
 
 
0.000 
 
0.001 
 
(0.791) 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.946) 
 
(0.800) 
Common stock deals (Dummy = 1, if the 
deal is settled in shares only) 
0.02 
 
-0.023
c
 
 
0.021 
 
-0.023 
 
(0.162) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.152) 
 
(0.14) 
Diversifying deals (Dummy = 1, If 
target and acquirer belong to different 
industry) 
0.003 
 
0.000 
 
0.002 
 
-0.014
a
 
 
(0.384) 
 
(0.922) 
 
(0.449) 
 
(0.009) 
B/M 0.005 
 
0.001 
 
0.005 
 
0.001 
 
(0.730) 
 
(0.531) 
 
(0.731) 
 
(0.838) 
Relative size 0.007 
 
-0.014 
 
0.007 
 
-0.037
a
 
 
(0.551) 
 
(0.316) 
 
(0.558) 
 
(0.008) 
Log (MV) -0.010
b
 
 
-0.011
a
 
 
-0.009
c
 
 
-0.013
a
 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.079) 
 
(0.000) 
FTALLSH (-180,-3) 0.059
a
 
 
0.024 
 
0.056
a
 
 
0.034 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.176) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.135) 
Ri-Rm (-180,-3) 0.006  
0.013 
 
0.005 
 
-0.005 
 
(0.172) 
 
(0.124) 
 
(0.205) 
 
(0.601) 
High Merger Activity (Dummy=1, if the 
deal is announced in a quarter of high 
M&A activities) 
-0.004 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.005 
 
(0.144) 
 
(0.792) 
 
(0.250) 
 
(0.301) 
N 3,038 848 831 3,099 2,935 530 521 
F-Statistics 6.94 4.69 3.16 7.89 6.08 1.43 5.14 
Adj. R² 5.11% 0.67% 5.65% 0.16% 5.25% 0.29% 12.66% 
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Table 3.14 Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions (CTPRs) of Long-Run Stock Returns 
using the Fama-French 3-Factor Model by Stock Options Proxy 
Monthly average abnormal returns (in percent) of bidders for one and three years following the 
announcement of bids are reported by the target ownership status (private (Panel B) or public 
(Panel C)) and method of payment (cash, stock and mixed offers) for rational and overconfident 
acquirers as classified by the stock options proxy. Managers who hold stock options until the 
year before the expiration date are classified as overconfident. All others are classified as 
rational. The calendar-time excess returns reported in the table are estimated using the Fama-
French 3-factor model with the following regression:  
ittitiftmtiiftpt HMLhSMBsRRaRR   )(  
The value of alpha (i) represents the average monthly excess returns for each sample group in 
the table. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the announcement month of successful bid and 
remain for 36 months and the portfolios are rebalanced. Statistical significance of returns 
(different from zero) are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘ at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. P-
values are reported in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The number 
of observations, the number of calendar observations and the R
2
 of each regression are also 
reported. The table also reports Rational (1) minus Overconfident (2) zero investment portfolio 
alphas. 
 
 
Stock Options Proxy (1 Year) Stock Options Proxy (3 Years) 
  All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed 
Panel A: All Targets 
All -0.09% -0.28% -1.23%
b 
0.14% -0.10% -0.12% -0.62% -0.12% 
p-value (0.683) (0.259) (0.029) (0.628) (0.564) (0.576) (0.152) (0.577) 
Obs. 848 372 35 441 848 372 35 441 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 75.16% 67.36% 17.75% 63.34% 78.07% 74.32% 22.61% 72.63% 
Rational (1) 0.11% 0.10% -0.65% 0.11% -0.09% 0.01% -0.75% -0.15% 
p-value (0.642) (0.715) (0.261) (0.710) (0.667) (0.963) (0.126) (0.514) 
Obs. 601 263 23 315 601 263 23 315 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 68.28% 55.97% 6.61% 57.76% 73.34% 68.13% 13.95% 67.76% 
Overconfident (2) -0.69%
b 
-0.73% -1.24%
b 
0.19% -0.28% -0.36% -0.78% -0.25% 
p-value (0.046) (0.065) (0.042) (0.729) (0.337) (0.308) (0.191) (0.499) 
Obs. 247 109 12 126 247 109 12 126 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 56.91% 37.77% 15.67% 37.94% 60.24% 42.83% 24.14% 50.10% 
Differential (1) - (2) 0.80%
b 
0.84%
c 
0.59% -0.07% 0.19% 0.37% 0.03% 0.10% 
p-value (0.031) (0.077) (0.481) (0.893) (0.568) (0.374) (0.966) (0.808) 
R
2
 2.67% 1.24% 4.11% 7.47% 4.51% 1.12% 4.36% 7.39% 
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Table 3.14-Continued 
Panel B: Private Targets 
All -0.20% -0.21% -1.60%
b 
-0.15% -0.13% -0.07% -2.44%
b 
-0.29% 
p-value (0.353) (0.473) (0.027) (0.557) (0.486) (0.746) (0.012) (0.179) 
Obs. 722 318 14 390 722 318 14 390 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 70.24% 55.22% 6.90% 65.60% 75.87% 68.56% 11.81% 72.46% 
Rational (1) 0.02% 0.21% -1.32%
b 
-0.18% -0.07% 0.14% -2.65%
a 
-0.27% 
p-value (0.947) (0.528) (0.034) (0.534) (0.736) (0.567) (0.006) (0.253) 
Obs. 522 230 10 282 522 230 10 282 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 63.79% 45.15% 5.83% 58.55% 72.40% 63.18% 11.16% 68.35% 
Overconfident (2) -0.86%
b 
-0.92%
b 
-0.89% 0.18% -0.37% -0.42% -0.52% -0.34% 
p-value (0.011) (0.027) (0.138) (0.721) (0.233) (0.257) (0.403) (0.327) 
Obs. 200 88 4 108 200 88 4 108 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 53.13% 33.16% 4.61% 34.14% 51.71% 38.57% 8.69% 43.01% 
Differential (1) - (2) 0.88%
b 
1.13%
b 
-0.43% -0.36% 0.31% 0.56% -2.13%
c 
0.07% 
p-value (0.013) (0.019) (0.608) (0.501) (0.376) (0.173) (0.058) (0.857) 
R
2
 3.50% 0.69% 1.67% 5.17% 1.36% 1.00% 2.31% 2.83% 
Panel C: Public Targets 
All 0.43% -0.38% -0.53% 0.39% -0.01% -0.14% -0.34% 0.35% 
p-value (0.240) (0.366) (0.219) (0.478) (0.968) (0.655) (0.463) (0.284) 
Obs. 126 54 21 51 126 54 21 51 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 55.73% 42.52% 12.93% 36.81% 60.40% 56.57% 16.47% 46.26% 
Rational (1) 0.52% -0.30% -0.30% 0.68% -0.11% -0.21% -0.06% 0.17% 
p-value (0.188) (0.513) (0.478) (0.176) (0.702) (0.567) (0.898) (0.641) 
Obs. 79 33 13 33 79 33 13 33 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 43.04% 28.45% 3.82% 25.64% 52.41% 49.29% 14.62% 40.18% 
Overconfident (2) 0.39% -0.29% -0.75%
c 
-0.47% 0.42% -0.03% -0.48% 0.09% 
p-value (0.378) (0.466) (0.065) (0.440) (0.226) (0.931) (0.317) (0.856) 
Obs. 47 21 8 18 47 21 8 18 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 23.85% 18.71% 10.02% 21.68% 41.38% 33.54% 15.11% 28.66% 
Differential (1) - (2) 0.13% -0.01% 0.45% 1.15% -0.53% -0.18% 0.42% 0.08% 
p-value (0.822) (0.983) (0.444) (0.154) (0.197) (0.711) (0.466) (0.900) 
R
2
 4.79% 4.73% 2.70% 4.42% 4.83% 5.94% 0.21% 5.54% 
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Table 3.15 Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions (CTPRs) of Long-Run Stock Returns using the Fama-French 3-Factor Model by Stock 
Options Proxy for Various Bidder and Deal Characteristics 
Monthly average abnormal returns (in percent) of bidders for one (Panel A) and three (Panel B) years following the announcement of bids are reported 
by various acquirer and deal characteristics (value, glamour, small and big bidders, low and high relative size deals, domestic, foreign, diversifying and 
non-diversifying deals) for rational and overconfident acquirers as classified by the stock options proxy. Managers who hold stock options until the year 
before the expiration date are classified as overconfident. All others are classified as rational.  Acquirers with higher (lower) than median book-to-
market ratio (a month prior to bid announcement) are categorized as value (glamour) bidders. Acquirers with larger (smaller) than median size (a month 
prior to bid announcement) are categorized as big (small) bidders. The relative size of the deal is defined as the deal value divided by the market value 
of the acquirer a month before the announcement date. Deals above (below) the median relative size are classified as high (low).  Acquisitions with 
bidders and targets originated from the same (different) country are defined as domestic (foreign) acquisitions. An acquisition is defined as diversifying 
(focused) when the acquirer‘s two-digit SIC code is different (the same) from that of the target. The calendar-time excess returns reported in the table 
are estimated using the Fama-French 3-factor model with the following regression:  
ittitiftmtiiftpt HMLhSMBsRRaRR   )(  
The value of alpha (i) represents the average monthly excess returns for each sample group in the table. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the 
announcement month of successful bid and remain for 36 months and the portfolios are rebalanced. Statistical significance of returns (different from 
zero) are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘ at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. P-values are reported in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity. The number of observations, the number of calendar observations and the R
2
 of each regression are also reported. The table also 
reports Rational (1) minus Overconfident (2) zero investment portfolio alphas. 
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Table 3.15-Continued 
Panel A: 1 Year 
  Value Glamour Small Big LowRS HighRS Domestic Foreign Diversifying Non-Diversifying 
All 0.04% -0.08% 0.71%
a 
-0.21% -0.19% -0.07% 0.01% -0.30% -0.07% -0.17% 
p-value (0.877) (0.777) (0.004) (0.356) (0.491) (0.793) (0.967) (0.295) (0.803) (0.540) 
Obs. 424 423 424 424 424 424 566 282 447 401 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 
R
2
 62.09% 66.21% 64.61% 73.12% 63.72% 66.03% 66.50% 66.75% 66.31% 64.50% 
Rational (1) 0.15% 0.03% 1.09%
a 
-0.03% -0.10% 0.19% 0.10% -0.03% 0.09% 0.27% 
p-value (0.627) (0.922) (0.001) (0.903) (0.702) (0.569) (0.708) (0.912) (0.754) (0.409) 
Obs. 291 309 291 310 313 288 394 207 325 276 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 
R
2
 54.37% 63.50% 50.47% 66.07% 59.16% 52.28% 58.59% 61.43% 62.56% 45.91% 
Overconfident (2) -0.52% -0.20% -0.26% -1.02% -0.41% -0.55% -0.27% -0.90%
b 
-0.58% -0.83%
b 
p-value (0.165) (0.684) (0.543) (0.028) (0.342) (0.177) (0.453) (0.066) (0.214) (0.045) 
Obs. 133 114 133 114 111 136 172 75 122 125 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 
R
2
 42.13% 42.61% 40.33% 43.33% 48.00% 40.59% 52.55% 39.76% 40.71% 48.76% 
Differential (1) - (2) 0.67% 0.23% 1.35%
a 
0.99%
b 
0.30% 0.74% 0.37% 0.87%
c 
0.68% 1.10%
b 
p-value (0.147) (0.667) (0.010) (0.044) (0.484) (0.146) (0.371) (0.099) (0.187) (0.031) 
R
2
 3.22% 0.91% 1.44% 3.18% 3.18% 0.92% 3.07% 1.14% 6.29% 5.38% 
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Table 3.15-Continued 
Panel B: 3 Years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Value Glamour Small Big LowRS HighRS Domestic Foreign Diversifying Non-Diversifying 
All 0.11% -0.41%
c 
0.38%
c 
-0.24% -0.13% -0.32% -0.05% -0.30% -0.20% -0.20% 
p-value (0.621) (0.078) (0.055) (0.297) (0.542) (0.153) (0.786) (0.260) (0.344) (0.525) 
Obs. 408 403 408 403 404 407 539 272 426 385 
Calendar Obs. 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 67.53% 73.20% 71.30% 72.96% 72.42% 72.14% 73.97% 68.85% 72.58% 61.89% 
Rational (1) 0.20% -0.45%
c 
0.70%
b 
-0.21% -0.09% -0.26% -0.14% -0.12% -0.14% 0.02% 
p-value (0.396) (0.057) (0.011) (0.390) (0.674) (0.346) (0.506) (0.662) (0.531) (0.960) 
Obs. 277 295 276 296 298 274 373 199 309 263 
Calendar Obs. 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 65.75% 68.67% 58.22% 68.42% 68.21% 61.44% 67.31% 64.94% 68.85% 45.77% 
Overconfident (2) -0.26% -0.07% -0.01% -0.37% -0.16% -0.31% 0.19% -0.56% -0.70%
c 
-0.21% 
p-value (0.401) (0.829) (0.977) (0.221) (0.634) (0.348) (0.544) (0.117) (0.073) (0.464) 
Obs. 131 108 132 107 106 133 166 73 117 122 
Calendar Obs. 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 41.15% 59.57% 36.05% 60.34% 56.14% 47.55% 51.83% 55.12% 44.70% 60.67% 
Differential (1) - (2) 0.46% -0.38% 0.71% 0.16% 0.07% 0.05% -0.32% 0.44% 0.56% 0.22% 
p-value (0.194) (0.331) (0.105) (0.653) (0.845) (0.902) (0.357) (0.280) (0.177) (0.644) 
R
2
 6.45% 6.99% 5.67% 6.77% 4.56% 2.23% 3.78% 4.17% 0.50% 7.88% 
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Table 3.16 Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions (CTPRs) of Long-Run Stock Returns 
using the Fama-French 3-Factor Model by Multiple Acquirers Proxy 
Monthly average abnormal returns (in percent) of bidders for one and three years following the 
announcement of bids are reported by the target ownership status (private (Panel B) or public 
(Panel C)) and method of payment (cash, stock and mixed offers) for rational and overconfident 
acquirers as classified by the multiple acquirers proxy. Individual CEOs who made 5 or more 
acquisitions within a 3 year period are called overconfident. All others are classified as rational. 
The calendar-time excess returns reported in the table are estimated using the Fama-French 3-
factor model with the following regression:  
ittitiftmtiiftpt HMLhSMBsRRaRR   )(  
The value of alpha (i) represents the average monthly excess returns for each sample group in 
the table. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the announcement month of successful bid and 
remain for 36 months and the portfolios are rebalanced. Statistical significance of returns 
(different from zero) are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘ at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. P-
values are reported in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The number 
of observations, the number of calendar observations and the R
2
 of each regression are also 
reported. The table also reports Rational (1) minus Overconfident (2) zero investment portfolio 
alphas. 
 
 
Multiple Acquirers Proxy (1 Year) Multiple Acquirers Proxy (3 Years) 
  All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed 
Panel A: All Targets 
All -0.13% -0.24% -0.68% -0.05% -0.15% -0.05% -0.51% -0.25% 
p-value (0.408) (0.197) (0.272) (0.814) (0.224) (0.713) (0.241) (0.176) 
Obs. 3,099 1,295 204 1,600 3,099 1,295 204 1,600 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 214 215 214 215 
R
2
 82.80% 75.94% 32.97% 70.67% 87.24% 85.02% 47.74% 78.46% 
Rational (1) -0.12% -0.23% -0.47% 0.04% -0.12% 0.00% -0.49% -0.19% 
p-value (0.456) (0.274) (0.425) (0.867) (0.360) (0.977) (0.280) (0.285) 
Obs. 2,256 931 166 1,159 2,256 931 166 1,159 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 214 215 214 215 
R
2
 79.15% 66.58% 32.89% 62.33% 85.94% 80.43% 45.01% 77.03% 
Overconfident (2) -0.29% -0.30% 0.35% -0.43% -0.58%
c 
-1.08% -0.56% -0.73%
b 
p-value (0.300) (0.290) (0.666) (0.204) (0.074) (0.169) (0.410) (0.029) 
Obs. 843 364 38 441 843 364 38 441 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 70.72% 62.43% 14.89% 64.31% 70.97% 45.31% 19.37% 64.49% 
Differential (1) - (2) 0.17% 0.07% -0.82% 0.47% 0.47% 1.09% 0.06% 0.53%
c 
p-value (0.525) (0.837) (0.387) (0.195) (0.133) (0.161) (0.935) (0.098) 
R
2
 11.88% 4.00% 1.01% 5.12% 16.66% 12.50% 1.18% 9.71% 
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Table 3.16-Continued 
Panel B: Private Targets 
All -0.11% -0.24% 0.37% -0.20% -0.03% 0.08% -0.25% -0.33% 
p-value (0.598) (0.295) (0.649) (0.456) (0.838) (0.597) (0.711) (0.131) 
Obs. 2,723 1,141 106 1,476 2,723 1,141 106 1,476 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 214 215 214 215 
R
2
 76.17% 65.66% 30.03% 70.02% 84.23% 79.82% 34.89% 76.18% 
Rational (1) -0.14% -0.35% 0.38% -0.03% 0.01% 0.09% -0.12% -0.24% 
p-value (0.535) (0.207) (0.621) (0.908) (0.972) (0.641) (0.871) (0.265) 
Obs. 1,953 805 84 1,064 1,953 805 84 1,064 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 214 215 214 215 
R
2
 70.94% 53.74% 26.15% 63.33% 83.94% 71.56% 28.22% 75.93% 
Overconfident (2) -0.21% -0.13% -0.83% -0.49% -0.50% -0.87% -0.78% -0.78%
c 
p-value (0.480) (0.649) (0.457) (0.183) (0.136) (0.268) (0.345) (0.027) 
Obs. 770 336 22 412 770 336 22 412 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 68.14% 59.56% 9.42% 60.65% 68.26% 42.41% 15.42% 62.57% 
Differential (1) - (2) 0.07% -0.21% 1.22% 0.46% 0.51% 0.96% 0.64% 0.55%
c 
p-value (0.807) (0.571) (0.354) (0.230) (0.161) (0.262) (0.528) (0.089) 
R
2
 5.99% 3.30% 1.07% 2.03% 10.90% 9.83% 0.97% 5.82% 
Panel C: Public Targets 
All -0.10% 0.09% -1.12%
c 
-0.48% -0.24% -0.25% -0.69%
c 
-0.15% 
p-value (0.622) (0.746) (0.056) (0.222) (0.128) (0.195) (0.070) (0.522) 
Obs. 376 154 98 124 376 154 98 124 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 69.72% 59.62% 25.73% 39.68% 78.92% 75.21% 48.87% 63.81% 
Rational (1) 0.03% 0.26% -1.15%
c 
-0.26% -0.18% -0.12% -0.57% -0.16% 
p-value (0.879) (0.367) (0.062) (0.573) (0.271) (0.562) (0.153) (0.509) 
Obs. 303 126 82 95 303 126 82 95 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 65.15% 57.90% 24.12% 31.85% 76.19% 69.89% 47.39% 61.13% 
Overconfident (2) -1.15% -0.89%
c 
-0.46% -0.66% -0.52% -0.95%
b 
-0.68%
a 
0.02% 
p-value (0.035) (0.057) (0.283) (0.246) (0.125) (0.012) (0.006) (0.972) 
Obs. 73 28 16 29 73 28 16 29 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 32.73% 23.71% 9.92% 12.97% 52.62% 46.80% 23.24% 26.46% 
Differential (1) - (2) 1.18%
b 
1.15%
b 
-0.69% 0.40% 0.33% 0.83%
c 
0.11% -0.17% 
p-value (0.045) (0.031) (0.328) (0.595) (0.379) (0.059) (0.805) (0.710) 
R
2
 1.23% 7.55% 7.88% 4.71% 2.26% 5.61% 22.57% 2.61% 
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Table 3.17 Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions (CTPRs) of Long-Run Stock Returns using the Fama-French 3-Factor Model by Multiple 
Acquirers Proxy for Various Bidder and Deal Characteristics 
Monthly average abnormal returns (in percent) of bidders for one (Panel A) and three (Panel B) years following the announcement of bids are reported 
by various acquirer and deal characteristics (value, glamour, small and big bidders, low and high relative size deals, domestic, foreign, diversifying and 
non-diversifying deals) for rational and overconfident acquirers as classified by the multiple acquirers proxy. Individual CEOs who made 5 or more 
acquisitions within a 3 year period are called overconfident. All others are classified as rational.  Acquirers with higher (lower) than median book-to-
market ratio (a month prior to bid announcement) are categorized as value (glamour) bidders. Acquirers with larger (smaller) than median size (a month 
prior to bid announcement) are categorized as big (small) bidders. The relative size of the deal is defined as the deal value divided by the market value 
of the acquirer a month before the announcement date. Deals above (below) the median relative size are classified as high (low).  Acquisitions with 
bidders and targets originated from the same (different) country are defined as domestic (foreign) acquisitions. An acquisition is defined as diversifying 
(focused) when the acquirer‘s two-digit SIC code is different (the same) from that of the target. The calendar-time excess returns reported in the table 
are estimated using the Fama-French 3-factor model with the following regression:  
ittitiftmtiiftpt HMLhSMBsRRaRR   )(  
The value of alpha (i) represents the average monthly excess returns for each sample group in the table. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the 
announcement month of successful bid and remain for 36 months and the portfolios are rebalanced. Statistical significance of returns (different from 
zero) are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘ at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. P-values are reported in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity. The number of observations, the number of calendar observations and the R
2
 of each regression are also reported. The table also 
reports Rational (1) minus Overconfident (2) zero investment portfolio alphas. 
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Table 3.17-Continued 
Panel B: 1 Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Value Glamour Small Big LowRS HighRS Domestic Foreign Diversifying Non-Diversifying 
All 0.01% -0.29% 0.36% -0.16% -0.24% 0.09% 0.00% -0.25% -0.30% 0.05% 
p-value (0.966) (0.148) (0.187) (0.320) (0.299) (0.665) (0.980) (0.210) (0.125) (0.797) 
Obs. 1,535 1,535 1,522 1,548 1,550 1,549 2,122 977 1,518 1,581 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 
R
2
 72.40% 76.50% 66.49% 81.67% 71.44% 71.67% 79.98% 73.92% 73.43% 74.98% 
Rational (1) -0.05% -0.26% -0.11% -0.12% -0.25% 0.06% 0.04% -0.29% -0.26% -0.02% 
p-value (0.830) (0.209) (0.700) (0.480) (0.303) (0.781) (0.823) (0.194) (0.204) (0.946) 
Obs. 1,144 1,088 1,203 1,029 1,010 1,246 1,561 695 1,101 1,155 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 
R
2
 66.48% 72.49% 65.19% 77.92% 66.82% 65.70% 74.19% 68.37% 69.03% 69.91% 
Overconfident (2) -0.09% -0.36% 1.40%
a 
-0.48% -0.43% 0.16% 0.00% -0.68%
b 
-0.59%
c 
0.03% 
p-value (0.759) (0.300) (0.000) (0.108) (0.196) (0.703) (0.997) (0.049) (0.072) (0.934) 
Obs. 391 447 319 519 540 303 561 282 417 426 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 
R
2
 53.95% 62.39% 51.12% 67.92% 62.54% 49.15% 65.46% 58.23% 60.55% 60.57% 
Differential (1) - (2) 0.04% 0.10% -1.51%
a 
0.37% 0.17% -0.09% 0.04% 0.39% 0.32% -0.04% 
p-value (0.897) (0.761) (0.000) (0.204) (0.583) (0.834) (0.901) (0.269) (0.326) (0.901) 
R
2
 6.83% 5.42% 6.98% 11.69% 6.41% 2.58% 8.70% 3.10% 10.26% 4.45% 
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Table 3.17-Continued 
Panel B: 3 Years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Value Glamour Small Big LowRS HighRS Domestic Foreign Diversifying Non-Diversifying 
All -0.11% -0.26%
c 
0.38% -0.18% -0.13% -0.25% -0.12% -0.18% -0.21% -0.09% 
p-value (0.521) (0.074) (0.173) (0.153) (0.393) (0.129) (0.345) (0.242) (0.127) (0.577) 
Obs. 1,449 1,430 1,447 1,432 1,440 1,439 1,971 908 1,418 1,461 
Calendar Obs. 214 215 214 215 215 214 214 215 214 215 
R
2
 79.54% 83.63% 66.39% 86.73% 83.25% 79.51% 85.60% 81.46% 86.08% 79.94% 
Rational (1) -0.09% -0.23% 0.13% -0.13% -0.09% -0.24% -0.05% -0.16% -0.14% -0.10% 
p-value (0.592) (0.117) (0.642) (0.339) (0.587) (0.165) (0.737) (0.310) (0.342) (0.523) 
Obs. 1,067 1,008 1,131 944 925 1,150 1,440 635 1,020 1,055 
Calendar Obs. 214 215 214 215 215 214 214 215 214 215 
R
2
 76.89% 81.34% 62.49% 85.23% 80.04% 76.34% 82.94% 79.07% 83.28% 78.41% 
Overconfident (2) -0.49% -0.35% 0.68%
c 
-0.73%
b 
-0.61%
c 
0.15% -0.57%
c 
-0.18% -1.33%
c 
-0.30% 
p-value (0.161) (0.210) (0.054) (0.028) (0.069) (0.683) (0.095) (0.537) (0.094) (0.344) 
Obs. 382 422 316 488 515 289 531 273 398 406 
Calendar Obs. 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 56.82% 69.15% 54.08% 69.90% 69.05% 50.89% 66.74% 67.26% 41.45% 65.06% 
Differential (1) - (2) 0.40% 0.12% -0.56% 0.60%
c 
0.53%
c 
-0.39% 0.52% 0.02% 1.19% 0.20% 
p-value (0.280) (0.660) (0.115) (0.055) (0.099) (0.313) (0.137) (0.956) (0.127) (0.530) 
R
2
 12.64% 9.58% 2.74% 16.98% 15.35% 1.09% 10.72% 7.37% 10.34% 10.84% 
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Table 3.18 Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions (CTPRs) of Long-Run Stock Returns 
using the Fama-French 3-Factor Model by Business Press Proxy 
Monthly average abnormal returns (in percent) of bidders for one and three years following the 
announcement of bids are reported by the target ownership status (private (Panel B) or public 
(Panel C)) and method of payment (cash, stock and mixed offers) for rational and overconfident 
acquirers as classified by the business press proxy. Managers characterized by the business press 
with the words ‗confident‘, ‗confidence‘, ‗optimistic‘, ‗optimism‘, ‗certain‘ and ‗positive are 
classified as overconfident managers. Those characterized as ‗reliable‘, ‗cautious‘, ‗prudent‘, 
‗conservative‘, ‗practical‘, ‗sensible‘, ‗frugal‘, ‗careful‘ or ‗steady‘ are classified as rational 
managers. The calendar-time excess returns reported in the table are estimated using the Fama-
French 3-factor model with the following regression:  
ittitiftmtiiftpt HMLhSMBsRRaRR   )(  
The value of alpha (i) represents the average monthly excess returns for each sample group in 
the table. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the announcement month of successful bid and 
remain for 36 months and the portfolios are rebalanced. Statistical significance of returns 
(different from zero) are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘ at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. P-
values are reported in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The number 
of observations, the number of calendar observations and the R
2
 of each regression are also 
reported. The table also reports Rational (1) minus Overconfident (2) zero investment portfolio 
alphas. 
 
 
Business Proxy (1 Year) Business Proxy (3 Years) 
  All Cash Stock Mixed All Cash Stock Mixed 
Panel A: All Targets 
All -0.08% 0.01% -1.18% -0.14% -0.10% -0.02% -1.20%
c 
-0.23% 
p-value (0.702) (0.970) (0.109) (0.686) (0.575) (0.913) (0.055) (0.377) 
Obs. 530 249 23 258 530 249 23 258 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 68.53% 62.79% 18.44% 50.05% 79.07% 75.31% 30.74% 64.99% 
Rational (1) -0.66%
b 
-0.45% -2.01%
a 
-1.13%
b 
-0.55%
b 
-0.52% -2.49%
a 
-0.60%
c 
p-value (0.039) (0.296) (0.002) (0.037) (0.016) (0.112) (0.001) (0.051) 
Obs. 196 92 9 95 196 92 9 95 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 48.07% 29.82% 12.44% 28.06% 66.66% 52.29% 14.01% 55.12% 
Overconfident (2) 0.09% -0.08% -0.79% 0.57% -0.06% -0.11% -0.58% -0.19% 
p-value (0.713) (0.799) (0.274) (0.215) (0.806) (0.650) (0.259) (0.610) 
Obs. 334 157 14 163 334 157 14 163 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 66.32% 54.42% 11.94% 47.04% 72.84% 66.88% 27.44% 56.23% 
Differential (1) - (2) -0.76%
c 
-0.36% -1.22% -1.70%
b 
-0.49% -0.40% -1.91%
b 
-0.41% 
p-value (0.059) (0.517) (0.213) (0.011) (0.105) (0.325) (0.031) (0.337) 
R
2
 0.97% 3.32% 1.22% 0.95% 1.40% 2.95% 4.11% 3.23% 
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Table 3.18-Continued 
Panel B: Private Targets 
All 0.12% -0.22% -2.38%
a 
0.12% 0.06% 0.02% -2.22%
b 
-0.47% 
p-value (0.689) (0.518) (0.006) (0.759) (0.823) (0.924) (0.013) (0.195) 
Obs. 439 199 12 228 439 199 12 228 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 56.86% 46.57% 11.18% 54.97% 68.84% 59.88% 12.02% 63.50% 
Rational (1) -0.32% -0.53% -2.38%
a 
-1.04%
c 
-0.42% -0.32% -2.56%
a 
-1.14%
a 
p-value (0.365) (0.265) (0.000) (0.099) (0.121) (0.431) (0.001) (0.010) 
Obs. 153 72 6 75 153 72 6 75 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 41.02% 23.21% 8.81% 27.91% 58.49% 34.21% 5.87% 55.71% 
Overconfident (2) 0.36% -0.41% -0.53% 0.79%
c 
0.09% -0.21% -1.08% -0.06% 
p-value (0.407) (0.382) (0.392) (0.098) (0.805) (0.480) (0.105) (0.894) 
Obs. 286 127 6 153 286 127 6 153 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 43.65% 38.28% 3.91% 45.93% 56.18% 59.12% 13.20% 50.46% 
Differential (1) - (2) -0.68% -0.11% -1.85%
b 
-1.84%
b 
-0.50% -0.11% -1.48% -1.09%
b 
p-value (0.209) (0.873) (0.043) (0.017) (0.256) (0.837) (0.153) (0.022) 
R
2
 1.92% 3.07% 2.51% 0.72% 2.20% 4.16% 2.84% 2.07% 
Panel C: Public Targets 
All -0.41% -0.12% -0.67% -0.66% -0.49%
b 
-0.14% -0.81%
c 
-0.76%
c 
p-value (0.270) (0.770) (0.363) (0.206) (0.047) (0.599) (0.077) (0.086) 
Obs. 91 50 11 30 91 50 11 30 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 48.46% 30.18% 10.31% 21.45% 64.80% 59.38% 19.86% 33.70% 
Rational (1) -0.84%
c 
-0.33% -0.35%
c 
-1.21%
b 
-0.99%
b 
-0.50% -0.68% -0.91%
b 
p-value (0.083) (0.325) (0.098) (0.013) (0.012) (0.127) (0.144) (0.037) 
Obs. 43 20 3 20 43 20 3 20 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 23.54% 16.00% 3.76% 16.31% 33.62% 28.37% 8.89% 26.74% 
Overconfident (2) -0.82% -0.58% -0.87% -0.59% -0.35% -0.03% -1.22%
b 
-0.89%
c 
p-value (0.132) (0.259) (0.221) (0.217) (0.222) (0.926) (0.030) (0.089) 
Obs. 48 30 8 10 48 30 8 10 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 26.50% 22.75% 8.48% 5.75% 56.96% 51.34% 11.72% 23.01% 
Differential (1) - (2) -0.02% 0.25% 0.53% -0.62% -0.64% -0.47% 0.54% -0.03% 
p-value (0.982) (0.682) (0.484) (0.371) (0.201) (0.327) (0.438) (0.966) 
R
2
 2.53% 4.67% 5.67% 2.84% 1.64% 7.17% 1.91% 1.41% 
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Table 3.19 Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions (CTPRs) of Long-Run Stock Returns using the Fama-French 3-Factor Model by Business 
Press Proxy for Various Bidder and Deal Characteristics 
Monthly average abnormal returns (in percent) of bidders for one (Panel A) and three (Panel B) years following the announcement of bids are reported 
by various acquirer and deal characteristics (value, glamour, small and big bidders, low and high relative size deals, domestic, foreign, diversifying and 
non-diversifying deals) for rational and overconfident acquirers as classified by the business press proxy. Managers characterized by the business press 
with the words ‗confident‘, ‗confidence‘, ‗optimistic‘, ‗optimism‘, ‗certain‘ and ‗positive are classified as overconfident managers. Those characterized 
as ‗reliable‘, ‗cautious‘, ‗prudent‘, ‗conservative‘, ‗practical‘, ‗sensible‘, ‗frugal‘, ‗careful‘ or ‗steady‘ are classified as rational managers. Acquirers with 
higher (lower) than median book-to-market ratio (a month prior to bid announcement) are categorized as value (glamour) bidders. Acquirers with larger 
(smaller) than median size (a month prior to bid announcement) are categorized as big (small) bidders. The relative size of the deal is defined as the deal 
value divided by the market value of the acquirer a month before the announcement date. Deals above (below) the median relative size are classified as 
high (low).  Acquisitions with bidders and targets originated from the same (different) country are defined as domestic (foreign) acquisitions. An 
acquisition is defined as diversifying (focused) when the acquirer‘s two-digit SIC code is different (the same) from that of the target. The calendar-time 
excess returns reported in the table are estimated using the Fama-French 3-factor model with the following regression:  
ittitiftmtiiftpt HMLhSMBsRRaRR   )(  
The value of alpha (i) represents the average monthly excess returns for each sample group in the table. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the 
announcement month of successful bid and remain for 36 months and the portfolios are rebalanced. Statistical significance of returns (different from 
zero) are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘ at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. P-values are reported in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity. The number of observations, the number of calendar observations and the R
2
 of each regression are also reported. The table also 
reports Rational (1) minus Overconfident (2) zero investment portfolio alphas. 
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Table 3.19-Continued 
Panel A: 1 Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Value Glamour Small Big LowRS HighRS Domestic Foreign Diversifying Non-Diversifying 
All 0.04% -0.24% 0.42% -0.12% -0.36% 0.43% -0.06% -0.33% -0.14% -0.13% 
p-value (0.881) (0.377) (0.150) (0.596) (0.256) (0.145) (0.818) (0.266) (0.604) (0.669) 
Obs. 265 264 264 265 265 264 357 172 276 253 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 
R
2
 49.66% 61.66% 61.34% 65.65% 58.50% 53.52% 60.63% 53.42% 53.79% 57.40% 
Rational (1) -1.32%
a 
-0.26% -0.43% -0.85%
b 
-1.27%
a 
-0.86%
c 
-0.86%
c 
-0.48% -0.41% -0.57% 
p-value (0.005) (0.579) (0.345) (0.019) (0.002) (0.080) (0.058) (0.271) (0.382) (0.160) 
Obs. 110 86 97 99 93 103 131 65 100 96 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 
R
2
 35.52% 30.25% 29.01% 43.11% 35.79% 30.11% 35.06% 32.92% 31.20% 26.44% 
Overconfident (2) -0.04% -0.35% 0.42% 0.07% 0.14% 0.06% -0.14% -0.39% 0.11% 0.25% 
p-value (0.916) (0.267) (0.251) (0.797) (0.754) (0.871) (0.675) (0.373) (0.710) (0.505) 
Obs. 155 178 167 166 172 161 226 107 176 157 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 
R
2
 40.31% 59.54% 52.85% 63.13% 44.81% 47.69% 59.66% 39.11% 53.90% 47.74% 
Differential (1) - (2) -1.27%
c 
0.09% -0.85% -0.92%
b 
-1.41%
b 
-0.92% -0.72% -0.09% -0.52% -0.82% 
p-value (0.055) (0.867) (0.147) (0.039) (0.014) (0.131) (0.194) (0.879) (0.315) (0.156) 
R
2
 2.05% 5.35% 3.12% 1.21% 1.49% 0.56% 2.65% 1.65% 1.77% 3.90% 
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Table 3.19-Continued 
Panel b: 3 Years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Value Glamour Small Big LowRS HighRS Domestic Foreign Diversifying Non-Diversifying 
All -0.06% -0.23% 0.16% -0.11% -0.14% -0.06% -0.27% -0.06% -0.10% -0.21% 
p-value (0.775) (0.266) (0.515) (0.524) (0.542) (0.807) (0.227) (0.749) (0.614) (0.355) 
Obs. 249 245 244 250 252 242 335 159 259 235 
Calendar Obs. 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 67.91% 73.12% 68.00% 78.03% 70.10% 66.44% 71.39% 71.45% 76.83% 68.38% 
Rational (1) -1.53%
a 
-0.36% -0.12% -0.58%
b 
-0.74%
b 
-1.39%
a 
-0.58%
b 
-0.65%
b 
-0.42% -0.74%
b 
p-value (0.001) (0.193) (0.733) (0.017) (0.011) (0.002) (0.040) (0.045) (0.122) (0.022) 
Obs. 103 77 88 92 89 91 122 58 90 90 
Calendar Obs. 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 41.17% 56.22% 44.16% 64.73% 51.26% 40.01% 54.94% 50.34% 59.06% 43.50% 
Overconfident (2) -0.04% -0.50%
c 
0.11% -0.08% -0.14% -0.15% -0.47% -0.02% -0.04% -0.09% 
p-value (0.900) (0.082) (0.724) (0.734) (0.674) (0.557) (0.107) (0.941) (0.860) (0.799) 
Obs. 146 168 156 158 163 151 213 101 169 145 
Calendar Obs. 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 
R
2
 56.40% 64.42% 59.03% 72.49% 59.70% 60.77% 67.13% 56.51% 70.93% 55.14% 
Differential (1) - (2) -1.49%
a 
0.14% -0.23% -0.51% -0.59% -1.24%
b 
-0.11% -0.63% -0.38% -0.65% 
p-value (0.007) (0.715) (0.623) (0.108) (0.172) (0.024) (0.780) (0.159) (0.256) (0.184) 
R
2
 2.11% 2.79% 4.44% 1.02% 5.05% 0.83% 4.77% 1.01% 0.71% 3.44% 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Managerial Overconfidence in High and Low Valuation Markets and Gains to Acquisitions 
151 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4:MANAGERIAL 
OVERCONFIDENCE IN HIGH AND LOW 
VALUATION MARKETS AND GAINS TO 
ACQUISITIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Managerial Overconfidence in High and Low Valuation Markets and Gains to Acquisitions 
152 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
A large body of financial literature had revealed that behavioral elements of managers 
and the wider market are important driving forces behind acquiring firms‘ performance 
in mergers and acquisitions. Shleifer and Vishny‘s (2003) market valuation theory 
suggests an irrational investor-rational manager framework where managers are 
considered to be rational agents who time the market and exploit the opportunities that 
may arise when stock market is in unreasonably high, ultimately to the benefit of their 
shareholders. Consistent with this theory, empirical research has shown that more 
acquisitions take place when stock markets are bullish than when they are depressed 
(Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001), Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005)). Bouwman et al. (2009) 
also argue that acquisitions in periods of booming stock markets (i.e. high valuation 
periods) are fundamentally different from those in periods of depressing stock markets 
(i.e. low valuation periods). 
 
Whilst Shleifer and Vishny (2003) consider the manager to be a rational agent, Roll‘s 
(1986) hubris hypothesis presents the investor as the rational party in a rational 
investor-irrational manager framework. In this way, financial markets are assumed to be 
efficient. In this environment, Roll (1986) suggests that managers engage in 
acquisitions with an overly optimistic opinion of their own ability to create value and 
extract potential synergies from a proposed takeover. In other words, overconfident 
managers feel that they hold the unique ability to identify hidden synergies and select 
good targets superior to their rivals. These individuals tend to overestimate the future 
returns from their investment projects, or indeed the capitalized value of their future 
leadership, and therefore overbid for the target in question, to the detriment of their 
shareholders‘ wealth.25 In later work, Malmendier and Tate (2008) document that 
overconfident managers are more likely to engage in acquisitions and actually realize 
worse performance than rational managers.  
 
                                                 
25
 Doukas and Petmezas (2007) and Billett and Qian (2008) test the self-attribution bias as a source of 
overconfidence. They define managers infected by self-attribution as firms that make many acquisitions 
in a very short span of time. They provided evidence that self-attribution drives overconfidence showing 
a monotonic decline in bidders‘ returns according to deal order. 
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While the individual effects of managerial overconfidence and market valuation have 
already been examined in the literature, their interaction remains an unanswered 
question. As Baker et al. (2007, p. 48) suggest ―the irrational manager and irrational 
investor stories can certainly coexist‖. Chapter Four attempts to reconcile these two 
stories of irrational managers and irrational investors, providing evidence about the role 
of managerial overconfidence in high and low market valuation periods and the 
resultant effect to bidders‘ shareholders wealth.  
 
Rosen (2006) argues that managers may be infected with the same optimism as 
investors during bullish periods. If this is the case, then managers might overestimate 
the potential synergies from the merger, which is likely to negatively influence the 
quality of the deal during a hot period. On the contrary, given that high-valuation 
periods are associated with an increase in bidder returns, rational managers, who assess 
a deal relatively more carefully and negotiate more efficiently, may time the 
announcement of bids in order to enhance shareholders‘ wealth. Furthermore, when 
overconfident bidders conduct deals in depressing markets, it is unlikely that they will 
be able to hide the poor quality of the deal alongside the possible overpayment. 
Investors in low valuation markets are substantially more careful and conservative in 
assessing the future prospects of the deal and are therefore likely to react more 
unfavourably upon the realization that the deal is bad. This results in actions which 
effectively depreciate the bidder‘s stock price. Given the above rationale, we predict 
that bidders are more likely to gain the most (least) when they are run by rational 
(overconfident) managers and the deal takes place in a bull (bear) market. 
 
Using a sample of UK acquisitions for the period 1990-2005 to investigate our leading 
hypothesis, we document supportive evidence that the interaction between aggregate 
market valuations and different behavioral traits of managers is a key determinant of 
bidders‘ announcement returns. We select to study the U.K. market primarily because it 
has the most active takeover market following the U.S., representing more than 65% of 
merger transactions conducted in Europe.  
 
Our results provide evidence of the importance of the interaction between managerial 
and aggregate market valuations in shaping acquirers‘ returns. More specifically, the 
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difference in the acquisition performance between the portfolios of deals undertaken by 
rational managers in high valuation periods and those conducted by overconfident 
managers in low valuation periods is 3.05%, economically and statistically significant 
for the five-day period surrounding the bid announcement. In addition, bidders with 
rational managers appear to gain the most in high valuation periods, while firms and 
their shareholders would be better placed without overconfident managers in all types 
of market conditions. Our results are robust to a multivariate analysis that controls for 
factors known to affect acquiring firms‘ returns, such as the method of payment, the 
listing status of the target firm, as well as the size and book-to-market ratio of the 
acquiring firm.  
 
In addition to our short-term findings, we also assess the long-run performance of 
bidders to assess whether our results are robust over time. We do not find evidence that 
acquisitions in high and low-valuation periods generate abnormal returns in the long-
term post-event period. However, we do find that acquisitions conducted by 
overconfident bidders continue to perform worse than acquisitions by rational bidders 
in the long-term. This provides further evidence to the superior performance of deals 
undertaken by rational managers. 
 
The study has several contributions. Firstly, it provides direct evidence that the 
interrelation between market valuation periods and managers with varying degrees of 
rationality is an important factor in shaping acquiring firm‘s returns. While the 
individual effect of managerial overconfidence has already been examined in the 
literature, the varying effect it exerts along with stock market conditions has before 
now, been largely neglected. Secondly, in contrast to overconfident managers, our 
results indicate that rational managers are able to create value for their shareholders 
through acquisitions in all market valuation periods. This is a significant factor given 
wide evidence documenting bidding firm losses. Thirdly, it is reported in this work that 
bidders have a worse performance on average when they are managed by individuals  
who are considered to be overconfident in all market conditions. This suggests that 
overconfidence in manager‘s is never to the benefit of the acquiring firm shareholders 
involved. Lastly, this chapter provides evidence that the effect of managerial 
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overconfidence is robust outside the US and insensitive to the choice over the 
quantitative measure of overconfidence.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the literature. 
Section 4.3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4.4 discusses the data and methodology of 
the empirical work before Section 4.5 analyzes the results. In particular, Section 4.5.1 
presents the short-run univariate analysis, Section 4.5.2 illustrates the multivariate 
findings and Section 4.5.3 shows the one and three year post-merger performance. 
Section 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
This section reviews the literature on factors and incentives that cause merger and 
merger clustering in time. More specifically, we review reasons based on the 
neoclassical school of thought of why merger waves occur. Then, we present 
behavioural explanation of market misevaluations as well as the performance of 
takeover activity in overvalued/undervalued periods in time. Lastly, we review the 
literature on main features that cause overconfidence as well as the hubris hypothesis. 
 
4.2.1 Merger Waves 
 
There are numerous points in time where merger clustering has been observed during 
the last century. While merger activity generally moves at levels considered normal, at 
some points in time, we witness spikes in the activity whereby many companies in the 
market begin acquiring or merging with other firms causing so-called merger waves. A 
sizeable stream of theoretical and empirical research on merger waves has attempted to 
explain the reasons behind why a great number of companies choose to proceed to 
undertake various takeovers at the same time. Explanations range from neoclassical 
theories of disturbance theory to behavioural approaches involving managerial 
decisions and biases. Section 4.2.1 will briefly introduce the key theories from each 
school of thought. 
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4.2.1.1 The Neoclassical Approach 
 
The neoclassical hypothesis of merger waves proposes that clustering of mergers 
through time is a result of some economic, regulatory or technological shock in the 
industry. The merger wave occurs because of a massive reaction of firms inside and 
outside the industry to this shock causing them to reallocate the industry‘s assets 
through mergers and acquisitions. 
 
The cluster of merger activity throughout time is not a recent phenomenon. Nelson 
(1959) examines merger movements in the American industry during 1885-1956 and 
reports three distinct periods (1889-1902, 1926-1930 and 1946-1956) during which the 
merger movements were so wide that it led to the characterization of merger waves. 
Economic growth or the development of the transportation system is two of the 
rationales examined and put forward as a an explanation for the high spikes in merger 
activity. Most importantly, Nelson (1959) takes into consideration the effect of the 
development of capital markets and observes that there is a high correlation between 
high merger activity and stock prices, indicating that merger waves may have their 
origins within stock price movements. 
 
Similarly, Holmstrong and Kaplan (2001) discuss the nature of the 1980s and 1990s 
merger waves. Most of the U.S. deals undertaken during the decade of 1980s have been 
characterised as hostile takeovers. Technically, this infers that the bidders in the eighties 
made direct offers to the shareholders of the target firm, effectively ignoring the 
opposing managerial team. Those companies that did not wish to go through this hostile 
restructuring, tried to appear less attractive in this period in order to avoid being 
acquired. The vast majority of mergers recorded during this decade are also largely 
described as leverage buy-outs (LBO). Firms preferred to borrow money in order to 
acquire target firms rather than to issue new stock or using their cash reserves. The 
notion of high LBO activity has been attributed to investor greed. Recent evidence
26
 
suggests that merger waves are driven by investor sentiment. Therefore, the offering of 
sentiment as a merger wave motive has always been considered throughout time. In 
addition, excess capacity and managerial unwillingness to give out free cash flows was 
                                                 
26
 See Rosen (2006) 
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also one of the factors behind the 1980s merger wave (Jensen (1983)). Shleifer and 
Vishny (1990) suggest that the failure of conglomerates as a result of the merger wave 
of the 1960s urged a lot of firms to return to their original specializations and therefore 
provided a motive to sell-off their unrelated divisions. However, there remains mixed 
evidence over the validity of this implication. If the number of mergers conducted in the 
eighties is as a result of deconglomeration then that implies that diversification in the 
sixties destroyed corporate value. However, the evidence on diversification also 
remains mixed
27
. Holmstrong and Kaplan (2001) report that deconglomeration might 
have played some role for the 1980s merger wave but cannot be attributed as the 
driving force. 
 
There is no doubt that takeovers during the eighties proved to be profitable for the 
companies and efficiency gains are involved.
28
 There are various reasons that explain 
the profitability of LBOs during the 1980s merger wave. LBOs enabled managers to 
have more equity in the newly combined company. In that way, managers had stronger 
incentives to increase shareholders value whilst also making money for themselves as 
well. Managers stopped viewing capital as costless money and it was recognised that 
the amount which had been borrowed to acquire firms had to be repaid. Hence, 
managers had to work harder in order to generate the payment on the capital borrowed, 
possibly increasing the efficiency of the firm. Finally, in many of the merged firms, the 
board consisted of a small number of members which owned large portions of equity, 
resulting in better managerial monitoring. The increase in leverage buy-outs did 
however lead to an increase in ‗toxic‘ bonds, as well, ultimately ending in a credit 
crunch during the late eighties, finalizing the high merger activity. Apart from that, anti-
takeover legislation and political pressure against high leverage levels are also some of 
the determining factors that caused this merger wave to terminate (Jensen (1991), 
Comment and Schwert (1995)).  
 
                                                 
27
 Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) find that diversification destroys value while 
Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2000), Gampa and Kedia (1999), Chevalier (1999), Hyland (1999), Lamont 
and Polk (2002) and Villalonga (2001) cannot propose that diversification is the explanation of value 
destruction. 
28
 Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988), Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Kaplan (1989), Rosett (1988) 
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On the other hand, discussing the 1990s merger wave, Schwert (2000) observes that 
hostile mergers are not as strong a phenomenon as they used to be in the decade of 
1980s. An increase in incentive-based compensation (Hall and Liebman (1998)) was 
more pronounced during the decade of 1990s. Managers had more incentives to earn 
more money through equity-based compensation. In general, the 1990s wave is more 
associated with assets employed in order to exploit growth opportunities in markets and 
new technologies. Therefore, we observe that firms started using equity instead of debt 
in the nineties wave. Conclusively, during the 1980s merger wave, takeovers appeared 
to be profitable. Profitability is closely linked with managerial compensation incentives 
and the structure of the board of the combined company and seems to be one of the 
main factors that helps explain the returns earned. These two issues will be discussed 
further. 
 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) attempt to explain merger movements during the last 
century and mainly focus on technological changes that have occurred. They show that 
merger waves are closely related to significant technological changes throughout time. 
In other words, many firms are unable to adapt to the new technology introduced 
probably because of a managerial lack of experience and skills. Consequently, these 
types of firms are acquired by others more superior in terms of adapting to the new 
technological changes. Furthermore, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) provide evidence 
on why antitrust and regulation policies as well as globalization cannot alone explain 
merger waves. A very interesting point of this study is the fact that merger waves arise 
during booming stock market periods. Their model generates a positive relationship 
between takeovers and periods of high price-earnings ratios in the stock market. This 
evidence indirectly serves to form a foundation for behavioural works, to be discussed 
in the forthcoming section.  
 
Harford (2005) examines the causes of merger waves from both the neoclassical and 
behavioural points of view. He investigates whether mergers are linked to the stock 
market or whether they are as a result of an economic disturbance. His results suggest 
that mergers cluster around economic, regulatory and technological shocks favouring 
the neoclassical school of though. He employs logit models to predict when a merger 
wave starts and finds that mergers occur after some market disturbance. However, he 
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writes that the disturbance alone does not cause a wider merger wave. For a wave to be 
instigated, Harford (2005) suggests that market liquidity must be of a level sufficient 
enough to allow firms to engage in M&A activity. The behavioural factors (prior 
industry returns, the standard deviation of the firm‘s return and market-to-book ratio) 
employed in the model are found to ultimately have limited explanatory value. 
 
As the foundation to the neoclassical aspects of Harford‘s work, Gort (1969) shows that 
acquisitions cluster in certain types of industries. The introduction of new technology 
and a change of stock prices are the major economic shocks that Gort (1969) finds 
increase valuations and therefore create merger movements. Mulherin and Boone 
(2000) find significant industry clustering for acquisitions and divestitures in the 1990s. 
Their results show that the positive wealth effects observed are consistent with 
synergistic explanations rather than nonsynergistic models based on managerial 
entrenchment, hubris and empire building. 
 
Economic growth, deconglomeration, technological innovation as well as economic and 
regulatory shocks are some of the explanations that have been studied and examined in 
order to explain and understand why merger waves occur. A very important issue that 
has been pinpointed in some of the above studies is the fact that merger wave periods 
appear to coincide with bullish stock markets. A high correlation between merger 
movements and stock prices has been observed in many works. However, this fact 
remained a simple observation without being attributed further explanatory value until 
recent times. Is there any relationship between the two factors, that is between high 
merger activity and bullish stock markets? Is this relationship a coincidence? Does a 
booming market drive merger waves or vice versa? The forthcoming section discusses 
the literature related to the above questions, a result of the behavioural school of 
research. 
 
4.2.1.2 The Behavioural Approach 
 
Various studies have attempted to explain merger waves based on neoclassical theory as 
presented above. However, whilst these models have offered much, the impact of the 
behaviour of market participants cannot be ignored. This has led to the emergence of 
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the behavioural field of finance, particularly in terms of the particular effects driving 
merger activity and their resultant impact on shareholder wealth creation. Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) propose a market-timing model, which suggests that acquisitions are 
driven by stock market misvaluations. The model outlined explains who acquires 
whom, the method of payment that managers use, the valuation effects of the merger 
itself as well as the causation factors which influence the wider merger waves. This 
work has formed an integral part of the growing behavioural finance literature. The key 
assumptions of the model are that financial markets do not fully reflect all information, 
so that firms can become incorrectly priced in the short-term. The second assumption 
proposes that managers are fully rational, able to take advantage of the market 
discrepancies by undertaking takeovers in order to exploit all possible synergy and 
misvaluation effects. More specifically, rational managers decide to conduct a takeover 
when their firms are overvalued, since their stock is an attractive means by which to pay 
for undervalued or less overvalued target firms. In this case, the motive for acquisitions 
does not lie in potential synergy gains, but rather managers attempt mergers in order to 
save some of the overvaluation for the long-run holders. In other words, managers opt 
to acquire undervalued companies using their overvalued stock, which can have less 
harmful effects for shareholders in the long-run.  
 
Similar evidence is provided by Ang and Cheng (2006). They also investigate the 
misvaluation hypothesis and find supportive evidence of the idea that misvaluation is an 
important driver for bidders to undertake stock acquisitions. Consistent with the 
previous research in this field, they also show that overvalued companies are more 
likely to finance their acquisition using their overvalued stock. Acquirers are shown to 
be more overvalued in successful stock mergers than in unsuccessful ones. Finally, the 
work shows that the shareholders of stock-acquirers enjoy more wealth than their 
counterparts do in firms that do not engage in acquisitions. Consistent with Rhodes-
Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) and Dong et al. (2006), Ang and Cheng 
(2006) also find that cash acquirers are less overvalued than stock acquirers whilst cash 
targets are undervalued relative to stock targets.  
 
With this in mind, there is substantial empirical evidence suggesting that merger waves 
coincide with high market valuations. This is evident even in studies that have 
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attempted to approach merger waves via neoclassical theory. For instance, Maksimovic 
and Phillips (2001) posit that there is a link between periods of high merger activity and 
high market misvaluations. In addition, they propose that firms tend to use stock rather 
than cash in order to acquire firms in high valuation/high merger activity periods. 
Moreover, Martin (1996) has showed that firms which engage in stock acquisitions 
have lower book-to-market ratios than those which use cash. 
 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) write that there is a close relationship between 
misvaluation and merger waves. Empirical evidence and theoretical models constructed 
suggest a high correlation between stock mergers and high valuation periods. However, 
they deny to accept the ‗naïve‘ explanation that overvalued bidders offer their 
overvalued stock to targets who then simply accept it. They question whether or not 
targets are irrational enough to accept bidders‘ overvalued equity. Therefore, they 
attempt to offer an alternative explanation which could describe the relationship 
between high merger volume in periods when prices are away from their fundamental 
values on either side. Stock mergers are different than cash mergers within the 
misvaluation hypothesis. In a stock–financed merger, the target firm receives part of the 
stock of the bidding company and should therefore have an incentive to value the 
acquirer‘s equity. The target firm has to decide whether the value of the bidder‘s shares 
is close to fundamental prices or whether it is currently misvalued, away from the 
intrinsic level. Research also shows that the valuation of the bidder‘s shares changes 
and depends on the timing of the announcement of the takeover. The bidder‘s valuation 
is one of the most crucial issues in takeovers, especially when stock is involved and the 
target management has to find out what the true value is on behalf of their shareholders 
to attempt to construct a fair deal.  
 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) set up their model assuming that targets behave 
rationally, have limited information on the bidder‘s value but also hold private 
information about the value of their own company. Additionally, the bidder‘s managers 
are considered to have private information about their own firm‘s value and the 
potential value of the combined firm. The work also assumes that both the bidder and 
the target are listed firms and that the market values might not coincide with the 
intrinsic values, attributing the misvaluation of the firm‘s to two components: the firm-
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specific component and the market-wide component. The managers of the target firm 
will decide on whether the merger will take place or not. They are also aware of 
whether their firm is correctly valued or if it is under or over its true level. Nevertheless, 
they will have difficulty in differentiating between whether the over or undervaluation 
effect is as a result of a firm, sector/market wide effect or a combination of them both 
and at what extent the misvaluation is. The decision of the completion of the merger 
will be based on whether the synergy gains are positive or not. However, both the 
bidders and target‘s information about the synergy gains on offer are affected by the 
overall market misvaluation as well. Therefore the target is assumed to be aware of the 
fact that some of the overvaluation is due to the market-wide effect and the 
management is considered to correctly try to decompose the misvaluation effect from 
the value of the synergy gains. Despite this, the target‘s managers will tend to attribute 
more value to the high synergy gains. In other words, the more overvalued the market 
is, the higher the estimation error will be regarding the potential synergy benefits. 
 
In short, the model of Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) suggests that in high 
valuation periods, target firms are more prone to overestimate the synergy gains on 
offer from a prospective deal and accept the takeover as a result. Consequently, it is 
more likely that more takeovers will occur during high valuation periods providing an 
alternative explanation for merger waves. We have to make clear that in the model 
presented, the authors do not assume that the synergy gains are higher during high 
valuation periods. Neither is it assumed that are managers are more willing to sell their 
firms for less than they are worth or that they are less than fully rational. However, the 
model does accept that even fully rational managers can sometimes make valuation 
mistakes under these conditions. 
 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) find strong supportive evidence for 
the Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and Shleifer and Vishny (2003) theories, 
which implies that misvaluation drives merger waves. To empirically investigate these 
theories, Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) decompose the M/B ratio 
into three components: the firm specific misvaluation error, the sector specific error and 
the long-run pricing to book. More specifically, they investigate misvaluation by 
decomposing the market-to-book ratio into the market-to-value component and the 
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value-to-book ratio. The first component (the Market to Value ratio) is used to account 
for the discrepancies between price and the true value and can be used as a measure of 
misvaluation. This component could be used to show a behavioural anomaly or the 
asymmetric information between informed insiders and the market. The second 
component (the Value to Book ratio) captures growth opportunities in the sense that it is 
not affected by misvaluation. The work finds that bidders with high firm specific 
misvaluation errors use stock to acquire targets with low firm specific misvaluation 
errors, especially in period where there is positive sector wide misvaluation. The results 
propose that targets acquired using cash are relatively undervalued to those acquired 
using stock. Consistent with the merger wave literature, Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and 
Viswanathan (2005) also argue that merger activity is positively correlated with short-
run deviations in valuation. Finally, it is shown that low long-run value-to-book firms 
buy high long-run value-to-book targets.  
 
There are different reasons that could explain this finding. Managers in overvalued 
companies acquire targets with high long-run value in order to restore the market‘s 
confidence. Another explanation is that low skilled managers of undervalued companies 
may desire to acquire managerial talent from outside to change the organizational 
behaviour. Lastly, managers may also wish to strengthen their position in the firm by 
acquiring high value targets. It is obvious that managerial incentives and decisions are 
involved in every corporate decision and, as has already been suggested, they affect a 
number of variables in the case of mergers and acquisitions as well. Therefore, the 
‗human‘ factor has to be taken seriously into consideration while studying various 
aspects of corporate takeovers. 
 
Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (2006) test the misvaluation hypothesis, as 
presented above, alongside the Q-theory of takeovers. The Q-theory posits that high 
quality acquirers improve bad targets. They employ two proxies to investigate their 
propositions, namely the price-to-book (P/B) and the price-to-residual-income-model-
value (P/V) for the bidder and target misvaluation. They find that misvaluation affects 
the method of payment, premium level, takeover hostility, offer success and bidder and 
target announcement returns in the takeover puzzle. They also show that in the entire 
sample bidders are always overvalued relative to their targets and that the more 
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overvalued they are, the more likely it is that they will use stock as the mode of 
payment. Lastly, they find that the Q-hypothesis is stronger in the pre-1990 period 
while the misvaluation hypothesis is stronger during the 1990s decade. 
 
Although the neoclassical perspective that merger waves are as a result of some kind of 
economic disturbance, the behavioural approach is useful to consider to help fill some 
vacant gaps in the research. Behavioural Finance can help to shed light on issues like 
who buys who in merger transactions, the means of financing used and to generally 
comprehend how misvaluation affects merger activity. Strong theoretical and empirical 
evidence proposes that M&As are not necessarily driven by technological or innovation 
shocks. Instead, managers motivated by market misvaluations, in an attempt to take 
advantage of their overvalued equity, proceed to conduct corporate takeovers. 
 
4.2.1.3 Market Valuation and Acquisition Quality 
 
Aside from the unquestionable fact that acquisitions occur in high magnitude during 
high valuation periods, some studies have concentrated on the quality of these 
takeovers. Research in this field has attempted to investigate the way in which bidders‘ 
shareholder wealth is affected from acquisitions undertaken in high and low valuation 
periods. For instance, Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009) claim that market valuation 
not only affects the volume of acquisition taking place during specific periods in time, 
but also impacts on the quality of these deals as well. More specifically, they show that 
acquisitions undertaken during high valuation periods enjoy significantly higher 
abnormal returns than those undertaken during low valuation periods. However, this 
picture is reversed in the long-run with three possible explanations such as 
overpayment, market timing and managerial herding, being examined. Managers are 
likely to overpay during high valuation periods, but empirical evidence suggests that 
premiums are simultaneously significantly lower. In addition, Bouwman, Fuller and 
Nain (2009) examine market timing as a potential reason for the long-run 
underperformance of high-valuation period acquisitions. Managers are more 
enthusiastic to pay with overvalued stock during bullish periods and as a result they are 
expected to experience a correction in their stock prices over the long-term. However, 
when they split the sample of high acquisitions down into those who announce a 
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takeover when their stock is near an annual high, they find evidence that these types of 
acquisitions enjoy higher abnormal returns in the long run. Therefore, both the 
overpayment and market timing explanations are declined. 
 
Finally, they investigate whether managerial herding can explain the results. Managerial 
herding models suggest that those who move later during the wave have lower returns. 
They split the sample of high acquisitions into early and late movers. After performing 
various tests, they find that losses come from those who decide to move later during the 
merger wave. Therefore, the better quality of acquisitions announced during high 
valuation periods is driven by the very superior performance of early acquirers in the 
merger wave. 
 
Similarly, Rosen (2006) examines whether market wide dynamics affect shareholders‘ 
wealth in corporate takeovers. He studies the case when mergers are announced during 
‗hot‘ merger markets and the effect of these mergers on the shareholders‘ wealth. ‗Hot‘ 
merger market are categorised as the periods in which many recent mergers have been 
announced by other companies as well. The results suggest that bidders‘ stock prices 
are likely to increase when mergers are announced during ‗hot‘ merger markets or 
during periods in which the market itself is performing well. However, he observes that 
there is a long-run reversal for those mergers. For deals announced during periods other 
than ‗hot‘, merger markets enjoy higher abnormal returns in the long-run (three years). 
Similar evidence is provided by Petmezas (2009) who finds that acquisitions announced 
during hot periods generate higher abnormal returns than those announced during cold 
periods. The results show a long-run reversal which indicates that the initial favourable 
market reaction is due to investor sentiment. 
 
Three theories are examined to explain this merger momentum, i.e. the correlation 
between market conditions (hot merger periods) and the announcement returns. Firstly, 
the neoclassical theory suggests that mergers occur in order to create synergies and 
maximize shareholders wealth. During high merger activity periods, the synergies are 
positively affected by these market shocks. Therefore, mergers announced during these 
periods are expected to be better than other mergers in other market conditions. 
However, no long-run drift is expected if the neoclassical explanation truly holds. 
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Secondly, the managerial motivations theory suggests that during merger waves, 
managers are more willing to make acquisitions so as to avoid been acquired by others 
(Gorton et al. (2005), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990)). Consequently, managers 
may choose targets which might not be particularly profitable or able to offer synergy 
gains to the bidding firm, ending up with the manager creating less or destroying value 
for their firms. Under this theory, the correlation between recent merger activity and 
announcement returns should be negative. The information should be fully incorporated 
in to the short-term returns and no long run reversal should therefore be expected. 
Finally, the last theory suggested to explain merger momentum is based on the fact that 
some investors, and possibly managers, may be overly optimistic. There is evidence 
which reports that investor sentiment can have a positive effect on corporate 
announcements, a factor irrelevant to synergy gains. Therefore, during high merger 
activity, this theory writes that investors act out of over optimism and are not able to 
rationally evaluate between relevant and irrelevant information. For instance, Helwege 
and Liang (1996) find evidence that Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) that take place 
during hot markets perform superior to those announced during cold markets and their 
results propose that managers take advantage of irrational investors and investor 
optimism during hot periods. 
 
Conclusively, acquisitions announced during high valuation periods seem to increase 
shareholders‘ wealth in the short-run. Investor sentiment is presented to be one of the 
main reasons driving the high performance. Managers think that the market is more 
positive and optimistic during high valuation periods and choose to announce a 
takeover in order to take advantage of the positive and optimistic climate. Additionally, 
supportive evidence on the above concern has been observed in other areas of corporate 
finance, such as Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). 
 
4.2.1.4 Investor Sentiment and Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
 
This section reviews the literature on Initial Public Offerings and the impact of investor 
sentiment on the initial market response to companies‘ stock prices. The concept of hot 
and cold market periods has not only been examined for the case of mergers and 
acquisitions. A sizeable stream of theoretical and empirical research on Initial Public 
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Offerings (IPOs) has revealed the reasons and differences between companies that 
choose to go public during high and low valuation periods. 
 
Hot IPO markets are described as a periods with unusually high volumes of firms going 
public, usually being underpriced. Some studies characterize hot markets as periods 
where many firms of high quality decide to go public (Allen and Faulhaber (1989)). 
Others suggest that technological innovation in specific industries is the primary 
determinant that makes many firms decide to go public during the same period. 
However, a strand of the IPOs literature claims that hot market firms are of a lower 
quality because they seem to have lower abnormal returns, supporting that investor 
sentiment results in the creation hot markets (Loughran and Ritter (1995), Lerner 
(1994), Field (1997)). 
 
Helwege and Liang (2002) investigate the short- and the long-run performance of firms 
that decide to go public during hot and cold IPO periods for the period 1975-2000. They 
find that hot periods within industries coincide with hot periods of the overall market, 
which implies that it is not necessarily an industry specific effect. There are no 
circumstances in which the overall market is hot because of one or two hot industries. 
The findings also conclude that the quality and future prosperity of the firm are not 
significantly different in the two types of markets. Technological changes do not seem 
to be the major driving force behind why we observe clustering of IPOs during different 
periods in time. However, their results are more consistent with the theory that hot IPO 
markets are mostly driven by investor optimism, although this may not suggest direct 
and active planning by managers. Investors seem to be much more optimistic during hot 
periods. As a result, firms can go public at a more favourable price and raise more funds 
at their initial public offerings. Similarly, Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) find 
that companies time their offerings when valuations are high but investors enjoy less 
abnormal returns in the long-run, which is an indication of timing investor sentiment. 
Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) also report that companies choose to go public when 
investor sentiment is high. Firms time their IPOs to occur during periods of excessive 
valuation (Baker and Wurgler (2000)). 
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Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006) construct a model which attempts to connect and 
explain the various IPO anomalies to a common basis. Anomalies, such as IPO 
underpricing, hot and cold markets alongside long-run underperformance, can be 
explained by the behaviour of a group of irrational investors. More specifically, the 
model aims to capture the strategic plans of issuers and underwriters that attempt to take 
advantage of the market‘s mispricing and the divergence of opinion among investors. 
 
In addition, they claim that one of the reasons that companies choose not to set their 
initial offering price too high is due to the fact that if they choose to conducte the IPO 
during a hot market, the investors‘ optimism could boost the share price to higher 
levels. From the social welfare point of view, firms that go public for opportunistic 
reasons by exploiting investor optimism in hot periods are a disadvantage for the 
overall economy. These firms may have negative present value investment 
opportunities. Therefore, when the investor sentiment goes down, these firms might go 
bankrupt but the high quality firms left in the market are affected by the overall climate 
and may subsequently have difficulty in raising funds. 
 
In short, one of the prevailing explanations in the IPO literature is that firms choose to 
go public during hot market periods in order to take advantage of the positive investor 
sentiment and investor optimism, which dominates these climates. Managerial decisions 
are highly affected by market conditions and they undoubtedly attempt to exploit 
irrational investor sentiment for short term benefits. 
 
4.2.1.5 Managerial Incentives and Merger Waves 
 
The neoclassical approach of mergers as a result of some economic or innovation shock 
has been presented as one of the theories behind merger waves. Alternatively the 
behavioural approach evolved recently to explain merger clustering through time and 
offers much in suggesting that merger activity is stock market driven. Nevertheless, 
new theories based on managerial decision-making and compensation incentives have 
started developing in order to approach the phenomenon of merger waves from a 
different angle.  
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Goel and Thakor (2008) present a model which claims that merger waves are caused 
because of managerial decisions based on envy. More specifically, the model proposes 
that when a manager proceeds to undertake an acquisition, the size of the company 
increases and so does the manager‘s compensation. Managers, being envious for other 
managers‘ compensation, also start making acquisitions to increase the size of their own 
companies and their own compensation benefits. The more acquisitions that take place, 
the more envy is triggered amongst managers resulting in more acquisitions, which end 
up creating the so-called merger waves. The model predicts, and subsequent findings 
support, that early acquirers in a merger wave achieve higher synergies than later 
acquirers whose acquisition activity is believed to be triggered by envy. Another 
prediction and finding is that acquirers late in the wave enjoy less wealth gains than 
those acquirers which moved early in the merger movement. Compensation of bidders‘ 
managers is higher for early acquirers than that of late merger movers. Finally, targets 
acquired in early wave deals are smaller compared to the size of targets of late wave 
acquirers. 
 
Gorton, Kahl and Rosen (2005) introduce a different model to explain merger clustering 
during various periods in time. Their model is also based on managerial decisions and 
specifically focuses on the managerial objective of avoiding a potential takeover threat. 
The basic feature of the model is that managers may wish to keep control of their own 
firm and remain independent. There are cases where firms have been acquired and its 
managers have then been assigned inferior positions in the new company or have even 
lost their jobs (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988)). Gorton et al. (2005) also assume 
that firms of a relatively small size cannot acquire large firms, mainly due to the 
financial difficulties that arise. It is obvious that it is not easy to raise funds by issuing 
debt for a larger acquisition, because that could result in increasing the company‘s 
financial distress, leading managers out of their jobs. The above restraints imply that a 
firm cannot acquire a company which is larger than its own size. In this way, the chance 
of large companies being acquired decreases. Hasbrouck (1985) and Palepu (1986) find 
that the probability of a firm being acquired declines as the size of the firm increases. 
 
The rational scenario would be that managers are not interested in making defensive 
acquisitions but remain more concerned with maximizing shareholders‘ wealth. In this 
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way, there is no defensive merger pressure and only profitable acquisitions should take 
place. 
 
However, the more likely scenario is that managers wish to remain independent and as 
a result, defensive managers acquire firms in order to increase their size and lessen the 
likelihood of their firm being acquired. This behaviour triggers other managers‘ 
defensive motives and drives them to acquire for the same reason. Therefore, a merger 
of defensive waves takes place. This theory has a similar conceptual framework to the 
one presented by Goel and Thakor (2008) in their attempts to explain merger waves 
based on managerial enviousness.  
 
To summarise, the literature based on managerial biases has been introduced in order to 
give alternative explanations for merger waves. Once again, we observe that the human 
factor has to be taken seriously into consideration when attempting to study corporate 
governance issues. Managerial biases definitely can affect shareholders‘ wealth. 
 
4.2.1.6 Managerial Incentives and Takeovers 
 
Morck, Scheifer and Vishny (1990), based on a sample of US acquisitions consisting of 
326 takeovers between 1975 and 1987, investigate the issue of whether acquisitions 
performance is driven by managers‘ objectives. More specifically, they notice that 
bidders that suffer the highest losses are those who diversify, those who buy a fast 
growing target and those where the manager‘s performance was relatively poor 
preceding the acquisition. Morck, Scheifer and Vishny (1990) suggest that managers 
overpay for targets that fulfil their own personal objectives rather than meeting the 
requirements of shareholders‘ value maximization. For instance, when a manager is set 
to receive high personal benefits out of a project, he is likely to undertake it although he 
might affect the market value of the company. Morck, Scheifer and Vishny (1990) 
design their methodology in such a way that they are able to capture the negative 
relationship between managerial objectives and the market value of the acquiring firm.  
 
There are different explanations that show why managers choose to acquire firms from 
industries other than the one they primarily operate in so as to engage in M&As for 
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their own personal utility maximisation. For instance, a manager may choose to 
diversify the holdings of the firms in cases where managers themselves are not properly 
diversified. Moreover, to secure his job in the firm, managers can expand in other 
industries at which he might be better skilled. Finally, diversification may be the only 
solution so as to avoid bankruptcy.  
 
Buying growing firms could also be driven by managerial objectives. The managers of 
the new growing company are not a big threat for the existing manager. Therefore, 
managers can feel more relaxed and secure in the company. Besides, incorporating 
growing firms in their companies can enhance their prestige and strengthen the 
reputation of the existing manager‘s in their respective fields. Finally, a manager may 
wish to secure the long term survival of the firm and acquiring a young, growing firm 
can help to achieve this objective. 
 
Lastly, bad managers are likely to make bad acquisitions simply because of their 
inability to do otherwise. These managers are in need of engaging in takeover activities 
so as to secure the survival of the firm and maybe find new businesses in which they 
can perform better. However, bad managers end up performing disastrous acquisitions. 
This comes in contrast to Roll‘s hubris hypotheses, which suggests that good 
performers make bad acquisitions because they are affected by hubris. In this 
alternative setting, poor performing managers, for the reason explained above, who 
wish to pursue their own personal objectives, are more likely to acquire young, rapid 
growing firms and diversify in industries other than the one they perform. Thus, 
managerial personal objectives seem to drive the poor performance of bad performing 
managers who acquire growing firms and diversify.  
 
4.2.2 Overconfidence 
 
One of the most developing and significant concepts in the field of behavioural finance 
is the phenomenon of overconfidence. Overconfidence has been well developed in the 
psychology literature and is mainly presented in the forms of miscalibration, better-
than-average effect, illusion of control and unrealistic optimism. While the concept had 
been well established and studied in the field of psychology, it is only recently that 
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economists have introduced this phenomenon to partially solve some existing financial 
puzzles that failed to be interpreted using the standard economic models. However, 
applying overconfidence in financial and economic models as a well-established and 
definite fact should be treated with caution and care. This section reviews some of the 
main concepts and ideas of overconfidence in the field of psychology and afterwards, 
we will attempt to link these concepts with financial decisions. Overconfidence was 
extensively reviewed in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, we briefly report the main concepts 
that enhance overconfidence. 
 
Overconfidence as Miscalibration 
Overconfidence in psychology is strongly linked to calibration and the probability of 
correct judgement. Therefore, the term overconfidence is often interpreted as one of the 
forms of miscalibration. Calibration is usually studied on general knowledge questions. 
For instance, participants are asked to answer set questions and attribute a probability 
that their given answers are correct. Miscalibration reflects the difference between the 
accuracy rate and the probability assigned by the participant that his answers are 
correct. Oskamp (1965) studies overconfidence as excess certainty over accuracy and 
most importantly, he suggests that confidence increases when one takes part in an 
evaluation task. Similarly, Fischhoff et al. (1977) show that overconfidence seems to be 
quite strong, especially in cases in which the experiment participants seemed to be 
‗certain‘ or ‗almost certain‘ in rating the likelihood of their answers being correct. 
Introducing financial incentives into the experiment did not improve the phenomenon. 
Whilst overconfidence was initially studied as a form of miscalibration, many 
researchers have extended this phenomenon into the area of positive illusions, including 
the better-than-average effect, unrealistic optimism and illusion of control. We further 
review these concepts now as their impact appears to be more pronounced in fields such 
as economics and finance. 
 
Better-than-Average Effect 
Psychological literature has proved that when people compare themselves with others, 
they tend to believe that they are superior to an average representative of the 
comparable group. For instance, Svenson (1981) shows that people consider themselves 
as more skilful and less risky at driving than the skills of others when compared. Taylor 
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and Brown (1988) suggest that positive features can be more accurately attributed to us 
than to others and there exists a form of self-serving bias in self-assessment. The self-
serving bias makes people attribute more responsibility for success, and conversely less 
for failure, to themselves. In a similar context, Miller and Ross (1975) claim that people 
attribute success to their own abilities while they tend to be failure is a result of 
exogenous factors. Thus, agents tend to believe that their contribution to a joint task is 
higher than what it really is and that their personal information is different than what 
the other members of the group are privy to. Finally, Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) 
also posit that the better-than-average effect is partly caused by the self-serving bias. 
 
Unrealistic Optimism 
Unrealistic optimism is usually analysed in the context of the better-than-average effect 
and is defined as people‘s wrong estimation about future events. Weinstein (1980) 
mainly examines unrealistic optimism and in experiments, participants evaluate the 
probabilities of a potential future fortune or misfortune to an average person. People 
tend to attribute more probability to the idea that a positive incident will happen to them 
than to others whilst they also claim that there are less chances that they will be victim 
to a negative incident. When we carefully examine the probabilities of an event 
happening to ourselves or to others, unrealistic optimism declines but does not 
altogether disappear. 
 
Illusion of Control 
Taylor and Brown (1988) show that people tend to believe they can influence the 
outcome of an event despite the fact that the event outcome may depend on pure luck. 
For instance, a typical example of the illusion of control is an event where people prefer 
to throw the dice themselves to heighten the chances of success or choose a specific 
ticket for the lottery. Although both incidents are chance-driven events, people believe 
that the outcome would be more favourable if they are involved themselves. Similarly, 
Langer and Roth (1975) show that participants believe that they are able to predict the 
outcome of coin-tossing better than others do, and are convinced that any success 
enjoyed is due to their experience and ability, and not due to luck. 
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Overconfidence, and the above facets of overconfidence, have been implemented in the 
finance and economics literature to interpret some financial puzzles that could not be 
explained by the standard economic models. We will now present some of the findings 
thus far from this field. 
 
4.2.2.1 Overconfidence on Financial Markets 
 
Overconfidence in financial markets is usually defined as the overestimation or error in 
the interpretation of one‘s precise information or knowledge. This phenomenon has 
been introduced to interpret behaviours both on the investors‘ side and on managerial 
decisions. The phenomenon of overconfidence in financial markets is studied through 
experimental work alongside qualitative studies via questionnaires developed from 
psychology. However, these methods are often criticized for problems such as non-
representative sampling. Small sample sizes and laboratory conditions are different 
from the true reflections of the real world. Besides this, proxies adapted to measure 
overconfidence have raised a lot of criticism and doubt.  
 
Despite being an important factor to explain various financial behaviours, 
overconfidence has to be treated with caution. We provide a brief review of studies 
based on overconfidence in financial markets both from the empirical and theoretical 
viewpoints. Biais et al. (2005) use a set of questionnaires to study overconfidence and 
suggest that overconfident agents perform worse than those who are not affected. 
Glaser and Weber (2007) suggest that the better-than-average effect influences 
investors and leads them to trade more often, resulting in high trading volume. De 
Bondt (1998), in a large questionnaire study, also reveals that investors are affected by 
all of the different facets of overconfidence. A very interesting finding is presented by 
Maciejovsky and Kirchler (2002) who find that levels of overconfidence increase 
towards the end of an experiment, when participants start to depend on their knowledge. 
Participants attribute more value to their own abilities and overestimate their acquired 
knowledge and information. 
 
In theoretical models, overconfidence is interpreted as investors‘ overestimating the 
precision of their information (i.e. they overestimate private signals and underestimate 
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public ones) whilst they underestimate the risk involved. As a consequence they end up 
holding riskier portfolios. Odean‘s (1998) model suggests that traders‘ overestimation 
leads to a high trading volume, larger market depth and volatility. De Long et al. (1990) 
suggest that noise traders have higher profits than rational ones due to their aggressive 
trading. Similar predictions are presented by Hirschleifer and Luo (2001). On the other 
hand, Gervais and Odean‘s (2001) predict that overconfident traders enjoy lower returns 
because they increase the trading volume and volatility, which in turn affects their 
results. Daniel et al. (2001) present a model in which overconfident investors cause 
some kind of mispricing, which is exploited by rational market participants. They 
assume that investors are overconfident only towards private and not public 
information. Similarly, Chuang and Lee (2006) adapt the same assumption in their 
model, writing that overconfident investors over- and underreact to private rather than 
public information. This assumption is employed by most of behavioural finance 
models which involve overconfidence. 
 
Empirical evidence seems to support the predictions of the models. Odean (1999) and 
Odean and Barber (2000, 2001) use a unique dataset of information on investors trading 
activity obtained from a large US firm. Empirical evidence suggests that overconfident 
traders who trade very often do not have the desirable results they wish for. Excess 
trading volume is also attributed to overconfidence. The fact that overconfident 
investors trade more frequently is also confirmed by Chuang and Lee (2006) and 
Statman et al. (2003). Furthermore, Chuang and Lee (2006) exploit a large sample of 
US listed firms between 1963 and 2001 and consistently find evidence for overreaction 
to private signals and underreaction to public ones. 
 
It is evident that a considerable stream of research, both theoretical and empirical, has 
employed overconfidence in an attempt to explain some of the puzzles of the financial 
world. High trading volumes, aggressive and frequent trading, high volatility and an 
overreaction to private signals are some of the phenomena which have been attributed 
to irrationally overconfident investors and traders‘ behaviours. Apart from financial 
markets, this behavioural bias has recently been extended in to other fields of finance, 
particularly corporate finance. The next section discusses the applicability of 
overconfidence in this setting. 
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4.2.2.2 Overconfidence in Corporate Finance – Managerial Hubris 
 
Projects and events in corporate finance are mainly affected by CEO‘s decisions. One 
of the major decisions made by CEOs is in relation to merger and acquisitions. 
Managerial biases can definitely influence the prosperities of the company and 
shareholders‘ wealth. Psychologists suggest that overconfidence is closely related to 
Mergers and Acquisitions and here we show how. 
 
An early work on the phenomenon of overconfidence in M&As by Roll (1986) posits 
that acquisitions may not only be driven by synergy gains but a hubris factor could also 
be a potential driver of acquisitions. Roll does not directly refer to overconfidence as 
such, but discusses that managers feel certain that that valuations are correct. As has 
been discussed above, recent literature shows that this behaviour lies close to the 
definitions of miscalibration and overconfidence. Roll (1986) suggests that the 
difficulty in M&A‘s lies in correctly valuing the target firm. The CEO of the bidding 
company has to assess the target company‘s assets taking into consideration different 
parameters. Most of the time, this is a particularly difficult task to be accurately 
evaluate. Factors such as non public information of the target company or the 
calculation of synergy gains, which themselves include a lot of uncertainty, make the 
valuation process an even more obscure game in which the final estimated value of the 
target company can be extremely unreliable. Managers infected by hubris tend to 
overestimate the synergy gains on offer and proceed to conduct acquisitions which have 
little or nothing to offer to their shareholders. 
 
The concept of overconfidence has been recently reexamined in the event of M&As. 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) adapt two different proxies for overconfidence and show 
that overconfident CEOs over-estimate their own abilities to generate returns whilst 
they also overpay for their target resulting in bidders engaging in mergers that destroy 
value. One of the proxies used is based on managerial compensation. CEOs that delay 
to exercise their options, because they overestimate the returns they can generate in the 
future, are defined as overconfident. The second proxy is based on the way in which the 
press portays CEOs. Based on these two proxies, Malmendier and Tate (2008) show 
that overconfident CEOs believe that their firm is undervalued by the market. There 
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seems to be a positive relationship between overconfident CEOs and their level of 
acquisitiveness and it is shown that these individuals have 65% more possibility of 
being involved in a merger if they are overconfident. Overconfidence seems to be 
enhanced in cases where there is abundance of internal financing sources. Additionally, 
the market reacts four times more negatively for mergers undertaken by overconfident 
CEOs than it does to deals announced by non-overconfident CEOs. Similarly, for the 
UK market, Doukas and Petmezas (2007) employ a different proxy to measure 
overconfidence and prove that overconfident managers end up destroying value for 
their shareholders. Based on psychological evidence, they claim that overconfident 
managers believe themselves to have superior managerial skills and are more competent 
than their counterparts resulting in these firms being involved in multiple acquisitions, 
under the belief that they are aligned with shareholders interests. Therefore, bidders 
who perform five or more acquisitions in a small period of time (three years) are 
defined as overconfident.  
 
The importance of investigating the phenomenon of overconfidence in takeovers that 
involve private targets is due to the fact that there is limited information available 
regarding private targets. Consequently the decision to acquire is mainly based on the 
manager‘s personal belief about the potential synergies to extract from the deal. The 
results from Doukas and Petmezas (2007) concerning the performance of multiple 
acquisitions show that first-order bids are more profitable than higher order deals 
leading to the conclusion that managers attribute the initial successful bid to their own 
abilities and afterwards they become overconfident and continue to acquire more 
companies. This is taken as evident proof of the self-attribution bias. 
 
A great deal of literature considers the issue of managerial biases in corporate finance, 
especially in terms of mergers and acquisitions, and it is proven that managerial 
overconfidence ends up destroying value for the bidders‘ shareholders wealth. It‘s 
relation to this chapter will now be presented. 
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4.3 Hypotheses Development 
 
The market valuation theory posits that, when stocks are overvalued, managers are 
likely to engage in acquisitions, especially in stock-financed deals, using their 
overvalued equity to acquire less-overvalued companies (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). 
Hence, more bids should take place during stock market booms when investors, as a 
group, become overoptimistic and drive stock prices higher than their fundamental 
value. During periods of high market valuations caused by investor‘s optimism, the 
market reaction to a bid announcement should be more favorable than to bids 
announced at other times (Bouwman et al. 2009) due to the increased sentiment in the 
market. Thus, we expect that acquirers during high-valuation markets earn substantially 
higher returns than those conducting deals in low-valuation periods. 
 
H1: Abnormal Returns for acquisitions announced during high valuation periods 
should be higher than abnormal returns of acquisitions announced during low 
valuation periods. 
 
Roll (1986) was the first to study the behavioral element of overconfidence in an M&A 
context. In this framework, managers may overestimate the synergy gains of the 
potential merger either because they believe that they have above-average abilities to 
lead the deal or via the potentiall underestimation of the downside of the merger due to 
the illusion of control over its outcome (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). The managers of 
bidding firms that have experienced recent success may believe that they can create 
value from acquisitions (Billett and Qian, 2008). However, overconfidence itself may 
also lead managers to undertake bad acquisitions. Hence, we should expect that 
overconfident managers should experience lower returns in their acquisitions. 
 
Rosen (2006) argues that managers are likely to have the same optimism as investors 
during bullish periods. Hence, managers might overestimate the potential synergies 
from the merger, which is likely to influence the quality of the deal undertaken during a 
hot period. If managers are rewarded for increasing stock prices, then they have an 
incentive to conduct acquisitions in hot markets, as even a bad deal is likely to 
temporarily increase the acquirer‘s stock price. Given that during high-valuation 
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periods there is potential for value-creation in M&As, even for overconfident managers, 
non-overconfident managers may time the announcement of bids and further enhance 
shareholders‘ wealth. On the other hand, when overconfident bidders conduct deals in 
depressed markets, it is extremely unlikely that they will be able to hide the poor quality 
of the deal and the possible overpayment. Investors in low valuation markets are 
substantially more careful in assessing the future prospects of the deal and therefore 
they are likely to react even more unfavourably when realizing that the deal is bad, 
depreciating the bidder‘s stock price further. Given the above, we should expect that 
bidders should gain (lose) the most when they are run by rational (overconfident) 
managers and when the deal takes place in bull (bear) markets. Following the above 
discussion, we form the following two hypotheses: 
 
H2: Rational managers who announce acquisitions during high valuation periods 
should obtain the highest abnormal returns around the announcement of the 
acquisition date. 
 
H3: Overconfident managers who announce acquisitions during low valuation 
periods should obtain the lowest abnormal returns around the announcement of the 
acquisition date. 
 
4.4. Data and Methodology 
 
4.4.1 Data 
 
4.4.1.1 The sample 
 
The sample consists of takeover bids announced by U.K. firms for the period 
01/01/1990-31/12/2005, as collected from the Thomson One Banker. The 
announcement bids collected are subject to the availability of Thomson One Banker at 
the time of data collection. To be included in the final sample, the deals should meet the 
following criteria: 
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o The acquirer is a U.K. firm publicly traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
and has five days of return data around the announcement date of the takeover 
available as well as one to three years return data on the DataStream database. 
o The target company is either a listed or unlisted company and can be a domestic 
or a foreign company. 
o The acquiring firm purchases at least 50% of the target‘s shares. 
o The deal value is ₤1 million or more. 
o The deal value represents at least 1% of the market value of the acquirer. 
o Multiple deals announced within five days of each other are excluded (after 
estimating the multiple acquisitions proxies)
29
. 
o Financial and utility firms, for both bidders and targets, are excluded from the 
sample (Fuller et al. (2002)). 
 
We further split the sample according to the method of payment into three groups: a) 
Cash acquisitions which include acquisitions which have been financed using cash; b) 
stock acquisitions which have been financed through a share exchangewith the target 
firm; and c) mixed acquisitions which are a combination of cash and stock offers 
(Martin (1996)). Finally our sample consists of 1281 unique bidders who performed 
3223 deals. 
 
4.4.1.2 High, Neutral and Low Valuation Periods 
 
To classify the stock market into high, neutral and low valuation periods, we follow 
Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009). We use monthly data of the P/E ratio of the value-
weighted market index (Total Market UK (TOTMKUK
30
)), in order to classify each 
month as a high, neutral or low valuation market period. We refer to acquisitions 
announced during those months as high, neutral and low acquisitions, respectively. 
 
The P/E ratio of the market has drifted upwards through time. To avoid characterizing 
acquisitions clustered during the first half of the period as low valuation and those 
                                                 
29
 The multiple acquirers proxy is based on the fact that a manager acquires five or more target firms 
within three years. The multiple deal announcements are then excluded after calculating this proxy. 
30
 The P/E ratio data was collected from DataStream. DataStream provides P/E data for the FTSE All 
Share Index from 1993 onwards. Therefore, we use the P/E data for TOTMKUK, which is the closest 
index to the FTSE All Share (the correlation between the two is 99.92%).  
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clustered during the second half as high valuation acquisition, we remove the trend 
from the ratio. 
 
We detrend the market P/E by removing the best fit straight line from the P/E of the 
month in question and the five preceding years. Then, each month is characterized as 
above (below) average if the detrended market P/E of that month is above (below) this 
past five-year average. Finally, the top-half of the above average months are classified 
as high-valuation periods and the bottom half of the below average months are 
classified as low-valuation periods. All other months are classified as neutral-valuation 
periods. Following this method, we end up having classified half of the months as 
neutral valuation periods (96 months) and the other half as high-low valuation periods. 
In total we have 96 neutral months, 56 high valuation months and 40 low valuation 
months.  
 
4.4.1.3 Measures of Overconfidence 
 
To capture overconfidence, we adopt various methods to ensure our results are reliable. 
We use a number of proxies, commonly accepted in the finance literature, whilse we 
modify others believing that they can better capture the human irrational behavior in 
their new format. This section describes the rationale of these proxies as well as the way 
in which we collected the data required. 
 
Stock Options Proxy 
 
The main proxy employed in this chapter to classify managers as overconfident or 
rational is based on the managers‘ personal portfolio decisions. More specifically, we 
examine the actions CEO‘s take concerning their executive stock options (Malmendier 
and Tate (2005)). CEOs usually receive huge grants of stock and non-tradable options 
as part of their compensation plans. It has been proved that risk averse CEOs should 
exercise their stock options before expiration if they are sufficiently ―in-the-money‖ 
since they are exposed to enormous firm specific risk which cannot be diversified. 
Upon exercise, the managers receive shares of company stocks which are always 
immediately sold (Ofek and Yermack (2000)). In other words, CEOs who persistently 
choose to maintain their stock options until expiration, continuing to expose themselves 
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to high levels of risk in the belief that the stock of the company will rise higher due to 
their superior leadership in the future, are defined as overconfident. 
 
We adopt this approach for measuring overconfidence. The first step is to identify the 
CEOs
31
 who managed the bidding companies of our sample around the announcement 
date provided by Thomson One Banker. After creating a list of the names of the CEOs 
who decided to undertake the takeover, we observe their personal portfolios and, more 
specifically, the actions they take concerning their stock options. We record the date 
that the stock option was granted to the manager, the date that he/she can start 
exercising the option, the expiration date of the option and finally, the strike price. 
Principally, executive stock options in the U.K. have a life span of ten years with a 
vesting period of three years (that is, they are exercisable after three years from the date 
of being first granted). Following Malmendier and Tate (2005), if managers hold the 
option until the expiration date, or until the last year before the expiration date, he is 
classified as overconfident. Moreover, we check whether the company stock price is 
higher than the strike price throughout the course of its life. When a manager holds the 
options to expiration because he is unable to exercise the option as the strike price is 
higher than the stock price at all times, then he is not classified as overconfident but as a 
rationally behaved person. In our sample, there are few cases where this is true. In the 
majority, all of the options are highly ―in-the-money‖ (i.e. the stock price is much 
higher than the strike price) and for considerably long periods of time (i.e. for over one 
year). Consequently, we employ this way of checking the ability of manager to exercise 
their options rationally without involving any benchmarks. The above data, such as the 
name of the manager, the dates regarding the life of the options and the strike price, 
were obtained through the annual reports of the companies. The annual reports are 
obtained either by databases such as Lexis-Nexis and Northcote.com or directly by 
requesting copies from the company itself. Finally, we manage to obtain data for 848 
deals, which represent more than a quarter of the initial sample (Table 4.1, Panel B). 
Following the Stock Options Proxy, 601 (70%) of these deals are identified as rational 
while 247 (30%) are deemed to beoverconfident. 
                                                 
31
 First we look for the CEO of the company around the announcement date. If there is no such post in the 
company we identify the managing director. In the UK market, the position for the CEO was initially 
titled Managing Director prior to1995. If the company has no positions for either of these titles then we 
examine and report the person that holds the Chairman post. 
Chapter 4: Managerial Overconfidence in High and Low Valuation Markets and Gains to Acquisitions 
183 
 
Multiple Acquisitions Proxy 
 
Multiple acquirers are classified as firms that acquire more than one company as has 
been studied in the literature. Fuller et al. (2002) introduces a more specific definition 
for multiple acquirers. They classify companies that acquire five or more targets in a 
period of three years as multiple acquirers. Doukas and Petmezas (2007) also use this 
definition to measure overconfidence. In this study, we adopt a similar approach but 
differentiate it in a very significant way. In this work, we do not refer to the companies 
themselves but to the managers which direct them. Therefore, managers who perform 
multiple acquisitions (five or more) in a small period of time (three years) are defined 
as overconfident. Since we focus on managerial overconfidence, it would be wise to 
adopt this proxy from the perspective of the manager/CEO himself. A company may 
have conducted five or more acquisitions in a three-year period of time, but literature on 
managerial turnover following M&As suggests that different individuals may have been 
responsible for each deal. Table 4.1, Panel C presents the distribution of the data 
collected employing this proxy throughout the sample period. In total, we manage to 
obtain data for 3099 deals (96% of the initial sample). Out of these, 2256 (72%) 
acquisitions are classified as rational and 843 (27%) as overconfident. As a side note, 
on the whole, acquisitions performed by rational and overconfident managers will be 
defined as rational and overconfident deals. In the same way, acquisitions announced 
during high, neutral or low valuation periods will be defined as high, neutral and low 
respectively. The combination of managers and valuation periods will define the 
acquisition. For instance, a takeover from a rational manager announced during a high 
valuation month will be denoted as a high-rational acquisition. In the same way, we 
consider low valuation-rational manager (low-rational), high valuation-overconfident 
manager (high-overconfident) and low valuation-overconfident manager (low-
overconfident) takeovers. 
 
4.4.1.4 Summary Statistics 
 
Table 4.1, Panel A presents the overall annual distribution of our sample, as well as the 
distribution of acquisitions according to the valuation classification in which they have 
been announced (i.e. high, neutral and low). According to the Bouwman, Fuller and 
Nain (2009) methodology of classifying months into high, neutral and low valuation 
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periods, the sum of high and low valuation months is equal to that of the neutral 
valuation months. For that reason, we observe that 47.60% of all acquisitions took place 
during neutral valuation periods, while 30.16% and 22.25% of takeovers were 
announced during high and low valuation periods accordingly. The fact that more 
acquisitions are undertaken during high valuation periods is consistent with the findings 
of Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009). They also observe a higher percentage of 
takeovers during overvalued markets. 
 
[Insert Table 4.1 about here] 
 
Table 4.1, Panels B and C present the annual distribution of acquisitions according to 
the stock options and multiple acquirers proxies, respectively, in measuring managerial 
overconfidence. Table 4.1, Panels B and C report the annual distribution of acquisitions 
according to whether the managers that undertook the acquisition was rational or 
overconfident, to the valuation classification in which the acquisition was announced 
(i.e. a high or low valuation month) and also according to the combination of the two 
(i.e. high or low valuation acquisitions performed by rational or overconfident 
managers).  
 
The nature of the two proxies for overconfidence is different. One proxy is based on 
managerial compensation and the other one is derived from the level of managerial 
acquisitiveness (as explained above). Moreover, due to collection difficulties, we 
manage to obtain a smaller sample for the stock options proxy. There are 848 deals for 
the stock options proxy sample and 3099 deals for the multiple acquirer‘s proxy sample 
out of the overall 3223 deals in the full sample. Despite these two major differences in 
the two proxies, alongside the problems in using proxies in general, some interesting 
results are found. Table 4.1, Panels A and Panel B report that 70.87% and 29.13% of 
the deals are performed by rational and overconfident managers respectively according 
to the stock options proxy. Similar ratios are observed for the multiple acquirers proxy. 
Rational managers undertook 72.80% of takeovers whilst overconfident ones conducted 
the remaining 27.20%. This evidence shows that despite the differences of the two 
proxies, the proportion of rational-overconfident deals remains the same for the two 
proxies. Similar proportions are observed when we split the samples according to the 
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valuation of the market in which the acquisitions were announced (i.e. high or low 
months).  
Table 4.1, Panel B (Stock Options Proxy) shows that 29.25% and 23.58% of the 
acquisitions were announced during high and low valuation months respectively while 
Table 4.1, Panel C (Multiple acquirers Proxy) supports with similar results. 30.14% and 
22.01% of the deals are defined as high and low acquisitions respectively. The above 
proportions for each proxy when considered separately are also representative for the 
whole sample. The proportion between the two proxies remains very close to each other 
even when we split the sample according to the combination of rational-overconfident 
and high-low acquisitions. 20.64% of the total acquisitions according to the stock 
options proxy (Table 4.1, Panel B) are announced by rational managers in high 
valuation periods. When measuring overconfidence with the multiple acquirers proxy 
(Table 4.1, Panel C), the proportion of acquisitions announced by rational managers 
during high valuation periods is 20.65%. Similarly, overconfident managers engage in 
acquisitions announced during undervalued periods in a proportion of 6.60% according 
to the stock options proxy while this figure is slightly lower at 5.52% according to the 
multiple acquirers‘ proxy. Similar proportions are observed for high-overconfident and 
low-rational deals for both proxies (see Table 4.1, Panels B and C). Therefore, the 
initial proportions observed for rational-overconfident managers for the two proxies 
remains even after we split the sample into high and low acquisitions. Conclusively, 
despite the different nature and the different size of the two proxies, the proportions 
remain similar for both of them, enhancing the robustness and reliability of the two sub-
samples used in the return analysis for the two proxies. 
 
Table 4.2 illustrates the activity of acquisitions among public and private targets as well 
as high, neutral and low deals. It displays the mean and median value of the acquirer as 
well as the mean and median value of the transaction. Table 4.2, Panels B and C, are 
split according to the type of manager (i.e. rational or overconfident) that performs the 
acquisitions for the two proxies (i.e. stock options and multiple acquirers‘ proxy). The 
acquirer‘s market capitalization is equal to the price per share one-month prior to the 
bid announcement multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding. The target 
firm size is measured as the deal value of the bid at the announcement. Table 4.2, Panel 
A shows that the mean (median) size of the bidder is 517.73 (88.53) million pounds for 
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1,281 unique acquirers in contrast to the smaller mean (median) size of target firms of 
64.49 (6) million pounds. This is mainly driven by the vast majority of private target 
firms observed in the sample. Out of the 3,223 takeovers in the full sample, in 2,839 
(88%) of them, the acquirer bids for a private target in contrast to the 384 (12%) public 
targets recorded. The high percentage of private targets in the UK market is consistent 
with the existing literature.
32
  
 
[Insert Table 4.2 about here] 
 
Table 4.2, Panel A also presents the mean and median value of the bidder and target 
after splitting the sample into high, neutral and low acquisitions. There seems to be an 
even distribution among the three groups. Finally, the summary statistics for 
overconfident and rational bidders are qualitatively similar for both proxies (Table 4.2, 
Panels B and C), which further enhances the robustness and reliability of the sub-
samples used in the return analysis for the three different measures of overconfidence. 
 
4.4.2 Methodology 
 
4.4.2.1 Short-Run Event Study Methodology 
 
To calculate the acquiring firms‘ performance and identify the impact of rational and 
overconfident management, we employ standard event study methodology (Fuller et al. 
(2002)) to calculate the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for the five-day period 
(-2, +2) surrounding the announcement date, as given by both DataStream and 
Thomson One Banker (SDC). We estimate the abnormal returns earned in the short-
term using a modified market model as follows: 
i,t i,t m,tAR   R –  R  
where ARi,t is the excess return of bidder i on day t;  Ri,t is the return of bidder i on day t 
measured as the percentage change in the return index, which includes the dividends of 
bidder i; Rm,t is the market return estimated as the percentage change in the FT-All 
                                                 
32
 Conn, Cosh, Guest and Hughes (2005) report that privately held targets account for more than 80% of 
domestic acquisitions. Faccio and Masulis (2005) report 90% private target acquisitions for the period 
1997-2000. Doukas and Petmezas (2007) document that 91% of UK deals conducted between 1980 and 
2004 were to acquire privately held firms.  
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share Index (value-weighted) on day t. The CARs are then calculated as the summation 
of the Abnormal Returns (ARi,t) for the five days surrounding the announcement of the 
bid as indicated by the following equation: 
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T-statistics are used to test the null hypothesis that the mean CAR is equal to zero for a 
sample of n firms is as follows: 
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Where 
,i tCAR  denotes the sample average, and ,( )i tCAR  denotes the cross-sectional 
sample standard deviations of abnormal returns for the sample of n firms. 
We do not report the t-statistic in tables but the p-value instead. The p-value provides a 
sense of strength of the evidence against the null hypothesis. The lower the p-value, the 
stronger the evidence that the mean CAR is different from zero. 
 
As discussed in Section 3.4.2.1 of Chapter 3, it has been shown that the ideal window 
for our study is -2 to +2 around the acquisitions date. Also, in Section 3.5.1 of Chapter 
3, we show that our results are not sensitive to the method (CARs or BHARs) or the 
event window used. In Chapter 4, we use the same sample as used in Chapter 3. 
Therefore we keep using the CARs(-2,+2) to assess the short-run performance of 
various takeovers. 
 
4.4.2.2 Long-Run Methodology 
 
The long run analysis undertaken in this chapter examines the bidder‘s excess returns 
which occur over a 12- and 36- month post-event period. Following Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000) we employ Calendar Time Portfolio Regressions (CTPRs) analysis. The 
portfolios are rebalanced each month to include firms that performed a takeover during 
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the previous month while also to remove firms that have reached the end of the 12- or 
36-month period. The average monthly excess returns for the three-year post acquisition 
period is the intercept from the time-series regression of the calendar portfolio on the 
Fama and French three-factor model as follows: 
 
ittitiftmtiiftpt HMLhSMBsRRaRR   )(  
 
Where Rpt is the average monthly return of the calendar portfolio at time t; Rft is the 
monthly risk free rate of return at time t; Rmt is the monthly return on the market index 
(value-weighted); SMBt is the monthly return on small minus large firms (value-
weighted); and HMLt is the monthly return on high book-to-market minus low book-to-
market firms (value-weighted). βi, si, hi, are the regression parameters and εit is error 
term. The intercept (αi) measures the monthly average excess returns of acquiring firms 
after controlling for the effect of the three risk factors. 
 
4.5 Empirical Findings 
 
This section discusses the announcement abnormal returns earned by bidders, the 
multivariate results and the long-run performance of bidding firms that announce 
acquisitions in high and low valuation periods respectively. Most importantly, we 
examine the interaction between the performance of rational and overconfident 
managers who announce takeover deals in high and low valuation periods. 
 
4.5.1 Short-Run Analysis 
 
This section presents the short-run analysis and discusses the cumulative abnormal 
returns (hereafter CARs) of the respective bidding firms. It attempts to reveal the 
differential performance in terms of the abnormal returns generated between the two 
types of managers - rational and overconfident - when announcing acquisitions during 
overvalued or undervalued markets, in terms of all of the possible combinations this 
connotes. CARs measure the abnormal returns of the acquirer around the announcement 
date (-2, +2). Initially, the abnormal returns are presented for the entire sample and then 
for acquisitions announced during high and low valuation periods. The portfolios are 
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also split according to the method of payment and the target‘s public status. The main 
part of the analysis focuses on the bidders‘ short-run abnormal returns in the rational-
irrational manager-investor framework. More specifically, we examine the five day 
performance of rational and overconfident investors who announce acquisitions in high 
and low valuation periods (i.e. High-Rational, High-Overconfident, Low-Rational and 
Low-Overconfident deals as defined earlier). This framework is examined when 
portfolios have been divided according to the various bidder and deal characteristics 
documented in the literature as influential factors affecting acquirers‘ abnormal returns. 
Such characteristics include the method of payment, the targets listing status, the 
bidders‘ growth opportunities (MTBV), the bidders‘ size (MV), the relative size of the 
deal, whether the bidder expands in the same or acquires a firm from a different 
industry and finally, whether the target company is of domestic or foreign origin. All 
portfolios are analyzed for both proxies of overconfidence.  
 
4.5.1.1 Bidder Gains for Acquisitions Announced during High and Low Valuation 
Periods 
 
Table 4.3 illustrates the CARs for the whole sample of acquisitions for deals announced 
during high, neutral and low valuation periods on the basis of the target firm‘s listing 
status (i.e. public or private) and the method of payment (i.e. cash, stock or mixed). 
Table 4.3 shows that the overall short-run performance of the whole sample (3,223 
deals) is gains of 1.47% earned around the announcement date, statistically significant 
at the 1% level, which is driven by the positive and significant performance (1.83%) of 
private acquisitions that populate the UK market (2,899 or 88% in our sample). Chang 
(1998), Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) and Draper and Paudyal (2006), among 
others, show that bidders enjoy positive and significant abnormal returns (especially 
with stock-swaps) around the announcement date which is explained by the limited 
competition,
33
 the monitoring
34
 and the information hypotheses.
35
 On the contrary, 
                                                 
33
 The limited competition hypothesis suggests that the bidding competition among private targets is 
likely to be less intense and the higher likelihood of underpayment can lead to higher returns for the 
bidder (Chang 1998) 
34
 The monitoring hypothesis implies that through stock offers the small number of owners of the private 
firm will become blockholders of the new combined firm. The effect is close monitoring of the 
managerial performance  by this group of stockholders leading to an increase in firm value (Drapper and 
Paudyal (2006), Chang (1998)). 
35
 According to the information hypothesis, the owners of the private firms have high incentives to assess 
properly the value of the stock of the bidding firm since they will end up having large amounts of shares 
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acquisitions of listed target firms suffer a loss (-1.20%) around the announcement date 
(Travlos (1987)). The CARs for cash and stock acquisitions are positive and equal to 
1.17% and 2.63% respectively, also predominantly driven by the large proportion of 
private deals in our sample (Draper and Paudyal (2006)). The overall findings of our 
sample are in accordance with the documented literature on M&As. Table 4.3 also 
displays the short run performance of acquisitions announced during high, neutral and 
low valuation periods as measured by the methodology of Bouwman, Fuller and Nain 
(2009). On the whole, acquisitions announced during high valuation periods enjoy the 
highest profits, followed by those announced in neutral valuation months. Finally those 
conducted in undervalued periods underperform the rest of the sample. More 
specifically, for the overall sample, acquisitions announced in high valuation periods 
enjoy 1.31%, statistically significant at the 1% level, more abnormal returns than those 
announced during low valuation periods. Bids for listed target firms generate negative 
abnormal returns in line with the documented literature, but those announced during 
high markets generate marginally negative and statistically insignificant returns (-
0.15%) while those announced in low periods suffer greater significant losses (-2.71%). 
The mean difference (1.21%) between high versus low deals is statistically significant 
at the 1% significance level. Similarly, deals of private targets as well as those financed 
using cash, stock and mixed methods in high valuation periods significantly outperform 
those announced in low valuation periods by 1.21%, 0.98%, 4.31% and 1.31% 
respectively. The high differential of 4.31% for stock deals, statistically significant at 
the 18% level (probably because of the small number of stock acquisitions in the UK 
market), provides support to the Sheifer and Vishny (2003) stock driven acquisition 
theory. In other words, managers take advantage of their overvalued equity to acquire 
undervalued or less overvalued targets. The overall results are consistent with existing 
studies that empirically investigate the quality of mergers in different valuation market 
periods (Rosen (2006), Bouwman et al. (2009)). 
 
[Insert Table 4.3 about here] 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
in a stock offer. This fact conveys favourable news to the market and a rise in the stock price of the 
bidders surrounding the announcement date (Chang (1998), Draper and Paudyal (2006)) 
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Table 4.4 illustrates the performance of deals announced during high, neutral and low 
valuation periods after controlling for various bidder and deal characteristics. We 
control for the effect of market valuations in the various portfolios including the value, 
glamour, small, big, low and high relative size, diversifying, non-diversifying, domestic 
and foreign classifications. The findings show that high acquisitions significantly 
outperform low acquisitions. More specifically, deals announced in high periods 
generate 1.45%, 1.13%, 1.75%, 0.97%, 0.70%, 1.94%, 0.83%, 1.74%, 1.21% and 
1.54% more abnormal returns than deals announced in low periods for the value, 
glamour, small, big, low and high relative size, diversifying, non-diversifying, domestic 
and foreign portfolios respectively. All the mean differences (apart from the 
diversifying portfolio) are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels. 
[Insert Table 4.4 about here] 
 
According to Rosen (2006), the good performance of high acquisitions could be due to 
the fact that CEOs exploit the market conditions and conduct acquisitions during hot 
periods only to boost up the company‘s stock prices. Managers usually enjoy large 
bonuses for increasing the price of their stocks. Literature on IPOs also suggests that 
investor sentiment is the dominant reason behind firms‘ decisions to become publicly 
listed during overvalued markets. If investor sentiment biases can affect acquisitions at 
this degree, then we have to consider managerial sentiment as well. CEOs decide which 
firm in the market will be the takeover target as well as controlling the timing of the 
announcement. Therefore, it is of great importance to take into consideration the 
parameter of managerial biases and the way that different types of managers are 
affected during overvalued and undervalued markets. 
 
4.5.1.2 Bidder Gains by Rational and Overconfident Managers in High and Low 
Valuation Periods 
 
The main purpose and contribution of this study is to uncover any potential differences 
between when rational or overconfident managers engage in acquisitions that take place 
during periods of high or low investor sentiment. The findings above imply that 
managers exploit investor sentiment during overvalued periods in order to boost up 
their company‘s stock price and therefore obtain positive short-run gains. In this 
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section, we attempt to uncover the bidders‘ gains in a rational-irrational manager-
investor framework. 
[Insert Table 4.5 and 4.6 about here] 
 
Table 4.5, Panel A, reports the CARs for rational and overconfident managers as 
measured by the stock options proxy. Rational managers enjoy positive and significant 
gains in all different states of market valuation (1.36% for high, 1.26% for neutral and 
1.13% for low periods). Acquisitions announced during high valuation periods 
outperform those announced during low valuation markets for the overall sample 
(1.10%), continuing to hold after we control for rational and overconfident managers. 
More importantly, the highest performance (1.36%) is achieved by rational managers 
who announce takeovers in high valuation months. This is due to the fact that rational 
managers choose targets firms which generate positive synergies for the combined firm 
as well as taking advantage of the high investor sentiment which boosts their stock 
prices up even further. On the other hand, CEOs infected by hubris that bid for target 
companies in low valuation months suffer the highest losses (-1.69%). In low valuation 
periods, the investor sentiment is likely to also be low and investors more carefully 
assess the future prospects of the deal. In such periods, overconfident managers are less 
likely to be able to hide possible overpayments. Hence, a manager‘s poor choice, both 
for the targets‘ potential synergies and the timing of the acquisition, can lead to 
negative abnormal returns for acquirer‘s shareholders wealth. The high differential 
(3.05%, statistically significant at the 5% level) between high-rational deals versus low-
overconfident ones strongly indicates that acquirer‘s gains are definitely affected by the 
CEO‘s optimal choice for the target firm and the timing of deal announcement. The 
picture remains the same when measuring the managerial bias of overconfidence using 
the multiple acquirers‘ proxy (Table 4.6, Panel A). The high performance (1.65%) of 
rational managers is mainly driven by the positive and significant gains (2.16%) 
achieved during high valuation months contrary to those obtained (0.69%) in low 
valuation periods. On the other hand, overconfident deals (0.88%) are highly affected 
by the low insignificant gains obtained in low valuation periods (0.19%). The multiple 
acquirers‘ proxy, despite being based on a different rationale to the options proxy as 
well as having a smaller subsample size, also indicates that bidder gains are driven by 
the high performance (2.16%) of high-rational deals contrary to the low insignificant 
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performance of low-overconfident deals (0.19%). The statistically significant 
differential (1.97%, significant at the 1% level of significance) reinforces the argument 
that managerial decisions, over which targets to pursue and when they should be 
acquired, can crucially affect bidders‘ returns. We further test the rational-irrational 
investor-managers framework according to the target firm‘s listing status and method of 
payment in the following sections.  
 
4.5.1.3 Bidder Gains by Rational and Overconfident Managers in High and Low 
Valuation Periods by Target’s Listing Status 
 
This section discusses the acquirers‘ abnormal returns as obtained by rational and 
overconfident managers in various valuation market conditions after splitting the 
portfolios according to the targets listing status. Private takeovers are the ideal ground 
in which to capture and study the phenomenon of overconfidence (Doukas and 
Petmeazas (2007)). The UK market is populated by private deals and hence a 
representative sample is obtained. The information for private deals is limited, which 
means that managers of the bidding firm need to involve their own personal estimation 
and valuation skills. Thus, if they are infected by hubris, the valuation process may be 
highly influenced by this bias. 
  
Table 4.5, Panel B reports bidders‘ gains for private deals according to the stock options 
proxy. Rational acquisitions outperform overconfident ones both in the overall sample 
by 0.90%, statistically significant at the 10% level, and for the various valuation states 
of the market (especially in low periods where the mean difference is 2.19%, 
statistically significant at the 10% level). Rational-high deals earn 1.72% significant 
abnormal returns around the announcement date. High-overconfident deals earn 1.50% 
while low-rational ones obtain 1.41% abnormal returns. These findings indicate that 
even if overconfident managers possibly overpay for their target, the short-run 
performance is enhanced by the positive investor sentiment in the market. The small 
mean differences between rational acquisitions in the different states of market 
valuations (1.72% for high-rational, 1.66% for neutral rational and 1.41% for low-
rational) shows that rational managers manage to generate positive abnormal returns 
irrespective of investor sentiment. Overconfident deals are boosted up by investor 
sentiment in high valuation periods (1.50%). On the other hand, the market reacts even 
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more unfavorably to overconfident deals conducted in low periods. In addition, it is 
evident in the portfolio for private targets that a combination of managerial decisions 
can influence bidder gains. The high differential (2.50%, statistically significant at the 
6% level) between high-rational and low-overconfident deals reinforces this argument 
confirming that rational managers who taking advantage of the high investor sentiment 
in the market manage to boost up their stock prices even more and resultantly obtain the 
best possible outcome for their shareholders, contrary to the devastating results of 
overconfident deals undertaken in undervalued periods.  
 
The above results and conclusions and not subject to the proxy used to measure 
overconfidence. When employing the multiple acquirers proxy (Table 4.6, Panel B), the 
overall picture remains robust. Overall, rational-high bids outperform overconfident-
low ones by 1.10% and 1.28% respectively. More specifically, the highest short-run 
performance (2.59%) is obtained by rational bidders who choose to acquire targets with 
positive synergy gains in periods in which they can take advantage of the investor 
sentiment. Overconfident managers seem to generate positive and significant gains 
(1.43%) when announcing deals during high valuation periods whilst rational-low deals 
also enjoy 1.16% positive and significant abnormal returns. There is no market reaction 
for low-overconfident acquisitions (0.29%, statistically insignificant). The differential 
between high-rational and low-overconfident deals is 2.31%, statistically significant at 
the 1% level, similar to the results observed for the stock options proxy. 
 
Table 4.5, Panel C (using the stock options proxy) shows that in all possible 
circumstances (i.e. for the overall sample, the type of manager or the market 
conditions), bidders‘ suffer losses, all of which are statistically insignificant, most 
probably due to the small number of observations of each portfolio. All differentials are 
positive in favor of rational and high acquisitions accordingly but they are statistically 
insignificant. This could be as a result of the small sample size. Bids for listed firms are 
relatively scarce in the UK market compared to private deals (only 12% of our sample 
accounts for public deals). As a result when splitting the sample of public bids into 
other sub-portfolios, the sample sizes for each classification declines even more. Apart 
from this, the insignificant differential between rational-overconfident bids, despite 
being positive (1.14% for the overall public portfolio), could indicate that the 
Chapter 4: Managerial Overconfidence in High and Low Valuation Markets and Gains to Acquisitions 
195 
 
phenomenon of overconfidence is less pronounced for public bids. More information is 
available for listed target firms and therefore managers can easier evaluate the target 
firm and the potential synergies on offer. This infers that there is less involvement 
regarding the personal critical abilities and beliefs of the manager, in which case the 
impact of overconfidence influencing the manager‘s decisions is lessened. Despite the 
small sample size and the lack of the overconfidence effect in this portfolio, the 
rational-irrational manager investor framework still holds. The CARs for high-rational 
deals are the least negative (-0.70%) when compared to the high losses of low-
overconfident deals (-5.40%). The small number of observations in each portfolio 
cannot lead to any fruitful conclusions. Despite this fact, the fact that rational CEOs in 
high periods lose 4.70% less that overconfident ones do in low periods provides extra 
support to our hypotheses. When measuring overconfidence using the multiple 
acquirers‘ proxy (Table 4.6, Panel C), the findings are more mixed. High-rational 
acquisitions (-0.11%) remain superior to low-overconfident ones (-1.37%), but it 
appears that rational managers in low periods suffer the highest losses (-2.49%). This 
fact, alongside other inconsistencies (such as the fact that rational bids seem to 
underperform overconfident ones) may rise from the fact that this proxy fails to capture 
overconfidence for listed targets. Listed targets are usually large firms which will have 
a greater impact in the after takeover performance in the post-event period for the 
combined company. Hence, managers may be more careful when choosing to bid for a 
listed firm. Besides, as mentioned above, there is less information asymmetry for public 
firms and the evaluation process is not so much influenced by managers‘ personal 
estimations and beliefs regarding the target‘s intrinsic value. Despite the problems of 
truly capturing overconfidence in the public portfolio, the high-rational bids still seem 
to be the portfolio that suffers the lowest losses. 
 
Overall, in both the private and public portfolios, managerial decisions in terms of 
which target to acquire and when to do so, can have considerably significant effects on 
bidder gains. Rational managers who opt for targets with positive synergies and 
announce the deal during high valuation periods so that they can exploit the positive 
investor sentiment, obtain the highest possible short-run abnormal returns for their 
shareholders. On the other hand, overconfident managers who overpay for their targets 
and, moreover, when this takes place during low valuation periods in which the low 
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sentiment in the market will not boost the bidders share price, generate negative returns 
for their shareholders. These effects are better observed in the private target portfolio 
where the phenomenon of overconfidence is best captured. 
 
4.5.1.4 Bidder Gains by Rational and Overconfident Managers in High and Low 
Valuation Periods according to the Method of Payment 
 
This section presents the short-run acquisition performance of bidders according to the 
various managerial traits in various valuation states of the market differentiated on the 
basis of the method of payment used to finance the acquisition. 
 
Panel D of Table 4.5 reports the bidder gains for cash acquisitions according to the 
stock options proxy. Rational deals enjoy similar profits during the various valuation 
periods (1.13% for high, 0.75% for neutral and 0.42% for low valuation periods). 
Greater differences are observed between the various market conditions for 
overconfident deals (1.43% for high, -0.18% for neutral and -1.12% for low), which 
indicates that rational managers‘ good performance is not so much affected by the 
market condition whilst there is a positive effect on overconfident deals exerted by high 
investor sentiment. Therefore, these latter deals are not catastrophic for the bidders‘ 
shareholders, contrary to the performance of overconfident deals in low valuation 
periods. The mean difference between high-rational and low-overconfident acquisitions 
is 2.24%, statistically significant at the 16% level. The overall findings of the rational-
irrational manager-investor framework remain unaffected when accounting for 
overconfidence using the multiple acquirers proxy (Table 4.6, Panel D). This proxy also 
confirms that the bidder‘s performance is affected by the excellent performance of high-
rational deals (1.45%) and negatively affected by the poor performance of low-
overconfident ones (-1.01%). The mean difference is 2.46%, highly significant at the 
1% level. 
 
It would not be wise to draw fruitful conclusions for the stock acquisitions portfolio due 
to the limited observations obtained for each classification. Stock acquisitions are quite 
scarce in the UK market. For the stock options proxy (Table 4.5, Panel E) high-rational, 
high-overconfident, low-rational and low-overconfident portfolios consist of 7, 4, 2 and 
Chapter 4: Managerial Overconfidence in High and Low Valuation Markets and Gains to Acquisitions 
197 
 
2 observations respectively whilst for the multiple acquirers proxy (Table 4.6, Panel E), 
the same portfolios comprise of 48, 15, 36 and 4 observation respectively. 
 
Panel F of Table 4.5 presents bidders‘ performance for mixed deals (i.e. where the 
means of financing the acquisitions was a combination of cash and equity). Rational 
managers (as measured using the stock options proxy) obtain significant positive 
abnormal returns of a similar level as previously found (1.69%, 1.75% and 1.69% for 
high, neutral and low valuation periods respectively) for their shareholders. This 
evidence also implies that rational managers‘ choice for value enhancing targets has a 
positive effect on bidders‘ shareholders wealth. On the other hand, overconfident 
managers‘ choices generate positive abnormal returns (1.03%) when the acquisition is 
announced in high valuation periods but the results are catastrophic (-1.53%) when 
investor sentiment is low and does not help to boost the bidder‘s stock price. The mean 
difference between high-rational and low-overconfident deals is 3.22% (statistically 
significant at the 14% level). Similar evidence is obtained when measuring 
overconfidence using the multiple acquirers proxy (Table 4.6, Panel F). Bidders‘ 
abnormal returns seem to be driven by the superior performance of high-rational deals 
(2.49%) compared to the poor performance (0.68%) of low-overconfident ones (the 
differential is 1.81%, statistically significant at the 5% level). 
 
Conclusively, the rational-overconfident managers in high-low valuation periods 
pattern remains robust even after we split the sample according to the method of 
payment chosen to finance the acquisition. In other words, bidders‘ returns are affected 
by the choice of rational managers to acquire value enhancing targets and the decision 
to announce these acquisitions during overvalued periods. Conversely, the performance 
of overconfident managers who undertake deals in low valuation periods is disastrous 
regardless of the financing choice. The UK market lacks stock acquisitions and the 
small size of the sub-portfolios prevents concrete conclusions to be extracted from these 
deals. 
 
4.5.1.5 Bidder Gains by Rational and Overconfident Managers in High and Low 
Valuation Periods according to Various Bidder and Deal Characteristics 
 
Bidders‘ Growth Opportunities (MTBV) 
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A number of factors have been studied in the literature and have been shown to affect 
bidders‘ returns. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) 
suggest that bidders‘ returns are influenced by the prior bidders‘ growth opportunities. 
Both studies claim that low book-to-market (glamour) acquirers significantly 
underperform while high book-to-market (value) acquirers have been shown to 
outperform in the long-run. While Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) for the UK market 
find similar results for the short run, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find the opposite. Rau 
and Vermaelen (2003) explain that the difference in performance between the two types 
of bidders (value vs. glamour) is attributed to the fact that glamour firms are infected 
with hubris and prefer to finance their takeovers using their overvalued equity. 
 
[Insert Table 4.7 and 4.8 about here] 
 
This section examines the way in which managerial decisions are affected when 
controlling for the prior growth opportunities of the bidder. Table 4.7, Panel A 
illustrates acquirers‘ five day abnormal returns for rational–overconfident managers in 
overvalued and undervalued periods for acquirers with low prior growth opportunities 
(value bidders). The results are puzzling for value acquirers according to the stock 
options proxy. In the overall sample there is no significant difference between those 
who announce acquisitions in high valuation periods and those which announce in low 
valuation periods, neither between rational or overconfident managers, hence it is not 
reliable if we draw further conclusions when the decisions are combined. The stock 
options proxy may not be able to fully capture overconfidence for value bidders. This 
proxy is based on whether managers exercise well-in-advance of the expiration or 
whether they leave it close to the date. Value bidders are companies with high B/M 
ratios, which signify that they have low growth opportunities. As a result, managers 
would not have the opportunity to exercise their stock options according to the 
conditions of this proxy. The stock price is likely to be lower than, or around, the strike 
price of the stock option granted to the manager. Hence, managers would justifiably 
wait until the stock price goes high enough in order to be profitable for them to exercise 
the options. For that reason, managers who wait until late to exercise the options may 
have been wrongly classified as overconfident in the value portfolios. 
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For the same reason, glamour bidders are the ideal type of companies in which to 
capture overconfidence by using the stock options proxy. Glamour bidders have high 
growth opportunities and managers should have a great incentive to exercise their stock 
options to obtain the maximum benefits. Hence, those who wait until the last year of 
expiration believing that they will be able to rise their companies‘ stock prices even 
more, can definitely be characterized as overconfident. Table 4.7, Panel B shows 
bidders returns for glamour acquirers according to the managerial bias and market 
valuation. Overall, rational bidders generate 1.80% (statistically significant at the 5% 
level) more abnormal returns than their overconfident counterparts while those who 
announce bids in high valuation periods earn 1.41% (statistically significant at the 5% 
level) more abnormal returns than those who announce acquisitions in low valuation 
periods. When the decisions are combined, the findings suggest that managers who 
choose to bid for value enhancing targets and take advantage of investor sentiment in 
the market generate profits of 2.04% while when the inverse decisions are taken by 
overconfident managers (i.e. they bid for value destroying targets) and the acquisition is 
announced during undervalued markets (i.e. low investor sentiment), then shareholders‘ 
wealth is declined by 2.96%. The difference (5.01%) is statistically significant at the 
5% significance level. 
 
Similar evidence is obtained when measuring overconfidence with the multiple 
acquirers proxy. Table 4.8, Panel A illustrates bidders‘ abnormal returns for value 
acquirers. High-rational deals generate the highest abnormal returns (2.42%) contrary to 
the very poor performance of low-overconfident deals (0.24%). The difference is also 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The same results are observed in the glamour 
portfolio as well (Table 4.8, Panel B). The difference between high-rational vs. low-
overconfident deals is 1.66%, statistically significant at the 5% level. In line with 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), value high-rational bidders outperform their glamour 
counterparts (2.42% vs. 1.71%). In general, even when controlling for bidders‘ past 
growth opportunities, the general hypothesis that managerial decisions affect bidder 
gains remains to hold. 
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4.5.1.6. Announcement Abnormal Returns of Manager-Investor Rational-
Irrational Framework by Bidders’ Size (MV) 
 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2002) show that bidders‘ size affect the gains 
involved in acquisitions attributing this fact to various factors. In particular, small 
bidders earn on average 2% more abnormal returns around the announcement day than 
large bidders do. Small acquirers usually acquire private firms which typically generate 
positive abnormal returns (Fuller et al. (2002)). In addition, small companies usually 
also use cash to finance the takeover. Cash acquisitions have also been shown to be 
profitable (Travlos (1987)). In small companies, managerial incentives are better 
aligned with those of shareholders. Hence, by controlling for acquirers‘ size, we can 
check whether managerial decisions still affect bidders‘ gains. Table 4.7, Panel C shows 
that in the portfolio of small firms, there is a difference of 3.47% (statistically 
significant at the 16% significance level) in the short-run performance between high-
rational and low overconfident deals, mainly driven by the poor performance of 
overconfident managers during periods of low investor sentiment. The same pattern 
holds in the portfolio of large bidders, as defined by using their Market Value. High-
rational bidders generate 2.84% more abnormal returns than low-overconfident ones. 
The difference is also statistically significant at the 10% significance level. 
 
When employing the multiple acquirers proxy, the overall findings remain unchanged. 
In both the small (Table 4.8, Panel C) and large (Table 4.8, Panel D) portfolios, rational 
bidders who announce takeovers during high valuation periods outperform their 
overconfident counterparts who announce bids in low valuations. This is more evident 
in the portfolio of small companies where the differential is 3.42%, highly statistically 
significant, while the small difference in the portfolio of large acquirers can be 
attributed to the weakness of the multiple acquirers proxy to capture overconfidence in 
this instance.  
 
Regardless of this, both proxies find that in all different states of the market and for all 
types of bidders, small firms in most cases outperform large ones in accordance to 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2002). Hence, it is evident that bidder gains are 
driven by rational managerial decisions to choose value enhancing targets and to 
announce such deals so as to take advantage of the prevailing investor sentiment at the 
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same time in order to further boost the price of the stock even more, even after 
controlling for bidders‘ size. 
 
4.5.1.7. Announcement Abnormal Returns of Manager-Investor Rational-
Irrational Framework by Deal’s Relative Size 
 
It has been widely documented in the literature that the relative size of the target in 
relation to the bidding firm is a major factor that affects bidders‘ announcement returns 
(Asquith et al. (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) and Fuller 
et al. (2002)). The empirical findings of such works suggest that the higher the relative 
size of the target to the bidding firm, the larger the abnormal returns generated around 
the acquisition date whilst the initial structure of the firm also changes as a result of the 
acquisition. Loderer and Martin (1990) argue that large firms tend to overpay for their 
targets whilst large acquisitions also seem to be overpriced, having an adverse effect on 
stock prices. This may be related to the fact that large targets are more likely to be 
financed using shares in merger and acquisition deals (Myers and Majluf (1984) and 
DeAngelo et al. (1984)) which in turn results in lower abnormal returns generation. 
Hence, it would be of great use to our analysis to examine managerial decisions under 
the perspective of this important factor for bidding firms‘ shareholders wealth. 
 
Our finding suggest that in both the low and the high relative size portfolios, using the 
stock options and the multiple acquirers proxies (Panels E and F in Tables 6 and 7), the 
highest returns are generated by rational managers who bid for value enhancing targets 
and announce these acquisitions during overvalued periods. Conversely, the poorest 
performance is observed for deals in which overconfident managers are involved 
ending up destroying value for their shareholders and deteriorating the performance of 
the firm after the takeover is announced during undervalued periods. Therefore, the 
results show that managerial decisions regarding the target and the timing of the merger 
announcement remain consistent with the main hypothesis of this chapter even when 
controlling for the relative size of the target to the bidding firm. 
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4.5.1.8. Announcement Abnormal Returns of Manager-Investor Rational-
Irrational Framework by Focused and Diversified Acquisitions 
 
The evidence on whether diversification through merger and acquisitions creates value 
is not clear. Lang and stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) find that diversification 
destroys value while Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2000), Gampa and Kedia (1999), 
Chevalier (1999), Hyland (1999), Lamont and Polk (2002) and Villalonga (2001) are 
unable to find that diversification is the explanation for value destruction reported. 
Nevertheless, we examine the reaction of bidders‘ share price around the announcement 
date when managers choose to acquire firms in the same industry (i.e. focussed 
acquisitions) or from a different industry than the one in which the bidding firm 
primarily operates (i.e. diversifying acquisitions). Table 4.7, Panel G, shows that 
rational bidders who diversify into other industries obtain positive and significant 
returns of similar magnitude throughout the various states of the market (1.03% for 
high, 1.58% for neutral and 1.35% for low valuation periods). Similar results are 
obtained for overconfident managers except for those acquisitions that are announced 
during low valuation periods, where overconfident bidders are found to suffer the 
highest losses (3.21%). The high and statistically significant differential between high-
rational and low-overconfident deals gives further support to the hypothesis that 
managerial decisions of the type of target to be acquired and the timing of the 
acquisition drive bidder gains.  
 
Similar evidence is found when managers choose to acquire firms in the same industry 
(Table 4.7, Panel H). In this instance, the difference in announcement abnormal returns 
between high-rational and low-overconfident deals is 2.11% (statistically significant at 
the 20% significance level). Table 4.8, Panels G and H, provide supportive evidence to 
the main hypothesis, when measuring overconfidence using the multiple acquirers 
proxy. Overall, managerial decisions seem to drive bidders‘ gain even after splitting the 
portfolios according to the target industry. 
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4.5.1.9. Announcement Abnormal Returns of Manager-Investor Rational-
Irrational Framework by Domestic and Foreign Acquisitions 
 
A great strand of the existing literature discusses bidding firms‘ announcement 
abnormal returns when companies get involved in domestic or foreign acquisitions 
(Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983), Eun, Kolodny and Scheraga (1996), Kang (1993), 
Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) and Cakici, Hessel and Tandon (1996)). 
 
Hence, we also examine managerial decisions in relation to the target nation as well. 
Panels I and G of Table 4.7 illustrate the five day announcement returns for bidders 
who acquire targets from the same country or from a foreign nation as well as those 
undertaken by rational and overconfident managers as measured using the stock options 
proxy. The findings suggest that in the domestic portfolio, rational managers perform 
equally well irrespective of the valuation period in which they announce the acquisition, 
while overconfident managers enjoy positive abnormal returns when they announce 
takeovers during high or neutral valuation periods. However, they suffer losses when 
the deal takes place during low valuation periods. The differences between bidders‘ 
performances are even more pronounced when managers bid for targets domiciled in 
foreign countries. In this portfolio, the overconfidence effect is captured in a more 
pronounced way. Managers infected with hubris feel that they can exploit more synergy 
gains when they engage in cross-border acquisitions. Therefore, overconfident 
managers who announce acquisitions during undervalued periods suffer great losses (-
3.38%). The difference between high-rational and low-overconfident deals is 4.89%, 
statistically significant at the 5% significance level. Similar evidence is obtained when 
measuring overconfidence  using the multiple acquirers proxy (Panels I and J of Table 
4.8). The differences between high-rational and low-overconfident deals are 1.65% and 
2.69%, both statistically significant at the 5% level, for domestic and foreign 
acquisitions respectively. 
 
Overall, managerial decisions in terms of selecting the appropriate target company and 
the timing of the announcement seem to play a very important role even when 
controlling for domestic and cross-border acquisitions. 
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4.5.1.10. Summary of Short-Term Univariate Findings 
 
This section has analyzed whether or not managerial decisions affect bidders‘ five-day 
announcement returns. Our results suggest that rational managers who bid for value 
enhancing targets generate positive abnormal returns for their shareholders while 
overconfident managers overestimate synergies and end up destroying shareholder 
value. In addition, it is found that managers who exploit investor sentiment and 
announce takeovers during overvalued periods, boost their share prices and these deals 
perform better than those announced during undervalued periods overall. 
 
However, the differentials between rational vs. overconfident managers are not 
significant when examined in various valuation periods (i.e. high, neutral and low) and 
similarly deals announced during high valuation periods are not statistically significant 
different to those announced during low valuation periods for each type of manager (i.e. 
rational and overconfident). On the other hand, when the decisions are combined, 
bidders‘ returns seem to be highly affected by the managerial decisions taken. More 
specifically, in most portfolios, the differentials between high-rational vs. low-
overconfident deals are highly statistically significant. In other words, rational 
managers who choose to acquire value enhancing targets and at the same time exploit 
investor sentiment by announcing the takeover during overvalued periods generate the 
highest possible abnormal returns around the announcement day. Conversely, 
overconfident managers who overestimate synergy gains and acquire firms which are 
value destroying for their shareholders and choose to announce their deal during 
undervalued periods, generate disastrous results for the bidding firm‘s shareholders. 
The above findings hold when using both proxies (i.e. stock options and multiple 
acquirers proxy) to capture managerial overconfidence. The high-rational vs. low-
overconfident pattern is also robust after controlling for various factors that can affect 
bidders‘ returns. In fact, the differentials are even higher in portfolios in which the 
overconfidence effect can be more effectively captured, for example in glamour-bidder 
deals. The performance of low-rational and high-overconfident deals is more or less 
found to be at the same level. The share price around the announcement date for low-
rational deals is boosted by the appropriate choice of the target firm but does not benefit 
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from the investor sentiment whilst the five-day CARs for high-overconfident deals are 
not too low due to the positive reaction from the stock market‘s high sentiment. 
 
4.5.2 Multivariate Analysis 
 
The univariate analysis results clearly indicate that overconfident bidders realize 
considerably lower announcement returns than rational acquirers do, especially during 
low stock market valuation periods while rational managers who announce takeover 
deals during high valuation periods generate the highest abnormal returns for their 
shareholders. However, the univariate analysis does not allow for the interaction 
between the various determinants of acquirers‘ gains and consequently does not account 
for the simultaneous effects of multiple factors. To better examine whether differences 
in acquirer and deal characteristics can help explain the abnormal return differentials in 
more depth, we adopt a multivariate regression framework where announcement period 
returns earned by bidders are regressed against a set of explanatory variables that have 
been proven in the literature as influential over bidders‘ performance.  
 
Various deal features and bidder characteristics are known to affect the announcement 
period gains. For instance, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) argue that glamour acquirers 
outperform value acquirers at the announcement period using a sample of US 
acquisitions while Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) provide evidence of the opposite 
pattern in the UK.  Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) provide evidence that 
smaller bidders gain more than larger bidders. Accordingly, Fuller et al. (2002) report 
that bidder‘s gains are a decreasing (increasing) function of the relative size of the 
target to acquirer in public (private) acquisitions. Finally, Doukas and Kan (2004) also 
show that bidders engaged in diversifying acquisition are more likely to suffer losses.
36
  
 
To overcome such limitations, we adopt a multivariate regression framework where 
bidders‘ five day abnormal announcement returns (CARs) are regressed against a set of 
explanatory variables that may affect bidders‘ gains as per the following model: 
 
                                                 
36
 The evidence on diversifying M&As is mixed.  For example, Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and 
Ofek (1995) show that diversifying deals destroy value while Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Bradley, 
Desai and Kim (1988) report evidence of positive gains from diversifying acquisitions. 
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The intercept (α) measures the excess return to bidders after accounting for various 
explanatory variables while the vector of explanatory variables ‗X‘ includes variables 
that are likely to explain bidders‘ abnormal returns. Tables 4.10 and 4.12 illustrate the 
multivariate analysis results when measuring overconfidence using the stock options 
and the multiple acquirers proxies respectively. 
 
All the regressions include: a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the target is 
private and zero otherwise; a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
acquisition is stock- (cash-) financed and zero otherwise; and a dummy variable for 
diversifying deals which takes the value of one when the acquirer‘s two-digit SIC code 
is different from that of the target and zero otherwise. To control for the bidder‘s size 
effect, the log of the Market Value of the acquiring firm is also included. The size of 
acquirers is measured by the market value of the respective firm one month before the 
deal‘s announcement. Other variables included in the regressions are the following: the 
bidder‘s book-to-market value, which is measured by the bidder‘s net book value of 
assets divided by its market value one month before the announcement of the deal; the 
deal‘s relative size, which is measured by the ratio of the deal value of the bid over the 
bidder‘s market value; a merger activity dummy variable which takes the value of one if 
the deal is announced during a highly active M&A period and zero otherwise. This 
categorization is based on aggregate quarterly M&A statistics from the UK National 
Statistics Office. Each quarter is categorised as an active period if the number of deals 
is more than the median and passive otherwise. Finally, other explanatory variables 
include the acquirer‘s lagged excess return for 180 days prior to the bid‘s 
announcement and the market portfolio return (FT-All Share) for the same 180-day 
period prior to the announcement. 
 
Table 4.9 and 4.11 presents the correlation coefficients of each pair of variable used in 
the multivariate analysis for the stock options and the multiple acquirers proxies 
respectively. We observe high correlations between the interactive variables 
HighRational, HighOverconfident, LowRational, LowOverconfident and the High, Low 
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and Rational, Overconfident dummy. However, these two variables are not used in the 
same regression in the multivariate analysis. 
 
[Insert Table 4.9 and 4.11 about here] 
 
In Table 4.10, Regression (1) includes two extra variables: a dummy which takes the 
value of one if the acquisition was announced during high valuation periods and zero 
otherwise; and a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the acquisition was 
announced during low valuation periods and zero otherwise. The coefficient of the high 
valuation period dummy is positive and statistically significant while the coefficient of 
the low valuation period dummy is negative, which is consistent with literature 
(Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009)). Deals announced during high valuation periods 
generate higher abnormal returns than those announced during low valuation periods. 
The rest of the coefficients of regression (1) show that private acquisitions, stock deals 
(due to dominance of private acquisitions financed with stock), book-to-market, large 
relative size deals, acquirer‘s returns t-1 and market‘s returns t-1 exhibit a positive 
relationship with the bidder‘s announcement returns, consistent with the literature.  
 
[Insert Table 4.10 and 4.12 about here] 
 
In regression (2), a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the manager of the 
acquiring firm was defined as overconfident with the stock options proxy and zero 
otherwise is included. The coefficient for the overconfident dummy is negative (-0.011) 
as expected and statistically significant at the 5% level. This indicates a negative 
relationship between the announcement returns and the value destroying 
overconfidence effect.  
 
Regression (3) includes the vector of explanatory variables including all of the previous 
dummy variables, plus additional dummy variables to capture for bids announced by 
firms with rational (overconfident) managers at the time of high (low) market valuation 
to allow for the interaction between managerial overconfidence and the aggregate 
market performance. The dummy of high valuation-rational acquirers carries a positive 
coefficient and is statistically significant at the 5% level. Accordingly, low valuation-
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overconfident deals have a significantly negative relationship with bidder returns, 
which supports the interaction effect of managerial overconfidence and market 
valuation.  
 
Finally, in regression (4), we examine the interaction of a dummy which takes the value 
of one if the deal was undertaken by an overconfident manager and was announced 
during a low valuation period and zero otherwise, with the other entire explanatory 
variables included. The coefficient of this variable is highly negative which implies the 
disruptive effect to a bidder‘s performance of such deals. The same four regressions are 
investigated in the subsample of the multiple acquirers proxy in Table 4.12. The results 
clearly indicate that the big picture of the rational-irrational investor-manager 
framework remains the same. 
 
Overall, the evidence found reaffirms the finding that a bidder‘s announcement period 
gains depend jointly on the behavioural elements of the aggregate stock market 
valuation conditions and managerial overconfidence. Evidence from both univariate and 
multivariate analyses provides support that bidders infected with managerial 
overconfidence experience lower announcement period returns. In addition, the results 
also support the prediction of the stock market valuation theory that bidders achieve 
positive returns on the announcement of takeover deals. 
 
4.5.3 Long-Run Analysis 
 
The short-run analysis suggests that the highest short-run performance around the 
announcement of the acquisition is achieved by rational managers who announce 
acquisitions during booming periods while overconfident CEOs who overpay for their 
targets and announce deals during bear markets suffer the highest losses, or indeed 
enjoy the lowest gains. Furthermore, acquisitions announced by overconfident 
managers during high valuation periods do not destroy value for their shareholders. To 
examine the one and three year post-merger performance of rational and overconfident 
deals in high and low valuation periods, we follow Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and 
employ Calendar Time Portfolio Regression (CTPRs) analysis. Intercepts of the CTPRs 
approach are reported for one and three years after the acquisition announcement. 
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[Insert Table 4.13 and 4.14 about here] 
 
Table 4.13 presents the one and three year post-merger performance of acquisitions 
announced during high, neutral and low valuation periods for the entire sample. Table 
4.13, Panel A illustrates the long-term performance one year after the announcement of 
the deal. No significance difference between high and low acquisitions is observed. 
Similarly, in Table 4.13, Panel B, the three year post merger performance suggests no 
statistical or economic difference between high and low deals. Table 4.14 reports the 
long-run performance of rational and overconfident bidders, as measured using the 
stock options proxy, when announcing takeovers in high and low valuation periods. 
Rational managers are shown to generate 0.80% more calendar abnormal returns in the 
12 months following the announcement of the deal (Table 4.14, Panel A). Rational and 
overconfident managers generate marginally negative and insignificant gains (-0.18% 
and -0.13% respectively) overall while overconfident managers in bearish periods 
suffer -0.59% significant monthly calendar losses. Similar results are presented in Table 
4.14, Panel B which reports the three year post-merger performance.  
 
[Insert Table 4.15 about here] 
 
Table 4.15 employs the multiple acquirers proxy to capture managerial overconfidence. 
Both one (Table 4.15, Panel A) and three (Table 4.15, Panel B) years after the 
announcement of the deal, we fail to observe any significant differences between high-
rational and low-overconfident acquisitions. High-rational deals seem to achieve a less 
negative performance than low-overconfident deals but the performances are 
statistically insignificant. 
 
In summary, rational managers generate higher calendar abnormal returns one and three 
years after the announcement of the takeover but, in general, the long-run analysis does 
not reveal significant difference. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
Chapter 4 examines the interaction between rational and overconfident managers in 
high and low valuations periods and the resultant effect on bidder gains. The hubris 
hypothesis of Roll (1986) is based on an irrational manager-rational market framework. 
Markets are efficient and managers who engage in takeover activity have an overly 
optimistic attitude. They believe that they can create synergistic gains due to their own 
personal abilities and skills. As a result, they tend to overestimate the future returns and 
synergy gains on offer and end up paying higher premium to acquire the target firms. 
Existing literature (Malmendier and Tate (2008)), as well as the empirical evidence 
presented in the previous chapter, revealed that overconfident managers which 
undertake takeover deals enjoy less abnormal returns than their rational counterparts. 
On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) propose a rational manager-irrational 
market framework whereby managers time the market and take advantage of their 
overvalued equity in order to acquire undervalued target firms to the benefit their own 
existing shareholders. Theories suggest that overvalued markets are one of the 
explanations for merger waves. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) and Rhodes-Kropf et 
al. (2005) suggest that more takeovers take place during booming periods as opposed to 
times of recession. Bouwman et al. (2009) find that acquisitions that take place during 
high valuation periods generate higher abnormal returns than those in low valuation 
periods. This chapter examine bidder gains in rational-irrational managerial-investor 
framework. It is as Baker et al. (2007, p. 48) wrote, ‗the irrational manager and 
irrational investor stories can certainly coexist’. Rosen (2006) suggests that managers 
may be infected with the same optimism as investors in bullish markets and this further 
supports the idea of the two parties at times both being irrational.  
 
Following Bouwman et. al. (2009), we classify our sample period into different stock 
market valuation periods (i.e. high, neutral and low) in order to study the differences 
between deals undertaken by overconfident managers and those conducted by rational 
managers. For managerial overconfidence, we employ the stock options and the 
multiple acquirers‘ proxy as extensively discussed in this and the previous chapter. The 
evidence presented in this chapter suggests there is a joint significance of the aggregate 
market condition with managerial (non-)overconfidence in shaping the gains endowed 
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to acquirers. More specifically, acquisitions undertaken by rational acquirers during 
overvalued periods generate the highest abnormal returns for their shareholders, 
consistent with our initial proposition. Rational managers assess the target firm more 
carefully, negotiate more efficiently and ultimately take advantage of market timing to 
create the highest possible abnormal returns for their shareholders. Conversely, our 
findings show that overconfident managers who announce takeovers during low 
valuation periods suffer the highest losses. During depressed markets, managers are 
unlikely to hide the quality of the deal and the possible overpayment involved. In low 
valuation periods, investors are more likely to assess the deal more carefully resulting in 
a more unfavourable reaction to the announcement of a takeover deal by an 
overconfident manager. The univariate analysis indicates that deals announced by 
rational managers in high periods are fundamentally different to those deals announced 
by overconfident managers in low periods. The high-rational vs. low-overconfident 
pattern also holds when controlling for various bidder and deal characteristics that have 
been reported as affecting bidders‘ performance. In fact, the differentials are even 
higher in portfolios in which the overconfidence effect is more pronounced. 
Furthermore, our findings show that rational managers tend to generate positive 
abnormal returns for their shareholders irrespective of the market conditions in which 
the deal is undertaken. In addition, overconfident managers who announce acquisitions 
in high valuation periods do not suffer high losses. Instead, they take advantage of the 
high investor sentiment and can potentially use it to hide any overpayments or the 
overall poor quality of the deal. Hence, in high valuation periods, even the stock price 
of overconfident managers is boosted by high investor sentiment. 
 
Evidence revealed in the univariate analysis is further reaffirmed within the cross-
sectional analysis results. We simultaneously control for the managerial bias and the 
different market conditions as well as other control variables that affect short-run bidder 
performance. The coefficient for the high valuation-rational manager‘s dummy carries 
the most positive and statistically significant value while the low valuation-
overconfident manager‘s dummy carries a negative and significant value. Results are 
largely similar when measuring overconfidence with the stock options and the multiple 
acquirers‘ proxy. The long-run analysis provides a similar but weaker picture in favor 
of deals announced by rational managers in high valuation periods. 
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Overall this chapter contributes to the existing literature by simultaneously investigating 
the effects of managerial (non-)overconfidence in various market conditions. The work 
indicates that M&As in the UK, when conducted by a rational manager, are consistently 
superior to those undertaken by an overconfident CEO. Whilst behavioural finance 
offers much in terms of growing our understanding of the M&A market, it appears that 
shareholders themselves would be better placed if the neoclassical school of efficient 
markets and participants held true more often in reality. 
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics of Acquisitions by Year 
The table presents the number of acquisitions by year and the percentage of total number of acquisitions by market valuation periods (Panel A) and 
bidder type (rational versus overconfident, Panel B). The summary statistics are provided on the basis of a sample of 3223 acquisitions from 1990 to 
2005 undertaken by 1281 unique bidders. Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Using monthly, each month 
is classified through this period as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all 
detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. Targets include both domestic and foreign public and private firms. Overconfident and 
rational managers are classified based on 3 different proxies: 1) Stock Options: Managers who hold stock options until the year before the expiration 
date are classified as overconfident. All others are classified as rational. 2) Multiple Acquirers: Individual CEOs who made 5 or more acquisitions 
within a 3 year period are called overconfident. All others are rational. 
 
Panel A: All Deals 
 
Valuation Periods 
 Year All High Neutral Low 
1990 124 0 124 0 
1991 100 91 9 0 
1992 91 64 27 0 
1993 103 21 82 0 
1994 169 9 58 102 
1995 177 0 100 77 
1996 195 0 195 0 
1997 272 180 92 0 
1998 292 217 75 0 
1999 310 269 41 0 
2000 344 0 243 101 
2001 266 0 0 266 
2002 212 0 76 136 
2003 171 23 113 35 
2004 204 68 136 0 
2005 193 30 163 0 
Total 3,223 972 1,534 717 
Total (%) 100.00% 30.16% 47.60% 22.25% 
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Table 4.1-Continued 
      
 
Panel B: Stock Options Proxy 
      Year All Rational Overconfident High Low High-
Rational 
High-Overconfident Low-
Rational 
Low-Overconfident 
1990 18 8 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1991 20 14 6 19 0 13 6 0 0 
1992 23 14 9 13 0 8 5 0 0 
1993 29 19 10 6 0 4 2 0 0 
1994 52 35 17 0 28 0 0 18 10 
1995 47 31 16 0 22 0 0 14 8 
1996 56 41 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1997 76 49 27 49 0 33 16 0 0 
1998 77 58 19 61 0 45 16 0 0 
1999 88 64 24 76 0 53 23 0 0 
2000 98 64 34 0 27 0 0 18 9 
2001 73 50 23 0 73 0 0 50 23 
2002 60 51 9 0 38 0 0 34 4 
2003 43 31 12 3 12 2 1 10 2 
2004 52 44 8 18 0 14 4 0 0 
2005 36 28 8 3 0 3 0 0 0 
Total 848 601 247 248 200 175 73 144 56 
Total (%) 26.31% 70.87% 29.13% 29.25% 23.58
% 
20.64% 8.61% 16.98% 6.60% 
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
Chapter 4: Managerial Overconfidence in High and Low Valuation Markets and Gains to Acquisitions 
215 
 
Table 4.1-Continued 
  Panel C: Multiple Acquirers Proxy 
Year All Rational Overconfident High Low High-
Rational 
High-Overconfident Low-
Rational 
Low-Overconfident 
1990 121 98 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1991 98 70 28 89 0 63 26 0 0 
1992 90 64 26 64 0 44 20 0 0 
1993 101 71 30 21 0 13 8 0 0 
1994 167 130 37 9 101 8 1 82 19 
1995 175 119 56 0 76 0 0 52 24 
1996 187 129 58 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1997 260 158 102 171 0 96 75 0 0 
1998 281 187 94 208 0 136 72 0 0 
1999 295 214 81 255 0 183 72 0 0 
2000 319 233 86 0 92 0 0 70 22 
2001 252 187 65 0 252 0 0 187 65 
2002 200 148 52 0 127 0 0 96 31 
2003 167 130 37 23 34 18 5 24 10 
2004 195 161 34 65 0 55 10 0 0 
2005 191 157 34 29 0 24 5 0 0 
Total 3,099 2,256 843 934 682 640 294 511 171 
Total (%) 96.15% 72.80% 27.20% 30.14% 22.01
% 
20.65% 9.49% 16.49% 5.52% 
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Table 4.2 Summary Statistics for Acquisitions for the Stock Options Proxy and the Multiple Acquirers Proxy 
The table presents the number of acquisitions, the mean and median market value of acquirers and the mean and median values of targets. The last three 
columns list the total deal value and the percentage of total value of transaction and number of acquisitions, respectively. The summary statistics are 
provided on the basis of a sample of 3223 acquisitions from 1990 to 2005 undertaken by 1281 unique bidders. Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed 
on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Targets include both domestic and foreign public and private firms. Using monthly data, each month is classified 
through this period as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es 
above (below) the past five-year average. Overconfident and rational managers are classified based on 3 different proxies: 1) Stock Options: Managers 
who hold stock options until the year before the expiration date are classified as overconfident. All others are classified as rational. 2) Multiple 
Acquirers: Individual CEOs who made 5 or more acquisitions within a 3 year period are called overconfident. All others are rational. Panel A presents 
statistics for all deals and by market valuation periods, Panel B for stock options‘ proxy and Panel C for multiple acquirers‘ proxy, respectively. The 
mean and median size for each acquirer and each target is the firm size at the year the deal was announced. The acquirer‘s market capitalization equals 
the price per share one-month prior to the bid announcement times the number of common shares outstanding. The target‘s firm size is measured as the 
deal value of the bid. 
 
Type of Acquisition Number of 
Acquisitions 
Mean Market 
Equity (£ mil) 
Median Market 
Equity (£ mil) 
Mean Transaction 
Value (£ mil) 
Median 
Transaction 
Value (£ mil) 
Total Deal 
Value (£ mil) 
% of Total 
Deal Value 
% of 
Total 
Number 
of 
acquisitio
ns 
Panel A: All Deals 
All Deals 3,223 517.728 88.53 64.485 6 207,834.564 100.00% 100.00% 
Private 2,839 305.481 80.66 18.876 5 53,589.777 25.78% 88.09% 
Public 384 2,086.918 209.52 401.679 50.04 154,244.787 74.22% 11.91% 
High 972 517.718 90.49 93.249 5.75 90,637.727 43.61% 30.16% 
Neutral 1,534 516.660 91.37 60.055 6 92,124.373 44.33% 47.60% 
Low 717 520.026 78.02 34.968 6.4 25,072.464 12.06% 22.25% 
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 Table 4.2-Continued 
Panel B: Stock Options Proxy 
All Deals 848 638.333 154.29 59.237 8.32 50,232.569 100.00% 26.31% 
Rational 601 617.915 161.47 62.349 8.28 37,471.761 74.60% 70.87% 
Overconfident 247 688.014 137.85 51.663 8.4 12,760.808 25.40% 29.13% 
High 248 535.494 150.58 53.365 10.95 13,234.612 26.35% 29.25% 
Low 200 724.116 211.78 57.806 9.53 11,561.319 23.02% 23.58% 
All Private Deals 722 409.887 147.13 21.677 6.16 15,651.123 31.16% 85.14% 
Rational 522 386.482 154.69 22.415 6.5 11,700.672 74.76% 72.30% 
Overconfident 200 470.974 111.73 19.752 5.70 3,950.451 25.24% 27.70% 
High 205 385.178 137.85 24.015 6.16 4,923.098 31.46% 28.39% 
Low 174 510.154 193.07 22.061 8.16 3,838.611 24.53% 24.10% 
All Public Deals 126 1,947.363 362.99 274.456 81.12 34,581.446 68.84% 14.86% 
Rational 79 2,147.128 362.92 326.216 79 25,771.089 74.52% 62.70% 
Overconfident 47 1,611.588 363.06 187.454 87.11 8,810.357 25.48% 37.30% 
High 43 1,252.120 362.92 193.291 77.13 8,311.514 24.03% 34.13% 
Low 26 2,156.019 626.25 297.027 117.93 7,722.708 22.33% 20.63% 
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 Table 4.2-Continued 
Panel C: Multiple Acquirers Proxy 
All Deals 3,099 522.98 88.02 66.229 6 205,242.726 100.00% 96.15% 
Rational 2,256 572.805 73.05 78.506 6.08 177,110.472 86.29% 72.80% 
Overconfident 843 389.64 137.85 33.372 5.69 28,132.254 13.71% 27.20% 
High 934 518.708 89.86 96.068 5.77 89,727.757 43.72% 30.14% 
Low 682 533.681 77.9 35.812 6.37 24,423.698 11.90% 22.01% 
All Private Deals 2,723 301.527 80.16 18.949 5 51,596.911 25.14% 87.87% 
Rational 1,953 294.847 65.21 17.49 4.9 34,157.642 66.20% 71.72% 
Overconfident 770 318.469 127.67 22.648 5.00 17,439.269 33.80% 28.28% 
High 805 297.895 79.03 16.590 4.65 13,354.895 25.88% 29.56% 
Low 606 307.513 76.44 19.780 5.5 11,987.242 23.23% 22.25% 
All Public Deals 376 2126.75 212.14 408.632 50.79 153,645.815 74.86% 12.13% 
Rational 303 2,364.398 214.07 471.792 49.09 142,952.83 93.04% 80.59% 
Overconfident 73 1,140.348 202.69 146.479 59.35 10,692.985 6.96% 19.41% 
High 129 1,896.648 211.39 592.038 50 76,372.862 49.71% 34.31% 
Low 76 2,337.069 177.77 163.637 44.39 12,436.456 8.09% 20.21% 
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Table 4.3 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) by Market Valuation 
This table present the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2,+2) 
surrounding the announcement of all acquirers included in the full sample.  Abnormal returns 
are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
AR = Ri,t - Rm,t 
where Ri,t is the return on firm i at time t and Rm,t is the value-weighted Market Index Return 
(FT-All share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). This table illustrates the gains to acquirers included in the full sample of all, private and 
public targets. The CARs are reported on the basis of the method of payment as well. ‗Cash‘ 
indicates only cash deals, ‗Stock‘ refers only to share deals and ‗Mixed‘ includes all other 
transactions financed by a combination of cash and shares. Using monthly data, each month is 
classified through this period as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of 
that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-
year average. The Differential (1)-(3) represents the differences in mean CARs for the five days 
(-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high- minus low-valuation bidders. a, b, c 
denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. P-values are presented in brackets. 
The sample size N is presented below the mean. 
 
  All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed 
All 1.47%
a 
1.83%
a 
-1.20%a 1.17%
a 
2.63%
b 
1.58%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.044) (0.000) 
N 3,223 2,839 384 1,351 208 1,664 
High (1) 1.85%
a 
2.16%
a 
-0.15% 1.31%
a 
3.39%
c 
2.14%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.840) (0.000) (0.061) (0.000) 
N 972 841 131 431 64 477 
Neutral (2) 1.67%
a 
2.04%
a 
-1.30%
b 
1.40%
a 
3.61%
c 
1.64%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) (0.095) (0.000) 
N 1,534 1,361 173 665 102 767 
Low (3) 0.54%
c 
0.95%
a 
-2.71%
b 
0.32% -0.92% 0.82%
b 
p-value (0.085) (0.003) (0.013) (0.431) (0.727) (0.040) 
N 717 637 80 255 42 420 
Different. (1)-(3) 1.31%
a 
1.21%
a 
2.57%
b 
0.98%
c 
4.31% 1.31%
b 
p-value (0.002) (0.005) (0.048) (0.054) (0.176) (0.021) 
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Table 4.4 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) by Market Valuation and Other Bidder and Deal Characteristics 
This table present the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2,+2) surrounding the announcement of all acquirers included in the 
full sample.  Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
AR = Ri,t - Rm,t 
where Ri,t is the return on firm i at time t and Rm,t is the value-weighted Market Index Return (FT-All share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms 
listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Using monthly data, each month is classified through this period as a high- (low-) valuation month if the 
detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. Acquirers with 
higher (lower) than median book-to-market ratio (a month prior to bid announcement) are categorized as value (glamour) bidders. Acquirers with larger 
(smaller) than median size (a month prior to bid announcement) are categorized as big (small) bidders. The relative size of the deal is defined as the 
deal value divided by the market value of the acquirer a month before the announcement date. Deals above (below) the median relative size are 
classified as high (low) relative size. An acquisition is defined as diversifying (non-diversifying) when the acquirer‘s two-digit SIC code is different 
(the same) from that of the target. Acquisitions with bidders and targets originated from the same (different) country are defined as domestic (foreign) 
acquisitions. The Differential (1)-(3) represents the differences in mean CARs for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high- 
minus low-valuation bidders. a, b, c denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. P-values are presented in brackets. The sample size N is 
presented below the mean. 
 
  Value Glamour Small Big Low Rel. Size High Rel. Size Diversifying Non-Diversifying Domestic Foreign 
All 1.83%
a 
1.06%
a 
2.25%
a 
0.69%
a 
0.83%
a 
2.12%
a 
1.60%
a 
1.35%
a 
1.47%
a 
1.47%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 1,596 1,596 1,612 1,611 1,612 1,611 1,586 1,637 2,206 1,017 
High 2.03%
a 
1.51%
a 
2.82%
a 
0.92%
a 
1.07%
a 
2.66%
a 
1.60%
a 
2.10%
a 
1.81%
a 
1.94%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 445 517 477 495 493 479 482 490 668 304 
Neutral 2.35%
a 
1.02%
a 
2.49%
a 
0.87%
a 
0.88%
a 
2.45%
a 
1.93%
a 
1.38%
a 
1.68%
a 
1.65%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 737 780 755 779 768 766 788 746 1033 501 
Low 0.62% 0.38% 1.07%
b 
-0.05% 0.36% 0.72% 0.77%
c 
0.36% 0.60%
c 
0.40% 
p-value (0.152) (0.411) (0.027) (0.901) (0.294) (0.169) (0.089) (0.404) (0.091) (0.535) 
N 414 299 380 337 351 366 316 401 505 212 
Different. (1)-(3) 1.45%
b 
1.13%
b 
1.75%
a 
0.97%
b 
0.70%
c 
1.94%
a 
0.83% 1.74%
a 
1.21%
b 
1.54%
c 
p-value (0.020) (0.041) (0.009) (0.039) (0.094) (0.006) (0.162) (0.003) (0.013) (0.049) 
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Table 4.5 Announcement Returns by Market Valuation, Managerial Overconfidence and 
Interaction of Both with Stock Options Proxy 
This table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) 
surrounding the announcement by stock market valuation conditions, managerial 
overconfidence, and their interaction. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-
adjusted model: 
ARit = Rit - Rmt 
where Rit is the return on firm i at time t and Rmt is the value-weighted Market Index Return 
(FT-All Share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). Using monthly data, each month is classified through this period as a high- (low-) 
valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of 
all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. Managers who hold stock options 
until the year before the expiration date are classified as overconfident. All others are classified 
as rational. CARs are reported for the interaction of market valuation and managerial 
overconfidence. ‗Cash‘ indicates only cash deals, ‗Stock‘ refers only to share deals and ‗Mixed‘ 
includes all other transactions financed by a combination of cash and shares. Panel A, B, C, D, 
E and F present CARs for the entire, private targets, public targets, cash, stock and mixed deals 
subsample respectively. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and 
‗c‘, respectively. The (1)-(3) and (4)-(5) represent the differences in mean CARs for the five 
days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high- minus low-valuation bidders and 
rational minus overconfident bidders respectively. The result in right bottom corner is the mean 
CAR for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high- rational bidders 
minus low- overconfident bidders. N denotes the number of observations and is reported below 
the mean return. P-values are reported in brackets. 
 
Panel A: All Targets 
 
 
 
  All Rational (4) Overconfident (5) Different. (4)-(5) 
All 0.94%
a 
1.26%
a 
0.16% 1.10%
b 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.729) (0.031) 
N 848 601 247   
High (1) 1.21%
a 
1.36%
a 
0.83% 0.54% 
p-value (0.002) (0.003) (0.268) (0.537) 
N 248 175 73   
Neutral (2) 1.07%
a 
1.26%
a 
0.62% 0.64% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.256) (0.317) 
N 400 282 118   
Low (3) 0.34% 1.13%
a 
-1.69% 2.81%
b 
p-value (0.482) (0.008) (0.203) (0.045) 
N 200 144 56   
Different. (1)-(3) 0.87% 0.24% 2.51%
c 
3.05%
b 
p-value (0.161) (0.703) (0.098) (0.031) 
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Table 4.5-Continued 
Panel B: Private Targets 
 
 
 
  All Rational (4) Overconfident (5) Different. (4)-(5) 
All 1.37%
a 
1.61%
a 
0.72%
c 
0.90%
c 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.096) (0.067) 
N 722 522 200   
High (1) 1.66%
a 
1.72%
a 
1.50%
c 
0.22% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.062) (0.810) 
N 205 149 56   
Neutral (2) 1.45%
a 
1.66%
a 
0.95%
c 
0.71% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.057) (0.250) 
N 343 244 99   
Low (3) 0.84%
c 
1.41%
a 
-0.78% 2.19%
c 
p-value (0.062) (0.001) (0.520) (0.092) 
N 174 129 45   
Different. (1)-(3) 0.82% 0.31% 2.28% 2.50%
c 
p-value (0.170) (0.615) (0.116) (0.056) 
Panel C: Public Targets 
 
 
 
  All Rational (4) Overconfident (5) Different. (4)-(5) 
All -1.51%
b 
-1.09% -2.22% 1.14% 
p-value (0.039) (0.149) (0.144) (0.498) 
N 126 79 47   
High (1) -0.97% -0.70% -1.40% 0.70% 
p-value (0.388) (0.639) (0.441) (0.762) 
N 43 26 17   
Neutral (2) -1.22% -1.27% -1.12% -0.15% 
p-value (0.219) (0.222) (0.611) (0.950) 
N 57 38 19   
Low (3) -3.02% -1.28% -5.40% 4.12% 
p-value (0.162) (0.432) (0.258) (0.405) 
N 26 15 11   
Different. (1)-(3) 2.05% 0.58% 4.00% 4.70% 
p-value (0.395) (0.790) (0.423) (0.340) 
Panel D: Cash Deals 
 
 
 
  All Rational (4) Overconfident (5) Different. (4)-(5) 
All 0.58%
b 
0.79%
b 
0.08% 0.71% 
p-value (0.041) (0.014) (0.890) (0.291) 
N 372 263 109   
High (1) 1.21%
b 
1.13%
c 
1.43% -0.30% 
p-value (0.037) (0.090) (0.238) (0.824) 
N 113 83 30   
Neutral (2) 0.44% 0.75%
c 
-0.18% 0.93% 
p-value (0.256) (0.089) (0.814) (0.296) 
N 176 118 58   
Low (3) 0.03% 0.42% -1.12% 1.53% 
p-value (0.959) (0.493) (0.430) (0.319) 
N 83 62 21   
Different. (1)-(3) 1.18% 0.71% 2.55% 2.24% 
p-value (0.148) (0.429) (0.170) (0.155) 
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Table 4.5-Continued 
Panel E: Stock Deals 
 
 
 
  All Rational (4) Overconfident (5) Different. (4)-(5) 
All -0.91% 0.37% -3.36% 3.73% 
p-value (0.365) (0.701) (0.148) (0.134) 
N 35 23 12   
High (1) -1.96% 0.18% -5.71% 5.89% 
p-value (0.248) (0.916) (0.112) (0.111) 
N 11 7 4   
Neutral (2) 0.42% 0.39% 0.50% -0.11% 
p-value (0.729) (0.773) (0.864) (0.972) 
N 20 14 6   
Low (3) -4.71% 0.83% -10.25% 11.07% 
p-value (0.360) (0.781) (0.379) (0.372) 
N 4 2 2   
Different. (1)-(3) 2.75% -0.64% 4.54% 10.43% 
p-value (0.596) (0.841) (0.650) (0.382) 
Panel F: Mixed Deals 
 
 
 
  All Rational (4) Overconfident (5) Different. (4)-(5) 
All 1.38%
a 
1.72%
a 
0.56% 1.16% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.423) (0.136) 
N 441 315 126   
High (1) 1.48%
a 
1.69%
b 
1.03% 0.66% 
p-value (0.007) (0.011) (0.294) (0.575) 
N 124 85 39   
Neutral (2) 1.68%
a 
1.75%
a 
1.49%
c 
0.26% 
p-value (0.000) (0.002) (0.063) (0.788) 
N 204 150 54   
Low (3) 0.75% 1.69%
a 
-1.53% 3.22% 
p-value (0.306) (0.006) (0.449) (0.131) 
N 113 80 33   
Different. (1)-(3) 0.74% 0.01% 2.56% 3.22% 
p-value (0.415) (0.996) (0.254) (0.133) 
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Table 4.6 Announcement Returns by Market Valuation, Managerial Overconfidence and 
Interaction of Both with Multiple Acquirers Proxy 
This table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) 
surrounding the announcement by stock market valuation conditions, managerial 
overconfidence, and their interaction. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-
adjusted model: 
ARit = Rit - Rmt 
where Rit is the return on firm i at time t and Rmt is the value-weighted Market Index Return 
(FT-All Share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). Using monthly data, each month is classified through this period as a high- (low-) 
valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of 
all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. CEOs that make five or more 
acquisitions within a 3-year period are classified as overconfident managers. All others are 
classified as rational. CARs are reported for the interaction of market valuation and managerial 
overconfidence. ‗Cash‘ indicates only cash deals, ‗Stock‘ refers only to share deals and ‗Mixed‘ 
includes all other transactions financed by a combination of cash and shares. Panel A, B, C, D, 
E and F present CARs for the entire, private targets, public targets, cash, stock and mixed deals 
subsample respectively. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and 
‗c‘, respectively. The (1)-(3) and (4)-(5) represent the differences in mean CARs for the five 
days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high- minus low-valuation bidders and 
rational minus overconfident bidders respectively. The result in right bottom corner is the mean 
CAR for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high- rational bidders 
minus low- overconfident bidders. N denotes the number of observations and is reported below 
the mean return. P-values are reported in brackets. 
 
Panel A: All Targets 
 
 
 
  All Rational (4) Overconfident (5) Different. (4)-(5) 
All 1.44%
a 
1.65%
a 
0.88%
a 
0.77%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
N 3,099 2,256 843   
High (1) 1.86%
a 
2.16%
a 
1.22%
a 
0.94%
c 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.057) 
N 934 640 294   
Neutral (2) 1.57%
a 
1.79%
a 
0.92%
a 
0.88%
b 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.028) 
N 1,438 1,105 378   
Low (3) 0.57%
c 
0.69%
c 
0.19% 0.50% 
p-value (0.081) (0.089) (0.669) (0.401) 
N 682 511 171   
Different. (1)-(3) 1.30%
a 
1.47%
a 
1.03%
c 
1.97%
a 
p-value (0.002) (0.008) (0.059) (0.001) 
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Table 4.6-Continued 
Panel B: Private Targets 
 
 
 
  All Rational (4) Overconfident (5) Different. (4)-(5) 
All 1.80%
a 
2.11%
a 
1.01%
a 
1.10%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 2,723 1,953 770   
High (1) 2.21%
a 
2.59%
a 
1.43%
a 
1.16%
b 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.028) 
N 805 537 268   
Neutral (2) 1.95%
a 
2.28%
a 
1.02%
a 
1.27%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
N 1,312 971 341   
Low (3) 0.93%
a 
1.16%
a 
0.29% 0.88% 
p-value (0.005) (0.006) (0.536) (0.160) 
N 606 445 161   
Different. (1)-(3) 1.28%
a 
1.43%
b 
1.15%
b 
2.31%
a 
p-value (0.004) (0.015) (0.045) (0.000) 
Panel C: Public Targets 
 
 
  All Rational (4) Overconfident (5) Different. (4)-(5) 
All -1.18%
a 
-1.34%
a 
-0.51% -0.83% 
p-value (0.007) (0.009) (0.489) (0.351) 
N 376 303 73   
High (1) -0.28% -0.11% -0.96% 0.85% 
p-value (0.694) (0.895) (0.372) (0.538) 
N 129 103 26   
Neutral (2) -1.34%
b 
-1.72%
b 
0.04% -1.76% 
p-value (0.028) (0.015) (0.974) (0.209) 
N 171 134 37   
Low (3) -2.35%
b 
-2.49%
c 
-1.37% -1.12% 
p-value (0.037) (0.051) (0.317) (0.539) 
N 76 66 10   
Different. (1)-(3) 2.06% 2.38% 0.41% 1.26% 
p-value (0.120) (0.122) (0.807) (0.430) 
Panel D:  Cash Deals 
 
 
 
  All Rational (4) Overconfident (5) Different. (4)-(5) 
All 1.11%
a 
1.37%
a 
0.44%
c 
0.93%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.082) (0.005) 
N 1,295 931 364   
High (1) 1.23%
a 
1.45%
a 
0.80%
c 
0.65% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.078) (0.284) 
N 409 271 138   
Neutral (2) 1.34%
a 
1.58%
a 
0.66%
b 
0.92%
b 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.050) (0.040) 
N 643 476 167   
Low (3) 0.31% 0.73% -1.01% 1.75%
b 
p-value (0.461) (0.154) (0.115) (0.034) 
N 243 184 59   
Different. (1)-(3) 0.92%
c 
0.71% 1.81%
b 
2.46%
a 
p-value (0.079) (0.278) (0.021) (0.001) 
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Table 4.6-Continued 
Panel E: Stock Deals 
 
 
 
  All Rational (4) Overconfident (5) Different. (4)-(5) 
All 2.76%
b 
2.98%
c 
1.81% 1.17% 
p-value (0.037) (0.064) (0.130) (0.555) 
N 204 166 38   
High (1) 3.44%
c 
3.97%
c 
1.72% 2.26% 
p-value (0.062) (0.091) (0.363) (0.447) 
N 63 48 15   
Neutral (2) 3.73%
c 
4.30% 1.28% 3.01% 
p-value (0.087) (0.106) (0.486) (0.347) 
N 101 82 19   
Low (3) -0.73% -1.33% 4.66% -5.99% 
p-value (0.790) (0.662) (0.153) (0.144) 
N 40 36 4   
Different. (1)-(3) 4.17% 5.31% -2.94% -0.68% 
p-value (0.208) (0.167) (0.960) (0.843) 
Panel F: Mixed Deals 
 
 
 
  All Rational (4) Overconfident (5) Different. (4)-(5) 
All 1.54%
a 
1.68%
a 
1.16%
a 
0.52% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.169) 
N 1,600 1,159 441   
High (1) 2.21%
a 
2.49%
a 
1.59%
a 
0.90% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.216) 
N 462 321 141   
Neutral (2) 1.48%
a 
1.61%
a 
1.11%
a 
0.50% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.357) 
N 739 547 192   
Low (3) 0.85%
b 
0.92%
c 
0.68% 0.24% 
p-value (0.037) (0.077) (0.250) (0.763) 
N 399 291 108   
Different. (1)-(3) 1.36%
b 
1.57%
b 
0.91% 1.81%
b 
p-value (0.019) (0.038) (0.232) (0.026) 
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Table 4.7 Announcement Returns by Market Valuation, Managerial Overconfidence and 
Interaction of Both with Stock Options Proxy and Other Bidder and Deal Characteristics 
This table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) 
surrounding the announcement by stock market valuation conditions, managerial 
overconfidence, and their interaction. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-
adjusted model: 
ARit = Rit - Rmt 
where Rit is the return on firm i at time t and Rmt is the value-weighted Market Index Return 
(FT-All Share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). Using monthly data, each month is classified through this period as a high- (low-) 
valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of 
all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. Managers who hold stock options 
until the year before the expiration date are classified as overconfident. All others are classified 
as rational. CARs are reported for the interaction of market valuation and managerial 
overconfidence. Panels A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I and J present CARs for value, glamour, small 
and big bidder, low and high relative size, diversifying, non-diversifying, domestic and foreign 
deals respectively. Acquirers with higher (lower) than median book-to-market ratio (a month 
prior to bid announcement) are categorized as value (glamour) bidders. Acquirers with bigger 
(smaller) than median size (a month prior to bid announcement) are categorized as big (small) 
bidders. The relative size of the deal is defined as the deal value divided by the market value of 
the acquirer a month before the announcement date. Deals above (below) the median relative 
size are classified as high (low) relative size. An acquisition is defined as diversifying (non-
diversifying) when the acquirer‘s two-digit SIC code is different (the same) from that of the 
target. Acquisitions with bidders and targets originated from the same (different) country are 
defined as domestic (foreign) acquisitions. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are 
represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘, respectively. The (1)-(3) and (4)-(5) represent the differences in 
mean CARs for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high- minus low-
valuation bidders and rational minus overconfident bidders respectively. The result in right 
bottom corner is the mean CAR for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement 
of high- rational bidders minus low- overconfident bidders. N denotes the number of 
observations and is reported below the mean return. P-values are reported in brackets. 
 
  Panel A: Value Bidders 
 
Panel B: Glamour Bidders 
   All Ration. 
(4) 
Overcon. 
(5) 
Dif (4)-(5) 
(Rational
-Overc.) 
All Ration. 
(4) 
Overcon. 
(5) 
Dif (4)-(5) 
(Rational
-Overc.) 
All 1.12%
a 
1.21%
a 
0.91% 0.31% 0.80%
a 
1.30%
a 
-0.51% 1.80%
a 
p-value (0.001) (0.001) (0.162) (0.679) (0.005) (0.000) (0.425) (0.011) 
N 375 259 116   472 341 131   
High (1) 0.93% 0.41% 2.10% -1.69% 1.41%
a 
2.04%
a 
-0.17% 2.21%
a 
p-value (0.138) (0.526) (0.144) (0.280) (0.004) (0.001) (0.819) (0.021) 
N 105 73 32   143 102 41   
Neutral (2) 1.29%
a 
1.42%
b 
1.02% 0.40% 0.91%
b 
1.16%
a 
0.28% 0.88% 
p-value (0.009) (0.025) (0.181) (0.685) (0.012) (0.005) (0.722) (0.312) 
N 167 113 54   232 168 64   
Low (3) 1.03%
c 
1.69%
a 
-0.58% 2.27% -0.39% 0.55% -2.96% 3.51% 
p-value (0.089) (0.006) (0.692) (0.155) (0.608) (0.360) (0.205) (0.147) 
N 103 73 30   97 71 26   
Differ. (1)-(3) -0.10% -1.28% 2.68% 0.99% 1.80%
b 
1.49%
c 
2.80% 5.01%
b 
p-value (0.906) (0.148) (0.188) (0.535) (0.047) (0.081) (0.251) (0.043) 
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Table 4.7-Continued 
  Panel C: Small Bidders 
 
Panel D: Big Bidders 
  All Ration. 
(4) 
Overcon. 
(5) 
Dif (4)-(5) 
(Rational
-Overc.) 
All Ration. (4) Overcon. 
(5) 
Dif (4)-(5) 
(Rational
-Overc.) 
All 1.74%
a 
2.2 %
a 
0.76% 1.47%
c 
0.51%
b 
0.79%
a 
-0.24% 1.03% 
p-value (0.000
) 
(0.000) (0.294) (0.082) (0.042
) 
(0.004) (0.676) (0.108) 
N 293 195 98   555 406 149   
High (1) 1.62%
b 
1.74%
b 
1.41% 0.33% 0.99%
b 
1.19%
b 
0.44% 0.75% 
p-value (0.012
) 
(0.034) (0.195) (0.806) (0.040
) 
(0.029) (0.665) (0.518) 
N 84 55 29   164 120 44   
Neutral (2) 2.06%
a 
2.31%
a 
1.54%
c 
0.78% 0.53% 0.73%
c 
0.01% 0.72% 
p-value (0.000
) 
(0.001) (0.074) (0.474) (0.122
) 
(0.062) (0.991) (0.372) 
N 142 95 47   258 187 71   
Low (3) 1.23% 2.68%
a 
-1.74% 4.42%
c -
0.11% 
0.42% -1.65% 2.08% 
p-value (0.175
) 
(0.000) (0.451) (0.074) (0.848
) 
(0.417) (0.312) (0.227) 
N 67 45 22   133 99 34   
Differ. (1)-(3) 0.39% -0.95% 3.15% 3.47% 1.10% 0.77% 2.10% 2.84% 
p-value (0.722
) 
(0.369) (0.218) (0.160) (0.139
) 
(0.304) (0.275) (0.101) 
  Panel E: Low Relative Size Deals 
 
Panel F: High Relative Size Deals 
   All Ration. 
(4) 
Overcon. 
(5) 
Dif (4)-(5) 
(Rational
-Overc.) 
All Ration. (4) Overcon. 
(5) 
Dif (4)-(5) 
(Rational
-Overc.) 
All 0.90%
a 
1.03%
a 
0.55% 0.48% 1.00%
b 
1.63%
a 
-0.31% 1.94%
b 
p-value (0.000
) 
(0.000) (0.277) (0.383) (0.016
) 
(0.001) (0.697) (0.038) 
N 503 368 135   345 233 112   
High (1) 1.26%
a 
1.41%
a 
0.89% 0.52% 1.14% 1.31% 0.75% 0.56% 
p-value (0.002
) 
(0.002) (0.323) (0.605) (0.106
) 
(0.127) (0.552) (0.714) 
N 138 98 40   110 77 33   
Neutral (2) 0.81%
a 
0.72%
b 
1.06% -0.34% 1.45%
b 
2.14%
a 
0.09% 2.05%
c 
p-value (0.009
) 
(0.029) (0.155) (0.679) (0.011
) 
(0.004) (0.908) (0.062) 
N 239 175 64   161 107 54   
Low (3) 0.66% 1.19%
b 
-0.96% 2.15%
c -
0.20% 
1.01% -2.58% 3.60% 
p-value (0.142
) 
(0.014) (0.359) (0.066) (0.849
) 
(0.232) (0.341) (0.208) 
N 126 95 31   74 49 25   
Differ. (1)-(3) 0.60% 0.22% 1.85% 2.37%
b 
1.34% 0.29% 3.33% 3.89% 
p-value (0.321
) 
(0.736) (0.179) (0.041) (0.293
) 
(0.805) (0.264) (0.174) 
  Panel G: Diversifying Deals 
 
Panel H: Non-Diversifying Deals 
  All Ration. 
(4) 
Overcon. 
(5) 
Dif (4)-(5) 
(Rational
-Overc.) 
All Ration. (4) Overcon. 
(5) 
Dif (4)-(5) 
(Rational
-Overc.) 
All 1.04%
a 
1.36%
a 
0.20% 1.15% 0.82%
a 
1.15%
a 
0.11% 1.03% 
p-value (0.000
) 
(0.000) (0.761) (0.114) (0.010
) 
(0.002) (0.857) (0.152) 
N 447 325 122   401 276 125   
High (1) 1.03%
c 
1.03%
c 
1.06% -0.03% 1.41%
b 
1.84%
a 
0.65% 1.20% 
p-value (0.053
) 
(0.087) (0.370) (0.980) (0.012
) 
(0.008) (0.509) (0.313) 
N 135 103 32   113 72 41   
Neutral (2) 1.48%
a 
1.58%
a 
1.23%
b 
0.35% 0.59% 0.88% -0.08% 0.96% 
p-value (0.000
) 
(0.000) (0.045) (0.634) (0.240
) 
(0.140) (0.928) (0.385) 
N 218 155 63   182 127 55   
Low (3) 0.04% 1.35%
b 
-3.21% 4.56%
c 
0.61% 0.94% -0.27% 1.20% 
p-value (0.958
) 
(0.024) (0.152) (0.052) (0.316
) 
(0.127) (0.859) (0.462) 
N 94 67 27   106 77 29   
Differ. (1)-(3) 0.99% -0.32% 4.27%
c 
4.23%
c 
0.80% 0.91% 0.92% 2.11% 
p-value (0.290
) 
(0.698) (0.091) (0.070) (0.326
) 
(0.317) (0.611) (0.207) 
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Table 4.7-Continued 
  Panel I: Domestic Deals Panel J: Foreign Deals 
  All Ration. 
(4) 
Overcon. 
(5) 
Dif (4)-(5) 
(Rational
-Overc.) 
All Ration. (4) Overcon. 
(5) 
Dif (4)-(5) 
(Rational
-Overc.) 
All 1.01%
a 
1.25%
a 
0.46% 0.80% 0.79%
b 
1.27%
a 
-0. 3% 1.80%
c 
p-value (0.000
) 
(0.000) (0.379) (0.179) (0.036
) 
(0.001) (0.560) (0.071) 
N 566 394 172   282 207 75   
High (1) 1.14%
b 
1.28%
b 
0.88% 0.39% 1.34%
c 
1.52%
b 
0.61% 0.90% 
p-value (0.013
) 
(0.024) (0.277) (0.688) (0.059
) 
(0.047) (0.750) (0.661) 
N 170 112 58   78 63 15   
Neutral (2) 1.02%
a 
1.17%
a 
0.64% 0.53% 1.18%
b 
1.44%
b 
0.57% 0.87% 
p-value (0.003
) 
(0.007) (0.225) (0.437) (0.033
) 
(0.015) (0.654) (0.532) 
N 266 187 79   134 95 39   
Low (3) 0.83% 1.39%
a 
-0.67% 2.06% -
0.58% 
0.63% -3.38%
c 
4.01%
b 
p-value (0.183
) 
(0.009) (0.715) (0.285) (0.443
) 
(0.391) (0.061) (0.039) 
N 130 95 35   70 49 21   
Differ. (1)-(3) 0.31% -0.11% 1.55% 1.95% 1.92%
c 
0.89% 3.99% 4.89%
b 
p-value (0.689
) 
(0.886) (0.440) (0.313) (0.063
) 
(0.395) (0.126) (0.014) 
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Table 4.8 Announcement Returns by Market Valuation, Managerial Overconfidence and 
Interaction of Both with Multiple Acquirers Proxy and Other Bidder and Deal 
Characteristics 
This table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) 
surrounding the announcement by stock market valuation conditions, managerial 
overconfidence, and their interaction. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-
adjusted model: 
ARit = Rit - Rmt 
where Rit is the return on firm i at time t and Rmt is the value-weighted Market Index Return 
(FT-All Share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). Using monthly data, each month is classified through this period as a high- (low-) 
valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of 
all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. CEOs that make five or more 
acquisitions within a 3-year period are classified as overconfident managers. All others are 
classified as rational. CARs are reported for the interaction of market valuation and managerial 
overconfidence. Panels A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I and J present CARs for value, glamour, small 
and big bidder, low and high relative size, diversifying, non-diversifying, domestic and foreign 
deals respectively. Acquirers with higher (lower) than median book-to-market ratio (a month 
prior to bid announcement) are categorized as value (glamour) bidders. Acquirers with bigger 
(smaller) than median size (a month prior to bid announcement) are categorized as big (small) 
bidders. The relative size of the deal is defined as the deal value divided by the market value of 
the acquirer a month before the announcement date. Deals above (below) the median relative 
size are classified as high (low) relative size. An acquisition is defined as diversifying (non-
diversifying) when the acquirer‘s two-digit SIC code is different (the same) from that of the 
target. Acquisitions with bidders and targets originated from the same (different) country are 
defined as domestic (foreign) acquisitions. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are 
represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘, respectively. The (1)-(3) and (4)-(5) represent the differences in 
mean CARs for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high- minus low-
valuation bidders and rational minus overconfident bidders respectively. The result in right 
bottom corner is the mean CAR for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement 
of high- rational bidders minus low- overconfident bidders. N denotes the number of 
observations and is reported below the mean return. P-values are reported in brackets. 
 
  Panel A: Value Bidders 
 
 
Panel B: Glamour Bidders 
 
 
  All Ration.(4) Overcon.(5
) 
Dif (4)-
(5)  
All Ration.(4) Overon.(5
) 
Dif(4)-(5) 
All 1.84%
a 
2.13%
a 
0.97%
a 
1.16%
a 
0.98%
a 
1.08%
a 
0.76%
a 
0.32% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.385) 
N 1,538 1,146 392   1,532 1,086 446   
High (1) 2.00%
a 
2.42%
a 
1.03%
b 
1.39%
c 
1.59%
a 
1.71%
a 
1.35%
a 
0.36% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.073) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.564) 
N 431 300 131   493 331 162   
Neutral (2) 2.34%
a 
2.62%
a 
1.38%
a 
1.24%
b 
0.86%
a 
0.99%
a 
0.55% 0.44% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.041) (0.002) (0.007) (0.146) (0.395) 
N 713 553 160   754 539 215   
Low (3) 0.75%
c 
0.93% 0.24% 0.68% 0.26% 0.33% 0.05% 0.28% 
p-value (0.092) (0.100) (0.690) (0.410) (0.578) (0.575) (0.938) (0.747) 
N 394 293 101   285 216 69   
Differ. (1)-(3) 1.25%
b 
1.50%
c 
0.79% 2.18%
b 
1.33%
b 
1.38%
c 
1.30%
c 
1.66%
b 
p-value (0.050) (0.074) (0.304) (0.013) (0.019) (0.057) (0.097) (0.031) 
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       Table 4.8-Continued 
  Panel C: Small Bidders 
 
 
Panel D: Big Bidders 
 
 
  All Ration.(4) Overcon.(5
) 
Dif (4)-
(5)  
All Ration.(4) Overon.(5
) 
Dif(4)-(5) 
All 2.25%
a 
2.57%
a 
1.02%
a 
1.5 %
a 
0.63%
a 
0.54%
b 
0.79%
a 
-0.24% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.001) (0.450) 
N 1,556 1,230 326   1,543 1,026 517   
High (1) 2.86%
a 
3.50%
a 
1.06%
b 
2.45%
a 
0.90%
a 
0.65%
b 
1.34%
a 
-0.69% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.041) (0.003) (0.001) (0.049) (0.002) (0.198) 
N 460 338 122   474 302 172   
Neutral (2) 2.41%
a 
2.64%
a 
1.42%
a 
1.22%
c 
0.75%
a 
0.81%
a 
0.63%
c 
0.18% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.060) (0.002) (0.010) (0.064) (0.702) 
N 734 595 139   749 510 239   
Low (3) 1.13%
b 
1.36%
b 
0.09% 1.27% -0.08% -0.24% 0.25% -0.49% 
p-value (0.023) (0.022) (0.882) (0.132) (0.848) (0.643) (0.684) (0.541) 
N 362 297 65   320 214 106   
Differ. (1)-(3) 1.72%
b 
2.14%
b 
0.97% 3.42%
a 
0.98%
b 
0.89% 1.09% 0.40% 
p-value (0.013) (0.013) (0.222) (0.000) (0.040) (0.145) (0.142) (0.561) 
  Panel E: Low Relative Size Deals 
 
 
Panel F: High Relative Size Deals 
 
 
  All Ration.(4) Overcon.(5
) 
Dif (4)-
(5)  
All Ration.(4) Overon.(5
) 
Dif(4)-(5) 
All 0.73%
a 
0.80%
a 
0.61%
a 
0.18% 2.14%
a 
2.33%
a 
1.34%
a 
0.99%
b 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.517) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.039) 
N 1,539 1,003 536   1,560 1,253 307   
High (1) 1.06%
a 
1.03%
a 
1.11%
a 
-0.09% 2.68%
a 
3.09%
a 
1.40%
b 
1.69%
c 
p-value (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.859) (0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.053) 
N 469 288 181   465 352 113   
Neutral (2) 0.76%
a 
0.88%
a 
0.50% 0.38% 2.38%
a 
2.54%
a 
1.65%
a 
0.90% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.121) (0.342) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.192) 
N 737 498 239   746 607 139   
Low (3) 0.22% 0.30% 0.07% 0.23% 0.90% 0.98% 0.45% 0.54% 
p-value (0.541) (0.529) (0.897) (0.738) (0.093) (0.110) (0.607) (0.614) 
N 333 217 116   349 294 55   
Differ. (1)-(3) 0.84%
b 
0.73% 1.05%
c 
0.96% 1.78%
b 
2.10%
b 
0.95% 2.64%
b 
p-value (0.048) (0.198) (0.094) (0.109) (0.015) (0.016) (0.371) (0.014) 
  Panel G: Diversifying Deals 
 
Panel H: Non-Diversifying Deals 
  All Ration.(4) Overcon.(5
) 
Dif (4)-
(5)  
All Ration.(4) Overon.(
5) 
Dif(4)-(5) 
All 1.55%
a 
1.73%
a 
1.06%
a 
0.67%
c 
1.34%
a 
1.57%
a 
0.70%
a 
0.87%
b 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.091) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.022) 
N 1,518 1,101 417   1,581 1,155 426   
High (1) 1.59%
a 
1.80%
a 
1.15%
b 
0.65% 2.14%
a 
2.51%
a 
1.30%
a 
1.21%
c 
p-value (0.000) (0.001) (0.019) (0.358) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.076) 
N 464 315 149   470 325 145   
Neutral (2) 1.80%
a 
2.10%
a 
0.94%
a 
1.16%
b 
1.33%
a 
1.48%
a 
0.90%
b 
0.58% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.033) (0.307) 
N 761 565 196   722 540 182   
Low (3) 0.82%
c 
0.69% 1.22%
c 
-0.53% 0.38% 0.70% -0.56% 1.26% 
p-value (0.084) (0.244) (0.065) (0.546) (0.395) (0.213) (0.344) (0.123) 
N 293 221 72   389 290 99   
Differ. (1)-(3) 0.77% 1.11% -0.07% 0.58% 1.76%
a 
1.81%
b 
1.86%
b 
3.07%
a 
p-value (0.204) (0.157) (0.932) (0.484) (0.003) (0.019) (0.012) (0.000) 
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Table 4.8-Continued 
  Panel I: Domestic Deals 
 
Panel J: Foreign Deals 
   All Ration.(4) Overcon.(5
) 
Dif (4)-
(5)  
All Ration.(4) Overon.(
5) 
Dif(4)-(5) 
All 1.48%
a 
1.68%
a 
0.94%
a 
0.74%
b 
1.35%
a 
1.59%
a 
0.76%
b 
0.83% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.035) (0.102) 
N 2,122 1,561 561   977 695 282   
High (1) 1.86%
a 
2.18%
a 
1.12%
a 
1.10%
c 
1.86%
b 
2.10%
b 
1.42%
b 
0.69% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.071) (0.000) (0.001) (0.024) (0.432) 
N 643 451 192   291 189 102   
Neutral (2) 1.63%
a 
1.84%
a 
0.99%
a 
0.85%
c 
1.46%
a 
1.71%
a 
0.78% 0.92% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.077) (0.000) (0.001) (0.127) (0.196) 
N 999 749 250   484 356 128   
Low (3) 0.66%
c 
0.71% 0.53% 0.18% 0.34% 0.65% -0.58% 1.23% 
p-value (0.071) (0.123) (0.302) (0.788) (0.612) (0.436) (0.505) (0.307) 
N 480 361 119   202 150 52   
Differ. (1)-(3) 1.20%
b 
1.47%
b 
0.59% 1.65%
b 
1.53%
c 
1.45% 2.00%
c 
2.69%
b 
p-value (0.016) (0.023) (0.345) (0.016) (0.058) (0.164) (0.063) (0.013) 
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Table 4.9 Correlation Matrix of Control Variables for the Stock Options Proxy 
This Table presents the correlations coefficient among all the variable that are used in 
the multivariate analysis. Explanatory variables includes dummies representing bids 
announced by firms with rational (overconfident) managers during high (low) market valuation 
periods, high-valuation period deals and low-valuation period deals. Using monthly data, each 
month is classified through this period as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended 
market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) 
the past five-year average. Overconfidence deals dummy is a binary variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the manager holds the options until the year before the expiration date and 0 
otherwise. Private variable is a dummy that takes the value of one if the target is private and 
zero otherwise; cash deals is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for acquisitions financed 
with 100% cash and 0 otherwise. Common-stock deals is an indicator variable taking the value 
of 1 for acquisitions financed with 100% stock and 0 otherwise. The size of acquirers is 
measured by the log of the market value a month before the deal‘s announcement. Bidder‘s 
book-to-market is measured by the bidder‘s net book value of assets divided by its market value 
a month before the announcement of the deal; a deal‘s relative size is the ratio between the deal 
value and the market value of the bidder firm; a dummy variable for diversifying deals take the 
value of 1 when the acquirer‘s two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target, and 0 
otherwise. Merger activity dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the deal is announced during 
a high activity M&A period, and zero otherwise. This categorization is based on aggregate 
quarterly M&A statistics from the UK National Statistics Office. Each quarter is categorized as 
an active period if the number of deals is more than the median and passive otherwise. Finally, 
other explanatory variables include: the acquirer‘s lagged excess return for 180 days prior to the 
bid‘s announcement; and the market portfolio return (FT-All Share) for the same 180-day 
period prior to the announcement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Managerial Overconfidence in High and Low Valuation Markets and Gains to Acquisitions 
234 
 
Table 4.9-continued 
 
MV 
(H) 
MV 
(L) 
OVER
CONFI
DENT 
(option
s) 
High
Ratio
nal 
HighO
vercon
f. 
LowR
ational 
LowO
vercon
f. 
Private Cash Stock 
Log 
(MV) 
BTMV 
Divers
ifying 
Relati
ve Size 
FTAL
LSH 
Ri-Rm 
Merger 
Activity 
(1=Active, 
high) 
MV (H) 1 
                
MV (L) -0.351 1 
               
Overconfident 
(options) 
0.004 -0.014 1 
              
HighRational 0.793 -0.283 -0.327 1 
             
HighOverconf. 0.477 -0.171 0.479 -0.157 1 
            
LowRational -0.291 0.814 -0.290 -0.231 -0.139 1 
           
LowOverconf. -0.171 0.479 0.415 -0.136 -0.082 -0.120 1 
          
Private -0.032 0.012 -0.075 0.000 -0.073 0.056 -0.036 1 
         
Cash 0.064 -0.093 -0.016 0.062 0.015 -0.021 -0.056 0.046 1 
        
Stock 0.003 0.010 0.016 -0.011 0.009 -0.056 -0.021 -0.276 -0.338 1 
       
Log (MV) 0.013 -0.014 -0.026 0.004 -0.015 0.048 0.028 -0.228 0.139 -0.125 1 
      
BTMV -0.019 0.024 0.060 -0.019 0.005 -0.013 -0.002 -0.062 0.008 0.068 -0.223 1 
     
Diversifying 0.005 -0.055 -0.043 0.063 -0.055 -0.056 -0.024 0.008 0.016 -0.019 -0.003 0.004 1 
    
Relative Size -0.017 0.010 0.034 -0.022 0.028 -0.031 0.012 -0.108 -0.109 0.147 -0.231 0.255 -0.008 1 
   
FTALLSH 0.404 -0.631 0.033 0.305 0.207 -0.575 -0.254 -0.012 0.074 -0.008 0.023 -0.053 0.038 -0.008 1 
  
Ri-Rm -0.043 -0.066 -0.026 -0.098 -0.042 0.024 -0.071 0.000 -0.093 0.107 0.006 -0.041 0.000 -0.001 0.025 1 
 
Merger 
Activity 
(1=Active, 
high) 
0.010 -0.252 -0.032 0.048 -0.015 -0.218 -0.080 0.042 0.060 -0.059 -0.022 -0.010 0.013 0.016 0.288 -0.049 1 
Chapter 4: Managerial Overconfidence in High and Low Valuation Markets and Gains to Acquisitions 
235 
 
Table 4.10 Cross-Sectional Analysis with Stock Options Proxy 
This table presents regression estimates of the acquirer‘s five-day cumulative abnormal return (-
2, +2) surrounding the announcement controlling for market valuation and managerial 
overconfidence effects and other deal and acquirer characteristics. The vector of explanatory 
variables includes dummies representing bids announced by firms with rational (overconfident) 
managers during high (low) market valuation periods, high-valuation period deals and low-
valuation period deals. Using monthly data, each month is classified through this period as a 
high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top 
(bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. Overconfidence 
deals dummy is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the manager holds the options until 
the year before the expiration date and 0 otherwise. Private variable is a dummy that takes the 
value of one if the target is private and zero otherwise; cash deals is an indicator variable taking 
the value of 1 for acquisitions financed with 100% cash and 0 otherwise. Common-stock deals 
is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for acquisitions financed with 100% stock and 0 
otherwise. The size of acquirers is measured by the log of the market value a month before the 
deal‘s announcement. Bidder‘s book-to-market is measured by the bidder‘s net book value of 
assets divided by its market value a month before the announcement of the deal; a deal‘s 
relative size is the ratio between the deal value and the market value of the bidder firm; a 
dummy variable for diversifying deals take the value of 1 when the acquirer‘s two-digit SIC 
code is different from that of the target, and 0 otherwise. Merger activity dummy variable takes 
the value of 1 if the deal is announced during a high activity M&A period, and zero otherwise. 
This categorization is based on aggregate quarterly M&A statistics from the UK National 
Statistics Office. Each quarter is categorized as an active period if the number of deals is more 
than the median and passive otherwise. Finally, other explanatory variables include: the 
acquirer‘s lagged excess return for 180 days prior to the bid‘s announcement; and the market 
portfolio return (FT-All Share) for the same 180-day period prior to the announcement. 
Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘, respectively. N 
denotes the number of observations. P-values are reported in brackets. 
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Table 4.10-Continued 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.023
b
 0.031
b
 0.025
c
 0.028
b
 
  (0.083) (0.016) (0.058) (0.030) 
High valuation period deals 0.008
c
 
  
  
(Dummy = 1, if the deal is announced in a high valuation 
month) 
(0.100) 
  
  
Low valuation period deals 0.002 
  
  
(Dummy = 1  if the deal is announced in a low valuation 
month ) 
(0.804) 
  
  
Overconfident deals (stock options)   -0.011
b
 
 
  
(Dummy = 1, if the acquirer‘s manager is overconfident)   (0.011) 
 
  
High Valuation-Non-Overconfident Deals (stock options)   
 
0.011
b
   
(Dummy = 1, if the deal is announced in a high-valuation 
month and the bidder‘s manager is non-overconfident) 
  
 
(0.041)   
High Valuation- Overconfident Deals (stock options)   
 
0.000   
(Dummy = 1, if the deal is announced in a high-valuation 
month and the bidder‘s manager is overconfident) 
  
 
(0.989)   
Low Valuation-Non-Overconfident Deals (stock options)   
 
0.005   
(Dummy = 1, if the deal is announced in a low-valuation 
month and the bidder‘s manager is non-overconfident) 
  
 
(0.508)   
Low Valuation- Overconfident Deals (stock options)   
 
-0.014 -0.018
b
 
(Dummy = 1, if the deal is announced in a low-valuation 
month and the bidder‘s manager is overconfident) 
  
 
(0.101) (0.034) 
Private target deals 0.012
c
 0.011 0.011 0.011
c
 
(Dummy = 1, if the target is a private firm) (0.073) (0.129) (0.109) (0.100) 
Cash deals -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
(Dummy = 1, if the deal is settled either in cash and/or debt) (0.598) (0.607) (0.523) (0.556) 
Common stock deals -0.021
b
 -0.021
b
 -0.021
b
 -0.022
b
 
(Dummy = 1, if the deal is settled in shares only) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Diversifying deals 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
(Dummy = 1, If target and acquirer belong to different 
industry) 
(0.416) (0.519) (0.491) (0.458) 
B/M 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.567) (0.446) (0.559) (0.572) 
Relative size -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 
  (0.301) (0.219) (0.289) (0.271) 
Log (MV) -0.011
a
 -0.012
a
 -0.011
a
 -0.011
a
 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FTALLSH (-180,-3) 0.012 0.031
c
 0.017 0.02 
  (0.630) (0.086) (0.474) (0.298) 
Ri-Rm (-180,-3) 0.018
a
 0.016
a
 0.017
a
 0.016
a
 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
High Merger Activity -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
(Dummy=1, if the deal is announced in a quarter of high 
M&A activities) (0.863) (0.671) (0.866) (0.746) 
N 822 822 822 822 
F-Statistics 2.91
a
 3.36
a
 2.88
a
 3.25
a
 
Adj. R² 5.38% 5.79% 6.11% 5.56% 
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Table 4.11 Correlation Matrix of Control Variables for Multiple Acquirers Proxy 
This Table presents the correlations coefficient among all the variable that are used in 
the multivariate analysis. Explanatory variables includes dummies representing bids 
announced by firms with rational (overconfident) managers during high (low) market valuation 
periods, high-valuation period deals and low-valuation period deals. Using monthly data, each 
month is classified through this period as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended 
market P/E of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) 
the past five-year average. Overconfidence deals dummy is a binary variable that takes the 
value of 1 if a manager conducts five or more acquisitions within a 3-year period and 0 
otherwise. Private variable is a dummy that takes the value of one if the target is private and 
zero otherwise; cash deals is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for acquisitions financed 
with 100% cash and 0 otherwise. Common-stock deals is an indicator variable taking the value 
of 1 for acquisitions financed with 100% stock and 0 otherwise. The size of acquirers is 
measured by the log of the market value a month before the deal‘s announcement. Bidder‘s 
book-to-market is measured by the bidder‘s net book value of assets divided by its market value 
a month before the announcement of the deal; a deal‘s relative size is the ratio between the deal 
value and the market value of the bidder firm; a dummy variable for diversifying deals take the 
value of 1 when the acquirer‘s two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target, and 0 
otherwise. Merger activity dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the deal is announced during 
a high activity M&A period, and zero otherwise. This categorization is based on aggregate 
quarterly M&A statistics from the UK National Statistics Office. Each quarter is categorised as 
an active period if the number of deals is more than the median and passive otherwise. Finally, 
other explanatory variables include: the acquirer‘s lagged excess return for 180 days prior to the 
bid‘s announcement; and the market portfolio return (FT-All Share) for the same 180-day 
period prior to the announcement. 
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Table 4.11-comntinued 
 
MV 
(H) 
MV 
(L) 
Overco
nfident 
(multip
le) 
High
Ratio
nal 
HighO
vercon
f. 
LowR
ational 
LowO
vercon
f. 
Private Cash Stock 
Log 
(MV) 
BTMV 
Divers
ifying 
Relati
ve Size 
FTAL
LSH 
Ri-Rm 
Merger 
Activity 
(1=Active, 
high) 
MV (H) 1 
                
MV (L) -0.351 1 
               
Overconfident 
(multiple) 
0.063 -0.025 1 
              
HighRational 0.777 -0.271 -0.312 1 
             
HighOverconf. 0.493 -0.172 0.530 -0.165 1 
            
LowRational -0.292 0.837 -0.272 -0.227 -0.144 1 
           
LowOverconf. -0.159 0.455 0.395 -0.123 -0.078 -0.107 1 
          
Private -0.032 0.012 0.065 -0.062 0.033 -0.011 0.047 1 
         
Cash 0.064 -0.093 0.018 0.036 0.042 -0.075 -0.038 0.046 1 
        
Stock 0.003 0.010 -0.074 0.031 -0.036 0.033 -0.041 -0.276 -0.338 1 
       
Log (MV) 0.013 -0.014 0.140 -0.029 0.059 -0.052 0.065 -0.228 0.139 -0.125 1 
      
BTMV -0.019 0.024 -0.030 -0.009 -0.011 0.014 0.005 -0.062 0.008 0.068 -0.223 1 
     
Diversifying 0.005 -0.055 0.006 0.002 0.011 -0.051 -0.033 0.008 0.016 -0.019 -0.003 0.004 1 
    
Relative Size -0.017 0.010 -0.088 0.016 -0.048 0.036 -0.042 -0.108 -0.109 0.147 -0.231 0.255 -0.008 1 
   
FTALLSH 0.404 -0.631 0.027 0.299 0.211 -0.514 -0.306 -0.012 0.074 -0.008 0.023 -0.053 0.038 -0.008 1 
  
Ri-Rm -0.043 -0.066 0.000 -0.027 -0.025 -0.069 -0.006 0.000 -0.093 0.107 0.006 -0.041 0.000 -0.001 0.025 1 
 
Merger 
Activity 
(1=Active, 
high) 
0.010 -0.252 -0.040 0.013 -0.007 -0.198 -0.136 0.042 0.060 -0.059 -0.022 -0.010 0.013 0.016 0.288 -0.049 1 
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Table 4.12 Cross-Sectional Analysis with Multiple Acquirers’ Proxy 
This table presents regression estimates of the acquirer‘s five-day cumulative abnormal return (-
2, +2) surrounding the announcement controlling for market valuation and managerial 
overconfidence effects and other deal and acquirer characteristics. The vector of explanatory 
variables includes dummies representing bids announced by firms with rational (overconfident) 
managers during high (low) market valuation periods, high-valuation period deals and low-
valuation period deals. Using monthly data, each month is classified through this period as a 
high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to the top 
(bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. Overconfidence 
deals dummy is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a manager conducts five or more 
acquisitions within a 3-year period and 0 otherwise. Private variable is a dummy that takes the 
value of one if the target is private and zero otherwise; cash deals is an indicator variable taking 
the value of 1 for acquisitions financed with 100% cash and 0 otherwise. Common-stock deals 
is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for acquisitions financed with 100% stock and 0 
otherwise. The size of acquirers is measured by the log of the market value a month before the 
deal‘s announcement. Bidder‘s book-to-market is measured by the bidder‘s net book value of 
assets divided by its market value a month before the announcement of the deal; a deal‘s 
relative size is the ratio between the deal value and the market value of the bidder firm; a 
dummy variable for diversifying deals take the value of 1 when the acquirer‘s two-digit SIC 
code is different from that of the target, and 0 otherwise. Merger activity dummy variable takes 
the value of 1 if the deal is announced during a high activity M&A period, and zero otherwise. 
This categorization is based on aggregate quarterly M&A statistics from the UK National 
Statistics Office. Each quarter is categorised as an active period if the number of deals is more 
than the median and passive otherwise. Finally, other explanatory variables include: the 
acquirer‘s lagged excess return for 180 days prior to the bid‘s announcement; and the market 
portfolio return (FT-All Share) for the same 180-day period prior to the announcement. 
Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘, respectively. N 
denotes the number of observations. P-values are reported in brackets. 
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Table 4.12-Continued 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.005 
  (0.589) (0.530) (0.681) (0.528) 
High valuation period deals 0.005 
  
  
(Dummy = 1, if the deal is announced in a high valuation 
month) 
(0.206) 
  
  
Low valuation period deals -0.002 
  
  
(Dummy = 1  if the deal is announced in a low valuation 
month ) 
(0.600) 
  
  
Overconfident deals (multiple acquisitions)   -0.006
c
 
 
  
(Dummy = 1, if the acquirer‘s manager is overconfident)   (0.091) 
 
  
High Valuation-Non-Overconfident Deals (multiple 
acquisitions) 
  
 
0.007
c
   
(Dummy = 1, if the deal is announced in a high-valuation 
month and the bidder‘s manager is non-overconfident) 
  
 
(0.071)   
High Valuation- Overconfident Deals (multiple acquisitions)   
 
-0.001   
(Dummy = 1, if the deal is announced in a high-valuation 
month and the bidder‘s manager is overconfident) 
  
 
(0.802)   
Low Valuation-Non-Overconfident Deals (multiple 
acquisitions) 
  
 
-0.001   
(Dummy = 1, if the deal is announced in a low-valuation 
month and the bidder‘s manager is non-overconfident) 
  
 
(0.769)   
Low Valuation- Overconfident Deals (multiple acquisitions)   
 
-0.005 -0.005 
(Dummy = 1, if the deal is announced in a low-valuation 
month and the bidder‘s manager is overconfident) 
  
 
(0.480) (0.479) 
Private target deals 0.026
a
 0.027
a
 0.027
a
 0.026
a
 
(Dummy = 1, if the target is a private firm) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash deals 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(Dummy = 1, if the deal is settled either in cash and/or debt) (0.807) (0.777) (0.827) (0.767) 
Common stock deals 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
(Dummy = 1, if the deal is settled in shares only) (0.200) (0.209) (0.209) (0.201) 
Diversifying deals 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
(Dummy = 1, If target and acquirer belong to different 
industry) 
(0.365) (0.365) (0.360) (0.374) 
B/M 0.005
a
 0.005
a
 0.005
a
 0.005
a
 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Relative size 0.010
a
 0.010
a
 0.010
a
 0.010
a
 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (MV) -0.011
a
 -0.011
a
 -0.011
a
 -0.011
a
 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FTALLSH (-180,-3) 0.045
b
 0.060
a
 0.046
b
 0.056
a
 
  (0.012) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) 
Ri-Rm (-180,-3) 0.006
a
 0.005
a
 0.006
a
 0.006
a
 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
High Merger Activity -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
(Dummy=1, if the deal is announced in a quarter of high 
M&A activities) (0.466) (0.356) (0.445) (0.379) 
N 2,916 2,916 2,916 2,916 
F-Statistics 6.07
a
 6.69
a
 5.44
a
 6.82
a
 
Adj. R² 5.51% 5.53% 5.59% 5.46% 
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Table 4.13 12 and 36 Months Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions (CTPRs) of Long-Run 
Stock Returns using the Fama-French 3-Factor Model by Market Valuation 
Monthly average abnormal returns (in percent) of bidders for one (Panel A) and three years 
(Panel B) following the announcement of bids are reported by the target ownership status 
(public or private) and method of payment (all-cash and non-cash (i.e., any other type of offer)) 
for high, neutral and low valuation-deals. Using monthly data, each month is classified through 
this period as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs 
to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. The 
calendar-time excess returns reported in the table are estimated using the Fama-French 3-factor 
model with the following regression:  
ittitiftmtiiftpt HMLhSMBsRRaRR   )(  
The value of alpha (i) represents the average monthly excess returns for each sample group in 
the table. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the announcement month of successful bid and 
remain for 36 months and the portfolios are rebalanced. Statistical significance of returns 
(different from zero) are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘ at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. P-
values are reported in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The number 
of observations, the number of calendar observations and the R
2
 of each regression are also 
reported. The table also reports High (1) minus Low (2) zero investment portfolio alphas. 
 
Panel A: 1 Year 
  All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed 
All -0.13% -0.11% -0.11% -0.22% -0.64% -0.05% 
p-value (0.409) (0.586) (0.574) (0.223) (0.305) (0.820) 
Obs. 3,223 2,839 384 1,351 208 1664 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 203 203 
Rsquared 82.98% 76.87% 70.28% 76.48% 32.90% 71.11% 
High (1) -0.26% -0.25% 0.02% -0.34% -1.01% -0.09% 
p-value (0.244) (0.369) (0.947) (0.174) (0.153) (0.750) 
Obs. 972 841 131 431 64 477 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 203 203 
Rsquared 36.22% 31.19% 23.75% 35.02% 6.99% 24.84% 
Neutral (2) 0.11% -0.05% 0.05% -0.34% -0.36% 0.10% 
p-value (0.697) (0.840) (0.913) (0.188) (0.587) (0.708) 
Obs. 1,534 1,361 173 665 102 767 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 203 203 
Rsquared 53.11% 61.08% 25.99% 48.32% 20.15% 53.26% 
Low (3) -0.32% -0.43%
b 
-0.24% -0.21% -0.27% -0.65%
b 
p-value (0.111) (0.029) (0.336) (0.310) (0.467) (0.017) 
Obs. 717 637 80 255 42 420 
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 203 203 
Rsquared 32.32% 34.24% 24.58% 24.40% 19.72% 31.47% 
Different (1)-(3) 0.06% 0.18% 0.26% -0.13% -0.73% 0.56% 
p-value (0.863) (0.643) (0.563) (0.715) (0.374) (0.206) 
Rsquared 5.36% 4.36% 3.79% 6.98% 2.15% 4.09% 
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 Table 4.13-Continued 
Panel B: 3 Years 
  All Private Public Cash Stock Mixed 
All -0.16% -0.04% -0.24% -0.05% -0.50% -0.25% 
p-value (0.214) (0.812) (0.125) (0.698) (0.247) (0.167) 
Obs. 3,030 2,659 371 1,265 199 1566 
Calendar Obs. 214 214 215 215 214 215 
Rsquared 87.36% 84.57% 78.95% 85.13% 47.78% 78.97% 
High (1) -0.14% -0.10% -0.10% 0.10% -0.58% -0.24% 
p-value (0.506) (0.634) (0.723) (0.666) (0.305) (0.355) 
Obs. 942 812 130 416 59 467 
Calendar Obs. 215 215 215 215 215 215 
Rsquared 60.15% 56.40% 43.70% 53.75% 21.69% 51.19% 
Neutral (2) -0.17% -0.08% -0.35% -0.26% -0.51% -0.24% 
p-value (0.255) (0.622) (0.110) (0.139) (0.384) (0.183) 
Obs. 1,371 1,210 161 594 98 679 
Calendar Obs. 215 215 215 215 215 215 
Rsquared 83.48% 81.49% 66.92% 79.18% 38.19% 77.25% 
Low (3) -0.25% -0.27% -0.24% -0.18% -0.12% -0.43%
c 
p-value (0.154) (0.183) (0.238) (0.296) (0.724) (0.088) 
Obs. 717 637 80 255 42 420 
Calendar Obs. 214 214 215 215 214 215 
Rsquared 40.03% 42.08% 25.82% 32.16% 26.15% 36.73% 
Different (1)-(3) 0.11% 0.16% 0.14% 0.27% 0.27% 0.20% 
p-value (0.686) (0.588) (0.693) (0.316) (0.316) (0.570) 
Rsquared 14.69% 6.74% 14.02% 16.09% 16.09% 3.82% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Managerial Overconfidence in High and Low Valuation Markets and Gains to Acquisitions 
243 
 
Table 4.14 12 and 36 Months Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions (CTPRs) of Long-Run 
Stock Returns using the Fama-French 3-Factor Model for Rational and Overconfident 
Managers by the Stock Options Proxy and Market Valuation 
Monthly average abnormal returns (in percent) of bidders for one (Panel A) and three years 
(Panel B) following the announcement of bids are reported by rational and overconfident 
managers as approached by the stock options proxy and high and low valuation-deals. Managers 
who hold stock options until the year before the expiration date are classified as overconfident. 
All others are classified as rational. Using monthly data, each month is classified through this 
period as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month belongs to 
the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. The 
calendar-time excess returns reported in the table are estimated using the Fama-French 3-factor 
model with the following regression:  
ittitiftmtiiftpt HMLhSMBsRRaRR   )(  
The value of alpha (i) represents the average monthly excess returns for each sample group in 
the table. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the announcement month of successful bid and 
remain for 36 months and the portfolios are rebalanced. Statistical significance of returns 
(different from zero) are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘ at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. P-
values are reported in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The number 
of observations, the number of calendar observations and the R
2
 of each regression are also 
reported. The table also reports High (1) minus Low (2) and Rational (4) minus Overconfident 
(5) zero investment portfolio alphas. 
 
Panel A: 1 Year 
  All Rational (4) Overconfident (5) Differnt (4)-(5) 
All -0.09% 0.11% -0.69%
b 
0.80%
b 
p-value (0.683) (0.642) (0.046) (0.031) 
Obs. 848 601 247   
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 
Rsquared 75.16% 68.28% 56.91% 2.67% 
High (1) -0.16% -0.18% -0.13% -0.04% 
p-value (0.540) (0.506) (0.740) (0.907) 
Obs. 248 175 73   
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 
Rsquared 31.40% 30.06% 15.79% 2.28% 
Neutral (2) 0.30% 0.65%
b 
-0.82%
b 
1.47%
a 
p-value (0.313) (0.045) (0.047) (0.001) 
Obs. 400 282 118   
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 
Rsquared 49.16% 40.74% 34.14% 0.11% 
Low (3) -0.56%
b 
-0.48%
b 
-0.59%
b 
0.11% 
p-value (0.030) (0.039) (0.048) (0.638) 
Obs. 200 144 56   
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 
Rsquared 27.86% 28.26% 21.40% 0.54% 
Different (1)-(3) 0.40% 0.30% 0.46% 0.41% 
p-value (0.336) (0.457) (0.387) (0.351) 
Rsquared 3.32% 5.19% 2.76% 3.22% 
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Table 4.14-Continued 
Panel B: 3 Years 
  All Rational (4) Overconfident (5) Differnt (4)-(5) 
All -0.10% -0.09% -0.28% 0.19% 
p-value (0.564) (0.667) (0.337) (0.568) 
Obs. 812 573 239   
Calendar Obs. 215 215 215 215 
Rsquared 78.07% 73.34% 60.24% 4.51% 
High (1) -0.19% -0.29% 0.04% -0.33% 
p-value (0.453) (0.313) (0.887) (0.308) 
Obs. 245 172 73   
Calendar Obs. 215 215 215 215 
Rsquared 54.08% 49.04% 39.11% 6.13% 
Neutral (2) 0.08% 0.02% -0.34% 0.37% 
p-value (0.728) (0.922) (0.276) (0.285) 
Obs. 367 257 110   
Calendar Obs. 215 215 215 215 
Rsquared 67.94% 62.57% 60.26% 8.04% 
Low (3) -0.37% -0.30% -0.52%
c 
0.22% 
p-value (0.136) (0.203) (0.071) (0.293) 
Obs. 200 144 56   
Calendar Obs. 215 215 215 215 
Rsquared 33.59% 32.35% 26.83% 1.43% 
Different (1)-(3) 0.18% 0.01% 0.56% 0.23% 
p-value (0.605) (0.989) (0.153) (0.565) 
Rsquared 8.25% 11.97% 3.68% 7.34% 
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Table 4.15 12 and 36 Months Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions (CTPRs) of Long-Run 
Stock Returns using the Fama-French 3-Factor Model for Rational and Overconfident 
Managers by the Stock Options Proxy and Market Valuation 
Monthly average abnormal returns (in percent) of bidders for one (Panel A) and three years 
(Panel B) following the announcement of bids are reported by rational and overconfident 
managers as approached by the multiple acquirers proxy and high and low valuation-deals. 
Individual CEOs who made 5 or more acquisitions within a 3 year period are called 
overconfident. All others are classified as rational. Using monthly data, each month is classified 
through this period as a high- (low-) valuation month if the detrended market P/E of that month 
belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended P/Es above (below) the past five-year average. 
The calendar-time excess returns reported in the table are estimated using the Fama-French 3-
factor model with the following regression:  
ittitiftmtiiftpt HMLhSMBsRRaRR   )(  
The value of alpha (i) represents the average monthly excess returns for each sample group in 
the table. Acquirers enter the portfolio on the announcement month of successful bid and 
remain for 36 months and the portfolios are rebalanced. Statistical significance of returns 
(different from zero) are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘ at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. P-
values are reported in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The number 
of observations, the number of calendar observations and the R
2
 of each regression are also 
reported. The table also reports High (1) minus Low (2) and Rational (4) minus Overconfident 
(5) zero investment portfolio alphas. 
 
Panel A: 1 Year 
  All Rational (4) Overconfident (5) Differnt (4)-(5) 
All -0.13% -0.12% -0.29% 0.17% 
p-value (0.408) (0.456) (0.300) (0.525) 
Obs. 3,099 2,256 843   
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 
Rsquared 82.80% 79.15% 70.72% 11.88% 
High (1) -0.29% -0.28% -0.49% 0.21% 
p-value (0.202) (0.228) (0.133) (0.442) 
Obs. 934 640 294   
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 
Rsquared 36.05% 34.17% 27.23% 0.61% 
Neutral (2) 0.11% 0.08% -0.26% 0.34% 
p-value (0.705) (0.814) (0.422) (0.360) 
Obs. 1,483 1,105 378   
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 
Rsquared 52.73% 43.33% 52.80% 4.89% 
Low (3) -0.31% -0.22% -0.41% 0.19% 
p-value (0.123) (0.346) (0.168) (0.494) 
Obs. 682 511 171   
Calendar Obs. 203 203 203 203 
Rsquared 32.12% 28.07% 22.99% 1.19% 
Different (1)-(3) 0.02% -0.06% -0.08% 0.13% 
p-value (0.957) (0.869) (0.875) (0.762) 
Rsquared 5.37% 5.20% 3.19% 4.82% 
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Table 4.15-Continued 
Panel B: 3 Years 
  All Rational (4) Overconfident (5) Differnt (4)-(5) 
All -0.15% -0.12% -0.58%
c 
0.46% 
p-value (0.224) (0.360) (0.074) (0.133) 
Obs. 2,908 2,099 809   
Calendar Obs. 214 214 215 214 
Rsquared 87.24% 85.94% 70.97% 16.60% 
High (1) -0.17% -0.11% -0.79%
c 
0.68% 
p-value (0.431) (0.608) (0.095) (0.149) 
Obs. 905 616 289   
Calendar Obs. 215 215 215 215 
Rsquared 59.57% 57.00% 37.94% 3.78% 
Neutral (2) -0.17% -0.10% -0.58%
b 
0.48%
b 
p-value (0.278) (0.559) (0.016) (0.045) 
Obs. 1,321 972 349   
Calendar Obs. 215 215 215 215 
Rsquared 83.10% 78.99% 75.77% 18.36% 
Low (3) -0.24% -0.27% -0.36% 0.08% 
p-value (0.171) (0.124) (0.201) (0.716) 
Obs. 682 511 171   
Calendar Obs. 214 214 215 214 
Rsquared 39.79% 37.24% 29.76% 4.57% 
Different (1)-(3) 0.07% 0.16% -0.43% 0.24% 
p-value (0.802) (0.572) (0.431) (0.476) 
Rsquared 15.43% 15.16% 8.34% 4.24% 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
Extensive literature has investigated short-run bidder gains and possible factors which 
affect shareholders wealth following the announcement of a takeover deal. This chapter 
introduces a behavioural approach to explain bidder gains following the announcement 
of corporate takeovers. We empirically examine the market reaction under conditions of 
information uncertainties when investors possess private information. By information 
uncertainty, we mean ambiguity about the bidding firm‘s value (Zhang (2006)). 
 
Traditional approaches to M&A gains suggest that the market reaction following the 
announcement of a takeover illustrates potential synergy or revaluation gains. 
Neoclassical theories suggest that the motive for M&As should be synergetic gains 
coming from economies of scale after the combination of the two companies and the 
market reaction at the announcement day should reflect potential synergy gains. Fuller 
et al. (2002) and Draper and Paudyal (2008) claim that short-run market reaction to 
bidder takeover announcements may reflect revaluation gains. Fuller at al. (2002) 
claims that gains in first order deals maybe higher because they incorporate revaluation 
gains apart from synergy gains. Draper and Paudyal (2008) further control for 
information asymmetries between investors and managers and find that undervalued 
bidder due to high information asymmetry between managers and investors, announce 
takeover to attract attention and therefore boost their stock price back to fundamental 
values, ending up enjoying the highest abnormal. Our analysis is motivated by the 
theoretical work of behavioural finance models. One of the most well-documented 
investor biases is overconfidence. Experimental evidence shows that investors tend to 
overestimate the precision of their information, especially in cases where they have 
been personally involved in the collection of this information. (Odean (1998)). The 
theoretical model of Daniel et al. (1998) predicts that investors are overconfident about 
their private information. As a result, they attribute more weight to their private 
information and underrect to public signals. Additionally, Daniel et al. (1998, 2001) 
also claim that investor become even more overconfident under conditions of 
information uncertainty. Jiang, Lee and Zhang (2004) and Zhang (2006) also suggest 
that the investor overreaction should be more prominent under conditions of 
information uncertainty since investors become more overconfident for firms that are 
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hard to value. Zhang (2006) suggests that under conditions of information uncertainty, 
announcements of good news generate relatively higher abnormal returns while 
announcements of bad news generate relatively lower abnormal returns. This 
hypothesis is motivated by the findings of Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) who 
claim that price continuation is due to a gradual market reaction and Hirshleifer (2001) 
and Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998, 2001). Zhang (2006) combines these 
two findings and suggests the following hypothesis: ―If the slow market response to 
information is due to psychological biases such as overconfidence, these psychological 
biases will be larger and, hence, the price response will be slower when there is more 
ambiguity about the implications of the information for a firm’s value”. In his analysis, 
Zhang (2006) controls only for information uncertainties and does not include private 
information of the investor into the analysis and proposes that further investigation is 
required. 
 
Motivated by the above empirical and theoretical evidence, we examine the market 
reaction following takeover announcements for high and low information uncertainty 
bidding firms when investors possess or do not possess private information. We 
hypothesize that for value ambiguous bidders when investors possess private 
information, they will overreact and generate highly positive abnormal returns 
following the announcement of acquisitions for private targets financed with cash or 
stock and for public targets financed with cash (good news). On the other hand, under 
the same conditions, the market reaction will be negative following announcements of 
takeovers for public targets paid for with stock (bad news). 
 
When uncertainty about the bidder‘s intrinsic value is low and investors are less likely 
to have collected private information, the market reaction should be complete (zero 
abnormal returns). 
 
There is substantial evidence which suggests that the target firm‘s listing status and the 
method of payment used to finance the takeover signal different news about the 
valuation conditions of the bidding firm. One of the hypotheses employed by Travlos 
(1987) to explain the underperformance of acquisitions of public targets paid for with 
stock relative to those paid for with cash is the signalling hypothesis. He suggests that 
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investors perceive a stock acquisition as ―bad‖ news assuming that the bidder is 
overvalued. The opposite signal is received by investors when cash is used as a method 
of payment. Furthermore, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) in an attempt to explain merger 
waves claim that overvalued bidders use their overvalued equity to acquire undervalued 
target firms.  
 
With respect to acquisitions for private firms, Chang (1998) and Draper and Paudyal 
(2006) support that good news is signalled when stock is used as method of financing 
the takeover. The reasoning offered is that the concentrated ownership of the privately 
held firm has more incentive to carefully evaluate the bidder‘s stock. Hence, it is quite 
unlikely that they would accept overvalued equity. Additionally, a cash acquisition for a 
private firm is usually a positive announcement but does not reveal much information 
regarding the bidder‘s intrinsic value. Acquirer are less uncertain about the potential 
synergy gains and are confident enough to offer cash as they are not willing to share 
potential synergy gains with the ownership of the target firm by creating blockholders. 
Therefore, a cash acquisition does not directly reveal information about the bidding 
stock value but can in generally be classified as a relatively positive piece of 
information. 
 
We employ four proxies for information uncertainty, such as: the age, the size, the 
sigma and the trading volume of the bidding firm. Furthermore, to capture whether 
investors are more likely to possess private information or not, we employ stock price 
synchronicity as introduced by Roll (1988) and further developed by Morck et al. 
(2000) and Chen et al. (2007). 
 
The main findings suggest that bidders subject to high information uncertainty generate 
higher abnormal returns relative to low information uncertainty bidding firm‘s 
following the announcement of private acquisitions paid for with cash and equity and 
for public targets paid for with cash, while the opposite effect is observed for public 
acquisitions paid for equity. Furthermore, when we control for private information, high 
information uncertainty deals generate stronger positive abnormal returns for private 
cash and stock and public cash deals, and even more negative returns for public stock 
takeovers. When uncertainty is lower and investors are likely to possess private 
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information (high synchronicity), zero economical and statistical abnormal returns are 
obtained. We also show that the findings of Travlos (1987) and Chang (1998) for the 
method of payment in public and private acquisitions respectively hold only under 
conditions of information uncertainty. In other words, public and private acquisitions 
paid for with cash are fundamentally different from those paid for using equity only 
under conditions of high information uncertainty. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
on investor biases, value ambiguity and stock price synchronicity. Section 3 develops 
the hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the data and methodology used. Section 5 analyses 
the empirical findings beforeSection 6 summarizes the conclusions of the investigation. 
 
5.2 Literature Review 
 
This section reviews the literature on issues related to investor biases, such as 
overconfidence and value ambiguity. The purpose is to identify the association of such 
biases with overreaction and underreaction of financial markets. We also review the 
literature on a recently developed issue which is stock price synchronicity. Stock price 
synchronicity is a measured mainly used in the finance literature to measure stock price 
informativeness and hidden private information in stock prices. 
 
5.2.1 Overconfidence: An Investor Bias 
 
Traditional financial models tend to incorporate assumptions unrealistic of the real 
world. In the recent past, financial researchers have started including factors driven by 
individual behaviour and their cognitive biases within financial modelling. One of the 
most common human bias studies in the finance literature which has been modelled in 
order to help explain a number of financial anomalies is overconfidence.  
 
Odean (1998) claims that investors are overconfident and  markets, in turn, become 
affected by this psychological bias. Some of the key predictions of his model suggest 
that overconfident investors trade more than rational ones. In doing so, they cause the 
market depth to increase but their expected utility remains lower than rational 
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investors‘. In addition, the literature has revealed that a market underreaction can be 
caused by abstract, statistical and relevant information while an overreaction is 
triggered by less relevant information.  
 
In a similar context, Odean (1999) investigates the question of whether excess trading 
activity is in fact driven by investor overconfidence. Using a large database of 
individuals‘ trading activity, excluding deals that could be triggered by a shortage in 
liquidity and tax loss purposes, Odean writes that in some cases, overconfident 
investors are likely to trade even when the trading cost to be incurred is higher than the 
expected profit to be made.  
 
Statman, Thorley and Vorkink (2006) adopt the justification that high trading volume is 
triggered by, and thereby an indicator of, overconfident traders in financial markets. 
Testing for self-attribution bias, the authors show that past returns are highly associated 
with higher future trading volume. The positive relationship between high turnover and 
lagged past returns holds both for market-wide and individual stocks, but is more 
pronounced for market-wide shocks. In other words, during periods of high market 
returns, investors become overconfident and in the following period, high trading 
volume can be observed. This evidence further supports the hypothesis of investor 
overconfidence and indicates that the phenomenon of overconfidence is more 
pronounced for small stocks and within periods when investors‘ portfolios consist of a 
large number of stocks.  
 
Along the same lines, Gervais and Odean (2001) develop a model in which they allow 
investors to become overconfident through ‗learning‘. After a successful trading 
strategy, investor biases increase as investors attribute the successful outcome of the 
strategy to their own abilities. In this way, investors become more overconfident after 
the successful execution of a trading strategy. On the contrary, the opposite effect has 
been found to occur after the failure of an executed trading strategy with 
overconfidence levels diminishing. Gervais and Odean (2001) allow for this dynamic 
change of overconfidence within their model. The overconfidence level changes are 
shown to be more prominent for traders that having been trading for a short period of 
time. More experienced investors adjust their biases in a better way whilst those who 
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have only been trading for a shorter period of time lack the foresight to recognise their 
trading biases. Since successful strategies have been found to make traders 
overconfident, overconfident traders as a result must be wealthy individuals. But it is 
important to note that overconfidence does not itself directly create wealth but rather 
wealth creates overconfidence. In the long-run period, the authors show that investors 
lose both wealth and confidence. The model also proves that overconfident traders lead 
to an increase in both the trading volume and volatility of the market.  
 
Benos (1998) attempts to examine and explain various financial anomalies, such as 
short-term profit taking, wide price movements and aggressive trading. He attributes the 
source of such behaviour to investors‘ biases and irrationality and more specifically to 
overconfidence and persistent errors. Investor biases are mainly triggered in two cases. 
In the first case, investors do not have the relevant information required and they have 
to forecast it whilst in the second scenario, investors have information but the quality is 
poorer and not precise. In the first sceanrio, investors have attributed various 
probabilities to forecast the event outcome and as they are usually driven by their 
biases, they tend to believe that their judgements are better than they actually are. In the 
second case, some investors may realize that the information is not perfect and contains 
noise whilst others might perceive that this information is perfect and as a consequence 
they overestimate their precision. Some of Benos‘ (1998) model predictions are that 
informed overconfident investors‘ trading activity and their associated behaviour results 
in the increase of price volatility, price informativeness, market depth and trading 
volume. Overconfident investors usually overweight the precision of their information 
and therefore place larger orders. This result in higher price volatility and more of 
investors‘ private information is revealed to the market. Additionally,  overconfident 
investors seem to enjoy high profits even higher than those of rational ones. This can be 
attributed to the fact that overconfident investors trade aggressively and benefit from 
the advantage of the ‗first-mover‘. 
 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyan (1998) also agree that several market reactions 
which have been documented in the finance literature cannot be explained by traditional 
models which are based on the assumptions that markets are rational and securities are 
rationally priced as a reaction to publicly available information. The authors report that 
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short-term momentum, long-term reversals and high volatility of asset prices relative to 
fundamentals are some of the market anomalies that traditional models cannot fully 
explain. Furthermore, some corporate decisions witnessed seem to be associated with 
market anomalies. DeBondt and Thaler (1985) support that psychological finance 
models based on psychological evidence could help to explain more deeply individuals‘ 
behaviour. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyan (1998) continue to build a model to 
address these issues. The model itself is based on investors‘ overconfidence and 
variations in overconfidence driven by self-attribution bias. 
 
A large part of the psychology literature
37
 suggests that individuals overestimate their 
own abilities in the decision making process whilst also overestimating the precision of 
the outcome of the decision made. Investors extract information from various sources 
(for example, from financial statements, the press, rumours amongst others). If they 
overestimate their ability to extract this information or they overweight the precision 
and significance of this information, then they will end up overreacting by 
underestimating the forecast error involved in their decision-making.  
 
Overconfidence has also been found to be usually enhanced by the individual‘s personal 
involvement in the information collection process. It has been found that investors will 
be more overconfident with signals or information that they have themselves extracted. 
Daniel et al (1998) define overconfident investors as those which overestimate the 
precision of their private information as opposed to the public signals available. They 
find that overconfident investors who possess private information will overweight this 
information, leading to a stock price overreaction. When an investor trades on his/her 
private information/signals and subsequently receives a public signal which serves to 
confirm the trading strategy being executed then the investor‘s confidence will rise. 
Conversely, if the signal does not confirm the strategy adopted, then the investor‘s 
confidence will remain unaffected or will decline slightly. Therefore, investors start 
trading with unbiased beliefs but as public signals arrive, they serve to boost the 
investor‘s confidence when they confirm the validity of the private information 
collected. This shows that the arrival of new public information can cause overreaction 
                                                 
37
 Griffin and Tversky (1992), Greenwald (1980), Svenson (1981), Cooper et al. 1988, Taylor and Brown 
(1988), Alpert and Raiffa (1982), Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1977), Batchelor and Dua (1992), 
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982) and Yates (1990). 
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due to the existing private signals held. This self-attribution bias can explain short-run 
momentum and long-run reversals in stock prices. One of the advantages of this model 
developed by Daniel et al. (1998)  when compared to previous behavioural models
38
 is 
that it assumes that investors get overconfident about private signals and therefore 
allows for both over- and under-reaction effects. Furthermore, the authors claim that 
since the model is mainly based on private information and subsequent under or 
overreaction, its predictive power will be more evident for firms with higher 
information uncertainty.  
 
Similarly, Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyan (2001) develop a model in which 
asset prices reflect both covariance risk and investors misvaluation. More specifically, 
they assume that investors use their private information incorrectly and therefore, in 
equilibrium securities are mispriced. As a consequence, misvaluation ratios can be used 
to explain or predict future returns. Evidence suggests that earnings/price or 
book/market ratios can predict future returns. However, a drawback of these ratios is 
that they can also be interpreted a risk measures aside from their use as proxies of 
misvaluation. The model of Daniel et al. (2001) fills this gap in the finance psychology 
literature by showing that both risk and misvaluation measures jointly can predict the 
cross-section of stock returns. One of the main predictions of the model constructed is 
that misvaluation ratio proxies could better predict risk-adjusted returns for firms that 
are hard to value. Finally, Hirshleifer (2001) discusses the importance of investor 
psychology being incorporated in asset pricing models to predict future returns. 
Psychological literature suggests that overconfident people tend to believe that their 
knowledge and predictions, especially about things that they are considered specialists 
of, are more accurate than they really are. Overconfidence seems to be enhanced when 
feedback about the individual‘s actions or decisions is inconclusive (Einhorn (1980), 
Griffin and Tversky (1992). Hence, Hirshleifer (2001) suggests that psychological 
biases grow both under conditions of greater uncertainty and in the absence of accurate 
feedback about fundamentals. Evidence on information uncertainty and ambiguity are 
further discussed later in this section. 
 
                                                 
38
 Kyle and Wang (1997), Odean (1998) and Wang (1998) define overconfidence as overestimation of 
information precision regardless of whether the information is private or public. 
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Overreaction/Underreaction 
Two of the most important and common observed irregularities discussed in the 
behavioural finance literature relates to the overreaction and underreaction of the 
market and its participants to news. Underreaction suggests that information and news 
received by the market are slowly incorporated into stock prices. As a result, we witness 
high autocorrelation throughout the period until all news is fully incorporated in the 
stock prices. On the other hand, overreaction suggests that investors overweight their 
information and resultantly overreact to news received which consequentially drives 
prices away from fundamentals. The outcome of both biases is that empirically, we 
observe a long term reversal and subsequent correction to the effects originally exerted 
upon stock prices. On this basis, rational investors can take advantage of these two 
market ‗phenomena‘ and obtain risk-free profits. The concept of risk-free profit 
conflicts with the predictions of the efficient market hypothesis. Fama and French 
(1996) suggest that their 3-factor model can be exerted to capture overreaction but fails 
to account for underreaction. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) state that this is a 
challenge for behavioural finance modelling and in their work, they attempt to explain 
investors‘ beliefs which leads to such phenomena. Their model is concerned upon 
attempts to model investors behaviour and beliefs about future earnings. The work itself 
is mainly motivated by the behavioural evidence presented by Griffin and Tversky 
(1992). Griffin and Tversky (1992) claim that investors seem to overweight information 
that they are associated with while they attribute lower weight to information which has 
realistic statistical probabilities. In other words, underreaction is caused by low strength 
and high statistical weight news while overreaction can be attributed to high strength 
and low statistical weight announcements. Various historical financial anomalies can be 
explained by Barberis et al.‘s (1998) model. For instance, the 1987 crash caused a great 
decline to stock prices and increased dramatically the volatility of the stock market. 
Investors responded with an overreaction to the news and started selling their stocks 
despite the fact their decisions were not based on news regarding the companies‘ 
fundamental values. Hence, the crash can be described as a high strength, low weight 
event, and according to the model predictions, it caused overreaction. Klibanoff et al. 
(1998) present an example of the closed-end country funds which can also be explained 
by Barberis et al.‘s (1998) model. There is a price overreaction observed to stocks when 
a fund that includes these stocks in their portfolios is presented in the front pages of the 
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press of the respective country. The weight of the news is constant but the strength of 
the news climbs highly. Consequently, an overreaction is observed. The model also 
explains experimental evidence which suggests that investor decisions fail under 
uncertainty. However, the model does not explain why arbitrage is not able to correct 
this mispricing. A possible explanation of why arbitrage trading is limited could be due 
to the fact investors biases are quite unpredictable especially in the short-run forcing 
prices to move even further away from fundamentals. This unpredictability in investor 
sentiment causes extra risk for arbitrageurs and leaves inefficiencies within the market 
place. 
 
Conclusively, the above discussion suggests that the human bias of overconfidence is 
an important factor that can explain a number of anomalies observed in financial 
markets. Most of the behavioural models successfully manage to provide further 
explanations of the way that investor overconfidence affects financial markets. The root 
of the problem is that overconfident traders overweight their private information while 
they underreact to public signals. 
 
5.2.2 Value Ambiguity 
 
Evidence suggests that investor biases are enhanced under conditions of information 
uncertainties or ambiguity. More specifically, Hirshleifer (2001) posits that 
psychological biases grow under conditions of great uncertainty and in the absence of 
accurate feedback about fundamentals while Daniel et al. (1998) claim that the 
predictive power of their model will be more evident for firms with higher information 
uncertainty. This section reviews the literature on value ambiguity. 
 
Financial participants are bombarded with a great number of news, information and 
signals. However, it is hard for them to distinguish which of the signals are precise and 
reliable and which are not. Becker and Browson (1964) discuss Ellberg‘s paradox 
which suggests that investors violate the expected utility theory due to aversion to 
ambiguity. They suggest that individuals are usually ambiguity-averse and are willing 
to pay a small amount if they can resultantly avoid ambiguity. Similarly, Epstein and 
Schneider (2008) analyse and model investors‘ behaviour when they find it hard to 
Chapter 5: Information Uncertainty, Private Information and Bidder Cains 
258 
 
judge the quality of the signal. In such cases, investors treat the signal as ambiguous. 
They do not act as Bayesian investors but attribute various probabilities for possible 
outcomes. 
 
Two main outcomes are observed related to ambiguous signals. Firstly, investors react 
asymmetrically to ambiguous signals. That means that investors react more strongly to 
bad news than to good news. As worst case scenario, investors perceive good 
ambiguous news as unreliable while bad ambiguous news as reliable. Secondly, 
investors will be negatively preoccupied on the anticipation of an ambiguous signal. 
Investors require extra returns to bear the expected low quality information. At some 
point, Epstein and Schneider (2008) note that event study conclusions should be treated 
with caution. A possible negative market reaction does not necessarily imply that 
investors disapprove fundamentals but it could be due to disapproval to ambiguous 
information. Furthermore, idiosyncratic volatility of fundamentals seems to be highly 
associated with ambiguity and plays a significant role in investors‘ overreaction. When 
fundamental volatility is high, investors require an even higher compensation when 
confronted with ambiguous signals. On the other hand, when volatility of fundamentals 
is low, there is a lower impact of whether information quality is high or low. The 
difference between risk and ambiguity premia is that the main concern of ambiguous 
averse investors is uncertainty. Highly ambiguous assets are believed to have lower 
mean payoff. 
 
Abnormal returns seem to exhibit skewness because of the fact that ambiguity is driven 
by the asymmetric response to various signals of ambiguous quality. More specifically, 
investors seem to overreact to bad intangible signals while they underreact to bad 
tangible signals. For instance, a tangible signal could be considered to be past dividends 
payments which are countable, while an intangible signal could relate to the 
announcement of future dividends. Overreaction and underreaction occurs because 
investors consider ambiguity only about intangible but not tangible signals. The 
subsequent long-run price correction is driven by the arrival of tangible information 
which corrects the market overreaction due to the intangible news received. 
 
Chapter 5: Information Uncertainty, Private Information and Bidder Cains 
259 
 
Zengjing and Epstein (2002) state that traditional models used to consider only risk as a 
main factor to explain any observed excess abnormal returns. They create a model 
which takes into consideration ambiguous-averse investors, but excludes those deemed 
to be risk averse. They prove that expected returns are a function of risk and ambiguity 
averse premia. Additionally, uncertainty is equally important component of risk to 
consider for investment decisions. Furthermore, Epstein and Schneider (2007) consider 
both risk and ambiguity in the learning process. Traditional models assume that 
participants allocate specific probabilities to all possibly uncertain events. That means 
that probabilities are fixed and given and are not influenced by behaviour biases such as 
confidence levels. In other words, there is so separation between known and unknown 
probabilities. However, in reality, individuals treat ambiguous events differently from 
risky events. Because of this, the model developed by Epstein and Schneider (2007) 
allows participants to change their prior beliefs as they learn. They compare changes in 
biases under uncertainty to changes in risk under learning. 
 
Veronesi (2000) investigates uncertainty and investors‘ risk preferences to explain 
various phenomena and anomalies in the finance world. The model assumes that the 
drift of fundamentals follows a process with unobservable regime shifts which is 
formalized by a two-stage Markov model. Investors based on past experience, set their 
probabilities for each stage. The model predicts that investors will react more rapidly to 
news under conditions of high uncertainty, which causes an increase in volatility. 
Furthermore, in good periods, investors tend to desire a higher discount over expected 
future dividends following bad news. This occurs in order to compensate investors for 
undertaking the higher risk involved as a consequence of higher uncertainty. As a 
result, the price declines more than the expected decline of expected future dividends. 
In the same way, in bad times, good news makes the expected future dividends increase 
as well as increasing the discount factor. However, although the price increases, it does 
so less than the increase observed in expected dividends. In short, the model shows that 
the sensitivity of price changes is higher during good times than bad. On the contrary, 
the volatility of returns is lower in good times and it increases more during bad times. 
The increase is even higher under conditions of uncertainty. 
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5.2.3 Information Uncertainty and Market Overreaction/ 
Underreaction 
 
Zhang (2006) is motivated by two strands of the behavioural finance literature. Firstly, 
the short-term stock price continuation is attributed to investor behavioural biases, such 
as the discussed overconfidence to new information as well as a sluggish response of 
the market to new information (Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996)
39
). Secondly, 
behavioural models suggest that psychological biases are enhanced under conditions of 
information uncertainty. Zhang (2006) combines these two ideas and suggests that if 
psychological biases like overconfidence are the reason for the slow market response to 
new information, then they will be more prominent, whilst the market response will be 
slower, under conditions of high information uncertainty regarding a firm‘s value. 
Zhang (2006) defines information uncertainty as ambiguity regarding new information 
relating to the firm‘s value. This ambiguity is derived from two sources - volatility of 
the underlying fundamentals and a shortage of information about the firm. 
 
Zhang (2006) examines two price anomalies - post-analyst forecast revision and price 
momentum. He chooses these two anomalies because they can be observed regularly, 
whilst they also can be easily classified as good and bad news. In addition, they bring 
new public information to the market. Zhang (2006) classifies positive forecast 
revisions and past winners as good news and negative revisions or past losers as bad 
news. 
 
To capture information uncertainty, Zhang (2006) uses six proxies, all of which provide 
similar results. These are firm size, firm age, analyst coverage, dispersion in analyst 
forecasts, return volatility and cash flow volatility. The main findings show that under 
conditions of information uncertainty, higher stock returns are generated after the 
                                                 
39
 Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) attempt to examine the sources of predictability of future 
returns based on past returns and suggest that future return drifts in stock returns are highly predicted by 
past returns and earnings surprises. Earning announcements are a continuous source of information for 
the firm. Their findings suggest that a great part of the momentum effect can be explained by earnings 
announcement releases. Results reveal that almost half of the momentum effect can be observed around 
earnings announcements. Generally, if the market responds positively or negatively to earnings surprises, 
then the market will keep moving in the same direction over the next two subsequent announcements. 
Apart from earning announcements, the slow response of analysts seems to be related to the momentum 
effect. Analysts are relatively slow in revising and revealing information especially for firms that do not 
perform very well. Conclusively, they suggest that the momentum effect can be associated to the slow 
and sluggish market‘s reaction to new information. 
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announcement of good news and lower stock returns are generated following the 
announcement of bad news. These findings imply that under uncertainty, the market 
responds slowly to the new information. On the other hand, under low information 
uncertainty conditions, the market is relatively complete and there is low market 
reaction and therefore little stock return predictability based on new information. 
 
Zhang (2006) claims that his main finding is primarily related to the behavioural model 
developed by Daniel et al. (1998, 2001). In short, Daniel et al. (1998) assume in their 
model that investors are overconfident about their private information and due to this 
psychological bias, they overreact to private information. In addition, the authors 
suggest that the psychological bias of overconfidence increases under conditions of 
information uncertainty when the firm‘s value is difficult to predict. The arguments 
developed in the model of Daniel et al. (1998, 2001) suggests that information 
uncertainty is associated with empirical work which suggests that higher (lower) stock 
returns are obtained following good (bad) news. However, Zhang (2006) does not 
incorporate a measure to capture for investor private information and overconfidence. 
Behavioural models which claim that investors give more importance to older 
information relative to newer due to anchoring or conservatism biases whilst they 
overweigh their prior information even more under uncertainty could explain his 
results. Size is one of the proxies used to capture information uncertainty. This study 
shows that size behaves more like a proxy for information uncertainty than as a risk 
factor. 
 
5.2.4 Stock Price Synchronicity 
 
5.2.4.1 Informative Stock Prices and Stock Price Synchronicity 
 
The behavioural finance models have focused on the role of private information and the 
subsequent impact on investors‘ cognitive biases and their following investment 
decisions. This section reviews the literature on stock price synchronicity. In short, this 
work defines  the concept of synchronicity as the co-movements of stock price returns 
with the market return. Furthermore, in this section, we analyse in depth what 
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synchronicity measures capture, how they are measured and how synchronicity has 
been used in the literature. 
 
One of the roles of financial markets is to facilitate the production and accumulation of 
information into stock prices. This happens through the trading activities of speculators 
on stock prices. Financial economists support the notion that stock returns incorporate 
firm-specific and market-wide information. Furthermore, Roll (1988) claims that stock 
prices move together depending on the amount of firm-specific or market-wide 
information capitalized in the stock prices. Roll (1988) also explains that stock price 
movements are influenced by market-wide economic shocks, by industry shocks and by 
news specific to the firm. He suggests that a low R
2
 value should be observed in periods 
of no public news about the firm, indicating that the price movement is triggered by 
private information. 
 
Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007) adopt synchronicity as a measure of stock price 
informativeness and show that there is a strong positive relationship between the 
amount of private information within stock prices and the sensitivity of corporate 
investment to stock prices. They suggest that managers learn from the private 
information incorporated in stock prices and take advantage of this information within 
their corporate investment decisions. More specifically, they suggest that private 
information is incorporated in stock prices through speculators trading activity. 
Theoretical evidence (Dow and Gorton (1997), Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999)) 
suggests that managers can extract useful information hidden in stock prices. Stock 
prices accumulate a lot of information from various trading participants in the market 
who do not have any other way of communicating with the firm apart from via the 
trading process. Consequently, stock prices may incorporate information that managers 
do not have. It is more likely that this type of information is related to issues like the 
demand for the firm‘s product or strategic issues, rather than information relating to 
technological issues. When managers attempt to maximize their firm‘s expected value, 
they will use all the possible available information they have at their disposal. 
Therefore, managers can be influenced by this type of information incorporated in stock 
prices and it will, in turn, affect their investment decisions. Hence, the investment 
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decision will be highly influenced by stock prices when private information is hidden 
within them. 
 
A crucial challenge is the way that this private information can be empirically captured. 
Different stocks have different levels of private information incorporated within them 
due to the various costs involved in the acquisition and production of such information 
(Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)). One of the measures frequently used is stock price 
synchronicity. As mentioned earlier, Roll (1988) shows that the measure of stock price 
nonsynchronicty is not correlated with public information and thereby serves as a good 
approach to capture private information. In Roll‘s own words, he claims ‗‗the financial 
press misses a great deal of relevant information generated privately‘‘ (Roll, 1988, page 
564). 
 
Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007) main findings suggest a positive relationship between 
the measures for private information and the sensitivity of investment to price which 
indicates that the high level of private information incorporated in stock prices provide 
managers with new information which is used in the manager‘s investment decisions. 
The authors clarify two things regarding their conclusions. Firstly, the private 
information that is new to the managers is not the only new information received. Some 
public information may also be new to them. However, the amount of private 
information transmitted through speculators‘ trading activity increases the amount of 
new information available to the managers thereby increasing the probability of 
managers relying more on a higher amount of new information. Secondly, their results 
show that a high amount of private information does not imply that stock prices are 
close to fundamentals. The variation between stock price and fundamental value 
depends on the amount of public information as well. The incorporation of private 
information is a timely procedure and that may imply that stock prices with more 
private than public information might be further away from fundamentals. Finally, they 
clarify their finding that financial analysts do not have any effect on managers‘ 
investment decisions by explaining that since managers already know the information 
produced by analysts, the latter adds no extra information value to their decisions. 
Supporting this explanation, Easley, O‘Hara and Paperman (1998) find that analysts 
add noise to stock prices and reduce the amount of private information within them. 
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The concept itself of stock price synchronicity was initially introduced by Roll (1988) 
and then further developed by Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000). Roll (1988) measures 
synchronicity as the R
2
 of the following linear regression: 
 
rit = ai + birmt + eit 
 
Where rit is the rerun of stock i at week t, and rmt is the market index return at week t. A 
high R
2
 in the above regression shows high stock price synchronicity. R
2
 is bounded 
within the interval [0,1]. To avoid this limitation, Morck et al. (2000) employ a standard 
econometric approach apply logistic transformations to that variable: 
2
2
log( )
1
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Using this measure, Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) find that stock prices move 
asynchronously in countries with high Gross Domestic Product (GDP) while stock 
prices tend to move together in less developed economies. They examine three possible 
reasons for this result. Their first explanation is that in less developed countries, 
fundamentals might be more closely correlated to one another resulting in a more 
synchronous manner in the stock price movement. Moreover, in these countries, private 
property rights are less protected. Political actions and rumours can cause market-wide 
stock price changes. The lack of poor property protection acts as a deterrent for risk 
arbitrager who could insert more information to the market and counter the effect of 
political actions and rumours. De Long et al. (1989, 1990) show that less informed 
trading leads to more noise trading resulting in an increase in stock price synchronicity. 
Finally, Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) hypothesize that their result could be because in 
countries with low levels of investor protection relative to corporate insiders, results in 
less informed trading leading in higher co-movement in stock prices. 
 
Support is provided only for the last two hypotheses upon further examination. Li, 
Morck, Yang and Yeung (2004) find similar evidence with Morck et al. (2000) relating 
to a number of emerging markets. More specifically, they show that higher firm-
specific variation is associated with greater market capital openness and good 
government integrity. 
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Along the same lines, Durnev, Morck, Yeung and Zarowin (2003) investigate whether 
firm-specific returns variation is associated with more or less informed stock prices. 
Stock price changes are the main communication tool of stock markets used in order to 
signal actions for more efficient investment decisions and the reallocation of resources. 
In other words, if stock prices were fully informative and therefore closer to 
fundamentals, capital would be more correctly priced and managers could take more 
efficient investment decisions as they could get better feedback from stock price 
changes.  
 
Information can force prices closer to fundamentals through a revaluation process 
following the announcement of public news and through the incorporation of private 
information which is collected and possessed by arbitragers. Durnev, Morck, Yeung 
and Zarowin (2003) also adopt Roll‘s (1988) R2 approach to study stock price 
informativeness. They find a positive relationship between current returns and future 
earnings for firms with low price synchronicity (high price informativeness). This 
finding suggests that information about future earnings is currently incorporated in 
stock prices. Their overall conclusion suggests that high stock price variation is linked 
with higher price informativeness. 
 
Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004) also attempt to examine whether there is any 
relationship between capital investment decisions and stock price informativeness and 
whether informative stock prices indeed lead to more efficient decisions. To measure 
investment efficiency, they employ the Tobin‘s q ratio. For price informativeness, 
Durnev et al. (2004) choose to use stock price return variation. Their empirical findings 
also support the notion that return variation is triggered by the trading of investors who 
possess private information. They adopt the reasoning of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) 
who claim that a lower cost of private information acquisition leads to more informative 
stock prices. Additionally, they are in favour of the findings supported by previous 
literature (Roll (1988), Morck et al. (2000), Durnev et al. (2001), Bushman et al. 
(2004)) which associate high stock return variation with trading on private information. 
Their main findings support that stock return variation is mainly due to stock price 
private information rather than frenzy noise and is more accurately reflected in stock 
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prices whilst their results also show that more informative stock prices enhance more 
efficient corporate investments. 
 
Lin and Myers (2006) try to explain the findings of Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000), 
which support that R
2
 is higher in countries with less developed financial systems and 
poor corporate governance. They suggest that variations in investor‘s property rights 
could explain the relationship between R
2
 and financial development. 
 
However, Jin and Myers (2000) claim that investors rights do not affect R
2
 when there 
is complete transparency in the firm. They suggest that the lack of transparency 
between insiders (managers) and outsiders (investors) could explain this phenomenon. 
Opaqueness of the firm can be both positive and negative. In other words, managers can 
take advantage of the firm‘s liquidity and cash flows in good periods but on the other 
hand they have to bear the downside risk involved of not revealing all information to 
outsiders. Their findings suggest a negative relationship between R
2
 and various 
measures of opaqueness. Additionally, they also show that high R
2
 firms are more 
likely to experience high sudden negative abnormal returns. 
 
Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004) and Wurgler (2000) also discuss the issue of 
capital allocation in financial markets relative to stock price informativeness. Bushman, 
Piotroski and Smith (2004) argue that the level of information available to outside 
investors is of great importance in the success and efficiency of capital allocation within 
an economy. Financial theories claim that the main importance lies in the fact that 
information availability reduces information and transaction costs. Despite this fact, 
they claim that there is a gap in the literature over why there is such variation in 
information environments around the world. They create a model that incorporates 
information-systems as a part of corporate transparency. They find that the quality of 
information systems positively contribute to financial transparency. After accounting 
for financial and government transparency, they conclude that government transparency 
is associated with a country‘s legal regime while financial transparency can be linked to 
its political economy. 
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In a related study, Wurgler (2000) argues that signals emanating from financial markets 
are of great importance in the decision of capital allocation and investment 
opportunities, especially if these signals include a great amount of firm-specific 
information. His findings suggest that developed financial markets seem to improve and 
increase investment in growing industries while the opposite occurs in declining 
industries. Wurgler (2000) also show a positive relationship between firm-specific 
information in domestic stock returns and capital allocation efficiency. 
 
Another study which employs stock price synchronicity as a measure of price 
informativeness is that of Fernades and Ferreira (2008). They examine the effect of the 
stock price informativeness of non-US companies cross-listing in the US market. They 
attempt to shed light on the relationship between price informativeness and the impact 
of cross-listing. They use stock price synchronicity in order to capture firm specific 
information in stock prices. Their findings suggest that stock price informativeness 
increases for firms in developed countries while it decreases for firms within emerging 
markets. The problem with firms in emerging markets can be attributed to the fact that 
more analysts start following these firms after they have been cross-listed in the US 
market. Financial analysts usually are associated more with the gathering of industry 
and market wide information rather than firm specific information. 
 
Veldkamp (2006) develops a model based on investors‘ information choices in order to 
explain stock price co-movements. The acquisition of information is costly depending 
on the type of information acquired and the type of asset considered. Following the 
laws of demand and supply, information which exhibits high demand is less expensive 
than low-demand information. Rational investors buy information for a small group of 
assets and most of them choose to buy low cost information, which is the same 
information which the rest of the investor group buys, because they all prefer low-costs. 
Therefore, this common information about a specific group of assets can also affect the 
prices of the remaining assets leading to a co-movement among assets in the markets. 
Veldkamp (2006) shows that stock price co-movement can be driven by rational 
investors and information markets. Investors are more willing to take advantage of 
cheap, publicly available information, such as industry or market specific information, 
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leading to greater stock price co-movement and consequently less informative stock 
prices. 
 
Haggard, Martin and Pereira (2008) examine the effect of voluntary disclosure policy 
within Veldkamp‘s (2006) and Jin and Myers‘s (2006) models. Following Veldkamp‘s 
(2006) model, they suggest that if firms decide to voluntarily disclose private 
information publicly, then it would not be costly for investors to acquire such 
information. Hence, investors will rely more on firm-specific information rather than 
market or industry-wide information leading to an increase in price informativeness. 
According to Jin and Myers‘s (2006) risk-based model, opaqueness of the firm due to 
the lack of private firm-specific information between insiders and outsiders can lead to 
large negative returns. Hence, voluntary disclosure of firm-specific information will 
increase stock price informativeness leading to less co-movement and fewer market 
crashes. Haggard, Martin and Pereira (2008), using stock price synchronicity as a 
measure of stock informativeness, find support for the two theories mentioned above 
and show that higher voluntary disclosure leads to more informative stock prices.  
 
Another approach that discusses the role of private information, as measured by stock 
price synchronicity, is presented by Ferreira, Ferreira and Raposo (2008). They examine 
the relationship between price informativeness and corporate boards. One of the 
questions they attempt to answer is whether stock price informativeness and the role of 
corporate boards act as substitutes or complements for one another. They provide two 
explanations which could justify whether a relationship between price informativeness 
and the monitoring role of the board should exist. Firstly, the more private information 
is available, the more efficient the market‘s monitoring role is. Hence managers avoid 
taking value destroying projects for their firms in fear of becoming easier takeover 
targets. With this in mind, managers fear for their own job security and this acts as a 
deterrent for value-destroying corporate activity. Secondly, besides this fact, high stock 
price informativeness also enables managers to have more information at their disposal 
and in turn makes the monitoring role more efficient. On one hand, high price 
informativeness increases monitoring efficiency but on the other hand the need for 
board independence declines. Therefore, it is ambiguous over whether or not the 
information acquisition complements or substitutes monitoring. The authors find a 
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positive relationship between stock price informativeness and members of the boards 
being absent while they report a negative relationship between firm-specific 
information and the number of meetings taking place as well as board independence. 
This evidence clearly indicates that board independence and firm-specific information 
are substitutes for one another. 
 
5.2.4.2 Market Participants and Stock Price Synchronicity 
 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) examine the degree to which trading activities affect 
stock price informativeness. Stock prices include firm-specific, industry-specific and 
market-wide information. They suggest that some trading groups in the market, such as 
insiders, institutional investors and financial analysts, through their trading process are 
able to change the levels of firm, industry and market-wide information impounded in 
stock prices as measured with stock return synchronicity. Each different party has a 
different relationship and affects differently the three types of information included in 
the stock prices. 
 
Insiders are those parties which possess the most quality information about the firm. 
They know the risk and opportunities involved in the operations of the firm and 
therefore there should be a direct link between insiders‘ trading and flow of firm-
specific information into the stock price, eventually leading to more informative stock 
prices and a reduction in stock price synchronicity. 
 
Institutional investors can affect the flow of information to stock prices according to 
their role regarding the firm. If they have a large stake in the firm, then they might have 
a significant amount of private information and will have a stronger motive to ensure 
better monitoring of the firm and its managers. While large trades may be driven by the 
private information possessed by the institutional investor, small trading may happen 
due to liquidation problems or re-balancing issues. Hence, the effect on stock price 
synchronicity is not as clear as for insiders. 
 
Finally, the literature agrees that financial analysts usually gather information regarding 
the industry and the market and convey this information through firm-specific earnings 
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forecasts. Therefore, findings suggest that stock price synchronicity increases in 
response to analysts‘ trading activities. Conclusively, the role of analysts in the price 
formation process is to collect and convey firm-specific information and identify 
common industry-specific information that all firms in the industry share. Overall, 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) also suggest that stock price synchronicity is a good 
measure to use in order to capture firm and market-specific information. 
 
Similarly, Chan and Hameed (2006) examine the effect of a security analyst on stock 
price informativeness in emerging markets. In emerging markets, there is a lack of 
disclosure of firm-specific information and informed trading is discouraged for a 
number of reasons. The regulatory systems are weak and as a result information 
disclosure is not obligatory. Within these markets, corporate transparency is weak and 
many companies are predominantly family-owned. Therefore, the role of the security 
analyst during the process of information conveyance in these markets is ambiguous. 
As noted earlier by investigations conducted by Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000), 
emerging markets suffer from weak property rights protection. Because of this, 
investors demand for analysts‘ contributions into the dissemination process of private 
firm-specific information may be higher. On the other hand, due to the difficulty in 
collecting such information in emerging markets, the type of information produced by 
analysts may be more of a macroeconomic quality level. Chan and Hameed (2006) 
address this issue examining the role of analysts and use stock return synchronicity to 
capture the amount of firm-specific information included in stock prices. Their findings 
suggest that more analyst coverage leads to higher stock return synchronicity which is 
consistent with Piotroski and Roulstone (2004). Additionally, while examining the lead-
lag relationship of low and high following firms and stock returns, they find that high 
analyst-following portfolios lead returns of low analyst-following portfolios. This 
finding gives support to the fact that market-wide information is incorporated faster in 
the stock prices of firms which are followed by many analysts. Conclusively, Chan and 
Hameed (2006) suggest that security analyst information is most relevant to the market-
wide component of stock price synchronicity. Along the same lines, Easley, O‘Hara and 
Paperman (1998), Roulstone (2003) and Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) also show that 
analyst coverage itself is not a good proxy for firm-specific information in stock prices 
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since financial analysts are more closely related to industry and market specific 
information, deteriorating stock price informativeness. 
 
5.3 Hypotheses Development 
 
The main hypotheses of this chapter are based on the idea that acquisition 
announcement reflect reaction to news following the announcement of various 
takeovers is a market overreaction. More specifically, under conditions of information 
uncertainty, investors are likely to overweight their private information and overreact to 
takeover announcements. 
 
It has been widely documented in the corporate finance literature that the target firm‘s 
listing status plays a significant role in explaining short-term bidder gains from takeover 
deals.  More specifically, takeovers for public target firms generate negative or zero 
abnormal returns (Jensen and Ruback (1983), Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988), Jarrell 
and Poulsen (1989), Higson and Elliot (1998)). On the other hand, takeovers for 
privately-held targets generate positive and significant gains for the bidding firm‘s 
shareholders (Hansen and Lott (1996), Chang (1998), Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller 
(2002), Draper and Paudyal (2006)). It has also been observed that the picture of the 
short-term bidder gains changes when taking into consideration the method of payment 
along with the target firm‘s status. Travlos (1987) shows that takeovers for public 
targets suffer losses when stock is employed as a means of financing the acquisition. 
When cash is used to finance the acquisition, bidders obtain insignificant gains.  
 
The difference in bidder gains between the two methods of payment can be explained 
by the signaling hypothesis which suggests that bidders which use stock to finance their 
acquisitions are more likely to be overvalued. Chang (1998) proposes that the method 
of payment used to acquire a potential target firm has the opposite effect for 
acquisitions for private targets. Stock acquisitions for private targets firm experience the 
most positive significant returns while cash deals generate lower positive and 
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insignificant gains. The Limited Competition, the Monitoring and the Information 
Hypothesis can explain this difference
40
.  
 
With the review of the existing literature complete, this chapter proposes a behavioral 
approach based on investor biases to explain short-term market reaction following 
takeover announcement deals. The hypotheses tested in this work will now be 
developed. 
 
5.3.1 Investor Biases and Information Uncertainty 
 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyan (1998) build a model based on investor 
behaviour biases such as overconfidence and self-attribution bias. They suggest that 
investors, who are involved in extracting information from various sources, end up 
overestimating the precision of such information. Investors become even more 
overconfident about this information, overweight it and subsequently overreact. Daniel 
et al. (1998, 2001) claim that the predictability of a future return should be higher under 
conditions of information uncertainty. The reasoning is that individuals become even 
more overconfident under such conditions. Chan et al. (1996) suggest that the price 
continuation observed in some cases is because of a gradual market response to 
information. Motivated by the findings of Chan at al. (1996) and Daniel at al. (1998, 
2001), Zhang (2006) suggests that high information uncertainty should generate higher 
(lower) expected abnormal returns following good (bad) news relative to conditions of 
low information uncertainty. 
  
We empirically test the above hypothesis in a Mergers and Acquisitions framework. 
The Myers and Majluf (1984) theory suggests that managers who know that their firm‘s 
stock price is undervalued will prefer to finance a potential acquisition with cash while 
when they know that their stock price is overvalued, they will prefer stock. The 
signalling hypothesis, as proposed in Travlos (1987), suggests that investors will 
perceive an announcement of an equity offer for a public target as bad news since they 
interpret that bidding firm is overvalued. On the other hand, cash offers are perceived as 
good news about the acquiring firm‘s intrinsic value. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) 
                                                 
40
 These hypotheses will be further analyzed in more depth later in this section 
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propose a model in order to explain merger waves. They suggest that bidding firms 
whose stock is overvalued proceed to takeover using equity as a method of payment. 
Consequently, acquisitions of public targets paid for with stock can be classified as bad 
news regarding the bidding firm‘s true value while those paid for with cash can be 
classified as good news. 
 
On the other hand, Chang (1998) and Draper and Paudyal (2006) suggest the opposite 
effect for stock offers for acquisitions for private targets. Investors interpret a stock 
acquisition for a private target as good news, since the small number of owners of the 
private firm has stronger incentive to carefully examine the true value of the bidders 
stock. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the owner of the privately held firm will 
accept stock if it is overvalued. Due to the signalling effect, private stock acquisitions 
can be classified as good news that the bidder stock price is not overvalued. 
 
A cash acquisition for a private firm is usually a positive announcement but does not 
reveal much information about the bidder‘s intrinsic value. The acquirer is less 
uncertain about the potential synergy gains and is confident enough to offer cash. It 
infers loosely that the bidder is confident as they do not issue equity in order to avoid 
sharing potential synergy gains with the ownership of the target firm, as would be the 
case using equity which would result in the creation of blockholders. Therefore, a cash 
acquisition does not directly reveal information about the bidder‘s stock value but can 
in general be classified as a relative positive piece of information. 
 
Following the above discussion, we form the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Bidding firms subject to high information uncertainty should generate higher 
abnormal returns for acquisitions for private targets paid for with cash or equity and 
acquisitions for public targets paid for with cash compared to bidding firms who are 
subject to low information uncertainty. On the contrary, bidding firms subject to high 
information uncertainty should generate lower abnormal returns for acquisitions for 
public targets paid for with equity compared to bidding firms who are subject to low 
information uncertainty. 
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The differences in the method of payments as proposed by the literature are likely to be 
driven by the market overreaction for bidders for which there is high information 
uncertainty. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Cash acquisitions should be fundamentally different from stock acquisitions for 
private or public targets only under conditions of high information uncertainty. Cash 
acquisitions should not be fundamentally different from stock acquisitions for private 
or public targets under conditions of low information uncertainty. 
 
5.3.2 Information Uncertainty and Private Information 
 
In the literature which discusses investor biases (Daniel et al. 1998, 2001), much 
emphasis is given to private information. Daniel et al. (1998) claim that investors are 
overconfident and overweight the precision of their private information but do not do so 
for public signals. Zhang (2006) reports that he does not incorporate measures of 
private information and recommends that further research is required. This work 
extends the previous literature and moves a step ahead by employing private 
information in the empirical analysis. 
 
Stock price synchronicity (R
2
), introduced by Roll (1998) as measure of private 
information, is employed in this work. Roll (1988) suggests that stock price changes are 
due to market-wide, industry and firm-specific information. A low R
2
 indicates that the 
price changes are triggered by private information. This measure has been widely used 
in the literature to test or capture private information. Specifically, Chen, Goldstein and 
Jiang (2007) employ stock price synchronicity to measure the level of private 
information incorporated into stock prices in order to examine whether managers learn 
from the market and to investigate whether their decisions are consequently influenced 
from this information, resulting in an  impact on the investments undertaken. A great 
number of studies also employ synchronicity as a measure of private information, such 
as Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000), Li, Morck, Yang and Yeung (2004), Durnev, Morck, 
Yeung and Zarowin (2003), Fernandes and Ferreira (2008, 2009), Jin and Myers 
(2000), Haggard, Martin and Pereira (2008), as documented earlier in the literature 
review. 
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With this in mind, the following two hypotheses are also formed: 
 
H3: Under conditions of high information uncertainty, low synchronicity bidding 
firms for acquisitions of private targets paid for with cash or equity, as well as 
acquisitions for public targets paid for with cash, will generate the highest positive 
abnormal returns while acquisitions for public targets paid for with equity will 
generate the lowest negative abnormal returns. 
 
H4: There will be no market reaction following any type of acquisition (private cash, 
private stock, public cash or public stock) announced by high synchronicity bidding 
firms under conditions of low information uncertainty. 
 
5.4 Data and Methodology 
 
5.4.1 Data 
 
5.4.1.1 The Sample 
 
The sample consists of takeover announcement deals undertaken by UK bidding firms 
for the period between 01/01/1985 and 31/08/2009. The announcements were collected 
by Thomson One Banker. To be included in our final sample, the deals need to meet the 
following criteria: 
o The acquirer is a U.K. firm publicly traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
with five days of return data available around the announcement date of the 
takeover as well as available data for one to three years returns from the 
DataStream database. 
o The target company is either a listed or unlisted company and can be a domestic 
or a foreign company. 
o The acquiring firm purchases at least 50% of the target‘s shares. 
o The deal value is ₤1 million or more. 
o The deal value represents at least 1% of the market value of the acquirer. 
o Multiple deals announced within a 5 day period are excluded. 
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o Financial and utility firms, for both bidders and targets, are excluded from the 
sample (Fuller, Netter and Stegemoeller (2002)). 
 
After excluding deals that do not meet these criteria, our sample comprises of 7019 
deals. 
 
5.4.1.2 Sample Characteristics 
 
Table 5.1 illustrates summary statistics for the number of takeovers as distributed by 
year for the period 1985 to 2009. Panel A shows the distribution for the whole sample, 
according to the synchronicity of the bidding firm. Panels B, C, D and E present 
acquisition distributions by synchronicity and information uncertainty as well as a 
combination of the two for the age, size, sigma and trading volume proxies respectively.  
 
[Insert Table 5.1 about here] 
 
We notice a gradual increase in mergers from the beginning of the sample period (1985) 
and an overpopulation of takeover activity at the end of 1990s. This is consistent with 
the late 90s merger wave. Regarding synchronicity, we observe that until 1995, the 
stock returns of bidding firms were more synchronous with market movements while 
after 1996, low synchronicity firms outnumber high synchronicity ones. Morck et al. 
(2000) find that stock returns move more synchronously in developing countries than in 
developed ones. The UK market is one of the most developed markets in the world but 
in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, it appears to display developing characteristics. Aside 
from this, the economic growth and the wider use of internet services at the late ‘90s 
seem to have allowed for more informative prices since investors have more and more 
means by which to collect private information. Finally, with respect to information 
uncertainty, on average, we observe a higher inclination towards low uncertainty 
bidders in the beginning of the sample period, while this changes after 2000-2001. 
Probably, after the 1999-2000 dot-com bubble, investors started feeling more uncertain 
about the true value of the bidding firms and this is reflected in the statistics compiled. 
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Table 5.2 presents the number of acquisitions, the mean (median) market value of the 
bidder and transaction value for the whole sample. It also stratifies bidders according to 
the target status (private or public), method of payment (cash or stock), information 
uncertainty (high or low) and synchronicity (high or low) of the deal(s) undertaken. 
 
[Insert Table 5.2 about here] 
 
The bidder‘s market capitalization is measured as the price per share one month prior to 
the bid multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. The transaction value shows the 
target firm size. In Panel A, for the whole sample the mean (median) size of the 
acquirer is 1,255.83 (130.22) million pounds while for target firms, the respective mean 
(median) is 197 (11.7) million pounds. This evidence shows the large difference in size 
between bidding and target firms. This can mainly be attributed to the fact that the UK 
M&A market is overpopulated by acquisitions for privately held companies. 
Acquisitions for private targets amount to 4,058 deals in the sample analysed while 
public targets comprise only 713, which represents only 10% of the entire sample
41
. 
The picture of the overall sample regarding the distribution of private versus public 
deals is consistent with the evidence presented by Draper and Paudyal (2006) and 
Faccio and Masulis (2005). On average, the findings remain similar and can be 
considered robust as shown in Panels B, C, D and E for the information uncertainty 
proxies. Table 5.3 presents summary statistics for the synchronicity measure of R
2
 for 
the different portfolios according to the method of payment and the target status for the 
entire sample and for the subsample as they have been classified by the four proxies for 
information uncertainty. Low R
2
 indicates that the firm move less synchronously with 
the market and therefore it is more likely that investors possess private information for 
it. Findings show that the average R
2
 is the highest for the public cash portfolio and the 
lowest for the private stock ones. Furthermore, we observe that high information 
uncertainty firm experience on average lower synchronicity, which is consistent among 
all four proxies for information uncertainty. That shows that investors seek to collect 
and acquire more private information for firms that they feel more uncertain about its 
                                                 
41
 Our sample consists of private, public and subsidiary acquisitions. The reason for including 
subsidiaries was to increase the sample size so as to allow for high versus low uncertainty or 
synchronicity deals to be more normally distributed. The presentation and analysis of subsidiary firms do 
not serve the purposes of this study.  
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true value while for low uncertainty firms more public information is available and the 
need to look for private information is lower. 
 
[Insert Table 5.3 about here] 
 
5.4.1.3 Measures for Information Uncertainty 
 
Age is the first proxy used to capture information uncertainty. Literature suggests that 
the younger the firm, the higher the amount of uncertainty there is regarding the firm‘s 
value (Zhang (2006), Jiang, Lee and Zhang (2004), Barry and Brown (1985)). Young 
firms are associated with a lower amount of information dissemination. Age is 
measured as the difference between the date of incorporation of the firm and the date of 
the announcement of the acquisition. 
 
Size is the second proxy employed to capture information uncertainty about the bidder‘s 
value. Small firms are less likely to disclose a lot of information and are less diversified 
than larger firms. However, small firms also have a lower number of suppliers, 
investors and customers and therefore the accessibility of information can be more 
difficult. Hence, small size firms are more likely to be associated with a higher degree 
of information uncertainty (Zhang (2006)). Size is measured as the Market Value (MV) 
of the bidding firm 20 days before the announcement of the acquisition. 
 
Sigma is the third measure employed to measure information uncertainty. Bidders with 
high return volatility are more likely to exhibit uncertainty about their true value (Zhang 
(2006), Jiang, Lee and Zhang (2004)) than those with more stable operations. Sigma is 
measured as the daily bidder excess returns 200 days before the announcement of the 
acquisition.  
 
Trading Volume is the fourth and last proxy used within this work. It is employed in 
order to capture information uncertainty. Low trading volumes suggest that a lower 
number of investors, and therefore less trading activity, are associated with the firm. 
Trading Volume is measured as the average trading volume of the bidder 12 months 
prior to the announcement of the acquisition. 
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5.4.1.4 Measures for Private Information - Stock Price Non(Synchronicity) 
 
The measure used to capture private information is stock price (non)synchronicity. This 
measure was initially introduced by Roll (1988) and then further developed by Morck, 
Yeung and Yu (2000), Durnev, Morck, Yeung and Zarowin (2003), Durnev, Morck and 
Yeung (2004) and Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007). The main concept is based on the 
correlation of the firm‘s stock returns with the market and the industry returns. When 
the firm‘s stock returns are highly correlated with the market or industry, then it is less 
likely that the firm‘s stock price will include or convey firm-specific information. 
Hence, a lower correlation between the firm‘s stock returns with the market and 
industry returns could suggest that the firm‘s stock price is more likely to include a 
higher amount of private information. More specifically, Roll (1988) shows that this 
measure has lower correlation with public information and is more likely to capture 
private information. Roll (1988, page 564) writes that ‗the financial press misses a 
great deal of relevant information generated privately‘. 
 
This investigation follows Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007) to measure stock price 
synchronicity. The variation of stock returns can be decomposed into the following 
components - market-wide variation, industry-specific variation and firm-specific 
variation. This work needs to capture the last component of firm-specific variation 
which can be measure by the R
2
 of the following regression: 
 
i, j,t i,0  i,m m,t i, j j,t ,r  r    r i t       
 
where ri,j,t is the return of bidder i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t 
and rj,t is the return of industry j at time t. To construct this regression, weekly returns 
for a period of 24 weeks (6 months) before the announcement of the acquisition are 
used. 
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5.4.2 Methodologies 
 
5.4.2.1 Short-Run Event Study Methodology 
 
To calculate the acquiring firms‘ performance and identify the short-run impact of 
information uncertainty and private information, we employ standard event study 
methodology (Fuller et al (2002)) to calculate the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CARs) for a five-day period (-2, +2) around the announcement date, as provided by 
Datastream. We estimate abnormal returns using the modified market model: 
, , ,i t i t m tAR R R   
Where ARi,t is the excess return of bidder i on day t;  Ri,t is the return of bidder i on day 
t measured as the percentage change in return index including dividends of bidder i; and 
Rm,t is the market return estimated as the percentage change in FT-All share Index 
(value weighted) on day t. The CARs are calculated as the sum of the Abnormal 
Returns (ARi,t) for the five days surrounding the announcement of the bid as per the 
following equation: 
2
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T-statistics are used to test the null hypothesis that the mean CAR is equal to zero for a 
sample of n firms is as follows: 
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Where ,i tCAR  denotes the sample average, and ,( )i tCAR  denotes the cross-sectional 
sample standard deviations of abnormal returns for the sample of n firms. 
We do not report the t-statistic in tables but the p-value instead. The p-value provides a 
sense of strength of the evidence against the null hypothesis. The lower the p-value, the 
stronger the evidence that the mean CAR is different from zero. 
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To further enhance our choice of using the event window of -2 to +2 days surrounding 
the acquisition date, we calculate Abnormal Returns for a period of -10 to +10 days 
around the acquisition date (Table 5.4, Panel A). Our results in Panel A of Table 5.4 
show that Abnormal Retruns are significant for days -2, -1, 0, +1 and +2. That indicates 
that there is some lickage of information 2 days before the event and some delay of 
information incorporated in the stock price 2 days after the event. Therefore, the event 
window (-2,+2) suggested by Fuller et al. (2002) is the most appropriate one to be used 
in our study as well. 
 
 
5.4.2.2 Long-Run Methodology 
 
To examine the long-run abnormal stock returns, we employ the 12- and 36-month buy-
and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) approach advocated by Barber and Lyon (1997). 
The BHAR is computed as: 
 
T
mt
T
iti RRBHAR 11 )1()1(  
where Rit is the monthly return for company i and Rmt is the monthly return of the 
market index. Following Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999), the skewness adjusted bootstrap 
t-statistics procedure is employed to compute the statistical significance of the abnormal 
returns. 
 
5.5 Empirical Findings 
 
This section presents the short-run, multivariate and long-run findings of our analysis. 
We split the sample according to the target firm public status (private or public) and the 
method of payment (cash or stock). To test for the hypotheses set, deals are divided 
according to the uncertainty of the bidding firm for the four proxies calculated as well 
as by stock price synchronicity. 
 
5.5.1 Short-Run Analysis 
 
In this section, we examine the five day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) measure 
around a small window (-2, +2) surrounding the announcement of the acquisition date. 
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Table 5.4, Panel B presents the overall picture of the entire sample. The sample consists 
of 7019 deals which generate 1.46% abnormal returns in the short-run period. The 
positive and significant gains of the overall sample are mainly driven by the vast 
majority of acquisitions for private deals which experience positive and significant 
gains (1.69%) relative to the negative and insignificant abnormal returns of acquisitions 
of public targets. Consistent with Chang (1998), acquisitions for private targets paid for 
with stock enjoy highly positive and significant gains (3.60%) relative to the positive 
gains of those paid for with cash (1.13%). The difference between stock and cash 
acquisitions for private targets is 2.47%, statistically significant at the 5% significance 
level. Conversely, in accordance with Travlos (1987), acquisitions for listed companies 
financed with equity suffer high losses (-2.04%) while those financed with cash 
generate positive abnormal returns (0.95%). The difference between cash and stock 
deals (2.99%) is also statistically significant at the 1% significance level. 
 
[Insert Table 5.4 about here] 
 
5.5.1.1 Bidder Gains under Information Uncertainty Conditions 
 
The purpose of this section is to investigate whether investor biases are enhanced under 
conditions of uncertainty which therefore results in a market overreaction following 
takeover announcements. We present abnormal returns for high information uncertainty 
(High IU) versus low information uncertainty (Low IU) bidders for various types of 
acquisitions as divided by the target firm status and the method of payment used to 
finance the takeover. Age, size, sigma and trading volume of the acquiring firm are the 
four proxies employed to capture information uncertainties. 
5.5.1.1.1 Bidder Gains by the Age of the Bidding Firm 
 
Table 5.5 presents five day CARs for bidding firms as per the age of the bidding firm. 
High IU refers to young bidding firms for which investors are more likely to be 
uncertain about their value while Low IU refers to older bidding firms for which 
investors are more likely to have more information about the firm‘s true value. Table 
5.5, Panel A shows that bidders subject to High IU generate higher gains (1.81%) than 
those who suffer from Low IU (0.97%) and their difference is statistically significant. 
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To examine the source of the effect, the sample is split by deals for private target firms 
(Panel B) and those for public target firms (Panel C). Furthermore we control for the 
method of payment used to finance the takeover.  
 
In Panel B, for the overall sample, acquisitions for private targets generate 1.70% 
abnormal returns around the announcement of the deal, which is driven by the superior 
performance observed for acquisitions financed with stock (3.61%) versus those 
financed with cash (1.14%). This difference is statistically significant and consistent 
with Chang (1998). As has been discussed in the earlier hypotheses development, 
private stock deals signal good news for the value of the bidding firm. We observe that 
the highest gains are obtained by bidders of private stock acquisitions when there is 
high information uncertainty (4.85%). When information uncertainty about the bidding 
firm value is lower, the market reaction to the announcement of such deals is also 
correspondingly significantly lower (1.56%) and the difference (3.29%) is marginally 
significant at the 10% significance level. Similar results are obtained for private cash 
deals. Private cash acquisitions are positive signals for the market but not as positive as 
those deals financed with equity. Therefore, the market reaction to the announcement of 
such deals is also more positive when there is high information uncertainty (1.51%) 
than when uncertainty is lower (0.57%). The difference is also statistically significant at 
the 5% significance level. The findings thus far are consistent with the first hypothesis 
outlined in Section 5.3.1 and the hypothesis presented by Zhang (2006). Investors seem 
to underreact to a higher degree when there is higher information uncertainty and 
produce relatively higher abnormal returns following good news. 
 
[Insert Table 5.5 about here] 
 
Panel C illustrates bidder announcement abnormal returns for acquisitions of public 
target firms. For the overall sample, public deals generate negative and insignificant 
gains (-0.46%) mainly driven by the negative performance of stock deals (-2.09%) 
relative to the positive gains from public cash acquisitions (0.97%). The difference 
between cash and stock deals is statistically significant (3.05%) and consistent with the 
findings of Travlos (1987). Similar to the evidence observed for private acquisitions, 
public cash deals also signal relatively good news that the bidder is not overvalued. 
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Therefore, acquisitions for high information uncertainty bidders generate higher 
abnormal returns (1.77%) relative to those which are subject to lower uncertainty 
(0.62%). This evidence is also consistent with Zhang (2006) and shows that investors 
generate higher returns following good news under conditions of high information 
uncertainty. The negative market reaction to public stock acquisitions (-2.09%) 
becomes even more negative (-3.62%) when investors are ambiguous about the bidding 
firm value while the market reaction is economically and statistically insignificant (-
0.12%) when there is not much uncertainty about the firm‘s value. The difference is 
3.50%, statistically significant at the 5% significance level. It is clear that the negative 
performance of public stock acquisitions is driven by announcements for high 
information uncertainty bidders. This indicates that under conditions of greater 
information uncertainty, investors underreact and produce relatively lower abnormal 
returns following bad news. This evidence is also consistent with Zhang‘s (2006) 
theory. 
 
The initial difference in the overall sample for public targets between cash and stock 
deals, which is 3.05% (statistically significant at 1% significance level), increases by 
almost 2.50% and becomes 5.40% (statistically significant at the 1% significance level) 
when investors are ambiguous about the firm‘s value (Table 5.5, Panel C). This is 
driven by a more positive market reaction for public cash acquisitions (1.77%) and a 
more negative reaction for public stock deals (-3.62%), under conditions of high 
information uncertainty about the firm‘s value. On the contrary, when uncertainty is 
lower, the market reaction is more complete regarding the two types of financing and 
the difference is only 0.74%, statistically insignificant. The evidence shows that 
Travlos‘ (1987) findings are driven by, and hold only for, firms for which investors are 
ambiguous about their true value. Similarly, in Table 5.5, Panel B, it can be observed 
that the same pattern regarding the methods of financing an acquisition holds also for 
takeovers of private targets as well. Chang (1998) suggests that acquisitions for private 
targets paid for with cash are fundamentally different than those paid for with equity. 
The findings here support this evidence (-2.47%, statistically significant at the 5% 
significance level). However, this difference is driven by deals announced by value 
ambiguous firms due to the very positive market reaction to private stock deals 
(4.85%). In short, the difference for takeovers of private targets between cash and stock 
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deals is 3.34%, statistically significant at the 10% significance level, under conditions 
of high information uncertainty while this difference is statistically insignificant 
(1.00%) under conditions of low information uncertainty. 
 
Conclusively, the results support the first two hypotheses. They indicate that under 
conditions of information uncertainty, investors react more positively following good 
news (private cash, private stock, public cash acquisitions) and more negatively 
following bad news (public stock acquisitions). In addition the results indicate that the 
findings of Travlos (1987) and Chang (1998) regarding the method of payment in 
takeovers hold only when investors are ambiguous about the firm‘s value. When they 
are not, there is no statistical difference observed between cash and stock acquisitions 
for a private or a public target firm. 
 
5.5.1.1.2 Bidder Gains by the Size of the Bidding Firm 
 
For robustness reasons, we use various measures to capture value ambiguity about the 
firm‘s value. Our second measure is the size of the acquirer. The smaller the firms size, 
the higher the probability that the firm releases less information. Table 5.6 shows bidder 
abnormal returns for high and low information uncertainty bidding firms by using the 
proxy of the bidder‘s size. Table 5.6, Panel A shows that bidders subject to high 
information uncertainty gain 2.50% around the announcement of the takeover while 
those subject to low information uncertainty enjoy small positive gains of 0.67%. The 
difference (1.83%) is statistically significant at the 1% significance level. When 
controlling for target status and the method of payment, we observe that the higher 
gains for value ambiguous firms are driven by takeovers for private target firms paid for 
with stock (5.09%). Table 5.6, Panel B shows that private stock deals generate 3.57% 
more gains, statistically significant at the 1% significance level, under conditions of 
high relative to low information uncertainty about the bidding firm‘s value. Similar 
results are obtained for private cash (Panel B) and public cash (Panel C) takeovers, 
which enjoy 1.81% and 1.79% more gains respectively when subject to high rather than 
low information uncertainty. On the other hand, the market heavily punishes takeovers 
for public targets paid for with equity (-3.33%) when investors are ambiguous for the 
bidding firm‘s value. This evidence provides extra support to our first hypothesis. 
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Under information uncertainty, investors react more positively following good news 
(private and public cash deals) while they react more negatively following bad news 
(public stock deals). 
 
[Insert Table 5.6 about here] 
 
In Table 5.6, Panel C we also observe that the difference between takeovers for public 
targets paid for with cash outperform those paid for with equity by 2.99%, statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level, consistent with Travlos (1987). However, this 
difference is mainly driven by takeovers announced by value ambiguous bidders. Under 
conditions of information uncertainty investors react even more positively to cash 
acquisitions and even more negatively for stock acquisitions of public targets. This 
results in a huge difference between the two different methods of payment (5.77%, 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level). On the contrary, the difference 
becomes smaller (1.46%) and insignificant for less value ambiguous bidders that 
announce takeovers of public target firms when paid for with cash or stock. The same 
pattern appears for takeovers of private targets as well (Panel B). The difference 
between stock and cash deals is statistically significant only under conditions of 
information uncertainty (2.79%) while this difference declines (1.03%) and is 
statistically insignificant when comparing bidders for which investors are less uncertain 
about their true value. 
 
Overall, our findings give support to the first two hypotheses. Firm size as a proxy for 
information uncertainty produces the same results and conclusions as those presented 
when using the age proxy for information uncertainty. Our results shed light in 
explaining some of the reasons of the outperformance of small firms as presented by 
Moeller, Schlingemman and Stulz (2004). They suggest that overall, small firms gain 
almost 2% more than large firms, attributing this difference to hubris and overpayment 
of large firms. We suggest that a possible reason for small firms‘ outperformance could 
be due to information uncertainties raised around the firm‘s value and investors‘ 
overreaction to such uncertainties. 
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5.5.1.1.3 Bidder Gains by the Sigma of the Bidding Firm 
 
A third measure used to proxy for information uncertainty is the stock price volatility or 
Sigma of the bidding firm. The higher the sigma, then the higher the information 
uncertainty present regarding the firm‘s true value. Results are presented in Table 5.7 
and are highly consistent with those presented by the two previous proxies (age and 
size). More specifically, Table 5.7, Panel A shows that in the overall sample, value 
ambiguous bidders generate higher short-run abnormal returns than less value 
ambiguous bidding firms. The same pattern presented above holds for this proxy as 
well. The outperformance of acquirers subject to high information uncertainty is driven 
by private stock (4.52%), private cash (1.81%) and public cash (1.94%) deals that 
outperform those whose value is less ambiguous by 2.24%, 1.19% and 1.90% 
respectively. Conversely, bidders subject to high information uncertainty who bid for 
public target firms paid for with equity (-4.10%) underperform by 3.71% those subject 
to lower uncertainty (-0.39%). All the differences (apart from private stock 
acquisitions) are statistically significant at the 5% and 10% significance levels. The 
results obtained, by using stock volatility as an information uncertainty proxy, provide 
further support to the hypothesis that under conditions of information uncertainty, the 
market reaction is more positive following private or public cash acquisitions (good 
news) and more negative following public stock acquisitions (bad news). 
 
[Insert Table 5.7 about here] 
 
We also observe that gains between cash and stock offers are statistically significant 
only when we compare deals announced by value ambiguous acquiring firms. More 
specifically, stock offers outperform cash offers for private firms by 2.71%, statistically 
significant at the 10% significance level, under conditions of high information 
uncertainty while this difference decreases (1.66%) and becomes statistically 
insignificant under conditions of low information uncertainty. The method of payment 
effect is even more pronounced for acquisitions of public targets. More specifically, 
cash acquisitions for public targets outperform those financed using stock by 6.04%, 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level, when investors are uncertain about 
the bidding firm true value, while this difference disappears (0.43%, statistically 
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insignificant) when investors are more assured about the firms‘ value. Overall, the stock 
volatility as a proxy for information uncertainty offers the same pattern in our results 
and provides further support to our hypotheses. 
 
5.5.1.1.4 Bidder Gains by the Trading Volume of the Bidding Firm 
 
Finally, we employ trading volume as a forth proxy for information uncertainty. Table 
5.8 presents five day CARs for bidding firms that are subject to high and low 
information uncertainty as proxied by the trading volume of the bidding firm as an 
average of 12 months before the announcement of the acquisition. Table 5.8, Panel A 
depicts that high information uncertainty bidders generate positive and significant 
abnormal returns (2.17%) which is 1.33% more than the gains obtained by low 
information uncertainty bidding firms (0.85%). The difference is also statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level. The same story holds for this proxy as well, 
with some minor deviations. In Panels B and C, under conditions of information 
uncertainty, the market reacts the most positively following the announcement of a 
private stock (3.47%), private cash (2.45%) and public cash (3.27%) acquisition while 
the market heavily punishes public stock deals (-6.43%). However, the market‘s 
reaction is more complete when there is lower uncertainty about the bidder‘s value 
apart from the case of private stock acquisitions. Once again, most of the differentials 
between low and high uncertainty deals are statistically significant apart from private 
stock deals. These findings provide extra support to the hypothesis that investors react 
more positively following good news and more negatively following bad news under 
conditions of information uncertainty. 
 
Furthermore, Panel C shows that the difference between cash and stock acquisitions is 
9.70%, statistically significant at the 1% significance level while this difference goes 
down to 0.63, statistically insignificant for low uncertainty bidders. For the trading 
volume proxy, both differentials (high and low) are statistically insignificant for private 
deals (Panel B). Conclusively, the overall picture remains the same apart from some 
minor deviations. 
 
[Insert Table 5.8 about here] 
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5.5.1.2 Bidder Gains under Information Uncertainty Conditions and Private 
Information 
 
Zhang‘s (2006) hypothesis is inspired by Daniel at al. (1998), whose model suggests 
that investors are more overconfident about their private information and therefore 
overweight private information and underreact to public signals. In addition, Daniel et 
al. (1998) argue that stock return predictability should be more pronounced for high 
value ambiguous firms for the reason that investors tend to be more overconfident 
under conditions of information uncertainty. Driven by these arguments, Zhang (2006) 
suggests that higher uncertainty generates higher abnormal returns following good news 
and lower returns following bad news. However, Zhang (2006) does not incorporate 
measures of private information in his empirical analysis and suggests in his own words 
that his ‗evidence leaves the door open‘ for such testing. The measure we employ to 
capture private information is stock price synchronicity. It was initially introduced by 
Roll (1988) and further developed by Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), Durnev et al. 
(2003), Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) and Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2006). 
 
Following the predictions of Daniel at al. (1998,2001) and Zhang‘s (2006) testable 
hypothesis, we suggest that under conditions of information uncertainty, when investors 
possess private information, they will react even more positively following good news 
and even more negatively following bad news. When uncertainty is lower and investors 
do not possess private information, the market reaction should be complete, that is no 
reaction should be observed for either good or bad news. The following four sections 
empirically test this hypothesis in a M&A framework. 
 
5.5.1.2.1 Bidder Gains by the Age and the Stock Price Informativeness of the 
Bidding Firm 
 
Table 5.9 presents abnormal returns for high and low information uncertainty bidders as 
well as for those which exhibit high and low synchronicity (HighS and LowS) before 
presenting the interaction of the two. In Table 5.9, the proxy used to capture 
information uncertainty is the bidder‘s age. As noted earlier, the younger the bidder, 
then the higher the uncertainty there is present about its value. Low stock price 
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synchronicity, as measured during the period of 6 months before the announcement of 
the takeover, indicates that the stock price of the bidding firm is less synchronous with 
market returns and therefore investors are more likely to possess private information 
about the firm. On the other hand, high synchronicity implies that the stock price of the 
bidder moves more synchronously with the market return and investors are less likely to 
have collected and less likely to possess private information. 
 
[Insert Table 5.9 about here] 
 
Table 5.9, Panel A shows the bidder abnormal returns for the entire sample. The overall 
picture indicates that high information uncertainty bidders gain positive and significant 
abnormal returns around the announcement of the acquisitions (1.95%) relative to low 
information uncertainty ones (1.02%). The difference (0.92%) is statistically significant 
at the 1% significance level. Furthermore, bidders whose stock returns were less 
synchronous with the market before the announcement of the acquisition gain 0.98% ( 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level) more abnormal returns than those 
whose stock returns were more synchronous with the market index. Under conditions of 
information uncertainty, abnormal returns increase even more (2.22%) when investors 
possess private information (low synchronicity) while the acquisition gains go down to 
0.53% when there is not much ambiguity and investors have not collected private 
information. This is a first indication that the market overreacts under uncertainty and 
even more so when investors possess and overweight their private information. 
However, it is not wise to draw fruitful conclusions from the picture of the overall 
sample, which includes acquisitions both for private and public targets which were 
financed with cash, stock or mixed methods of payment. In the next panels of Table 5.9, 
we examine separately private, private cash, private stock, public, public cash and 
public stock deals. 
 
Panel B illustrates bidder abnormal returns only for acquisitions of private targets. The 
overall picture remains similar with the results presented for the overall sample. High 
uncertainty bidders (2.17%) outperform those subject to lower uncertainty (1.11%) by 
1.06% (statistically significant). Moreover, when investors possess private information, 
they overreact even more under uncertainty (2.61%) while the market is relatively 
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complete when there is lower uncertainty and investors are less likely to possess private 
information (0.62%). 
 
The results presented in Table 5.9, Panels C and D for acquisitions of private targets 
paid for with cash and equity respectively are more insightful. We discussed earlier that 
acquisitions for private targets paid for with cash signal relatively good news for the 
bidding firm‘s value. The market reacts more positively following the announcement of 
private cash deals when investors are ambiguous about the firm value (1.64%) than 
when there is more certainty (0.64%). Furthermore, gains to low synchronicity bidders 
(1.83%) are 1.24% (statistically significant) higher than high synchronicity bidding 
firms. This implies that investors who are more likely to possess private information 
overweight this information and react more positively following good news than those 
who are less likely to have such private information. 
 
After combining the two effects of uncertainty and private information, we observe that 
investors indeed overweight private information especially under conditions of 
ambiguity and the market reaction is even more positive and significant (2.43%). On 
the other hand, when there is less ambiguity about the firm‘s value, we observe a less 
positive reaction which declines even more (0.19%) when investors do not possess 
much private information. The differential between high and low information 
uncertainty bidders is 1.00%, statistically significant. For the two extreme portfolios of 
high uncertainty with investors who possess private information versus low uncertainty 
with investors who have not collected private information, the difference increases to 
2.24%, statistically significant at the 1% significance level. 
 
The above evidence is even more pronounced following the announcement of private 
stock acquisitions (Table 5.9, Panel D). Acquisitions for private targets paid for with 
stock signal even more positive news for the bidder‘s value, as has already been 
discussed. High information uncertainty bidders gain positive and significant gains 
(5.08%) while low information uncertainty ones obtain only 1.93% insignificant gains. 
Moreover, high synchronicity acquiring firms (5.75%) enjoy 3.87% more abnormal 
returns than their low synchronicity counterparts (1.10%). The interaction of the two 
effects shows that high information uncertainty-low synchronicity bidders gain the 
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highest abnormal returns (6.32%) while low information uncertainty-high synchronicity 
bidders have marginally positive and highly insignificant abnormal returns (0.49%). 
The difference between high and low information uncertainty bidders, which was 
previously 3.15%, is almost doubled (5.83%) when controlling for those who possess 
and those who do not possess private information. This evidence is consistent with our 
third hypothesis. Under conditions of uncertainty, investors overweight their private 
information even more and generate highly positive abnormal returns following good 
news. On the other hand, when uncertainty is low and the likelihood that investors have 
collected private information is also low, the market reaction is complete (no abnormal 
returns). 
 
The analysis of acquisitions for public targets reveals interesting conclusions. Table 5.9, 
Panel F illustrates abnormal returns for acquiring firms that bid for public targets. All 
methods of payments (cash, stock and mixed) are included and hence the results are 
quite inconclusive. When controlling for the method of payment, the effect becomes 
clearer. Acquisitions for public targets paid for with cash signal that the acquiring firm 
is less likely to be overvalued (good news regarding the acquirer‘s value). Once again, 
gains for value ambiguous acquirers following the announcement of a public cash deals 
is 2.09%, statistically significant (Panel G). Investors react even more positively 
(3.85%) when they possess private information and there is ambiguity about the 
bidder‘s intrinsic value. This evidence also provides extra evidence to our third 
hypothesis. On the other hand, gains to low information uncertainty bidders are 
marginally positive and significant (0.94%) while when there is less ambiguity and 
investors do not have private information, there are no significant gains (0.84%). 
 
The results presented in Panel H are really interesting since the market reaction is in 
exactly the opposite direction following public acquisitions financed with stock. The 
market reaction following the announcement of a public stock acquisitions when there 
is uncertainty about the bidder value is more negative (-3.87%) than when uncertainty is 
lower (-0.28%). Low synchronicity bidders that are subject to high uncertainty 
experience even more negative abnormal returns (-5.89%) following the announcement 
of an acquisition for a public target paid for with stock while high synchronicity ones 
for which uncertainty is lower obtain marginally positive and insignificant gains 
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(0.61%). This evidence implies that under uncertainty, the market reacts negatively 
following the announcement of bad news and when investors possess private 
information, they overweight this information and overreact resulting in an even more 
negative market reaction. On the other hand, when there is lower uncertainty and 
investors do not possess private information (hence they have no information to 
overweight or overreact), the market reaction is complete. We also observe that the 
difference between high versus low information uncertainty bidders is -3.58%, 
statistically significant and when we control for private information, the difference 
between the two extreme portfolios (low synchronicity-high uncertainty versus high 
synchronicity-low uncertainty) is almost doubled (-6.50%). It is positively surprising to 
notice that despite the small number of observations in the two portfolios, the 
differential is still highly significant. 
 
Table 5.9, Panels E and I show the differentials between cash and stock acquisitions for 
private and public targets respectively. In Panel E, we observe that the difference 
between cash and stock acquisitions for the overall sample is -2.57%, statistically 
significant, which is consistent with Chang (1998). This difference remains significant 
only for high uncertainty and low synchronicity bidders. This implies that cash 
acquisitions are fundamentally different than stock ones only when investors overreact 
due to information uncertainty or because they overweight their private information. 
The rest of the differentials are statistically insignificant mainly because both private 
cash and private stock signal relatively positive and strongly positive news respectively 
for the bidder‘s true value. However, the sample size of the portfolios can be a 
limitation. 
 
On the other hand, acquisitions of public targets paid for with cash signal good news 
that the bidder is more likely to be undervalued while those paid for with equity signal 
bad news since the bidder is more likely to be overvalued. Panel I depicts that the 
difference between cash and stock acquisitions for public targets is 3.49%, statistically 
significant. This finding is in support of Travlos (1987). Additionally, this difference 
increases to 5.96% and 5.07%, statistically significant at the 1% significance level, for 
high uncertainty and low synchronicity bidders respectively. This is due to the fact that 
under uncertainty or when investors possess private information, they overreact more 
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positively and more negatively following public cash and public stock announcement 
respectively and the differences consequently amplify. When controlling for both 
effects simultaneously, the overreaction is even more pronounced and the difference for 
low synchronicity-high information uncertainty between the two methods of payment is 
9.74%, statistically significant at the 1% significance level (despite the small size of the 
portfolios). On the contrary, for the portfolio of high synchronicity-low uncertainty, 
there is statistically and economically no significant difference (0.19%) between cash 
and stock acquisitions. 
 
Conclusively, greater information uncertainty, when investors are more likely to 
possess private information, generate the highest abnormal returns following private 
stock, public cash and private cash acquisitions while the most negative abnormal 
returns are experienced following the announcement of public stock acquisitions. This 
evidence suggests that under uncertainty, investors overweight their private information 
and react very positively following the announcement of good news while the market 
reaction is very negative following the announcement of bad news. When uncertainty is 
lower and investors do not possess private information, the market reaction is complete 
irrespective of the type of the target firm‘s public status or the method of payment used. 
 
5.5.1.2.2 Bidder Gains by the Size and the Stock Price Informativeness of the 
Bidding Firm 
 
Table 5.10 presents the bidder abnormal returns around of the announcement of an 
acquisition, taking into consideration the bidder‘s stock return synchronicity, which is a 
measure of the private information of the bidder‘s stock price, and also the size of the 
bidder, which is used as a proxy for the information uncertainty present regarding the 
bidders value.  
 
Table 5.10, Panel A illustrates the abnormal returns for the whole sample. The highest 
performance is achieved by low synchronicity-high uncertainty bidders (2.72%) while 
the lowest gains (0.45%) are experienced by high synchronicity-low uncertainty 
bidders. However, the whole sample included all types of acquisitions, which have 
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already been shown to have different effects and thus it would not be wise to draw 
fruitful conclusions from Panel A.  
 
The overall picture is similar for acquisitions of private targets (Table 5.10, Panel B) 
which are generally perceived as a good signal by the market and therefore we notice a 
positive overreaction especially when there is high uncertainty and investors have 
collected private information (3.11%). The evidence for acquisitions of public targets is 
also mixed since both types of method of payment are included in the overall public 
sample (Table 5.10, Panel F). 
 
[Insert Table 5.10 about here] 
 
To capture the effect of the different types of deals, we split them according to the 
target status and method of payment as well. Table 5.10, Panel C illustrates bidder gains 
for private cash acquisitions. High uncertainty and low synchronicity bidders generate 
2.66% and 1.83% respectively while low uncertainty and high synchronicity ones 
experience marginally positive and significant gains of 0.46% and 0.59% respectively. 
When controlling for both effects simultaneously, we observe that low synchronicity-
high uncertainty bidders experience even more positive and significant gains (3.02%) 
while high synchronicity-low uncertainty ones obtain insignificant gains. Similar and 
more pronounced results are obtained for private stock acquisitions which serve as a 
stronger signal of good news for the market (Table 5.10, Panel D). The highest 
abnormal returns are obtained by low synchronicity-high uncertainty bidders (6.57%) 
while there is no market reaction (0.76% insignificant gains) for high synchronicity-low 
uncertainty bidding firms. The differential between these two types of acquirers is 
5.81%, statistically significant. The market reaction is also positive (1.14%) following 
the announcement of public cash acquisitions (Table 5.10, Panel G) which are also 
perceived as strongly positive news about the acquirer‘s intrinsic value. Under 
uncertainty the market reaction is even more positive (3.25%) and when we 
simultaneously control for investor‘s private information, we observe positive and 
significant gains of 4.23%. On the contrary, in the absence of uncertainty and private 
information, the market reacts less positively (1.12%). The above evidence provides 
extra support for the hypothesis that investors overweight their private information 
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under conditions of information uncertainty and generate highly positive abnormal 
returns following the announcement of acquisitions which are more likely to reveal 
good news about the acquirer‘s true value. 
 
The opposite effect is observed following the announcement of public acquisitions paid 
for with equity (Table 5.10, Panel H). Overall, public stock acquisitions generate 
negative and significant losses (-2.35%) which under uncertainty increase to -3.82% 
and when we control for private information, the short-run bidder gains go even lower 
to -4.10%. However, in the absence of uncertainty and private information, acquisition 
announcements do not generate significant gains. A small anomaly observed in this 
panel (Table 5.10, Panel H) is that high synchronicity-high uncertainty deals generate -
6.18% losses, which could be attributed to the small number of observations in the 
portfolio (11 deals). 
 
Finally, we test whether cash and stock takeovers are fundamentally different for 
private and public deals respectively (Table 5.10, Panel E and I). Panel E shows that 
stock deals significantly outperform cash deals by 2.57% in the sample of takeovers of 
privately held targets, which is driven by deals announced by value ambiguous 
acquirers (2.85%) or by low synchronicity acquirers (3.92%). Panel I shows the 
difference in the methods of payment of public takeovers, which are more pronounced 
due to the market reaction in different directions for each method of financing the 
takeover. The differences are large and highly significant for high uncertainty (7.07%), 
low synchronicity (5.07%), low synchronicity-high uncertainty (8.43%), and high 
synchronicity-high uncertainty (8.54%). There seems to be no statistical difference 
between cash and stock deals for low uncertainty acquirers. The findings obtained by 
employing size as a proxy for information uncertainty also support our hypotheses. 
 
5.5.1.2.3 Bidder Gains by the Sigma and the Stock Price Informativeness of the 
Bidding Firm 
 
For robustness reason a third proxy is employed to capture information uncertainty 
about the bidding firm and examine the impact of uncertainty when investors possess 
private information. We use stock return volatility or sigma of the firm as a third proxy 
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to capture uncertainty. The higher the sigma, the higher the volatility, the higher 
investors‘ uncertainty about the acquiring firm. In Table 5.11, Panels A, B and F 
illustrate bidder abnormal returns for the whole sample, for acquisitions for private and 
public targets respectively. The highest performance is observed for low synchronicity-
high uncertainty bidders for the overall (2.74%) and private (3.12%) sample while 
marginally positive gains are obtained for high synchronicity-low uncertainty bidders 
(0.46% for the whole and 0.52% for the private sample). The results are mainly driven 
by the positive performance of private cash and stock deals. In contrast, the overall 
performance of acquisitions for public targets seems to be the most negative for low 
synchronicity-high uncertainty acquirers (-1.58%), mainly driven by the negative 
performance of stock acquisitions. 
 
[Insert Table 5.11 about here] 
 
The findings are more insightful when controlling for both the target‘s public status as 
well as for the method of payment. Table 5.11, Panel C shows the performance of 
private cash deals for which announcements are perceived as relatively good news 
about the bidder‘s real value. The higher the uncertainty, the higher the abnormal 
returns bidders enjoy (1.77% versus 0.74%). Furthermore, the lower the synchronicity, 
the higher the returns for bidding firms (1.74% versus 0.61%). The differences in both 
cases are statistically significant. When the two effects are examined together, the 
market reacts highly positively for low synchronicity-high uncertainty deals while it is 
relatively complete for the rest of the combinations. The differential between the 
performances of the two extreme portfolios (low-synchronicity-high uncertainty versus 
high synchronicity-low uncertainty) is doubled relative to when the effects where 
separately examined. 
 
Similar and more pronounced evidence is observed for private stock deals (Table 5.11, 
Panel D) which are perceived as even more positive news regarding the acquirer value. 
Low synchronicity–high uncertainty deals generate the most positive returns (6.57%) 
while when uncertainty is low and bidder‘s stock price synchronicity is high, there is no 
market reaction (0.03%). The difference between high versus low uncertainty bidders is 
1.26% (insignificant) while between low versus high synchronicity ones it is 4.28% 
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(significant). When controlling for both effects, the differential goes up to 6.54% 
(statistically significant). More or less, the picture is similar for public cash acquisitions 
(Table 5.11, Panel G) which also serve as positive signals for the bidder‘s value. The 
above evidence indicates that when there is high uncertainty or when investors possess 
private information, they overreact following the announcement of private or public 
cash acquisition (good news) and more over the reaction is highly positive when both 
effects are taken simultaneously into account. On the other hand, in the absence of 
uncertainty and private information, there is no market reaction. 
 
The picture is totally reversed following the announcement of public stock acquisitions 
which are mainly considered to be negative news concerning the bidder‘s valuation 
(Table 5.11, Panel H). High uncertainty generates more positive returns following the 
announcement of public stock deals. The differential between high and low uncertainty 
acquisitions is -4.35% (statistically significant). However, the results when controlling 
for private information are inconclusive in this panel (-2.82% for low and -2.37 for high 
synchronicity bidders). When controlling for both effects, we observe that under 
uncertainty investors overweight private information (when they possess it) and such 
deals are heavily punished (-5.52%). On the other hand, lower uncertainty and lack of 
private information triggers no market reaction. 
 
We also examine the differences in the performance for cash and stock deals. Table 
5.11, Panel E presents the differentials between private cash minus private stock 
acquisitions. They are statistically significant only for the overall sample and for low 
synchronicity acquirers. This is attributed to the fact that both cash and stock 
acquisitions for private targets are perceived as good news by the market (stock more 
positively than cash), and the market moves to the same direction. In Table 5.11, Panel 
I, the differences are more pronounced between public cash and public stock takeovers. 
The differences are significant for the overall sample (3.57%, significant), mainly 
driven by high uncertainty (6.84%, significant) and low synchronicity (5.09%, 
significant) deals. The highest difference is observed for the low synchronicity-high 
uncertainty portfolios. Under uncertainty, investors with private information overreact 
in different directions for cash and stock acquisitions. 
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Using sigma as a third proxy for information uncertainty, we can conclude that under 
uncertainty, investors bias increases and they consequently overweight their private 
information. As a result, investors overreact, generating positive returns following the 
announcement of private stock, private cash and public cash acquisition while the 
outcome is totally negative for public stock deals. When uncertainty is low and 
investors are less likely to possess private information, abnormal returns are 
economically and statistically equal to zero irrespective of the type of the deal. 
 
5.5.1.2.4 Bidder Gains by the Trading Volume and the Stock Price 
Informativeness of the Bidding Firm 
 
[Insert Table 5.12 about here] 
 
Finally, trading volume is employed as a forth proxy to examine investors reaction 
under uncertainty and when they have private information. The big picture is more or 
less consistent with the finding obtained with the other three proxies. Some minor 
anomalies are noticed mainly due to the smaller number of observations obtained for 
the bidding firm‘s trading volume. In Table 5.12, Panels A, B and F illustrate the 
bidder‘s 5 day CARs for the overall, private and public samples respectively. Once 
again, for more intuitive results, we will focus on the four types of acquisitions, as split 
according to their public status and method of payment.  
 
Under information uncertainty about the bidder‘s value, investors‘ biases are increased 
and therefore they overweight their private information. As a result, they react 
positively following the announcement of private cash (2.95%, panel C), private stock 
(4.23%, panel D) and public cash (2.29%, panel G) acquisitions while under the same 
conditions, they heavily punish (-6.48%, panel H) public stock deals. On the other hand, 
in the absence of private information and uncertainty about the bidder‘s value, the 
market reaction is more complete. We simply observe very low returns which are 
mainly statistically insignificant. More specifically, private cash, private stock, public 
cash and public stock acquisitions generate 0.44% (insignificant), 1.27% (insignificant), 
1.12% (significant) and -1.33% (insignificant) abnormal returns around the 
announcement of the acquisition respectively. 
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The difference between cash and stock deals for private, as well as cash acquisitions for 
private (Panel E) and public (Panel I) acquisitions, follow a similar pattern as presented 
before. The differentials are mainly insignificant for private acquisitions since the 
market reaction moves towards the same direction for cash and stock offers. 
Conversely, differences between cash and stock offers for public targets are 
significantly amplified, especially under conditions of uncertainty, even more so when 
the effect of private information is also taken into consideration. There are no 
significant differences when uncertainty is low. Overall this proxy is consistent with the 
findings obtained from the previous proxies, confirming our hypothesis and offering 
extra supportive evidence to our theory. 
 
In short, there is consistency amongst all four proxies used for information uncertainty. 
The main findings suggest that under conditions of information uncertainty, investors 
overweight their private information and react highly positively following the 
announcement of private cash, private stock and public cash acquisitions (good news) 
while the market reaction is highly negative following the announcement of public 
stock deals (bad news). On the contrary, when investors are less ambiguous about the 
true value of the bidding firm, in the absence of private information, no market reaction 
is observed. Furthermore, concerning the findings of Travlos (1987) and Chang (1998) 
regarding the method of payment used, we suggest that cash deals are fundamentally 
different from stock deals only under conditions of information uncertainty. 
 
5.5.2 Multivariate Analysis 
 
The univariate analysis clearly shows that under conditions of uncertainty and 
especially when investors possess private information, they overreact positively 
following the announcement of private cash, private stock and public cash acquisitions 
(good news about the bidder‘s value) while under the same conditions there is a highly 
negative market reaction following the announcement of public stock deals (bad news 
about the bidder‘s value). However, the univariate analysis does not take into 
consideration the multiple effects that can affect short-run bidders‘ abnormal returns, 
and the interaction between these influential factors. For that reason, we adopt a 
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multivariate regression framework where the bidder‘s five day CARs are regressed on a 
number of explanatory variables that have been proved in the literature to affect 
bidder‘s performance, as per the following equation: 
1
N
i i i
i
CAR a X 

    
In the regressions, we include the following variables: a dummy variable (HighIU) that 
takes the value of 1 if the deal has been undertaken by a bidder subject to high 
information uncertainty and zero otherwise; and a dummy variable (LowSynchr) that 
takes the value of 1 if the deal was announced by a low synchronicity bidder and zero 
otherwise. We also include interactive variables such as: a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if the deal in question was announced by a high synchronicity bidder 
subject to high uncertainty (HsHia) and zero otherwise; a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if the deal in question was announced by a high synchronicity bidder 
subject to low uncertainty (HsLiu) and zero otherwise; a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if the deal was announced by a low synchronicity bidder subject to high 
uncertainty (LsHiu) and zero otherwise; and finally a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if the deal was announced by a low synchronicity bidder subject to low 
uncertainty (LsLiu) and zero otherwise. The control variables included are the 
following: a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the takeover target firm was 
a privately owned firm and zero otherwise; and a dummy variable that takes the value 
of one if the takeover is finance with cash (stock) and zero otherwise. The private, cash 
and stock dummy variables are not included in the regressions when we examine the 
effect of uncertainty and private information solely on private and public takeovers 
financed with cash or equity. Furthermore, we account for the bidder‘s market-to-book 
ratio, as measured by the bidder‘s market value one month before the announcement 
divided by the net book value of assets, and the deal‘s relative size, which is the ratio of 
the deal value over the bidder‘s market value. Additionally, we include dummy 
variables for diversifying and domestic deals that take the value of one if the target firm 
is involved in an industry different than the bidder‘s and whether the target is 
domestically based in the same market as the acquirer respectively and zero otherwise. 
Lastly, the acquirer‘s lagged excess return for 180 days prior to the announcement and 
the market portfolio return (FT-All Share) for the same 180-day period prior to the 
announcement bid are included. 
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Table 5.13 presents the correlation coefficients of each pair of variable used in the 
multivariate analysis. We observe high correlations between the interactive variables 
HsHiu, HsLiu, LsHiu, LsLiu and the HighIU, LowIU. However, these two variables are 
not used in the same regression in the multivariate analysis. 
 
[Insert Table 5.13 about here] 
 
Table 5.14 presents the results of the multivariate analysis for the overall sample and 
for all four proxies for information uncertainty. The coefficient of the HighIU dummy 
of regression (1) shows that there is a positive and significant relationship between 
bidder abnormal returns and high uncertainty. In regression (2), the coefficient for 
LowSynchr dummy is also positive. This evidence indicates that higher bidder 
abnormal returns are associated with higher uncertainty and higher levels of private 
information. Similarly, a positive relationship is observed in regressions (7), (8), (13), 
(14), (19) and (20) for the size, sigma and trading volume proxies respectively. When 
controlling for the interaction effect, we observe that the High synchronicity-Low 
information uncertainty (HsLiu) variable is negatively associated with the bidder‘s five 
day CARs (regression (3)), while there is a positive relationship between abnormal 
returns and low synchronicity deals announced by bidders subject to high information 
uncertainty (regression (4)). In regression (5), we include all 4 combinations of the 
interaction portfolios to examine whether the effect still holds after controlling for the 
effect of the rest of the portfolios. The LsHiu dummy exhibits a positive coefficient 
while the other three have negative coefficients. The most negative relationship is with 
the HsLiu dummy variable. Finally in regression (6), we include the HighIU, the 
LowSynchr and the LsHiu dummy to examine how much of the effect can be explained 
by the interaction variable. The results indicate an insignificant coefficient for the 
interaction variable while only the uncertainty variable is significant. Similar evidence 
is presented regarding the other three proxies; age, sigma and trading volume. The 
findings for the overall sample indicate that the bidder‘s abnormal returns exhibit a 
positive relationship with high uncertainty conditions and the existence of private 
information, even more so when both effects simultaneously exist. Besides, it seems 
that the effect is mainly driven by the uncertainty factor. The rest of the analysis 
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focusses solely on the various types of acquisitions based on the targets firm‘s status 
(private or public) and the method of payment (cash or stock). 
 
[Insert Table 5.14 about here] 
 
Table 5.15 presents the multivariate analysis results for private cash, private stock, 
public cash and public stock. In Table 5.15, information uncertainty is measured by the 
proxy of age. The results show that in regression (1), the HighIU dummy exhibits 
almost a zero coefficient (0.001) for private cash deals which becomes positive in 
regressions (7) and (13) for private stock (0.031) and public cash (0.031) takeovers 
respectively. The coefficient of the same dummy is negative (-0.0024) for public stock 
acquisitions (regression 19). These results confirm the evidence presented so far that the 
higher the uncertainty, the higher the abnormal returns for bidders that announce private 
or public cash acquisitions and the lower the gains for those that announce public stock 
deals. The coefficients of the LowSynchr dummy (regressions (2), (8), (14) and (20)) 
follow the same pattern with the HighIU dummy. Moreover, there is a negative and 
significant relationship between the HsLiu dummy and abnormal returns for private and 
public cash deals (regressions (3), (9) and (15)) while it becomes positive and 
significant for public stock acquisitions (regression (21)). Exactly the opposite effect is 
observed for the LsHiu dummy. The coefficient is almost zero for private cash 
acquisitions (regression (4)), while it becomes more positive for private cash and public 
stock deals (regressions (10) and (16) respectively). A reversal is observed for public 
stock deals. The coefficient in regression (22) is negative and statistically significant. 
The same pattern holds for the two interactive dummy variables (HsLiu and LsHiu) 
when controlling for all four combinations (regressions (5), (11), (17) and (23)) and 
whether the effect is driven by uncertainty or private information (regressions (6), (12), 
(18) and (24)). 
[Insert Table 5.15 about here] 
 
Tables 5.15, 5.16 and 5.17 illustrate the multivariate analysis results for the size, sigma 
and trading volume proxies respectively. The findings are largely consistent with the 
results presented for the age proxy. 
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[Insert Tables 5.16, 5.17 and 5.18 about here] 
 
Conclusively, the findings and conclusions of the univariate analysis are further 
supported by the cross-sectional results. Despite the finding that some coefficients are 
insignificant, the overall picture suggests a positive relationship between bidder 
abnormal returns with uncertainty and private information, which is enhanced when the 
two factors are combined following the announcement of good news regarding the 
bidder‘s true value (private or public cash acquisitions). A negative and significant 
relationship is reported following bad news (public stock takeovers). 
 
5.5.3 Bidder Information Uncertainty, Private Information and 
Bidders’ Long-term Performance 
 
The findings of the short-run analysis show that under uncertainty, investors‘ biases 
increase, investor‘s resultantly overweight their private information and consequently 
overreact to various takeover announcements generating very positive abnormal returns 
following the announcement of private cash, private stock and public cash takeovers. 
Conversely, the market reaction is very negative following announcements for public 
stock takeovers. On the other hand, there is no market reaction when uncertainty is 
lower and investors do not have private information. This section aims to investigate the 
long-run performance of these takeovers and examine whether the initial short-run 
reaction was simply a market overreaction (reversal and correction in the long-run) or 
whether it was a rational reaction which keeps holding in the long-run as well. Due to 
the small number of observations in some portfolios, we employ the Buy-and-Hold-
Abnormal Returns (BHARs) methodology. 
 
Table 5.19 illustrates the 1 year long-run performance and Table 5.19 shows the 3 year 
long-run performance of UK acquirers. Table 5.19, Panel A shows that acquisitions 
announced by bidders subject to high information uncertainty underperform those 
announced by bidders subject to lower uncertainty by 6.65% (statistically significant), 
8.10% (statistically significant), 4.54% (statistically significant) for the age, sigma and 
trading volume proxies respectively. There is no significant difference when size is 
used as a proxy for uncertainty. 3 years after the announcement of the acquisition, 
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bidders suffer higher losses but similar differences are observed between high and low 
uncertainty acquirers (Table 5.20, Panel A). Differences range from around 6.47% to 
16.90%, statistically significant for all four proxies. 
 
[Insert Tables 5.19 and 5.20 about here] 
 
When controlling for private information, we observe no statistical differences between 
low versus high synchronicity acquirers neither 1 year nor 3 years after the acquisition. 
Reversals are observed for the extreme portfolios. Low synchronicity bidders subject to 
high uncertainty seem to underperform high synchronicity ones subject to lower 
uncertainty by 4.36% to 6.82%, statistically significant for the age, sigma and trading 
volume proxies. Similar differences with higher bidder losses are observed 3 years after 
the announcement of the deal (Table 5.20, Panel A). Differences for the size proxy are 
insignificant. 
 
The long-run results for the overall sample suggest that there is a reversal in bidder 
gains when controlling for information uncertainty. This is a first indication that in the 
short-run, investors‘ biases were high and they resultantly overreacted to the 
announcement of the takeover acquisition. 
 
Similar findings are presented regarding acquisitions for private targets 1 and 3 years 
after the announcement of the deal (Panel B, Table 5.19 and 5.20 respectively). High 
uncertainty bidders seem to underperform low uncertainty ones by a difference which 
ranges from 4.55% to 11.89% (significant) 1 year after the announcement of the deal 
(results do not hold for size as a proxy) and 7.00% to 19.26% (significant) 3 years later. 
On the other hand, low synchronicity investors keep marginally underperforming high 
synchronicity ones by around 3%, marginally significant at the 10% significance level 1 
year after the deal (Table 5.19, Panel B) while we observe small insignificant reversals 
3 years after the deal (Table 5.20, Panel B). Mixed evidence is illustrated between low 
synchronicity bidders subject to high uncertainty versus high synchronicity ones subject 
to low uncertainty ones. There are small insignificant reversals in the first years 
following the deal while the reversal increases in magnitude and becomes significant in 
some cases 3 years following the deal. 
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Panels C and D show the long-run performance of acquisitions for private targets paid 
for with cash and stock respectively. More specifically, private cash acquisitions suffer 
losses 1 year after the announcement and even higher losses 3 years later. More 
importantly, there are no significant economical or statistical differences between high 
versus low uncertainty bidders, between high versus low synchronicity bidders or when 
the two effects are simultaneously taken into account for almost all four proxies used to 
capture uncertainty. These findings hold both for the 1 year long-run performance 
(Table 5.19, Panel C) and the 3 year long-run performance (Table 5.20, Panel C) 
following the announcement of the deal. 
 
The picture for private acquisitions paid for with stock is quite different (Panel D). The 
results are pretty mixed when controlling for uncertainty. There is no reversal for the 
age (insignificant) and size (significant) proxies while the other two proxies show 
insignificant reversals for 1 year following the announcement. The 3 year post-
acquisition performance mainly indicates that low uncertainty bidders, although they 
suffer losses,  outperform high uncertainty ones. In contrast, no reversals are observed 
for low versus high synchronicity bidders. Low synchronicity bidders enjoy positive 
insignificant gains while high synchronicity ones suffer high losses. The differences 
between the two types of acquirers are significant for all for proxies 1 year after the 
deal. The 3 year post acquisition performance shows the same picture and the difference 
remains statistically significant for all 4 proxies as well. The picture remains similar 
when controlling for the difference in long-run performance between low 
synchronicity-high uncertainty versus high synchronicity-low uncertainty deals mainly 
driven by the synchronicity effect. 
 
This evidence suggests that investors who possess private information about the 
acquiring firm (low synchronicity) may be more effective in valuing the outcome of the 
acquisitions and therefore their short-run reaction is a rational one indicating that indeed 
private stock acquisitions do create or destroy less value both in the short and long-run 
for the bidders;‘ shareholders. 
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Panel E presents BHARs for acquisitions of public targets. The main findings suggest 
that bidders subject to high uncertainty suffer higher losses than those subject to lower 
uncertainty. The differences between the two groups are statistically significant and 
seem to hold for all 4 proxies, both for 1 year and 3 years following the announcement 
of the deal. However, no statistical or economical difference is observed when 
controlling for high versus low synchronicity bidders. 
 
Panels F and G present BHARs for public targets paid for with cash and with stock. In 
terms of cash payment, low uncertainty acquirers outperform high uncertainty acquirers 
(a reversal compared to short-run), low synchronicity bidders outperform high 
synchronicity bidders (no reversal compared to short-run) and there is no large 
differences between the two extreme portfolios when both uncertainty and private 
information are taken into consideration (LsHiu vs. HsLiu). We have to note that all the 
above differences for almost all four proxies, both 1 and 3 year after the acquisition, are 
statistically insignificant. 
 
Finally, the most interesting result from Panel G which illustrates the long-run 
performance of public stock acquisitions is that high uncertainty bidders keep 
underperforming low uncertainty ones as was presented and discussed in the short-run 
analysis. The 1 year post merger performance (Table 5.19) displays a statistical 
difference which ranges from 16.21% to 22.77%. The evidence is quite mixed among 
the four proxies for the 3 year post-merger performance. When controlling for private 
information or for its combination with information uncertainty, no statistically 
significant differences are obtained. 
In conclusion, the main findings drawn from the investigation of the 1 and 3 year long-
run performance is that regardless of any uncertainty or private information effects, 
bidders suffer losses 1 year following, and even higher losses 3 year after, the 
announcement of the acquisition. 
 
More specifically, regarding information uncertainty, the initial positive 
outperformance of acquisitions announced by bidders subject to high versus those 
subject to low information uncertainty is mainly reversed, apart from public stock deals. 
For public stock acquisitions, high uncertainty bidders underperformed low uncertainty 
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ones and they keep underperforming in the long-run as well. Hence, irrespective of the 
type of the acquisition, high uncertainty regarding the bidder‘s value around the 
announcement of the deal destroys more value in the long-run than bidders subject to 
lower uncertainty. Regarding private information, as captured by synchronicity, in most 
of the cases there is either no statistical differences or low synchronicity acquirers keep 
outperforming as they did in the short-run. This is an indication that investors who 
possess private information about the bidding firm proceed to more accurate and 
rational valuation decisions around the announcement date, which remains true in the 
long-term as well. Due to the above contradictory long-run outcomes, the comparison 
of the two portfolios where both effects are taken into account does not lead to many 
economical and statistical significant differences. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the market response to takeover announcements. We adopt a 
behavioural approach to UK mergers and acquisitions under conditions of information 
uncertainty and private information. More specifically, we examine short and long-term 
bidder gains controlling for information uncertainty and investor‘s private information 
in the surrounding environment of the bidder. We define information uncertainty as 
ambiguity present regarding the bidding firm‘s intrinsic value. To capture information 
uncertainties, we employ four proxies, namely the age, size, sigma and trading volume 
of the bidding firm. To measure whether investors are more or less likely to possess 
private information, we use stock price synchronicity as introduced by Roll (1988) and 
further extended by Morck et al. (2000) and Chan et al. (2006). 
The main findings suggest that bidders subject to high information uncertainty generate 
higher abnormal returns relative to low information uncertainty bidding firm‘s 
following the announcement of private acquisitions paid for with cash and equity and 
for public targets paid for with cash, while the opposite effect is observed for public 
acquisitions paid for equity. 
 
Furthermore, when we control for private information, high information uncertainty 
deals generate stronger positive abnormal returns for private cash and stock and public 
cash deals, and even more negative returns for public stock takeovers. When 
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uncertainty is lower and investors are likely to possess private information (high 
synchronicity), zero economical and statistical abnormal returns are obtained. 
 
This evidence is consistent with Daniel et al. (1998, 2001) who suggest that investors 
are overconfident and overreact to public announcements under conditions of 
uncertainty. Furthermore, they claim that investors, due to self-attribution bias, become 
even more overconfident about their private information and overreact even more. 
Consequently, under uncertainty, investors with private information react highly 
positively following the announcement of good news (private cash, private stock, public 
cash deals) while they react very negatively following the announcement of bad news 
(public stock deals). When there is low uncertainty and investors do not possess private 
information, the market reaction is complete. 
 
We also show that the findings of Travlos (1987) and Chang (1998) for the method of 
payment in public and private acquisitions respectively hold only under conditions of 
information uncertainty. In other words, public and private acquisitions paid for with 
cash are fundamentally different from those paid for using equity only under conditions 
of high information uncertainty. The statistically significant differences are mainly 
driven by the investor‘s overreaction to high uncertainty deals. This difference is 
amplified even more when controlling for private information but only for acquisitions 
of public target firms. The reasoning offered is that public cash deals are considered as 
good news while public stock deals are signals of bad news and therefore the market 
overreacts in opposite directions. 
 
Additionally, we provide a different approach regarding size as determinant factor of 
takeover bids. Moeller, Schlingemman and Stulz (2002) show that small bidding firms 
generate on average 2% higher abnormal returns relative to larger bidding companies. 
We use size as a proxy for information uncertainty. With this in mind, we suggest that 
the observed size effect could be driven by investors biases enhanced under conditions 
of uncertainty.  
 
Furthermore, the multivariate analysis results show that the coefficients of the high 
uncertainty dummy are mostly negative and significant following the announcement of 
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public acquisitions paid for with stock. This evidence is consistent with Epstein and 
Schneider (2008) who suggest that investors react asymmetrically to news when they 
are ambiguous about the firm value. Bernard et al. (1997), La Porta et al. (1997) and 
Skinner and Sloan (1999) show significant differences in the markets response with 
regards to good and bad news.  
 
Finally, consistent with previous literature
42
, overall, we find that bidding firms suffer 
losses 1 year following the announcement, and even higher losses 3 years later. 
Moreover, there is a reversal regarding high versus low information uncertainty 
acquisitions apart from the case of acquisitions for public targets paid for with stock. 
Hence, irrespective of the type of the acquisition, high uncertainty regarding the 
bidder‘s value around the announcement of the deal destroys more value in the long-run 
than lower uncertainty counterparts. When controlling for private information (low 
versus high synchronicity bids), we observe no statistical difference. In some cases low 
synchronicity bidders keep outperforming high synchronicity ones as was found in the 
short-run as well. Due to the contradictory findings regarding uncertainty (reversal) and 
private information (no reversal), the comparison and the effect between the two 
portfolios where both effects are taken into account is difficult to be examined and the 
results do not show any fruitful conclusive outcomes. 
 
Overall, this study offers a different approach to explain the market reaction following 
announcement takeovers. The short-run market reaction to M&As announcements 
reflect either potential synergy or revaluation gains. Our evidence suggests that there is 
a simple market overreaction driven by investor biases. Investors‘ biases increase 
especially with uncertainty and depending on the signal conveyed by each type of 
takeover, investors react either positively or negatively. In the absence of uncertainty, 
the market reaction is complete. 
                                                 
42
 Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Malatesta (1983), Asquith (1983), 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Gregory (1997), Alexandridis, Antoniou and Zhao (2007) 
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Table 5.1 Summary Statistics by acquisitions by Year 
The table presents the number of acquisitions by year and the percentage of total number of acquisitions by synchronicity (Panel A) and information 
uncertainty proxies (Panel B, C, D and E). The summary statistics are provided on the basis of a sample of 6,043 acquisitions from 1985 to 2009 
undertaken by 1883 unique bidders. Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Panel A presents statistics by year 
for the whole sample. Synchronicity is measured as the R
2
 of the following regression: 
ri,j,t= βi,0 + βi,m rm,t + βi,j rj,t +εi,t 
where ri,j,t is the return of bidder i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t and rj,t is the return of industry j at time t. The lowest 33% R
2
 
firms are classified as low synchronicity, the highest 33% R
2
 firms as high synchronicity and the rest as medium. Panel B shows statistics for 
information uncertainty as approached with the proxy of Age. The 33% youngest acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% oldest as low 
uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Age is measured as the difference between the incorporation date of the firm until the 
announcement date of the deal. Panel C illustrates statistics for the Size proxy.  The 33% smallest acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% 
largest as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Size is measured as the market capitalization (MV) of the bidding firm 20 
days before the announcement date of the deal. Panel D shows statistics for the Sigma proxy. The 33% highest sigma acquirers are classified as high 
uncertainty, the 33% lowest sigma as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Sigma is measured by the standard deviation of 
daily excess returns 200 days before the announcement date of the deal. Finally, Panel E presents descriptive statistics for the Trading Volume proxy. 
The 33% less active acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% most active as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium 
uncertainty. Trading Volume is measured as the average of the monthly trading volume of the acquirer before the announcement date of the deal. 
Portfolios HsHiu, HsLiu, LsHiu and LsLiu relate to the combination portfolios of High(Low)Synchronicity for bidders subject to High (Low) 
Information Uncertainty respectively. 
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Table 5.1-Continued 
Panel A: All Deals 
Year All High Synchronicity Medium Synchronicity Low Synchronicity 
1985 9 4 3 2 
1986 20 12 7 1 
1987 48 28 13 7 
1988 125 81 25 19 
1989 164 96 41 27 
1990 97 46 34 17 
1991 89 39 28 22 
1992 119 50 37 32 
1993 159 33 63 63 
1994 196 83 62 51 
1995 193 44 76 73 
1996 239 49 81 109 
1997 303 70 110 123 
1998 382 117 141 124 
1999 459 106 165 188 
2000 531 157 171 203 
2001 404 159 141 104 
2002 325 107 121 97 
2003 246 81 91 74 
2004 306 77 111 118 
2005 405 115 130 160 
2006 412 122 118 172 
2007 464 191 137 136 
2008 269 114 96 59 
2009 79 34 11 34 
Total 6,043 2,015 2,013 2,015 
Total (%) 100.00% 33.34% 33.31% 33.34% 
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Table 5.1-Continued 
Panel B: Information Uncertainty (IU) by Age 
Year All HighSynchr. 
Synchronicity 
MediumSynchr. 
Synchronicity 
LowSynchr. 
Synchronicity 
All High IU Medium 
IU 
Low IU HsHiu HsLiu LsHiu LsLiu 
1985 9 4 3 2 9 2 7 0 2 0 0 0 
1986 20 12 7 1 25 1 24 0 1 0 0 0 
1987 48 28 13 7 72 11 23 38 6 14 0 3 
1988 125 81 25 19 179 50 54 75 15 40 8 4 
1989 164 96 41 27 236 51 96 89 15 54 4 3 
1990 97 46 34 17 164 39 63 62 5 27 3 5 
1991 89 39 28 22 130 35 44 51 8 21 7 6 
1992 119 50 37 32 156 38 35 83 12 34 7 15 
1993 159 33 63 63 213 50 49 114 4 20 27 21 
1994 196 83 62 51 276 50 84 142 12 56 13 13 
1995 193 44 76 73 266 50 79 137 7 30 14 38 
1996 239 49 81 109 319 73 91 155 7 28 31 50 
1997 303 70 110 123 412 128 127 157 19 36 32 53 
1998 382 117 141 124 474 160 127 187 29 61 45 41 
1999 459 106 165 188 507 181 164 162 26 47 76 58 
2000 531 157 171 203 558 223 194 141 71 49 80 41 
2001 404 159 141 104 408 175 131 102 62 46 47 20 
2002 325 107 121 97 327 130 118 79 26 39 44 22 
2003 246 81 91 74 250 87 90 73 14 36 33 13 
2004 306 77 111 118 306 121 115 70 24 24 50 21 
2005 405 115 130 160 408 177 131 100 26 48 85 25 
2006 412 122 118 172 414 172 141 101 34 56 79 25 
2007 464 191 137 136 466 187 177 102 45 63 82 15 
2008 269 114 96 59 270 91 108 71 24 49 25 11 
2009 79 34 11 34 80 27 35 18 11 13 13 3 
Total 6,043 2,015 2,013 2,015 6,925 2,309 2,307 2,309 505 891 805 506 
Total (%) 100.00% 33.34% 33.31% 33.34% 100.00% 33.34% 33.31% 33.34% 7.29% 12.87% 11.62% 7.31% 
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Table 5.1-Continued 
Panel C: Information Uncertainty (IU) by Size (MV) 
Year All HighSynchr. 
Synchronicity 
MediumSynchr. 
Synchronicity 
LowSynchr. 
Synchronicity 
All High IU Medium 
IU 
Low IU HsHiu HsLiu LsHiu LsLiu 
1985 9 4 3 2 9 1 2 6 0 4 1 1 
1986 20 12 7 1 25 1 9 15 0 11 0 1 
1987 48 28 13 7 75 21 15 39 5 19 4 2 
1988 125 81 25 19 185 56 67 62 17 40 12 2 
1989 164 96 41 27 246 84 89 73 17 52 20 0 
1990 97 46 34 17 172 61 61 50 8 24 8 2 
1991 89 39 28 22 137 60 38 39 12 22 15 2 
1992 119 50 37 32 160 56 57 47 2 29 15 2 
1993 159 33 63 63 214 78 75 61 2 22 29 9 
1994 196 83 62 51 280 88 112 80 8 53 27 2 
1995 193 44 76 73 269 67 121 81 2 29 20 12 
1996 239 49 81 109 324 87 138 99 6 27 30 27 
1997 303 70 110 123 419 150 149 120 14 44 55 19 
1998 382 117 141 124 483 145 175 163 12 71 49 27 
1999 459 106 165 188 513 156 179 178 12 64 84 43 
2000 531 157 171 203 569 141 194 234 25 99 65 60 
2001 404 159 141 104 410 143 129 138 42 73 47 27 
2002 325 107 121 97 328 127 90 111 18 64 55 14 
2003 246 81 91 74 250 90 80 80 8 50 42 10 
2004 306 77 111 118 309 118 95 96 15 47 59 20 
2005 405 115 130 160 412 155 123 134 23 75 79 21 
2006 412 122 118 172 414 162 132 120 20 79 92 16 
2007 464 191 137 136 466 164 122 180 20 145 84 8 
2008 269 114 96 59 270 96 62 112 11 86 37 3 
2009 79 34 11 34 80 33 25 22 5 19 21 1 
Total 6,043 2,015 2,013 2,015 7,019 2,340 2,339 2,340 304 1,248 950 331 
Total (%) 100.00% 33.34% 33.31% 33.34% 100.00% 33.34% 33.32% 33.34% 4.33% 17.78% 13.53% 4.72% 
Chapter 5: Information Uncertainty, Private Information and Bidder Cains 
315 
 
Table 5.1-Continued 
Panel D: Information Uncertainty (IU) by Sigma 
Year All HighSynchr. 
Synchronicity 
MediumSynchr. 
Synchronicity 
LowSynchr. 
Synchronicity 
All High IU Medium 
IU 
Low IU HsHiu HsLiu LsHiu LsLiu 
1985 7 2 3 2 7 1 1 5 0 1 0 2 
1986 20 12 7 1 25 2 12 11 1 5 0 1 
1987 47 27 13 7 71 19 29 23 4 10 3 1 
1988 123 80 24 19 175 49 93 33 16 16 5 8 
1989 163 95 41 27 234 19 44 171 3 75 7 19 
1990 96 45 34 17 163 16 44 103 1 36 5 8 
1991 88 38 28 22 129 17 33 79 5 24 3 11 
1992 119 50 37 32 155 23 39 93 2 40 6 18 
1993 156 33 61 62 209 36 63 110 2 23 15 25 
1994 193 81 62 50 271 40 61 170 5 61 7 28 
1995 192 43 76 73 264 14 47 203 0 39 4 56 
1996 233 46 80 107 309 40 64 205 3 37 14 76 
1997 293 67 106 120 399 64 112 223 2 42 27 64 
1998 374 114 139 121 463 133 227 103 32 14 33 31 
1999 441 98 161 182 489 258 206 25 59 1 88 13 
2000 498 145 160 193 525 352 135 38 122 2 105 21 
2001 384 151 137 96 388 226 139 23 100 4 52 9 
2002 312 103 116 93 314 169 127 18 53 7 54 6 
2003 245 81 91 73 249 153 81 15 46 7 43 5 
2004 286 72 104 110 286 80 99 107 13 34 36 34 
2005 387 111 128 148 389 95 114 180 17 72 45 53 
2006 391 114 111 166 393 109 167 117 23 54 56 37 
2007 441 183 132 126 443 105 182 156 23 98 41 31 
2008 266 112 96 58 267 138 107 22 40 16 37 0 
2009 79 34 11 34 80 75 5 0 29 0 34 0 
Total 5,834 1,937 1,958 1,939 6,697 2,233 2,231 2,233 601 718 720 557 
Total (%) 100.00% 33.20% 33.56% 33.24% 100.00% 33.34% 33.31% 33.34% 8.97% 10.72% 10.75% 8.32% 
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Table 5.1-Continued 
Panel E: Information Uncertainty (IU) by Trading Volume 
Year All HighSynchr. 
Synchronicity 
MediumSynchr. 
Synchronicity 
LowSynchr. 
Synchronicity 
All High IU Medium 
IU 
Low IU HsHiu HsLiu LsHiu LsLiu 
1985 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1987 7 5 1 1 15 0 0 15 0 5 0 1 
1988 27 23 3 1 37 1 1 35 0 23 0 1 
1989 48 45 3 0 54 1 4 49 0 43 0 0 
1990 23 19 2 2 29 1 6 22 0 17 0 2 
1991 39 26 8 5 55 6 27 22 4 15 1 2 
1992 71 39 16 16 87 20 42 25 4 16 9 2 
1993 95 24 39 32 123 33 46 44 1 16 13 10 
1994 124 70 35 19 177 47 74 56 9 37 10 1 
1995 142 41 54 47 201 82 64 55 9 19 22 10 
1996 159 35 55 69 214 54 99 61 3 21 26 12 
1997 204 56 78 70 272 93 104 75 11 32 32 11 
1998 293 99 106 88 359 110 145 104 9 54 42 18 
1999 358 87 136 135 398 136 137 125 12 54 59 24 
2000 411 133 127 151 434 124 158 152 28 76 58 36 
2001 337 140 117 80 340 116 119 105 34 59 39 14 
2002 313 103 117 93 315 129 95 91 18 55 51 16 
2003 245 81 90 74 248 85 82 81 5 54 39 10 
2004 288 72 104 112 288 106 81 101 11 46 49 23 
2005 388 111 128 149 389 141 122 126 21 73 74 18 
2006 396 114 113 169 398 157 117 124 17 76 84 26 
2007 444 185 134 125 445 168 128 149 23 112 81 9 
2008 265 111 96 58 266 97 64 105 13 76 42 3 
2009 79 34 11 34 79 34 26 19 6 16 22 1 
Total 4,756 1,653 1,573 1,530 5,223 1,741 1,741 1,741 238 995 753 250 
Total (%) 100.00% 34.76% 33.07% 32.17% 100.00% 33.33% 33.33% 33.33% 4.56% 19.05% 14.42% 4.79% 
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Table 5.2 Summary Statistics for Acquisitions as classified by Synchronicity and Information Uncertainty for the Age, Size, Sigma and 
Trading Volume Proxy and the Combination of the Both 
The table presents the number of acquisitions, the mean and median market value of acquirers and the mean and median values of targets. The last three 
columns list the total deal value and the percentage of total value of transaction and number of acquisitions, respectively. The summary statistics are 
provided on the basis of a sample of 7019 acquisitions from 1985 to 2009 undertaken by 1883 unique bidders. Acquirers are publicly traded firms listed 
on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Targets include both domestic and foreign public and private firms. Synchronicity is measured as the R
2
 of the 
following regression: 
 
ri,j,t= βi,0 + βi,m rm,t + βi,j rj,t +εi,t 
 
where ri,j,t is the return of bidder i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t and rj,t is the return of industry j at time t. The lowest 33% R
2
 
firms are classified as low synchronicity, the highest 33% R
2
 firms as high synchronicity and the rest as medium. Panel A illustrates descriptive 
statistics for the whole sample. Panel B presents descriptive statistics for information uncertainty as approached with the proxy of Age. The 33% 
youngest acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% oldest as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Age is 
measured as the difference between the incorporation date of the firm until the announcement date of the deal. Panel C illustrates descriptive statistics 
for the Size proxy. The 33% smallest acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% largest as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium 
uncertainty. Size is measured as the market capitalization (MV) of the bidding firm 20 days before the announcement date of the deal. Panel D shows 
statistics for the Sigma proxy. The 33% highest sigma acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% lowest sigma as low uncertainty and the 
medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Sigma is measured by the standard deviation of daily excess returns 200 days before the announcement date of 
the deal. Finally, Panel E presents descriptive statistics for the Trading Volume proxy. The 33% less active acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, 
the 33% most active as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Trading Volume is measured as the average of the monthly 
trading volume of the acquirer before the announcement date of the deal. Portfolios HsHiu, HsLiu, LsHiu and LsLiu relate to the combination portfolios 
of High (Low)Synchronicity for bidders subject to High (Low) Information Uncertainty respectively. The acquirer‘s market capitalization equals the 
price per share one-month prior to the bid announcement times the number of common shares outstanding. The target‘s firm size is measured as the 
deal value of the bid. 
 
Type of 
Acquisition 
Number of 
Acquisitions 
Mean Market 
Equity (£ mil) 
Median Market 
Equity (£ mil) 
Mean 
Transaction 
Value (£ mil) 
Median 
Transaction Value 
(£ mil) 
Total Deal Value 
(£ mil) 
% of Total 
Deal Value 
% of Total Number of 
acquisitions Panel A: All Deals 
All Deals 7,019 1,255.832 130.220 197.006 11.705 1,214,203.537 100.00% 100.00% 
Private 4,058 626.825 98.490 29.786 8.306 94,154.342 7.75% 57.81% 
Public 713 3,817.170 293.320 1,389.924 89.064 894,878.302 73.70% 10.16% 
Cash 3199 1,849.901 220.070 105.517 12.265 268,049.885 22.08% 45.58% 
Stock 544 1,033.016 58.785 675.695 17.991 320,214.872 26.37% 7.75% 
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Table 5.2-Continued 
Panel B: Information Uncertainty (IU) by Age Proxy 
All Deals 6,043 1,405.788 137.370 222.480 12.354 1,344,444.478 100.00% 100.00% 
Private 3,541 688.445 101.190 31.246 8.718 110,640.859 8.23% 58.60% 
Public 636 4,198.382 336.075 1,540.578 106.196 979,807.698 72.88% 10.52% 
Cash 2,678 2,134.553 260.575 118.610 13.381 317,636.682 23.63% 44.32% 
Stock 486 1,136.646 58.940 747.560 17.701 363,313.927 27.02% 8.04% 
High IU 2,066 562.745 53.685 86.046 8.626 177,771.926 13.22% 34.19% 
Low IU 1,964 2,241.962 432.240 315.140 19.464 618,935.846 46.04% 32.50% 
High Synchr 2,015 3,333.335 544.320 517.062 21.500 1,041,880.598 77.50% 33.34% 
Low Synchr 2,015 340.624 63.330 67.637 8.986 136,288.440 10.14% 33.34% 
LsHiu 805 180.943 35.570 30.085 7.298 24,218.582 1.80% 13.32% 
LsLiu 506 599.827 130.710 117.737 11.544 59,574.807 4.43% 8.37% 
HsHiu 505 1,584.188 130.940 208.710 11.965 105,398.578 7.84% 8.36% 
HsLiu 891 3,980.700 1,077.920 542.925 36.914 483,746.503 35.98% 14.74% 
Panel C: Information Uncertainty (IU) by Size Proxy 
All Deals 6,043 1,405.788 137.370 222.480 12.354 1,344,444.478 100.00% 100.00% 
Private 3,541 688.445 101.190 31.246 8.718 110,640.859 8.23% 58.60% 
Public 636 4,198.382 336.075 1,540.578 106.196 979,807.698 72.88% 10.52% 
Cash 2,678 2,134.553 260.575 118.610 13.381 317,636.682 23.63% 44.32% 
Stock 486 1,136.646 58.940 747.560 17.701 363,313.927 27.02% 8.04% 
High IU 1,972 22.839 20.605 13.988 5.142 27,584.646 2.05% 32.63% 
Low IU 2,114 3,864.475 1,062.925 593.530 40.693 1,254,722.043 93.33% 34.98% 
High Synchr 2,015 3,333.335 544.320 517.062 21.500 1,041,880.598 77.50% 33.34% 
Low Synchr 2,015 340.624 63.330 67.637 8.986 136,288.440 10.14% 33.34% 
LsHiu 950 22.318 19.780 12.130 5.162 11,523.399 0.86% 15.72% 
LsLiu 331 1,711.663 660.740 315.811 30.859 104,533.334 7.78% 5.48% 
HsHiu 304 24.148 23.070 12.645 4.979 3,844.145 0.29% 5.03% 
HsLiu 1,248 5,319.379 1,513.890 820.320 46.814 1,023,759.439 76.15% 20.65% 
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Table 5.2-Continued 
Panel D: Information Uncertainty (IU) by Sigma Proxy 
All Deals 5,834 1,437.498 143.685 229.625 12.739 1,339,629.734 100.00% 100.00% 
Private 3,385 700.790 107.360 31.828 8.800 107,738.595 8.04% 58.02% 
Public 625 4,248.951 344.940 1,566.834 113.302 979,271.372 73.10% 10.71% 
Cash 2,618 2,152.905 269.430 120.472 13.491 315,396.245 23.54% 44.87% 
Stock 473 1,166.683 59.330 766.903 17.921 362,745.244 27.08% 8.11% 
High IU 2,064 882.649 63.100 152.137 9.584 314,010.902 23.44% 35.38% 
Low IU 1,818 2,193.902 231.960 198.375 15.434 360,645.634 26.92% 31.16% 
High Synchr 1,937 3,419.458 578.520 536.620 23.095 1,039,432.852 77.59% 33.20% 
Low Synchr 1,939 350.346 65.870 69.689 9.000 135,126.687 10.09% 33.24% 
LsHiu 720 303.699 29.885 46.894 7.014 33,763.411 2.52% 12.34% 
LsLiu 557 472.504 105.400 104.087 9.450 57,976.732 4.33% 9.55% 
HsHiu 601 2,143.667 319.640 381.734 16.667 229,422.143 17.13% 10.30% 
HsLiu 718 4,659.565 1,174.235 349.610 33.124 251,020.202 18.74% 12.31% 
Panel E: Information Uncertainty (IU) by Trading Volume Proxy 
All Deals 4,756 1,661.942 189.065 272.097 14.248 1,294,092.286 100.00% 100.00% 
Private 2,775 758.174 128.480 35.223 9.747 97,742.607 7.55% 58.35% 
Public 500 5,160.459 529.545 1,917.072 154.827 958,536.057 74.07% 10.51% 
Cash 2,174 2,505.233 387.685 136.799 16.245 297,401.316 22.98% 45.71% 
Stock 350 1,309.338 65.290 1,013.554 19.266 354,744.054 27.41% 7.36% 
High IU 1,592 107.209 34.430 23.665 6.982 37,675.272 2.91% 33.47% 
Low IU 1,641 4,441.586 1,403.360 720.650 43.708 1,182,587.450 91.38% 34.50% 
High Synchr 1,653 3,809.237 785.830 617.297 26.370 1,020,392.031 78.85% 34.76% 
Low Synchr 1,530 405.149 74.040 80.517 9.708 123,190.564 9.52% 32.17% 
LsHiu 753 65.490 29.500 20.427 6.815 15,381.355 1.19% 15.83% 
LsLiu 250 1,805.423 668.135 327.032 22.915 81,758.007 6.32% 5.26% 
HsHiu 238 296.953 54.365 32.461 7.538 7,725.828 0.60% 5.00% 
HsLiu 995 6,091.007 2,039.010 996.410 57.940 991,427.721 76.61% 20.92% 
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Table 5.3 R
2
 Summary Statistics for the Entire Sample and Information Uncertainty as 
Classified by the Age, Size, Sigma and trading Volume Proxy 
Table presents the average R
2
 for each of the all, private cash, privatestock, publiccash and 
publicstock portfolios for the entire sample as well as it has been classified by the age, size, 
sigma and trading volume proxies. 
R
2
 is estimated by the following regression: 
 
ri,j,t= βi,0 + βi,m rm,t + βi,j rj,t +εi,t 
 
where ri,j,t is the return of bidder i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t and rj,t 
is the return of industry j at time t. The lowest 33% R
2
 firms are classified as low synchronicity, 
the highest 33% R
2
 firms as high synchronicity and the rest as medium. Panel A illustrates 
descriptive statistics for the whole sample. Panel B presents descriptive statistics for 
information uncertainty as approached with the proxy of Age. The 33% youngest acquirers are 
classified as high uncertainty, the 33% oldest as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of 
medium uncertainty. Age is measured as the difference between the incorporation date of the 
firm until the announcement date of the deal. Panel C illustrates descriptive statistics for the 
Size proxy. The 33% smallest acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% largest as 
low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Size is measured as the market 
capitalization (MV) of the bidding firm 20 days before the announcement date of the deal. Panel 
D shows statistics for the Sigma proxy. The 33% highest sigma acquirers are classified as high 
uncertainty, the 33% lowest sigma as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium 
uncertainty. Sigma is measured by the standard deviation of daily excess returns 200 days 
before the announcement date of the deal. Finally, Panel E presents descriptive statistics for the 
Trading Volume proxy. The 33% less active acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 
33% most active as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Trading 
Volume is measured as the average of the monthly trading volume of the acquirer before the 
announcement date of the deal 
 
 
All PrivateCash PrivateStock PublicCash PublicStock 
Panel A: All Deals 
All Deals 32.24% 20.80% 17.22% 30.88% 19.19% 
Panel B: Information Uncertainty by Age 
High IU 15.90% 17.16% 15.52% 23.11% 17.94% 
Medium IU 18.77% 20.00% 15.79% 27.48% 15.54% 
Low IU 24.84% 24.16% 25.32% 37.50% 25.22% 
Panel C: Information Uncertainty by Size 
High IU 12.14% 12.46% 10.97% 12.49% 12.61% 
Medium IU 15.07% 15.25% 17.52% 19.84% 15.67% 
Low IU 31.22% 30.98% 34.37% 37.40% 32.52% 
Panel D: Information Uncertainty by Sigma 
High IU 18.19% 20.26% 15.57% 25.69% 17.47% 
Medium IU 18.94% 19.51% 18.00% 30.59% 22.26% 
Low IU 22.35% 22.46% 21.11% 35.16% 17.39% 
Panel E: Information Uncertainty by Trading Volume 
High IU 11.73% 11.30% 11.51% 12.44% 10.49% 
Medium IU 16.65% 18.00% 17.99% 20.33% 13.23% 
Low IU 32.24% 32.02% 27.12% 39.59% 33.23% 
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Table 5.4 Abnormal Returns (ARs) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for the 
Entire Sample 
This table presents Abnormal Returns (ARs) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the entire 
sample. Panel A present the Abnormal Returns (ARs) t days before and after the announcement 
date of all acquirers included in the full sample.  Abnormal returns are calculated using a 
modified market-adjusted model: 
AR = Ri,t - Rm,t 
where Ri,t is the return on firm i at time t and Rm,t is the value-weighted Market Index Return 
(FT-All share). P-values are presented in brackets. The full sample size is 7019 deals. 
Panel B presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) 
surrounding the announcement for the entire sample. The number of bids for each category is 
reported below the mean return. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ‗a‘, 
‗b‘ and ‗c‘, respectively. The Dif (1)-(2) represents the differences in mean CARs for the five 
days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of cash versus stock acquisitions. P-values 
are reported in brackets. 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns (AR) 
Days Before/ After Announcemnt Day AR p-value 
-10 0.01% (0.758) 
-9 0.04% (0.126) 
-8 0.03% (0.235) 
-7 0.00% (0.967) 
-6 0.13% (0.000) 
-5 -0.01% (0.693) 
-4 0.06% (0.032) 
-3 -0.01% (0.759) 
-2 0.07% (0.011) 
-1 0.12% (0.000) 
0 0.83% (0.000) 
1 0.33% (0.000) 
2 0.12% (0.000) 
3 0.02% (0.397) 
4 0.04% (0.122) 
5 0.06% (0.035) 
6 0.01% (0.686) 
7 -0.04% (0.173) 
8 -0.04% (0.100) 
9 -0.02% (0.576) 
10 -0.03% (0.370) 
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 Table 5.4-continued 
Panel B: CARs 
  All Cash (1) Stock(2) Mixed (3) Dif (1)-(2) 
All 1.46%
a
 1.30%
a
 1.70%
a
 1.57%
a
 -0.40% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.482) 
N 7,019 3,199 544 3,276   
Private 1.69%
a
 1.13%
a
 3.60%
a
 1.82%
a
 -2.47%
b
 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) 
N 4,058 1,416 248 2,394   
Public -0.46% 0.95%
b
 -2.04%
a
 -0.89%
c
 2.99%
a
 
p-value (0.113) (0.012) (0.001) (0.099) (0.000) 
N 713 297 208 208   
Subsidiary 1.65%
a
 1.54%
a
 5.20%
a
 1.44%
a
 -3.66%
a
 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) 
N 2,248 1,486 88 674   
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Table 5.5 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of High and Low Uncertainty Acquirers 
by Age of the Acquiring Firm 
 
This table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) 
surrounding the announcement of high and low information uncertainty acquirers by the age of 
the acquirer. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
ARit = Rit - Rmt 
where Rit is the return on firm i at time t and Rmt is the value-weighted Market Index Return 
(FT-All Share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). The 33% youngest acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% oldest as low 
uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Age is measured as the difference 
between the incorporation date of the firm until the announcement date of the deal. Panel A 
illustrates the gains to acquirers for the entire sample, Panel B for acquisitions for private target 
firms and Panel C for acquisitions for public target firms and the method of payment (cash, 
stock and mixed (combined offer of both cash and stock). The number of bids for each category 
is reported below the mean return. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by 
‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘, respectively. The H-L [(1)-(3)] represents the differences in mean CARs for the 
five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high versus low uncertainty bidders. 
The Dif (cash-stock) represents the differences in mean CARs for the five days (-2, +2) around 
the acquisition announcement of cash versus stock offers. P-values are reported in brackets. 
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Table 5.5-Continued 
Panel A: Entire Sample 
  All HighIU (1) MediumIU (2) LowIU (3) H-L [(1)-(3)] 
All 1.47%
a 
1.81%
a 
1.62%
a 
0.97%
a 
0.84%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 6,925 2,309 2,307 2,309   
Panel B: Private Targets 
Private 
  
  
  
  
  All Cash Stock Mixed Dif(Cash-Stock) 
All 1.70%
a 
1.14%
a 
3.61%
a 
1.83%
a 
-2.47%
b 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) 
N 4,006 1,392 247 2,367   
HighIU (1) 2.04%
a 
1.51%
a 
4.85%
a 
1.92%
a 
-3.34%
c 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.052) 
N 1,478 395 114 969   
MediumIU (2) 1.82%
a 
1.53%
a 
3.02%
b 
1.84%
a 
-1.49% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.048) (0.000) (0.337) 
N 1,391 446 90 855   
LowIU (3) 1.12%
a 
0.57%
a 
1.56% 1.64%
a 
-1.00% 
p-value (0.000) (0.004) (0.192) (0.000) (0.409) 
N 1,137 551 43 543   
H-L [(1)-(3)] 0.92%
a 
0.94%
b 
3.29% 0.29%   
p-value (0.004) (0.030) (0.108) (0.508)   
Panel C: Public Targets 
   All Cash Stock Mixed Dif(Cash-Stock) 
All -0.46% 0.97%
b 
-2.09%
a 
-0.88% 3.05%
a 
p-value (0.115) (0.011) (0.001) (0.104) (0.000) 
N 708 296 206 206   
HighIU (1) -1.26%
c 
1.77%
c 
-3.62%
a 
-1.19% 5.40%
a 
p-value (0.066) (0.055) (0.005) (0.305) (0.001) 
N 197 62 81 54   
MediumIU (2) -0.38% 0.93% -1.91%
b 
-0.79% 2.84%
b 
p-value (0.455) (0.224) (0.025) (0.461) (0.013) 
N 233 100 68 65   
LowIU (3) 0.04% 0.62% -0.12% -0.76% 0.74% 
p-value (0.916) (0.163) (0.902) (0.292) (0.488) 
N 278 134 57 87   
H-L [(1)-(3)] -1.30%
c 
1.15% -3.50%
b 
-0.43%   
p-value (0.095) (0.257) (0.027) (0.749)   
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Table 5.6 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of High and Low Uncertainty Acquirers 
by Size of the Acquiring Firm 
 
This table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) 
surrounding the announcement of high and low information uncertainty acquirers by the size of 
the acquirer. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
ARit = Rit - Rmt 
where Rit is the return on firm i at time t and Rmt is the value-weighted Market Index Return 
(FT-All Share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). The 33% smallest acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% largest as low 
uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Size is measured as the market 
capitalization (MV) of the bidding firm 20 days before the announcement date of the deal. Panel 
A illustrates the gains to acquirers for the entire sample, Panel B for acquisitions for private 
target firms and Panel C for acquisitions for public target firms and the method of payment 
(cash, stock and mixed (combined offer of both cash and stock). The number of bids for each 
category is reported below the mean return. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are 
represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘, respectively. The H-L [(1)-(3)] represents the differences in 
mean CARs for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high versus low 
uncertainty bidders. The Dif (cash-stock) represents the differences in mean CARs for the five 
days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of cash versus stock offers. P-values are 
reported in brackets. 
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Table 5.6-Continued 
Panel A: Entire Sample 
  All HighIU (1) MediumIU (2) LowIU (3) H-L [(1)-(3)] 
All 1.46%
a 
2.50%
a 
1.20%
a 
0.67%
a 
1.83%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 7,019 2,340 2,339 2,340   
Panel B: Private Targets 
   All Cash Stock Mixed Dif(Cash-Stock) 
All 1.69%
a 
1.13%
a 
3.60%
a 
1.82%
a 
-2.47%
b 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) 
N 4,058 1,416 248 2,394   
HighIU (1) 2.81%
a 
2.30%
a 
5.09%
a 
2.69%
a 
-2.79%
c 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.085) 
N 1,561 385 140 1,036   
MediumIU (2) 1.32%
a 
0.92%
a 
1.80% 1.52%
a 
-0.88% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.189) (0.000) (0.524) 
N 1,410 499 58 853   
LowIU (3) 0.56%
a 
0.48%
b 
1.51% 0.54%
c 
-1.03% 
p-value (0.002) (0.032) (0.197) (0.064) (0.387) 
N 1,087 532 50 505   
H-L [(1)-(3)] 2.25%
a 
1.81%
a 
3.57%
c 
2.15%
a 
  
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.066) (0.000)   
Panel C: Public Targets 
   All Cash Stock Mixed Dif(Cash-Stock) 
All -0.46% 0.95%
b 
-2.04%
a 
-0.89%
c 
2.99%
a 
p-value (0.113) (0.012) (0.001) (0.099) (0.000) 
N 713 297 208 208   
HighIU (1) -1.31% 2.44%
c 
-3.33%
a 
-0.98% 5.77%
a 
p-value (0.936) (0.051) (0.009) (0.447) (0.001) 
N 160 38 78 44   
MediumIU (2) -0.68% 0.95% -1.59%
b 
-1.35% 2.54%
b 
p-value (0.126) (0.184) (0.020) (0.157) (0.010) 
N 199 66 76 57   
LowIU (3) 0.05% 0.65% -0.81% -0.61% 1.46% 
p-value (0.904) (0.164) (0.521) (0.422) (0.278) 
N 354 193 54 107   
H-L [(1)-(3)] -1.36% 1.79% -2.52% -0.36%   
p-value (0.120) (0.174) (0.156) (0.808)   
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Table 5.7 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of High and Low Uncertainty Acquirers 
by Sigma of the Acquiring Firm 
 
This table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) 
surrounding the announcement of high and low information uncertainty acquirers by the sigma 
of the acquirer. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
ARit = Rit - Rmt 
where Rit is the return on firm i at time t and Rmt is the value-weighted Market Index Return 
(FT-All Share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). The 33% highest sigma acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% lowest 
sigma as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Sigma is measured by 
the standard deviation of daily excess returns 200 days before the announcement date of the 
deal. Panel A illustrates the gains to acquirers for the entire sample, Panel B for acquisitions for 
private target firms and Panel C for acquisitions for public target firms and the method of 
payment (cash, stock and mixed (combined offer of both cash and stock). The number of bids 
for each category is reported below the mean return. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are 
represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘, respectively. The H-L [(1)-(3)] represents the differences in 
mean CARs for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high versus low 
uncertainty bidders. The Dif (cash-stock) represents the differences in mean CARs for the five 
days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of cash versus stock offers. P-values are 
reported in brackets. 
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Table 5.7-Continued 
Panel A: Entire Sample 
  All HighIU (1) MediumIU (2) LowIU (3) H-L [(1)-(3)] 
All 1.43%
a 
2.27%
a 
1.20%
a 
0.81%
a 
1.46%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 6,697 2,233 2,231 2,233   
 Panel B: Private Targets 
 
Private 
  
  
  
  
  All Cash Stock Mixed Dif(Cash-Stock) 
All 1.66%
a 
1.10%
a 
3.83%
a 
1.76%
a 
-2.73%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) 
N 3,840 1,353 240 2,247   
HighIU (1) 2.46%
a 
1.81%
a 
4.52%
a 
2.44%
a 
-2.71%
c 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.089) 
N 1,385 395 135 855   
MediumIU (2) 1.40%
a 
0.98%
a 
3.90%
a 
1.52%
a 
-2.92%
b 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.040) 
N 1,293 489 43 761   
LowIU (3) 0.98%
a 
0.62%
a 
2.28% 1.12%
a 
-1.66% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.175) (0.000) (0.323) 
N 1,162 469 62 631   
H-L [(1)-(3)] 1.48%
a 
1.19%
b 
2.24% 1.32%
a 
  
p-value (0.000) (0.017) (0.321) (0.002)   
Panel C: Public Targets 
  
Public 
  
  
  
  
  All Cash Stock Mixed Dif(Cash-Stock) 
All -0.46% 0.96%
b 
-2.15%
a 
-0.84% 3.11%
a 
p-value (0.118) (0.013) (0.001) (0.126) (0.000) 
N 695 291 200 204   
HighIU (1) -0.61% 1.94%
b 
-4.10%
a 
0.45% 6.04%
a 
p-value (0.360) (0.045) (0.001) (0.707) (0.000) 
N 245 88 86 71   
MediumIU (2) -0.23% 1.11%
c 
-0.94% -1.67%
c 
2.05%
b 
p-value (0.594) (0.064) (0.260) (0.068) (0.046) 
N 212 94 59 59   
LowIU (3) -0.51% 0.04% -0.39% -1.41%
b 
0.43% 
p-value (0.143) (0.925) (0.648) (0.036) (0.652) 
N 238 109 55 74   
H-L [(1)-(3)] -0.10% 1.90%
c 
-3.71%
b 
1.86%   
p-value (0.890) (0.072) (0.015) (0.174)   
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Table 5.8 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of High and Low Uncertainty Acquirers 
by Trading Volume of the Acquiring Firm 
This table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) 
surrounding the announcement of high and low information uncertainty acquirers by the trading 
volume of the acquirer. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted 
model: 
ARit = Rit - Rmt 
where Rit is the return on firm i at time t and Rmt is the value-weighted Market Index Return 
(FT-All Share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). The 33% less active acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% most active as 
low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Trading Volume is measured 
as the average of the monthly trading volume of the acquirer before the announcement date of 
the deal. Panel A illustrates the gains to acquirers for the entire sample, Panel B for acquisitions 
for private target firms and Panel C for acquisitions for public target firms and the method of 
payment (cash, stock and mixed (combined offer of both cash and stock). The number of bids 
for each category is reported below the mean return. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are 
represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘, respectively. The H-L [(1)-(3)] represents the differences in 
mean CARs for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high versus low 
uncertainty bidders. The Dif (cash-stock) represents the differences in mean CARs for the five 
days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of cash versus stock offers. P-values are 
reported in brackets. 
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Table 5.8-Continued 
Panel A: Entire Sample 
  All HighIU (1) MediumIU (2) LowIU (3) H-L [(1)-(3)] 
All 1.53%
a 
2.17%
a 
1.57%
a 
0.85%
a 
1.33%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 5,223 1,741 1,741 1,741   
 Panel B: Private Targets 
 
Private 
  
  
  
  
  All Cash Stock Mixed Dif(Cash-Stock) 
All 1.71%
a 
1.22%
a 
3.80%
a 
1.81%
a 
-2.58%
b 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.038) 
N 3,024 1,080 172 1,772   
HighIU (1) 2.46%
a 
2.45%
a 
3.47%
c 
2.35%
a 
-1.02% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.053) (0.000) (0.579) 
N 1,199 310 93 796   
MediumIU (2) 1.48%
a 
0.97%
a 
4.88%
c 
1.54%
a 
-3.90% 
p-value (0.000) (0.002) (0.071) (0.000) (0.148) 
N 1,053 379 44 630   
LowIU (3) 0.87%
a 
0.49%
c 
3.34%
c 
1.05%
a 
-2.85% 
p-value 772 391 35 346   
N (0.000) (0.051) (0.060) (0.002) (0.110) 
H-L [(1)-(3)] (0.000) (0.000) (0.960) (0.007)   
p-value 1.60%
a 
1.96%
a 
0.13% 1.30%
a 
  
 Panel C: Public Targets 
 
Public 
  
  
  
  
  All Cash Stock Mixed Dif(Cash-Stock) 
All -0.39% 1.10%
b 
-2.71%
a 
-0.64% 3.81%
a 
p-value (0.270) (0.011) (0.002) (0.321) (0.000) 
N 533 239 137 157   
HighIU (1) -2.24%
b 
3.27%
b 
-6.43%
a 
-2.82%
b 
9.70%
a 
p-value (0.020) (0.028) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) 
N 115 37 44 34   
MediumIU (2) 0.09% 0.66% -2.01%
c 
1.67% 2.67%
c 
p-value (0.885) (0.411) (0.084) (0.228) (0.058) 
N 145 59 46 40   
LowIU (3) 0.13% 0.72% 0.09% -0.85% 0.63% 
p-value (0.765) (0.165) (0.951) (0.316) (0.686) 
N 273 143 47 83   
H-L [(1)-(3)] -2.38%
b 
2.55%
c 
-6.52%
a 
-1.97%   
p-value (0.025) (0.100) (0.004) (0.203)   
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Table 5.9 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of High and Low Uncertainty and High 
and Low Synchronicity Acquirers by Age of the Acquiring Firm 
This table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) 
surrounding the announcement of high and low information uncertainty acquirers by the age of 
the acquirer and high and low synchronicity acquirers. Synchronicity is measured as the R
2
 of 
the following regression: 
ri,j,t= βi,0 + βi,m rm,t + βi,j rj,t +εi,t 
 
where ri,j,t is the return of bidder i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t and rj,t 
is the return of industry j at time t. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-
adjusted model: 
ARit = Rit - Rmt 
where Rit is the return on firm i at time t and Rmt is the value-weighted Market Index Return 
(FT-All Share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). The 33% youngest acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% oldest as low 
uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Age is measured as the difference 
between the incorporation date of the firm until the announcement date of the deal. The lowest 
33% R
2
 firms are classified as low synchronicity, the highest 33% R
2
 firms as high 
synchronicity and the rest as medium. Panel A illustrates the gains to acquirers for the entire 
sample, Panel B for acquisitions for private target firms only, Panel C for acquisitions for 
private target paid for with cash, Panel D for acquisitions for private target paid for with equity, 
Panel F for acquisitions for public target firms only, Panel G for acquisitions for public target 
paid for with cash and Panel H for acquisitions for public target paid for with stock. Cash deals 
are deals financed with 100% cash and stock deals are deals financed 100% with stock. The L-
H [(2)-(1)] at the last row of each panel represents the differences in mean CARs for the five 
days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of low versus high synchronicity bidders. 
The H-L [(4)-(5)] at the last column of each panel represents the differences in mean CARs for 
the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high versus low uncertainty 
bidders. The diagonal differential in each panel represent the difference in mean CARs for the 
five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement between low synchronicity-high 
uncertainty versus high synchronicity-low uncertainty bidders. Panels E and I illustrate the 
differentials of cash versus stock acquisitions for private and public targets respectively for all 
the combinations of portfolios. The number of bids for each category is reported below the 
mean return. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘, 
respectively. P-values are reported in brackets. 
Panel A: Entire Sample 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All 1.55%
a 
1.95%
a 
1.02%
a 
1.64%
a 
0.92%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 6,043 2,066 1,964 2,013   
HighSynchr (1) 0.93%
a 
1.43%
a 
0.53%
a 
1.08%
a 
0.90%
c 
p-value (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.058) 
N 2,015 505 891 619   
LowSynchr (2) 1.91%
a 
2.22%
a 
1.16%
a 
2.09%
a 
1.06%
b 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) 
N 2,015 805 506 704   
MediumSynchr (3) 1.81%
a 
2.01%
a 
1.68%
a 
1.69%
a 
0.32% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.459) 
N 2,013 756 567 690   
L-H [(2)-(1)] 0.98%
a 
0.78% 0.63%
c 
1.01%
b 
1.69%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.177) (0.060) (0.018) (0.000) 
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Table 5.9-Continued 
Panel B: Private Targets 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All 1.79%
a 
2.17%
a 
1.11%
a
 1.92%
a 
1.06%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
N 3,541 1,347 979 1,215   
HighSynchr (1) 1.08%
a 
1.26%
b 
0.62%
b 
1.45%
a 
0.63% 
p-value (0.000) (0.035) (0.031) (0.000) (0.338) 
N 1,058 315 400 343   
LowSynchr (2) 2.20%
a 
2.61%
a 
1.39%
a 
2.24%
a 
1.21%
b 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.040) 
N 1,277 547 293 437   
MediumSynchr (3) 1.98%
a 
2.28%
a 
1.50%
a 
1.96%
a 
0.78% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.181) 
N 1,206 485 286 435   
L-H [(2)-(1)] 1.12%
a 
1.35%
c 
0.77%
c 
0.79% 1.98%
a 
p-value (0.002) (0.073) (0.100) (0.160) (0.000) 
Panel C: Private Targets paid with by Cash 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All 1.22%
a 
1.64%
a 
0.64%
a 
1.56%
a 
1.00%
b 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.037) 
N 1,201 351 471 379   
HighSynchr (1) 0.59%
b 
0.06% 0.19% 1.64%
a 
-0.13% 
p-value (0.021) (0.939) (0.517) (0.000) (0.873) 
N 451 96 222 133   
LowSynchr (2) 1.83%
a 
2.43%
a
 0.89%
b 
2.09%
a 
1.54%
c 
p-value (0.000) (0.003) (0.032) (0.010) (0.087) 
N 371 131 117 123   
MediumSynchr (3) 1.38%
a 
2.02%
a
 1.18%
b 
0.95% 0.85% 
p-value (0.000) (0.002) (0.011) (0.121) (0.280) 
N 379 124 132 123   
L-H [(2)-(1)] 1.24%
a 
2.37%
b
 0.70% 0.45% 2.24%
a 
p-value (0.010) (0.032) (0.164) (0.618) (0.009) 
Panel D: Private Targets paid with by Stock 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All 3.80%
a 
5.08%
a
 1.93% 3.00%
c 
3.15% 
p-value (0.000) (0.005) (0.163) (0.065) (0.160) 
N 226 106 37 83   
HighSynchr (1) 1.10% 1.65% 0.49% 0.84% 1.16% 
p-value (0.500) (0.637) (0.807) (0.533) (0.772) 
N 60 26 16 18   
LowSynchr (2) 5.75%
a 
6.32%
c
 4.20%
b 
5.65%
c 
2.11% 
p-value (0.003) (0.062) (0.030) (0.060) (0.568) 
N 80 36 11 33   
MediumSynchr (3) 3.87%
b 
6.09%
b
 1.72% 1.48% 4.36% 
p-value (0.030) (0.026) (0.637) (0.599) (0.334) 
N 86 44 10 32   
L-H [(2)-(1)] 4.65%
c 
4.67% 3.71% 4.81% 5.83% 
p-value (0.064) (0.331) (0.161) (0.138) (0.134) 
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 Table 5.9-Continued 
Panel E: DifferentIUl (Private Cash - Private Stock) 
  All HighIU LowIU MediumIU   
All -2.57%
b 
-3.44%
c 
-1.29% -1.44%   
p-value (0.016) (0.062) (0.354) (0.385)   
HighSynchr -0.51% -1.59% -0.30% 0.80%   
p-value (0.757) (0.657) (0.882) (0.571)   
LowSynchr -3.92%
b 
-3.88% -3.31%
c 
-3.55%   
p-value (0.047) (0.257) (0.079) (0.244)   
MediumSynchr -2.49% -4.07% -0.55% -0.53%   
p-value (0.167) (0.141) (0.881) (0.854)   
Panel F: Public Targets 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All -0.48% -1.28%
c 
0.21% -0.55% -1.49%
c 
p-value (0.133) (0.077) (0.613) (0.309) (0.073) 
N 636 185 242 209   
HighSynchr (1) -0.31% -0.88% 0.31% -0.90% -1.19% 
p-value (0.484) (0.505) (0.518) (0.272) (0.397) 
N 267 61 129 77   
LowSynchr (2) -0.78% -2.50%
c 
0.06% 0.05% -2.56% 
p-value (0.240) (0.061) (0.957) (0.961) (0.127) 
N 166 54 50 62   
MediumSynchr (3) -0.45% -0.69% 0.11% -0.71% -0.80% 
p-value (0.452) (0.551) (0.903) (0.475) (0.587) 
N 203 70 63 70   
L-H [(2)-(1)] -0.47% -1.62% -0.25% 0.95% -2.81%
b 
p-value (0.557) (0.381) (0.824) (0.477) (0.047) 
Panel G: Public Targets paid by with Cash 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All 1.14%
a 
2.09%
b 
0.94%
c 
0.78% 1.15% 
p-value (0.007) (0.039) (0.065) (0.356) (0.305) 
N 253 56 111 86   
HighSynchr (1) 1.16%
b 
1.76% 0.80% 1.51% 0.96% 
p-value (0.018) (0.248) (0.166) (0.131) (0.551) 
N 136 22 75 39   
LowSynchr (2) 2.27%
c 
3.85%
c 
0.84% 1.85% 3.01% 
p-value (0.062) (0.085) (0.492) (0.461) (0.223) 
N 45 16 13 16   
MediumSynchr (3) 0.41% 0.93% 1.47% -0.69% -0.54% 
p-value (0.659) (0.592) (0.326) (0.661) (0.813) 
N 72 18 23 31   
L-H [(2)-(1)] 1.11% 2.09% 0.04% 0.34% 3.05% 
p-value (0.389) (0.421) (0.975) (0.899) (0.176) 
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 Table 5.9-Continued 
Panel H: Public Targets paid by with Stock 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All -2.35%
a 
-3.87%
a 
-0.28% -2.25%
b 
-3.58%
b 
p-value (0.001) (0.005) (0.786) (0.011) (0.035) 
N 187 75 52 60   
HighSynchr (1) -2.32%
c 
-3.73% 0.61% -4.52%
b 
-4.34% 
p-value (0.072) (0.201) (0.618) (0.021) (0.169) 
N 57 22 21 14   
LowSynchr (2) -2.80%
b 
-5.89%
a 
-0.14% -1.23% -5.75% 
p-value (0.016) (0.003) (0.965) (0.403) (0.117) 
N 62 24 13 25   
MediumSynchr (3) -1.96%
c 
-2.30% -1.43% -1.95% -0.87% 
p-value (0.080) (0.315) (0.376) (0.145) (0.753) 
N 68 29 18 21   
L-H [(2)-(1)] -0.48% -2.16% -0.75% 3.29% -6.50%
a 
p-value (0.779) (0.523) (0.821) (0.152) (0.005) 
Panel I: DifferentIUl (Public Cash - Public Stock) 
  All HighIU LowIU MediumIU   
All 3.49%
a 
5.96%
a 
1.23% 3.03%
b 
  
p-value (0.000) (0.001) (0.290) (0.013)   
HighSynchr 3.49%
b 
5.49%
c 
0.19% 6.03%
a 
  
p-value (0.012) (0.095) (0.888) (0.006)   
LowSynchr 5.07%
a 
9.74%
a 
0.98% 3.08%   
p-value (0.003) (0.001) (0.767) (0.289)   
MediumSynchr 2.36% 3.23% 2.90% 1.26%   
p-value (0.101) (0.258) (0.185) (0.534)   
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Table 5.10 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of High and Low Uncertainty and High 
and Low Synchronicity Acquirers by Size of the Acquiring Firm 
This table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) 
surrounding the announcement of high and low information uncertainty acquirers by the size of 
the acquirer and high and low synchronicity acquirers. Synchronicity is measured as the R
2
 of 
the following regression: 
ri,j,t= βi,0 + βi,m rm,t + βi,j rj,t +εi,t 
 
where ri,j,t is the return of bidder i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t and rj,t 
is the return of industry j at time t. 
 Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
ARit = Rit - Rmt 
where Rit is the return on firm i at time t and Rmt is the value-weighted Market Index Return 
(FT-All Share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). The 33% smallest acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% largest as low 
uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Size is measured as the market 
capitalization (MV) of the bidding firm 20 days before the announcement date of the deal. The 
lowest 33% R
2
 firms are classified as low synchronicity, the highest 33% R
2
 firms as high 
synchronicity and the rest as medium. Panel A illustrates the gains to acquirers for the entire 
sample, Panel B for acquisitions for private target firms only, Panel C for acquisitions for 
private target paid for with cash, Panel D for acquisitions for private target paid for with equity, 
Panel F for acquisitions for public target firms only, Panel G for acquisitions for public target 
paid for with cash and Panel H for acquisitions for public target paid for with stock. Cash deals 
are deals financed with 100% cash and stock deals are deals financed 100% with stock. The L-
H [(2)-(1)] at the last row of each panel represents the differences in mean CARs for the five 
days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of low versus high synchronicity bidders. 
The H-L [(4)-(5)] at the last column of each panel represents the differences in mean CARs for 
the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high versus low uncertainty 
bidders. The diagonal differential in each panel represent the difference in mean CARs for the 
five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement between low synchronicity-high 
uncertainty versus high synchronicity-low uncertainty bidders. Panels E and I illustrate the 
differentials of cash versus stock acquisitions for private and public targets respectively for all 
the combinations of portfolios. The number of bids for each category is reported below the 
mean return. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘, 
respectively. P-values are reported in brackets. 
Panel A: Entire Sample 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All 1.55%
a 
2.70%
a 
0.64%
a 
1.37%
a 
2.06%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 6,043 1,972 2,114 1,957   
HighSynchr (1) 0.93%
a 
1.96%
a 
0.45%
a 
1.53%
a 
1.52%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.009) 
N 2,015 304 1,248 463   
LowSynchr (2) 1.91%
a 
2.72%
a 
1.24%
a 
1.16%
a 
1.48%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) 
N 2,015 950 331 734   
MediumSynchr (3) 1.81%
a 
2.97%
a 
0.72%
a 
1.47%
a 
2.26%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 2,013 718 535 760   
L-H [(2)-(1)] 0.98%
a 
0.75% 0.79%
b 
-0.37% 2.27%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.255) (0.044) (0.410) (0.000) 
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 Table 5.10-Continued 
Panel B: Private Targets 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All 1.79%
a 
3.03%
a 
0.51%
a 
1.47%
a 
2.52%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 3,541 1,337 988 1,216   
HighSynchr (1) 1.08%
a 
2.21%
a 
0.45%
c 
1.52%
a 
1.76%
b 
p-value (0.000) (0.003) (0.084) (0.001) (0.024) 
N 1,058 201 564 293   
LowSynchr (2) 2.20%
a 
3.11%
a 
1.10%
b 
1.29%
a 
2.01%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.002) 
N 1,277 658 158 461   
MediumSynchr (3) 1.98%
a 
3.26%
a 
0.29% 1.63%
a 
2.98%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.435) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 1,206 478 266 462   
L-H [(2)-(1)] 1.12%
a 
0.90% 0.65% -0.23% 2.66%
a 
p-value (0.002) (0.292) (0.237) (0.688) (0.000) 
Panel C: Private Targets paid with by Cash 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All 1.22%
a 
2.66%
a 
0.46%
c 
1.02%
a 
2.20%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 1,201 313 480 408   
HighSynchr (1) 0.59%
b 
1.37% 0.50%
c 
0.44% 0.87% 
p-value (0.021) (0.205) (0.100) (0.321) (0.435) 
N 451 53 293 105   
LowSynchr (2) 1.83%
a 
3.02%
a 
0.04% 1.36%
a 
2.98%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.948) (0.002) (0.004) 
N 371 156 63 152   
MediumSynchr (3) 1.38%
a 
2.78%
a 
0.58% 1.08%
b 
2.21%
b 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.260) (0.024) (0.016) 
N 379 104 124 151   
L-H [(2)-(1)] 1.24%
a 
1.65% -0.46% 0.92% 2.52%
a 
p-value (0.010) (0.226) (0.499) (0.137) (0.005) 
Panel D: Private Targets paid with by Stock 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All 3.80%
a 
5.51%
a 
1.44% 1.80% 4.06%
c 
p-value (0.000) (0.002) (0.265) (0.213) (0.057) 
N 226 126 45 55   
HighSynchr (1) 1.10% 4.87% 0.76% -2.29% 4.11% 
p-value (0.500) (0.327) (0.686) (0.140) (0.435) 
N 60 16 29 15   
LowSynchr (2) 5.75%
a 
6.57%
b 
5.91%
c 
2.66% 0.66% 
p-value (0.003) (0.011) (0.055) (0.265) (0.844) 
N 80 59 5 16   
MediumSynchr (3) 3.87%
b 
4.48%
c 
1.22% 3.79% 3.26% 
p-value (0.030) (0.100) (0.402) (0.172) (0.284) 
N 86 51 11 24   
L-H [(2)-(1)] 4.65%
c 
1.70% 5.15% 4.94%
c 
5.81%
c 
p-value (0.064) (0.757) (0.102) (0.081) (0.065) 
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 Table 5.10-Continued 
Panel E: DifferentIUl (Private Cash - Private Stock) 
  All HighIU LowIU MediumIU   
All -2.57%
b 
-2.85% -0.99% -0.78%   
p-value (0.016) (0.109) (0.452) (0.593)   
HighSynchr -0.51% -3.51% -0.26% 2.73%
c 
  
p-value (0.757) (0.487) (0.890) (0.092)   
LowSynchr -3.92%
b 
-3.56% -5.87%
c 
-1.29%   
p-value (0.047) (0.179)  (0.054) (0.587)   
MediumSynchr -2.49% -1.69% -0.64% -2.71%   
p-value (0.167) (0.545) (0.672) (0.330)   
Panel F: Public Targets 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All -0.48% -1.47%
c 
0.12% -0.79% -1.59%
c 
p-value (0.133) (0.085) (0.777) (0.115) (0.094) 
N 636 143 327 166   
HighSynchr (1) -0.31% -3.24% 0.13% -0.83% -3.38% 
p-value (0.484) (0.145) (0.780) (0.438) (0.138) 
N 267 24 204 39   
LowSynchr (2) -0.78% -1.35% 0.57% -1.46%
c 
-1.92% 
p-value (0.240) (0.254) (0.652) (0.100) (0.267) 
N 166 66 52 48   
MediumSynchr (3) -0.45% -0.82% -0.26% -0.37% -0.56% 
p-value (0.452) (0.583) (0.798) (0.622) (0.754) 
N 203 53 71 79   
L-H [(2)-(1)] -0.47% 1.90% 0.44% -0.63% -1.48% 
p-value (0.558) (0.443) (0.746) (0.650) (0.244) 
Panel G: Public Targets paid by with Cash 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All 1.14%
a 
3.25%
b 
0.73% 1.27% 2.52%
c 
p-value (0.007) (0.024) (0.150) (0.128) (0.091) 
N 253 31 173 49   
HighSynchr (1) 1.16%
b 
2.36% 1.12%
b 
0.93% 1.24% 
p-value (0.018) (0.180) (0.038) (0.519) (0.469) 
N 136 6 118 12   
LowSynchr (2) 2.27%
c 
4.23%
b 
1.56% 1.32% 2.68% 
p-value (0.062) (0.044) (0.470) (0.425) (0.351) 
N 45 13 21 11   
MediumSynchr (3) 0.41% 2.63% -1.15% 1.41% 3.78% 
p-value (0.659) (0.377) (0.392) (0.279) (0.248) 
N 72 12 34 26   
L-H [(2)-(1)] 1.11% 1.87% 0.43% 0.40% 3.11% 
p-value (0.389) (0.450) (0.845) (0.854) (0.135) 
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 Table 5.10-Continued 
Panel H: Public Targets paid by with Cash 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All -2.35%
a 
-3.82%
a 
-0.74% -2.03%
a 
-3.08%
c 
p-value (0.001) (0.005) (0.569) (0.007) (0.099) 
N 187 71 52 64   
HighSynchr (1) -2.32%
c 
-6.18% -1.08% -2.15% -5.10% 
p-value (0.072) (0.194) (0.482) (0.207) (0.297) 
N 57 11 32 14   
LowSynchr (2) -2.80%
b 
-4.10%
b 
1.14% -2.87%
b 
-5.24% 
p-value (0.016) (0.035) (0.768) (0.015) (0.230) 
N 62 29 10 23   
MediumSynchr (3) -1.96%
c 
-2.71% -1.56% -1.24% -1.16% 
p-value (0.080) (0.177) (0.631) (0.319) (0.758) 
N 68 31 10 27   
L-H [(2)-(1)] -0.48% 2.08% 2.21% -0.72% -3.03% 
p-value (0.779) (0.673) (0.594) (0.714) (0.210) 
Panel I: DifferentIUl (Public Cash - Public Stock) 
  All HighIU LowIU MediumIU   
All 3.49%
a 
7.07%
a 
1.47% 3.30%
a 
  
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.295) (0.003)   
HighSynchr 3.49%
b 
8.54%
c 
2.20% 3.08%   
p-value (0.012) (0.094) (0.178) (0.162)   
LowSynchr 5.07%
a 
8.34%
a 
0.42% 4.19%
b 
  
p-value (0.003) (0.003) (0.923) (0.042)   
MediumSynchr 2.36% 5.34% 0.41% 2.66%   
p-value (0.101) (0.138) (0.907) (0.139)   
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Table 5.11 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of High and Low Uncertainty and High 
and Low Synchronicity Acquirers by Sigma of the Acquiring Firm 
This table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) 
surrounding the announcement of high and low information uncertainty acquirers by the sigma 
of the acquirer and high and low synchronicity acquirers. Synchronicity is measured as the R
2
 
of the following regression: 
ri,j,t= βi,0 + βi,m rm,t + βi,j rj,t +εi,t 
 
where ri,j,t is the return of bidder i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t and rj,t 
is the return of industry j at time t. 
 Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
ARit = Rit - Rmt 
where Rit is the return on firm i at time t and Rmt is the value-weighted Market Index Return 
(FT-All Share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). The 33% highest sigma acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% lowest 
sigma as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Sigma is measured by 
the standard deviation of daily excess returns 200 days before the announcement date of the 
deal. The lowest 33% R
2
 firms are classified as low synchronicity, the highest 33% R
2
 firms as 
high synchronicity and the rest as medium. Panel A illustrates the gains to acquirers for the 
entire sample, Panel B for acquisitions for private target firms only, Panel C for acquisitions for 
private target paid for with cash, Panel D for acquisitions for private target paid for with equity, 
Panel F for acquisitions for public target firms only, Panel G for acquisitions for public target 
paid for with cash and Panel H for acquisitions for public target paid for with stock. Cash deals 
are deals financed with 100% cash and stock deals are deals financed 100% with stock. The L-
H [(2)-(1)] at the last row of each panel represents the differences in mean CARs for the five 
days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of low versus high synchronicity bidders. 
The H-L [(4)-(5)] at the last column of each panel represents the differences in mean CARs for 
the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high versus low uncertainty 
bidders. The diagonal differential in each panel represent the difference in mean CARs for the 
five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement between low synchronicity-high 
uncertainty versus high synchronicity-low uncertainty bidders. Panels E and I illustrate the 
differentials of cash versus stock acquisitions for private and public targets respectively for all 
the combinations of portfolios. The number of bids for each category is reported below the 
mean return. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘, 
respectively. P-values are reported in brackets. 
Panel A: Entire Sample 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All 1.51%
a 
2.32%
a 
0.91%
a 
1.21%
a 
1.42%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 5,834 2,064 1,818 1,952   
HighSynchr (1) 0.87%
a 
1.45%
a 
0.46%
a 
0.78%
a 
0.99%
b 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.020) 
N 1,937 601 718 618   
LowSynchr (2) 1.88%
a 
2.74%
a 
1.16%
a 
1.54%
a 
1.58%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
N 1,939 720 557 662   
MediumSynchr (3) 1.78%
a 
2.62%
a 
1.24%
a 
1.29%
a 
1.38%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
N 1,958 743 543 672   
L-H [(2)-(1)] 1.01%
a 
1.29%
b 
0.70%
a 
0.76%
b 
2.28%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.041) (0.005) (0.030) (0.000) 
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Table 5.11-Continued 
Panel B: Private Targets 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All 1.75%
a 
2.55%
a 
1.06%
a 
1.43%
a 
1.49%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 3,385 1,283 956 1,146   
HighSynchr (1) 0.99%
a 
1.39%
b 
0.52%
a 
1.01%
a 
0.87% 
p-value (0.000) (0.012) (0.006) (0.001) (0.135) 
N 1,003 362 321 320   
LowSynchr (2) 2.16%
a 
3.12%
a 
1.31%
a 
1.77%
a 
1.81%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) 
N 1,222 470 333 419   
MediumSynchr (3) 1.97%
a 
2.88%
a 
1.35%
a 
1.41%
a 
1.53%
b 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) 
N 1,160 451 302 407   
L-H [(2)-(1)] 1.18%
a 
1.73%
b 
0.79%
b 
0.77%
c 
2.60%
a 
p-value (0.001) (0.036) (0.015) (0.085) (0.000) 
Panel C: Private Targets paid with by Cash 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All 1.17%
a 
1.77%
a 
0.74%
a 
1.04%
a 
1.03%
c 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.054) 
N 1,168 360 379 429   
HighSynchr (1) 0.61%
b 
0.47% 0.58%
b 
0.76%
c 
-0.11% 
p-value (0.019) (0.488) (0.023) (0.071) (0.873) 
N 436 126 158 152   
LowSynchr (2) 1.74%
a 
2.75%
b 
0.94%
b 
1.50%
a 
1.81% 
p-value (0.000) (0.014) (0.019) (0.001) (0.126) 
N 360 116 107 137   
MediumSynchr (3) 1.26%
a 
2.19%
a 
0.77%
b 
0.88%
c 
1.42%
c 
p-value (0.000) (0.005) (0.038) (0.063) (0.096) 
N 372 118 114 140   
L-H [(2)-(1)] 1.13%
b 
2.28%
c 
0.36% 0.74% 2.17%
c 
p-value (0.021) (0.079) (0.443) (0.227) (0.058) 
Panel D: Private Targets paid with by Stock 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All 4.04%
a 
4.30%
a 
3.04% 4.49%
a 
1.26% 
p-value (0.000) (0.006) (0.134) (0.006) (0.620) 
N 219 131 51 37   
HighSynchr (1) 1.60% 3.39% 0.03% -0.06% 3.36% 
p-value (0.332) (0.315) (0.982) (0.966) (0.350) 
N 57 27 19 11   
LowSynchr (2) 5.89%
a 
6.57%
b 
3.67% 6.56%
a 
2.90% 
p-value (0.004) (0.046) (0.145) (0.003) (0.471) 
N 77 45 18 14   
MediumSynchr (3) 4.00%
b 
2.99% 6.33% 6.25% -3.34% 
p-value (0.027) (0.126) (0.342) (0.137) (0.625) 
N 85 59 14 12   
L-H [(2)-(1)] 4.28%
c 
3.18% 3.64% 6.62%
a 
6.54%
c 
p-value (0.097) (0.492) (0.193) (0.006) (0.063) 
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 Table 5.11-Continued 
Panel E: DifferentIUl (Private Cash - Private Stock) 
  All HighIU LowIU MediumIU   
All -2.88%
a 
-2.53% -2.30% -3.46%
b 
  
p-value (0.009) (0.122) (0.256) (0.031)   
HighSynchr -0.99% -2.92% 0.55% 0.81%   
p-value (0.551) (0.394) (0.679) (0.554)   
LowSynchr -4.15%
b 
-3.82% -2.73% -5.06%
b 
  
p-value (0.042) (0.264) (0.277) (0.015)   
MediumSynchr -2.74% -0.80% -5.56% -5.37%   
p-value (0.132) (0.700) (0.403) (0.197)   
Panel F: Public Targets 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All -0.47% -0.74% -0.24% -0.39% -0.50% 
p-value (0.142) (0.294) (0.520) (0.405) (0.532) 
N 625 229 204 192   
HighSynchr (1) -0.28% 0.35% -0.16% -1.06% 0.51% 
p-value (0.543) (0.765) (0.718) (0.132) (0.684) 
N 260 80 101 79   
LowSynchr (2) -0.76% -1.58% -0.56% 0.10% -1.02% 
p-value (0.257) (0.241) (0.536) (0.918) (0.527) 
N 164 66 46 52   
MediumSynchr (3) -0.49% -1.14% -0.13% 0.06% -1.01% 
p-value (0.412) (0.342) (0.874) (0.941) (0.490) 
N 201 83 57 61   
L-H [(2)-(1)] -0.48% -1.93% -0.40% 1.16% -1.42% 
p-value (0.549) (0.280) (0.692) (0.337) (0.316) 
Panel G: Public Targets paid by with Cash 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All 1.15%
a 
2.15%
b 
0.48% 0.89% 1.67% 
p-value (0.008) (0.041) (0.305) (0.184) (0.145) 
N 250 80 90 80   
HighSynchr (1) 1.15%
b 
3.14%
b 
0.46% 0.44% 2.68%
c 
p-value (0.020) (0.035) (0.300) (0.585) (0.080) 
N 134 35 58 41   
LowSynchr (2) 2.27%
c 
5.14%
b 
1.16% -0.02% 3.98% 
p-value (0.062) (0.045) (0.504) (0.993) (0.182) 
N 45 17 13 15   
MediumSynchr (3) 0.42% -0.89% 0.10% 2.21% -0.99% 
p-value (0.650) (0.620) (0.946) (0.127) (0.664) 
N 71 28 19 24   
L-H [(2)-(1)] 1.12% 2.01% 0.70% -0.46% 4.69%
c 
p-value (0.385) (0.474) (0.692) (0.807) (0.068) 
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 Table 5.11-Continued 
Panel H: Public Targets paid by with Stock 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All -2.43%
a 
-4.69%
a 
-0.34% -0.89% -4.35%
a 
p-value (0.001) (0.001) (0.712) (0.323) (0.007) 
N 181 80 48 53   
HighSynchr (1) -2.37%
c 
-4.86% 0.15% -1.41% -5.01% 
p-value (0.079) (0.110) (0.941) (0.267) (0.168) 
N 54 21 13 20   
LowSynchr (2) -2.82%
b 
-5.52%
a 
-1.40% -0.30% -4.12% 
p-value (0.019) (0.008) (0.475) (0.880) (0.136) 
N 60 26 14 20   
MediumSynchr (3) -2.12%
c 
-3.93%
c 
0.06% -1.02% -3.99%
c 
p-value (0.060) (0.064) (0.962) (0.373) (0.098) 
N 67 33 21 13   
L-H [(2)-(1)] -0.44% -0.66% -1.56% 1.11% -5.67%
c 
p-value (0.802) (0.851) (0.582) (0.632) (0.051) 
Panel I: DifferentIUl (Public Cash - Public Stock) 
  All HighIU LowIU MediumIU   
All 3.57%
a 
6.84%
a 
0.82% 1.78%   
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.428) (0.113)   
HighSynchr 3.52%
b 
7.99%
b 
0.30% 1.85%   
p-value (0.015) (0.020) (0.887) (0.217)   
LowSynchr 5.09%
a 
10.66%
a 
2.56% 0.28%   
p-value (0.003) (0.001) (0.323) (0.913)   
MediumSynchr 2.54%
c 
3.04% 0.04% 3.24%
c 
  
p-value (0.081) (0.267) (0.983) (0.078)   
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Table 5.12 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of High and Low Uncertainty and High 
and Low Synchronicity Acquirers by Trading Volume of the Acquiring Firm 
This table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) 
surrounding the announcement of high and low information uncertainty acquirers by the trading 
volume of the acquirer and high and low synchronicity acquirers. Synchronicity is measured as 
the R
2
 of the following regression: 
ri,j,t= βi,0 + βi,m rm,t + βi,j rj,t +εi,t 
 
where ri,j,t is the return of bidder i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t and rj,t 
is the return of industry j at time t. 
 Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model: ARit = Rit - Rmt 
where Rit is the return on firm i at time t and Rmt is the value-weighted Market Index Return 
(FT-All Share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). The 33% less active acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% most active as 
low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Trading Volume is measured 
as the average of the monthly trading volume of the acquirer before the announcement date of 
the deal. The lowest 33% R
2
 firms are classified as low synchronicity, the highest 33% R
2
 firms 
as high synchronicity and the rest as medium. Panel A illustrates the gains to acquirers for the 
entire sample, Panel B for acquisitions for private target firms only, Panel C for acquisitions for 
private target paid for with cash, Panel D for acquisitions for private target paid for with equity, 
Panel F for acquisitions for public target firms only, Panel G for acquisitions for public target 
paid for with cash and Panel H for acquisitions for public target paid for with stock. Cash deals 
are deals financed with 100% cash and stock deals are deals financed 100% with stock. The L-
H [(2)-(1)] at the last row of each panel represents the differences in mean CARs for the five 
days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of low versus high synchronicity bidders. 
The H-L [(4)-(5)] at the last column of each panel represents the differences in mean CARs for 
the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement of high versus low uncertainty 
bidders. The diagonal differential in each panel represent the difference in mean CARs for the 
five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement between low synchronicity-high 
uncertainty versus high synchronicity-low uncertainty bidders. Panels E and I illustrate the 
differentials of cash versus stock acquisitions for private and public targets respectively for all 
the combinations of portfolios. The number of bids for each category is reported below the 
mean return. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘, 
respectively. P-values are reported in brackets. 
 
Panel A: Entire Sample 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All 1.56%
a 
2.17%
a 
0.87%
a 
1.65%
a 
1.31%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 4,756 1,592 1,641 1,523   
HighSynchr (1) 0.87%
a 
1.61%
a 
0.62%
a 
1.06%
a 
0.99% 
p-value (0.000) (0.007) (0.001) (0.006) (0.113) 
N 1,653 238 995 420   
LowSynchr (2) 2.00%
a 
1.97%
a 
1.51%
a 
2.29%
a 
0.46% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.430) 
N 1,530 753 250 527   
MediumSynchr (3) 1.84%
a 
2.66%
a 
1.09%
a 
1.50%
a 
1.57%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) 
N 1,573 601 396 576   
L-H [(2)-(1)] 1.13%
a 
0.36% 0.89%
c 
1.23%
b 
1.35%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.615) (0.062) (0.020) (0.002) 
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Table 5.12-Continued 
Panel B: Private Targets 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All 1.76%
a 
2.48%
a 
0.89%
a 
1.58%
a 
1.58%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 2,775 1,110 736 929   
HighSynchr (1) 0.95%
a 
1.66%
b 
0.64%
b 
1.03%
b 
1.03% 
p-value (0.000) (0.029) (0.022) (0.047) (0.203) 
N 850 153 430 267   
LowSynchr (2) 2.36%
a 
2.47%
a 
1.96%
a 
2.32%
a 
0.51% 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.482) 
N 981 537 120 324   
MediumSynchr (3) 1.86%
a 
2.78%
a 
0.80%
c 
1.30%
a 
1.98%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.067) (0.002) (0.005) 
N 944 420 186 338   
L-H [(2)-(1)] 1.41%
a 
0.81% 1.32%
b 
1.29%
c 
1.83%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.357) (0.038) (0.073) (0.001) 
Panel C: Private Targets paid with by Cash 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All 1.27%
a 
2.43%
a 
0.57%
b 
1.07%
a 
1.87%
a 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.002) (0.001) 
N 977 284 369 324   
HighSynchr (1) 0.60%
b 
1.08% 0.44% 0.81% 0.64% 
p-value (0.036) (0.324) (0.187) (0.185) (0.574) 
N 379 38 240 101   
LowSynchr (2) 2.12%
a 
2.95%
a 
1.15%
c 
1.56%
a 
1.80%
c 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.069) (0.010) (0.071) 
N 299 137 55 107   
MediumSynchr (3) 1.28%
a 
2.24%
a 
0.54% 0.84% 1.70%
b 
p-value (0.000) (0.002) (0.289) (0.136) (0.049) 
N 299 109 74 116   
L-H [(2)-(1)] 1.52%
a 
1.87% 0.71% 0.74% 2.52%
a 
p-value (0.003) (0.163) (0.313) (0.382) (0.003) 
Panel D: Private Targets paid with by Stock 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All 4.02%
a 
3.77%
b 
3.34%
c 
5.15%
c 
0.43% 
p-value (0.002) (0.049) (0.060) (0.083) (0.868) 
N 162 87 35 40   
HighSynchr (1) 2.38% -1.50% 1.27% 8.07% -2.77% 
p-value (0.306) (0.475) (0.639) (0.260) (0.414) 
N 40 11 18 11   
LowSynchr (2) 5.51%
b 
4.23% 5.94% 9.73% -1.71% 
p-value (0.021) (0.103) (0.172) (0.209) (0.705) 
N 54 38 5 11   
MediumSynchr (3) 3.80%
c 
4.83% 5.37%
c 
0.56% -0.54% 
p-value (0.072) (0.172) (0.071) (0.804) (0.902) 
N 68 38 12 18   
L-H [(2)-(1)] 3.13% 5.73%
c 
4.67% 1.66% 2.96% 
p-value (0.338) (0.084) (0.321) (0.869) (0.423) 
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Table 5.12-Continued 
Panel E: DifferentIUl (Private Cash - Private Stock) 
  All HighIU LowIU MediumIU   
All -2.74%
b 
-1.34% -2.78% -4.08%   
p-value (0.037) (0.495) (0.119) (0.169)   
HighSynchr -1.77% 2.58% -0.83% -7.26%   
p-value (0.447) (0.277) (0.761) (0.310)   
LowSynchr -3.39% -1.28% -4.79% -8.17%   
p-value (0.155) (0.632) (0.253) (0.287)   
MediumSynchr -2.52% -2.59% -4.83% 0.27%   
p-value (0.236) (0.469) (0.103) (0.906)   
Panel F: Public Targets 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All -0.41% -2.33%
b 
0.16% 0.10% -2.49%
b 
p-value (0.277) (0.019) (0.739) (0.881) (0.024) 
N 500 110 257 133   
HighSynchr (1) -0.26% -3.87% 0.06% -0.11% -3.93% 
p-value (0.619) (0.192) (0.912) (0.922) (0.192) 
N 218 16 166 36   
LowSynchr (2) -0.80% -2.77%
b 
0.39% 0.65% -3.16% 
p-value (0.297) (0.034) (0.802) (0.568) (0.120) 
N 133 54 31 48   
MediumSynchr (3) -0.28% -1.14% 0.30% -0.29% -1.44% 
p-value (0.708) (0.526) (0.773) (0.804) (0.487) 
N 149 40 60 49   
L-H [(2)-(1)] -0.54% 1.10% 0.33% 0.77% -2.83%
b 
p-value (0.556) (0.726) (0.843) (0.636) (0.046) 
Panel G: Public Targets paid by with Cash 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All 1.12%
b 
3.14%
b 
0.76% 0.63% 2.38% 
p-value (0.017) (0.038) (0.184) (0.466) (0.135) 
N 217 36 129 52   
HighSynchr (1) 1.02%
c 
2.67% 1.12%
c 
0.04% 1.54% 
p-value (0.058) (0.216) (0.084) (0.970) (0.466) 
N 115 6 90 19   
LowSynchr (2) 2.22%
c 
2.29% 0.87% 3.22% 1.43% 
p-value (0.086) (0.338) (0.677) (0.170) (0.647) 
N 41 14 12 15   
MediumSynchr (3) 0.58% 4.06% -0.49% -0.90% 4.55% 
p-value (0.568) (0.134) (0.737) (0.472) (0.135) 
N 61 16 27 18   
L-H [(2)-(1)] 1.19% -0.37% -0.25% 3.19% 1.17% 
p-value (0.386) (0.902) (0.907) (0.203) (0.632) 
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Table 5.12-Continued 
Panel H: Public Targets paid by with Stock 
  All HighIU (4) LowIU (5) MediumIU (6) H-L [(4)-(5)] 
All -2.79%
a 
-6.85%
a 
0.01% -2.02%
c 
-6.86%
a 
p-value (0.002) (0.001) (0.994) (0.093) (0.005) 
N 130 40 46 44   
HighSynchr (1) -2.59% -13.30% -1.33% -0.40% -11.96% 
p-value (0.132) (0.110) (0.451) (0.918) (0.141) 
N 41 5 27 9   
LowSynchr (2) -3.00%
b 
-6.48%
b 
2.00% -1.81% -8.47% 
p-value (0.036) (0.012) (0.655) (0.217) (0.108) 
N 45 18 8 19   
MediumSynchr (3) -2.75%
c 
-5.34%
c 
1.87% -3.18% -7.21% 
p-value (0.098) (0.093) (0.606) (0.118) (0.132) 
N 44 17 11 16   
L-H [(2)-(1)] -0.41% 6.82% 3.33% -1.42% -5.14%
c 
p-value (0.849) (0.368) (0.488) (0.729) (0.085) 
Panel I: DifferentIUl (Public Cash - Public Stock) 
  All HighIU LowIU MediumIU   
All 3.91%
a 
9.99%
a 
0.75% 2.65%
c 
  
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.640) (0.072)   
HighSynchr 3.61%
b 
15.96%
c 
2.46% 0.43%   
p-value (0.046) (0.069) (0.195) (0.913)   
LowSynchr 5.22%
a 
8.77%
b 
-1.13% 5.03%
c 
  
p-value (0.007) (0.012) (0.817) (0.068)   
MediumSynchr 3.33%
c 
9.40%
b 
-2.35% 2.27%   
p-value (0.086) (0.024) (0.544) (0.327)   
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Table 5.13 Correlation Matrix Table for Control Variables 
This Table presents the correlations coefficient among all the variable that are used in the multivariate analysis. Information Uncertainty (IU) is 
captured by four proxies. The 33% youngest acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% oldest as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of 
medium uncertainty. Age is measured as the difference between the incorporation date of the firm until the announcement date of the deal. The 33% 
smallest acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% largest as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Size is 
measured as the market capitalization (MV) of the bidding firm 20 days before the announcement date of the deal. The 33% highest sigma acquirers are 
classified as high uncertainty, the 33% lowest sigma as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Sigma is measured by the 
standard deviation of daily excess returns 200 days before the announcement date of the deal. Finally, the 33% less active acquirers are classified as 
high uncertainty, the 33% most active as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Trading Volume is measured as the average 
of the monthly trading volume of the acquirer before the announcement date of the deal. Synchronicity is the logarithmic transformation of R
2
. 
Synchronicity is measured as the R
2
 of the following regression: 
ri,j,t= βi,0 + βi,m rm,t + βi,j rj,t +εi,t 
where ri,j,t is the return of bidder i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t and rj,t is the return of industry j at time t. The lowest 33% R
2
 
firms are classified as low synchronicity, the highest 33% R
2
 firms as high synchronicity and the rest as medium. 
HighIU dummy takes the value of 1 of the bid was announced by a high information uncertainty bidder according to the four proxies, and zero 
otherwise. The LowSynchr dummy takes the value of 1 if the bid was announced by a low synchronicity bidder and zero otherwise. Target ownership 
status dummy takes the value of one if the target is private and zero otherwise; cash (stock) deals is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for 
acquisitions financed with 100% cash (stock) and 0 otherwise. Diversifying deals is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the acquirer‘s two-digit 
SIC code is different from that of the target and 0 otherwise. Bidder‘s market-to-book is measured by the bidder‘s market value a month before the 
announcement of the deal divided by its net book value of assets; a deal‘s relative size is the ratio between target and bidder size. Domestic deals 
dummy takes the value of 1 for acquisitions of UK firms and zero otherwise. Finally, other explanatory variables include: the acquirer‘s lagged excess 
return for 180 days prior to the bid‘s announcement; and the market portfolio return (FT-All Share) for the same 180-day period prior to the 
announcement. 
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Table 5.13-continued 
Panel A: Age 
  HighIU LowSynchr. HsHiu HsLiu LsHiu LsLiu Private Cash Stock MTBV Relative Size Domestic Diversifying FTALLSH Ri-Rm 
HighIU 1 
             
  
LowSynchr. 0.086 1 
            
  
HsHiu 0.419 -0.214 1 
           
  
HsLiu -0.300 -0.294 -0.126 1 
          
  
LsHiu 0.544 0.554 -0.118 -0.163 1 
         
  
LsLiu -0.218 0.427 -0.091 -0.126 -0.119 1 
        
  
Private 0.088 0.069 0.023 -0.116 0.074 -0.004 1 
       
  
Cash -0.140 -0.107 -0.036 0.170 -0.098 0.023 -0.251 1 
      
  
Stock 0.055 0.022 0.032 -0.054 0.013 -0.032 -0.072 -0.265 1 
     
  
MTBV 0.033 -0.009 0.044 -0.023 -0.009 -0.014 0.011 -0.028 0.016 1 
    
  
Relative Size 0.049 0.009 -0.009 -0.045 0.023 -0.017 0.000 -0.076 0.138 -0.011 1 
   
  
Domestic 0.096 0.100 0.003 -0.149 0.092 0.001 0.012 -0.118 0.075 -0.028 0.011 1 
  
  
Diversifying -0.106 -0.028 -0.035 0.084 -0.079 0.068 0.027 0.002 0.012 -0.030 0.030 0.016 1 
 
  
FTALLSH -0.040 0.083 -0.069 -0.020 0.032 0.066 -0.020 0.013 0.024 0.020 0.005 0.030 0.029 1   
Ri-Rm 0.070 0.024 0.034 -0.050 0.028 -0.027 0.037 -0.070 0.098 0.075 0.002 0.003 -0.007 0.025 1 
Panel B: Size 
  HighIU LowSynchr. HsHiu HsLiu LsHiu LsLiu Private Cash Stock MTBV Relative Size Domestic Diversifying FTALLSH Ri-Rm 
HighIU 1 
             
  
LowSynchr. 0.219 1 
            
  
HsHiu 0.331 -0.163 1 
           
  
HsLiu -0.355 -0.361 -0.117 1 
          
  
LsHiu 0.621 0.611 -0.099 -0.220 1 
         
  
LsLiu -0.168 0.340 -0.055 -0.123 -0.104 1 
        
  
Private 0.127 0.069 0.035 -0.139 0.094 -0.053 1 
       
  
Cash -0.208 -0.107 -0.047 0.183 -0.147 0.043 -0.251 1 
      
  
Stock 0.093 0.022 0.018 -0.052 0.060 -0.020 -0.072 -0.265 1 
     
  
MTBV -0.027 -0.009 0.014 0.000 -0.024 0.043 0.011 -0.028 0.016 1 
    
  
Relative Size 0.133 0.009 0.045 -0.059 0.056 -0.024 0.000 -0.076 0.138 -0.011 1 
   
  
Domestic 0.235 0.100 0.082 -0.228 0.137 -0.045 0.012 -0.118 0.075 -0.028 0.011 1 
  
  
Diversifying -0.038 -0.028 -0.020 0.039 -0.032 -0.003 0.027 0.002 0.012 -0.030 0.030 0.016 1 
 
  
FTALLSH -0.005 0.083 -0.047 -0.033 0.032 0.042 -0.020 0.013 0.024 0.020 0.005 0.030 0.029 1   
Ri-Rm -0.007 0.024 -0.012 -0.022 0.003 0.014 0.037 -0.070 0.098 0.075 0.002 0.003 -0.007 0.025 1 
 
 
Chapter 5: Information Uncertainty, Private Information and Bidder Cains 
349 
 
 Table 5.13-continued 
 Panel C: Sigma 
  HighIU LowSynchr. HsHiu HsLiu LsHiu LsLiu Private Cash Stock MTBV Relative Size Domestic Diversifying FTALLSH Ri-Rm 
HighIU 1 
             
  
LowSynchr. 0.026 1 
            
  
HsHiu 0.458 -0.239 1 
           
  
HsLiu -0.277 -0.264 -0.127 1 
          
  
LsHiu 0.507 0.532 -0.127 -0.141 1 
         
  
LsLiu -0.240 0.460 -0.110 -0.122 -0.122 1 
        
  
Private 0.067 0.069 0.015 -0.101 0.055 0.012 1 
       
  
Cash -0.138 -0.107 -0.021 0.133 -0.108 -0.028 -0.251 1 
      
  
Stock 0.106 0.022 0.017 -0.048 0.068 -0.013 -0.072 -0.265 1 
     
  
MTBV 0.029 -0.009 0.002 0.009 0.022 -0.009 0.011 -0.028 0.016 1 
    
  
Relative Size 0.061 0.009 -0.003 -0.032 0.039 -0.016 0.000 -0.076 0.138 -0.011 1 
   
  
Domestic -0.021 0.100 -0.083 -0.096 0.038 0.068 0.012 -0.118 0.075 -0.028 0.011 1 
  
  
Diversifying -0.059 -0.028 -0.014 0.044 -0.041 0.028 0.027 0.002 0.012 -0.030 0.030 0.016 1 
 
  
FTALLSH -0.205 0.083 -0.201 0.096 -0.025 0.124 -0.020 0.013 0.024 0.020 0.005 0.030 0.029 1   
Ri-Rm 0.133 0.024 0.029 -0.047 0.093 -0.039 0.037 -0.070 0.098 0.075 0.002 0.003 -0.007 0.025 1 
Panel D: Trading Volume 
  HighIU LowSynchr. HsHiu HsLiu LsHiu LsLiu Private Cash Stock MTBV Relative Size Domestic Diversifying FTALLSH Ri-Rm 
HighIU 1 
             
  
LowSynchr. 0.230 1 
            
  
HsHiu 0.324 -0.158 1 
           
  
HsLiu -0.365 -0.354 -0.118 1 
          
  
LsHiu 0.611 0.630 -0.100 -0.223 1 
         
  
LsLiu -0.167 0.342 -0.054 -0.121 -0.102 1 
        
  
Private 0.157 0.069 0.028 -0.158 0.114 -0.049 1 
       
  
Cash -0.193 -0.107 -0.046 0.187 -0.140 0.047 -0.251 1 
      
  
Stock 0.053 0.022 0.005 -0.048 0.028 0.002 -0.072 -0.265 1 
     
  
MTBV 0.015 -0.009 -0.007 -0.001 0.002 0.031 0.011 -0.028 0.016 1 
    
  
Relative Size 0.106 0.009 0.031 -0.053 0.044 -0.020 0.000 -0.076 0.138 -0.011 1 
   
  
Domestic 0.186 0.100 0.063 -0.219 0.109 -0.038 0.012 -0.118 0.075 -0.028 0.011 1 
  
  
Diversifying -0.040 -0.028 -0.001 0.036 -0.020 0.006 0.027 0.002 0.012 -0.030 0.030 0.016 1 
 
  
FTALLSH -0.021 0.083 -0.054 -0.023 0.021 0.044 -0.020 0.013 0.024 0.020 0.005 0.030 0.029 1   
Ri-Rm 0.004 0.024 0.007 -0.047 -0.002 0.026 0.037 -0.070 0.098 0.075 0.002 0.003 -0.007 0.025 1 
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Table 5.14 Regressions of CARs on Proxies of Information Uncertainty, Synchronicity and Deal Features for the Whole Sample 
This table presents regression estimates of the acquirer‘s five-day cumulative abnormal return controlling for information unceratainty and 
synchronicity of the bidder‘s stock price. Information Uncertainty (IU) is captured by four proxies. The 33% youngest acquirers are classified as high 
uncertainty, the 33% oldest as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Age is measured as the difference between the 
incorporation date of the firm until the announcement date of the deal. The 33% smallest acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% largest as 
low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Size is measured as the market capitalization (MV) of the bidding firm 20 days before 
the announcement date of the deal. The 33% highest sigma acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% lowest sigma as low uncertainty and the 
medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Sigma is measured by the standard deviation of daily excess returns 200 days before the announcement date of 
the deal. Finally, the 33% less active acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% most active as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of 
medium uncertainty. Trading Volume is measured as the average of the monthly trading volume of the acquirer before the announcement date of the 
deal. Synchronicity is the logarithmic transformation of R
2
. 
Synchronicity is measured as the R
2
 of the following regression: 
 
ri,j,t= βi,0 + βi,m rm,t + βi,j rj,t +εi,t 
where ri,j,t is the return of bidder i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t and rj,t is the return of industry j at time t. The lowest 33% R
2
 
firms are classified as low synchronicity, the highest 33% R
2
 firms as high synchronicity and the rest as medium. 
HighIU dummy takes the value of 1 of the bid was announced by a high information uncertainty bidder according to the four proxies, and zero 
otherwise. The LowSynchr dummy takes the value of 1 if the bid was announced by a low synchronicity bidder and zero otherwise. Target ownership 
status dummy takes the value of one if the target is private and zero otherwise; cash (stock) deals is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for 
acquisitions financed with 100% cash (stock) and 0 otherwise. Diversifying deals is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the acquirer‘s two-digit 
SIC code is different from that of the target and 0 otherwise. Bidder‘s market-to-book is measured by the bidder‘s market value a month before the 
announcement of the deal divided by its net book value of assets; a deal‘s relative size is the ratio between target and bidder size. Domestic deals 
dummy takes the value of 1 for acquisitions of UK firms and zero otherwise. Finally, other explanatory variables include: the acquirer‘s lagged excess 
return for 180 days prior to the bid‘s announcement; and the market portfolio return (FT-All Share) for the same 180-day period prior to the 
announcement. P-values are reported in brackets under the coefficients. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and ‗c‘, 
respectively. 
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Table 5.14-Continued 
All Age Size Sigma VO 
 CARs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
HighIU 0.005b 
    
0.006c 0.019a 
    
0.021a 0.016a 
    
0.016a 0.009a 
    
0.014a 
 
(0.061) 
    
(0.078) (0.000) 
    
(0.000) (0.000) 
    
(0.000) (0.003) 
    
(0.000) 
LowSynchr   0.003 
   
0.004 
 
0.003 
   
0.001   0.003 
   
0.002   0.003 
   
0.008b 
 
  (0.177) 
   
(0.172) 
 
(0.177) 
   
(0.555)   (0.177) 
   
(0.262)   (0.177) 
   
(0.013) 
HsHiu   
   
-0.002   
    
0.009     
   
0.004     
   
0.000   
 
  
   
(0.703)   
    
(0.170)     
   
(0.376)     
   
(0.986)   
HsLiu   
 
-0.010a 
 
-0.010a   
  
-0.012a 
 
-0.010a     
 
-0.012a 
 
-0.011a     
 
-0.010a 
 
-0.010a   
 
  
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000)   
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000)     
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000)     
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000)   
LsHiu   
  
0.005 0.003 -0.002 
   
0.013a 0.011a -0.004   
  
0.014a 0.000a 0.002   
  
0.003 0.000 -0.014 
 
  
  
(0.223) (0.491) (0.757) 
   
(0.002) (0.007) (0.485)   
  
(0.004) (0.000) (0.792)   
  
(0.551) (0.927) (0.021) 
LsLiu   
   
-0.007b   
    
-0.004     
   
-0.007a     
   
-0.003   
 
  
   
(0.041)   
    
(0.262)     
   
(0.005)     
   
(0.541)   
Private target 0.006a 0.006a 0.005b 0.006a 0.005b 0.006b 0.004b 0.006b 0.005b 0.005b 0.005b 0.004b 0.005b 0.006a 0.005b 0.006b 0.005b 0.005b 0.004c 0.006a 0.004c 0.005b 0.004a 0.004 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.016)  (0.009) (0.018) (0.012) (0.043) (0.009) (0.026)  (0.015) (0.048) (0.047) (0.013) (0.009) (0.016) (0.011) (0.021) (0.017) (0.087)  (0.009) (0.085) (0.042) (0.094) (0.104) 
Cash deals -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.730) (0.682) (0.895) (0.669) (0.968) (0.835) (0.536) (0.682) (0.974) (0.938) (0.681) (0.532) (0.889) (0.682) (0.845) (0.829) (0.980) (0.808) (0.986) (0.682) (0.987) (0.745) (0.957) (0.902) 
Stock deals 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 
(0.893) (0.866) (0.888) (0.864) (0.903) (0.898) (0.933) (0.866) (0.875) (0.925) (0.934) (0.938) (0.882) (0.866) (0.885) (0.935) (0.987) (0.872) (0.775) (0.866) (0.755) (0.752) (0.754) (0.762) 
M/B 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.324) (0.341) (0.320) (0.345) (0.333) (0.326) (0.429) (0.341) (0.337) (0.374) (0.379) (0.434) (0.293) (0.341) (0.348) (0.300) (0.310) (0.296) (0.683) (0.341) (0.701) (0.701) (0.708) (0.680) 
Relative Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.700) (0.824) (0.804) (0.819) (0.795) (0.810) (0.507) (0.824) (0.788) (0.791) (0.747) (0.631) (0.650) (0.824) (0.808) (0.798) (0.781) (0.744) (0.684) (0.824) (0.820) (0.836) (0.818) (0.780) 
Domestic deals 0.004c 0.004c 0.003 0.004c 0.003 0.004c 0.000 0.004c 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.005b 0.004c 0.004c 0.004c 0.004c 0.005b 0.003 0.004c 0.003 0.004c 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.088) (0.059) (0.122) (0.060) (0.152) (0.093) (0.951) (0.059) (0.314) (0.145) (0.628) (0.928) (0.029) (0.059) (0.089) (0.054) (0.068) (0.030) (0.214) (0.059) (0.215) (0.061) (0.234) (0.276) 
Diversifying -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 
(0.469) (0.364) (0.506) (0.410) (0.638) (0.495) (0.632) (0.364) (0.449) (0.431) (0.542) (0.652) (0.553) (0.364) (0.422) (0.432) (0.547) (0.593) (0.561) (0.364) (0.505) (0.429) (0.513) (0.579) 
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 Table 5.14-Continued 
 
FTALLASH(-180,-3) 0.040
a 0.039a 0.040a 0.040a 0.040a 0.040a 0.041a 0.039a 0.039a 0.039a 0.039a 0.042a 0.052a 0.039a 0.044a 0.041a 0.048a 0.052a 0.041a 0.039a 0.039a 0.040a 0.039a 0.040a 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ri -Rm(-180,-3) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.852) (0.875) (0.836) (0.869) (0.813) (0.820) (0.986) (0.875) (0.869) (0.901) (0.903) (0.963) (0.567) (0.875) (0.832) (0.748) (0.669) (0.540) (0.674) (0.875) (0.614) (0.660) (0.619) (0.646) 
Intercept 0.008b 0.008a 0.011a 0.009a 0.011a 0.007b 0.005c 0.008a 0.013a 0.008b 0.011a 0.005 0.002 0.008a 0.011a 0.007b 0.009a 0.001 0.008b 0.008a 0.013a 0.010a 0.013a 0.006c 
 
(0.012) (0.010) (0.001) (0.006) (0.000) (0.039) (0.080) (0.010) (0.000) (0.012) (0.001) (0.119) (0.444) (0.010) (0.001) (0.019) (0.006) (0.630) (0.015) (0.010) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.063) 
N 5,786 5,757 5,757 5,757 5,757 5,757 5,786 5,757 5,757 5,757 5,757 5,757 5,784 5,757 5,755 5,755 5,755 5,755 4,651 5,757 4,637 4,637 4,637 4,637 
Adj. R2 0.71% 0.68% 0.83% 0.69% 0.90% 0.76% 1.66% 0.68% 0.97% 0.95% 1.25% 1.72% 1.45% 0.68% 0.88% 0.98% 1.24% 1.53% 0.83% 0.68% 0.80% 0.59% 0.81% 0.98% 
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Table 5.15 Regressions of CARs on Information Uncertainty by Age, Synchronicity and Deal Features 
This table presents regression estimates of the acquirer‘s five-day cumulative abnormal return controlling for information unceratainty and 
synchronicity of the bidder‘s stock price. The 33% youngest acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% oldest as low uncertainty and the 
medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Age is measured as the difference between the incorporation date of the firm until the announcement date of 
the deal. Synchronicity is the logarithmic transformation of R
2
. Synchronicity is measured as the R
2
 of the following regression: 
 
ri,j,t= βi,0 + βi,m rm,t + βi,j rj,t +εi,t 
 
where ri,j,t is the return of bidder i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t and rj,t is the return of industry j at time t. The lowest 33% R
2
 
firms are classified as low synchronicity, the highest 33% R
2
 firms as high synchronicity and the rest as medium. 
HighIU dummy takes the value of 1 of the bid was announced by a high information uncertainty bidder according to the four proxies, and zero 
otherwise. The LowSynchr dummy takes the value of 1 if the bid was announced by a low synchronicity bidder and zero otherwise. Target ownership 
status dummy takes the value of one if the target is private and zero otherwise; cash (stock) deals is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for 
acquisitions financed with 100% cash (stock) and 0 otherwise. Diversifying deals is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the acquirer‘s two-digit 
SIC code is different from that of the target and 0 otherwise. Bidder‘s market-to-book is measured by the bidder‘s market value a month before the 
announcement of the deal divided by its net book value of assets; a deal‘s relative size is the ratio between target and bidder size. Domestic deals 
dummy takes the value of 1 for acquisitions of UK firms and zero otherwise. Finally, other explanatory variables include: the acquirer‘s lagged excess 
return for 180 days prior to the bid‘s announcement; and the market portfolio return (FT-All Share) for the same 180-day period prior to the 
announcement. P-values are reported in square brackets under the coefficients. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and 
‗c‘, respectively. 
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Table 5.15-Continued 
 
PrivateCash PrivateStock PublicCash PublicStock 
CARs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
HighIU 0.001 
    
0.001 0.031 
    
0.041 0.013 
    
0.010 -0.024 
    
-0.011 
 
(0.890) 
    
(0.825) (0.162) 
    
(0.120) (0.234) 
    
(0.441) (0.146) 
    
(0.586) 
LowSynchr   0.002 
   
0.002   0.030 
   
0.042c   0.009 
   
0.005   -0.018 
   
-0.003 
 
  (0.689) 
   
(0.624)   (0.220) 
   
(0.099)   (0.462) 
   
(0.770)   (0.194) 
   
(0.863) 
HsHiu   
   
-0.009     
   
-0.013     
   
0.014     
   
0.006   
 
  
   
(0.302)     
   
(0.756)     
   
(0.457)     
   
(0.869)   
HsLiu   
 
-0.007c 
 
-0.009b     
 
-0.048c 
 
-0.046c     
 
-0.006 
 
-0.002     
 
0.029c 
 
0.025   
 
  
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.028)     
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.073)     
 
(0.515) 
 
(0.824)     
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.106)   
LsHiu   
  
0.001 -0.002 -0.002   
  
0.032 0.026 -0.027   
  
0.020 0.021 0.008   
  
-0.054b -0.049b -0.044 
 
  
  
(0.933) (0.824) (0.871)   
  
(0.403) (0.513) (0.583)   
  
(0.235) (0.240) (0.764)   
  
(0.015) (0.026) (0.173) 
LsLiu   
   
-0.007     
   
-0.012     
   
0.003     
   
0.011   
 
  
   
(0.146)     
   
(0.630)     
   
(0.861)     
   
(0.705)   
M/B 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001c -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001c -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002c -0.003b -0.002b -0.002c -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.676) (0.672) (0.673) (0.675) (0.678) (0.675) (0.138) (0.092) (0.108) (0.131) (0.116) (0.089) (0.248) (0.288) (0.237) (0.264) (0.256) (0.250) (0.078) (0.031) (0.029) (0.086) (0.106) (0.105) 
Relative Size 0.022c 0.022c 0.021c 0.022c 0.021c 0.021c -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 
(0.061) (0.058) (0.070) (0.061) (0.072) (0.065) (0.226) (0.375) (0.352) (0.379) (0.348) (0.411) (0.748) (0.702) (0.698) (0.685) (0.711) (0.770) (0.232) (0.240) (0.268) (0.257) (0.281) (0.254) 
Domestic deals 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.006 -0.011 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.039 -0.040c -0.038 -0.040c -0.040c -0.040c 
 
(0.444) (0.439) (0.575) (0.417) (0.631) (0.444) (0.773) (0.615) (0.684) (0.741) (0.691) (0.675) (0.243) (0.201) (0.208) (0.184) (0.220) (0.215) (0.114) (0.091) (0.112) (0.089) (0.098) (0.097) 
Diversifying -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 
(0.270) (0.260) (0.311) (0.251) (0.325) (0.263) (0.976) (0.962) (0.981) (0.967) (0.952) (0.943) (0.586) (0.676) (0.667) (0.628) (0.568) (0.587) (0.948) (0.970) (0.998) (0.735) (0.715) (0.721) 
FTALLASH(-180,-3) 0.043
a 0.043a 0.042a 0.043a 0.041a 0.043a 0.101 0.081 0.085 0.092 0.089 0.098 0.024 0.019 0.021 0.019 0.024 0.021 0.157a 0.164a 0.154a 0.172a 0.173a 0.172a 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.141) (0.260) (0.242) (0.199) (0.216) (0.162) (0.423) (0.535) (0.477) (0.521) (0.457) (0.484) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Ri -Rm(-180,-3) -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.041
a 0.040a 0.041a 0.040a 0.040a 0.040a -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.538) (0.535) (0.517) (0.536) (0.559) (0.529) (0.992) (0.901) (0.968) (0.913) (0.928) (0.999) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.840) (0.508) (0.754) (0.923) (0.997) (0.985) 
Intercept 0.007c 0.007 0.009b 0.007c 0.011b 0.007 0.034 0.044b 0.056a 0.044b 0.053a 0.023 0.009 0.011 0.014 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.025 0.025 0.013 0.026 0.020 0.029 
 
(0.086) (0.102) (0.042) (0.077) (0.017) (0.122) (0.104) (0.026) (0.006) (0.016) (0.010) (0.301) (0.293) (0.181) (0.135) (0.171) (0.348) (0.297) (0.285) (0.272) (0.574) (0.271) (0.389) (0.203) 
N 1159 1154 1154 1154 1154 1154 222 217 217 217 217 217 250 249 249 249 249 249 178 177 177 177 177 177 
Adj. R2 5.47% 5.49% 5.65% 5.48% 5.84% 5.50% 4.58% 4.51% 4.33% 4.23% 4.80% 5.61% 8.87% 8.51% 8.40% 8.78% 9.12% 9.06% 13.34% 12.83% 13.04% 15.41% 16.15% 15.64% 
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Table 5.16 Regressions of CARs on Information Uncertainty by Size, Synchronicity and Deal Features 
This table presents regression estimates of the acquirer‘s five-day cumulative abnormal return controlling for information unceratainty and 
synchronicity of the bidder‘s stock price. The 33% smallest acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% largest as low uncertainty and the 
medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Size is measured as the market capitalization (MV) of the bidding firm 20 days before the announcement date 
of the deal. Synchronicity is measured as the R
2
 of the following regression: 
 
ri,j,t= βi,0 + βi,m rm,t + βi,j rj,t +εi,t 
where ri,j,t is the return of bidder i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t and rj,t is the return of industry j at time t. The lowest 33% R
2
 
firms are classified as low synchronicity, the highest 33% R
2
 firms as high synchronicity and the rest as medium. 
HighIU dummy takes the value of 1 of the bid was announced by a high information uncertainty bidder according to the four proxies, and zero 
otherwise. The LowSynchr dummy takes the value of 1 if the bid was announced by a low synchronicity bidder and zero otherwise. Target ownership 
status dummy takes the value of one if the target is private and zero otherwise; cash (stock) deals is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for 
acquisitions financed with 100% cash (stock) and 0 otherwise. Diversifying deals is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the acquirer‘s two-digit 
SIC code is different from that of the target and 0 otherwise. Bidder‘s market-to-book is measured by the bidder‘s market value a month before the 
announcement of the deal divided by its net book value of assets; a deal‘s relative size is the ratio between target and bidder size. Domestic deals 
dummy takes the value of 1 for acquisitions of UK firms and zero otherwise. Finally, other explanatory variables include: the acquirer‘s lagged excess 
return for 180 days prior to the bid‘s announcement; and the market portfolio return (FT-All Share) for the same 180-day period prior to the 
announcement. P-values are reported in square brackets under the coefficients. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and 
‗c‘, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Information Uncertainty, Private Information and Bidder Cains 
356 
 
 
Table 5.16-Continued 
  PrivateCash PrivateStock PublicCash PublicStock 
CARs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
HighIU 0.013c 
    
0.014c 0.051b 
    
0.058b 0.027c 
    
0.024 -0.020 
    
-0.010 
 
(0.059) 
    
(0.095) (0.015) 
    
(0.030) (0.072) 
    
(0.257) (0.165) 
    
(0.598) 
LowSynchr   0.002 
   
0.001   0.030 
   
0.038   0.009 
   
0.003   -0.018 
   
-0.005 
 
  (0.689) 
   
(0.885)   (0.220) 
   
(0.142)   (0.462) 
   
(0.834)   (0.194) 
   
(0.796) 
HsHiu   
   
0.009     
   
0.058     
   
0.004     
   
-0.022   
 
  
   
(0.473)     
   
(0.331)     
   
(0.863)     
   
(0.660)   
HsLiu   
 
-0.003 
 
-0.003     
 
-0.047b 
 
-0.032     
 
0.000 
 
0.002     
 
0.020 
 
0.014   
 
  
 
(0.416) 
 
(0.508)     
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.170)     
 
(0.982) 
 
(0.852)     
 
(0.235) 
 
(0.409)   
LsHiu   
  
0.008 0.008 -0.003   
  
0.035 0.037 -0.032   
  
0.030 0.031 0.008   
  
-0.035c -0.032 -0.024 
 
  
  
(0.329) (0.366) (0.782)   
  
(0.231) (0.224) (0.458)   
  
(0.123) (0.125) (0.795)   
  
(0.098) (0.137) (0.500) 
LsLiu   
   
-0.009     
   
0.063     
   
0.000     
   
0.022   
 
  
   
(0.182)     
   
(0.165)     
   
(0.988)     
   
(0.567)   
M/B 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001c -0.001c -0.001 -0.001c -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003b -0.003b -0.003b -0.003b -0.003b -0.003b 
 
(0.656) (0.672) (0.679) (0.647) (0.673) (0.665) (0.200) (0.092) (0.094) (0.148) (0.056) (0.145) (0.453) (0.288) (0.295) (0.358) (0.404) (0.450) (0.022) (0.031) (0.035) (0.014) (0.020) (0.015) 
Relative Size 0.019 0.022c 0.021c 0.021c 0.020 0.019 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 
(0.197) (0.058) (0.066) (0.087) (0.119) (0.199) (0.134) (0.375) (0.327) (0.364) (0.249) (0.240) (0.900) (0.702) (0.672) (0.835) (0.820) (0.874) (0.306) (0.240) (0.266) (0.236) (0.235) (0.266) 
Domestic deals 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.018 -0.011 -0.014 -0.010 -0.017 -0.020 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014 -0.038 -0.040c -0.039 -0.044c -0.041c -0.043 
 
(0.942) (0.439) (0.524) (0.544) (0.737) (0.913) (0.398) (0.615) (0.534) (0.649) (0.432) (0.380) (0.130) (0.201) (0.239) (0.177) (0.210) (0.119) (0.113) (0.091) (0.101) (0.070) (0.093) (0.111) 
Diversifying -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 
(0.407) (0.260) (0.259) (0.305) (0.327) (0.394) (0.852) (0.962) (0.913) (0.948) (0.869) (0.856) (0.555) (0.676) (0.698) (0.683) (0.687) (0.580) (0.850) (0.970) (0.991) (0.890) (0.861) (0.899) 
FTALLASH(-180,-3) 0.042
a 0.043a 0.043a 0.043a 0.044a 0.042a 0.085 0.081 0.080 0.081 0.075 0.086 0.026 0.019 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.024 0.146a 0.164a 0.156a 0.157a 0.148a 0.154a 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.222) (0.260) (0.266) (0.260) (0.298) (0.235) (0.370) (0.535) (0.472) (0.503) (0.500) (0.401) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ri -Rm(-180,-3) -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.041
b 0.040a 0.041a 0.041b 0.040b 0.040b -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.593) (0.535) (0.553) (0.560) (0.574) (0.586) (0.852) (0.901) (0.887) (0.926) (0.826) (0.812) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.479) (0.508) (0.670) (0.353) (0.593) (0.422) 
Intercept 0.006 0.007 0.009c 0.007 0.008c 0.005 0.031 0.044b 0.063a 0.044b 0.051b 0.024 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.023 0.025 0.014 0.028 0.023 0.030 
 
(0.174) (0.102) (0.067) (0.103) (0.089) (0.182) (0.122) (0.026) (0.003) (0.024) (0.012) (0.233) (0.177) (0.181) (0.282) (0.138) (0.382) (0.191) (0.305) (0.272) (0.545) (0.243) (0.327) (0.201) 
N 1,159 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154 222 217 217 217 217 217 250 249 249 249 249 249 178 177 177 177 177 177 
Adj. R2 6.09% 5.49% 5.52% 5.64% 5.83% 6.11% 5.97% 4.51% 4.70% 4.64% 6.29% 6.67% 9.70% 8.51% 8.26% 9.19% 9.21% 9.90% 12.87% 12.83% 12.71% 13.89% 14.81% 14.06% 
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Table 5.17 Regressions of CARs on Information Uncertainty by Sigma, Synchronicity and Deal Features 
This table presents regression estimates of the acquirer‘s five-day cumulative abnormal return controlling for information unceratainty and 
synchronicity of the bidder‘s stock price. The 33% highest sigma acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% lowest sigma as low uncertainty 
and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Sigma is measured by the standard deviation of daily excess returns 200 days before the announcement 
date of the deal. Synchronicity is measured as the R
2
 of the following regression: 
 
ri,j,t= βi,0 + βi,m rm,t + βi,j rj,t +εi,t 
where ri,j,t is the return of bidder i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t and rj,t is the return of industry j at time t. The lowest 33% R
2
 
firms are classified as low synchronicity, the highest 33% R
2
 firms as high synchronicity and the rest as medium. 
HighIU dummy takes the value of 1 of the bid was announced by a high information uncertainty bidder according to the four proxies, and zero 
otherwise. The LowSynchr dummy takes the value of 1 if the bid was announced by a low synchronicity bidder and zero otherwise. Target ownership 
status dummy takes the value of one if the target is private and zero otherwise; cash (stock) deals is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for 
acquisitions financed with 100% cash (stock) and 0 otherwise. Diversifying deals is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the acquirer‘s two-digit 
SIC code is different from that of the target and 0 otherwise. Bidder‘s market-to-book is measured by the bidder‘s market value a month before the 
announcement of the deal divided by its net book value of assets; a deal‘s relative size is the ratio between target and bidder size. Domestic deals 
dummy takes the value of 1 for acquisitions of UK firms and zero otherwise. Finally, other explanatory variables include: the acquirer‘s lagged excess 
return for 180 days prior to the bid‘s announcement; and the market portfolio return (FT-All Share) for the same 180-day period prior to the 
announcement. P-values are reported in square brackets under the coefficients. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and 
‗c‘, respectively. 
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Table 5.17-Continued 
  PrivateCash PrivateStock PublicCash PublicStock 
CARs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
HighIU 0.009c 
    
0.008 0.023 
    
0.017 0.008 
    
0.002 -0.032b 
    
-0.023 
 
(0.082) 
    
(0.189) (0.342) 
    
(0.528) (0.465) 
    
(0.858) (0.044) 
    
(0.228) 
LowSynchr   0.002 
   
0.000 
 
0.030 
   
0.017   0.009 
   
-0.001 
 
-0.018 
   
-0.006 
 
  (0.689) 
   
(0.936) 
 
(0.220) 
   
(0.526)   (0.462) 
   
(0.919) 
 
(0.194) 
   
(0.689) 
HsHiu   
   
0.000   
    
0.003 
 
  
   
0.024   
    
-0.004   
 
  
   
(0.988)   
    
(0.931) 
 
  
   
(0.139)   
    
(0.906)   
HsLiu   
 
-0.005 
 
-0.005   
  
-0.053a 
 
-0.045b 
 
  
 
-0.007 
 
0.000   
  
0.015 
 
0.008   
 
  
 
(0.123) 
 
(0.151)   
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.015) 
 
  
 
(0.336) 
 
(0.959)   
  
(0.526) 
 
(0.718)   
LsHiu   
  
0.011 0.009 0.006 
   
0.044 0.039 0.022   
  
0.028 0.033 0.028 
   
-0.042c -0.042c -0.022 
 
  
  
(0.295) (0.366) (0.651) 
   
(0.240) (0.314) (0.641)   
  
(0.195) (0.142) (0.322) 
   
(0.061) (0.058) (0.476) 
LsLiu   
   
-0.007   
    
-0.011 
 
  
   
0.008   
    
-0.006   
 
  
   
(0.174)   
    
(0.703) 
 
  
   
(0.662)   
    
(0.786)   
M/B 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001c -0.001 -0.001c -0.001c -0.001c -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002b -0.003b -0.003b -0.003c -0.003c -0.002c 
 
(0.685) (0.672) (0.672) (0.679) (0.704) (0.686) (0.101) (0.092) (0.103) (0.080) (0.074) (0.078) (0.275) (0.288) (0.275) (0.217) (0.346) (0.223) (0.045) (0.031) (0.027) (0.063) (0.067) (0.063) 
Relative Size 0.021c 0.022c 0.021c 0.021c 0.021c 0.020c -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
 
(0.082) (0.058) (0.062) (0.064) (0.068) (0.085) (0.250) (0.375) (0.360) (0.369) (0.360) (0.358) (0.694) (0.702) (0.695) (0.748) (0.714) (0.755) (0.282) (0.240) (0.257) (0.241) (0.240) (0.265) 
Domestic deals 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.005 -0.011 -0.009 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.047c -0.040c -0.040c -0.045c -0.045c -0.048b 
 
(0.396) (0.439) (0.459) (0.456) (0.447) (0.396) (0.819) (0.615) (0.686) (0.782) (0.770) (0.790) (0.227) (0.201) (0.199) (0.225) (0.250) (0.232) (0.055) (0.091) (0.093) (0.057) (0.056) (0.049) 
Diversifying -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 
 
(0.319) (0.260) (0.257) (0.289) (0.302) (0.316) (0.858) (0.962) (0.880) (0.823) (0.777) (0.841) (0.694) (0.676) (0.696) (0.758) (0.687) (0.767) (0.855) (0.970) (0.970) (0.774) (0.773) (0.938) 
FTALLASH(-180,-3) 0.051
a 0.043a 0.045a 0.044a 0.048a 0.051a 0.106 0.081 0.086 0.104 0.108 0.112 0.024 0.019 0.022 0.016 0.026 0.017 0.117b 0.164a 0.151a 0.156a 0.152a 0.132b 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.168) (0.260) (0.234) (0.173) (0.162) (0.172) (0.427) (0.535) (0.451) (0.602) (0.403) (0.594) (0.040) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.018) 
Ri -Rm(-180,-3) -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.040
b 0.040a 0.041a 0.038a 0.036b 0.038b -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 
(0.424) (0.535) (0.521) (0.486) (0.456) (0.419) (0.998) (0.901) (0.977) (0.919) (0.965) (0.954) (0.014) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.022) (0.011) (0.951) (0.508) (0.680) (0.857) (0.871) (0.991) 
Intercept 0.004 0.007 0.008c 0.007 0.008 0.004 0.036 0.044b 0.059a 0.043b 0.050b 0.031 0.009 0.011 0.014 0.011 0.006 0.011 0.038 0.025 0.018 0.031 0.032 0.042c 
 
(0.356) (0.102) (0.057) (0.132) (0.103) (0.316) (0.137) (0.026) (0.005) (0.029) (0.023) (0.218) (0.221) (0.181) (0.125) (0.153) (0.523) (0.175) (0.112) (0.272) (0.424) (0.185) (0.179) (0.079) 
N 1,159 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154 222 217 217 217 217 217 250 249 249 249 249 249 177 177 176 176 176 176 
Adj. R2 5.88% 5.49% 5.55% 5.72% 5.86% 5.93% 4.10% 4.51% 4.60% 4.91% 5.57% 5.10% 8.57% 8.51% 8.45% 9.31% 10.74% 9.33% 14.36% 12.83% 12.29% 14.49% 14.60% 15.31% 
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Table 5.18 Regressions of CARs on Information Uncertainty by Trading Volume, Synchronicity and Deal Features 
This table presents regression estimates of the acquirer‘s five-day cumulative abnormal return controlling for information uncertainty and synchronicity 
of the bidder‘s stock price. The 33% less active acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% most active as low uncertainty and the medium 
33% as of medium uncertainty. Trading Volume is measured as the average of the monthly trading volume of the acquirer before the announcement 
date of the deal. Synchronicity is measured as the R
2
 of the following regression: 
 
ri,j,t= βi,0 + βi,m rm,t + βi,j rj,t +εi,t 
where ri,j,t is the return of bidder i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t and rj,t is the return of industry j at time t. The lowest 33% R
2
 
firms are classified as low synchronicity, the highest 33% R
2
 firms as high synchronicity and the rest as medium. 
HighIU dummy takes the value of 1 of the bid was announced by a high information uncertainty bidder according to the four proxies, and zero 
otherwise. The LowSynchr dummy takes the value of 1 if the bid was announced by a low synchronicity bidder and zero otherwise. Target ownership 
status dummy takes the value of one if the target is private and zero otherwise; cash (stock) deals is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for 
acquisitions financed with 100% cash (stock) and 0 otherwise. Diversifying deals is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the acquirer‘s two-digit 
SIC code is different from that of the target and 0 otherwise. Bidder‘s market-to-book is measured by the bidder‘s market value a month before the 
announcement of the deal divided by its net book value of assets; a deal‘s relative size is the ratio between target and bidder size. Domestic deals 
dummy takes the value of 1 for acquisitions of UK firms and zero otherwise. Finally, other explanatory variables include: the acquirer‘s lagged excess 
return for 180 days prior to the bid‘s announcement; and the market portfolio return (FT-All Share) for the same 180-day period prior to the 
announcement. P-values are reported in square brackets under the coefficients. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and 
‗c‘, respectively. 
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Table 5.18-Continued 
 
  
PrivateCash PrivateStock PublicCash PublicStock 
CARs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
HighIU 0.006 
    
0.006 0.013 
    
0.031 0.020 
    
0.025 -0.067a 
    
-0.065b 
 
(0.224) 
    
(0.349) (0.659) 
    
(0.391) (0.216) 
    
(0.230) (0.001) 
    
(0.036) 
LowSynchr   0.002 
   
0.001 
 
0.030 
   
0.065   0.009 
   
0.010 
 
-0.018 
   
-0.017 
 
  (0.689) 
   
(0.813) 
 
(0.220) 
   
(0.263)   (0.462) 
   
(0.518) 
 
(0.194) 
   
(0.432) 
HsHiu   
   
-0.006   
    
-0.047 
 
  
   
0.016   
    
-0.091   
 
  
   
(0.627)   
    
(0.306) 
 
  
   
(0.438)   
    
(0.203)   
HsLiu   
 
-0.004 
 
-0.004   
  
-0.049 
 
-0.053 
 
  
 
0.000 
 
0.003   
  
0.033 
 
0.021   
 
  
 
(0.347) 
 
(0.406)   
  
(0.113) 
 
(0.117) 
 
  
 
(0.968) 
 
(0.785)   
  
(0.109) 
 
(0.300)   
LsHiu   
  
0.004 0.003 -0.001 
   
0.008 -0.004 -0.068   
  
0.011 0.013 -0.016 
   
-0.064b -0.060b 0.003 
 
  
  
(0.508) (0.637) (0.914) 
   
(0.813) (0.905) (0.337)   
  
(0.657) (0.610) (0.627) 
   
(0.011) (0.021) (0.954) 
LsLiu   
   
0.000   
    
0.010 
 
  
   
0.007   
    
0.048   
 
  
   
(0.992)   
    
(0.843) 
 
  
   
(0.762)   
    
(0.340)   
M/B 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001c -0.001c -0.001c -0.001c -0.001c -0.001c -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005a -0.003b -0.005a -0.005a -0.005a -0.005a 
 
(0.835) (0.672) (0.851) (0.832) (0.838) (0.837) (0.080) (0.092) (0.074) (0.084) (0.080) (0.084) (0.285) (0.288) (0.152) (0.188) (0.236) (0.244) (0.001) (0.031) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Relative Size 0.031b 0.022c 0.031a 0.031a 0.031a 0.031a -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 
(0.000) (0.058) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.189) (0.375) (0.295) (0.330) (0.421) (0.297) (0.764) (0.702) (0.510) (0.558) (0.552) (0.813) (0.228) (0.240) (0.361) (0.318) (0.315) (0.236) 
Domestic deals 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 -0.020 -0.011 -0.017 -0.015 -0.016 -0.023 -0.014 -0.011 -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.051b -0.040c -0.056b -0.0603b -0.058b -0.052 
 
(0.295) (0.439) (0.268) (0.228) (0.285) (0.305) (0.491) (0.615) (0.520) (0.590) (0.586) (0.437) (0.139) (0.201) (0.211) (0.158) (0.221) (0.144) (0.046) (0.091) (0.042) (0.019) (0.034) (0.059) 
Diversifying -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.013 -0.001 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.004 
 
(0.768) (0.260) (0.749) (0.737) (0.770) (0.771) (0.618) (0.962) (0.622) (0.645) (0.626) (0.576) (0.921) (0.676) (0.990) (0.981) (0.985) (0.973) (0.853) (0.970) (0.992) (0.990) (0.794) (0.813) 
FTALLASH(-180,-3) 0.059
a 0.043a 0.058a 0.058a 0.057a 0.058a 0.112 0.081 0.119 0.115 0.123 0.144 0.001 0.019 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.172a 0.164a 0.180b 0.189a 0.163b 0.187a 
 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.181) (0.260) (0.179) (0.202) (0.175) (0.140) (0.985) (0.535) (0.938) (0.998) (0.990) (0.991) (0.010) (0.003) (0.018) (0.009) (0.023) (0.006) 
Ri -Rm(-180,-3) -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.044
a 0.040a 0.045a 0.045a 0.046a 0.043a -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 
 
(0.854) (0.535) (0.863) (0.844) (0.866) (0.855) (0.990) (0.901) (0.932) (0.981) (0.928) (0.963) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.772) (0.508) (0.802) (0.271) (0.281) (0.762) 
Intercept 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.063a 0.044b 0.075a 0.065a 0.078a 0.050b 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.054b 0.025 0.029 0.052c 0.047c 0.060b 
 
(0.498) (0.102) (0.242) (0.397) (0.290) (0.532) (0.008) (0.026) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.032) (0.136) (0.181) (0.279) (0.120) (0.427) (0.203) (0.038)  (0.272) (0.283) (0.051) (0.068) (0.029) 
N 958 1,154 955 955 955 955 162 217 158 158 158 158 216 249 216 216 216 216 125 177 125 125 125 125 
Adj. R2 10.66% 5.49% 10.57% 10.56% 10.64% 10.66% 5.38% 4.51% 6.27% 5.44% 6.79% 6.75% 11.55% 8.51% 10.56% 10.71% 10.89% 11.79% 23.67% 12.83% 16.54% 19.49% 24.12% 24.12% 
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Table 5.19 Long Term BHARs (12 Months) by Bidder’s Stock Price Synchronicity, Information Uncertainty and the their Interaction 
This table presents the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) for 12 months following the announcement of bids of High (Low) Uncertainty 
Acquirers, High (Low) Synchronicity Acquirers and their interaction (LsHiu and HsLiu).  Information Uncertainty (IU) is captured by four proxies. The 
33% youngest acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% oldest as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Age is 
measured as the difference between the incorporation date of the firm until the announcement date of the deal. The 33% smallest acquirers are classified 
as high uncertainty, the 33% largest as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Size is measured as the market capitalization 
(MV) of the bidding firm 20 days before the announcement date of the deal. The 33% highest sigma acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 
33% lowest sigma as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Sigma is measured by the standard deviation of daily excess 
returns 200 days before the announcement date of the deal. Finally, the 33% less active acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% most active 
as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Trading Volume is measured as the average of the monthly trading volume of the 
acquirer before the announcement date of the deal. Synchronicity is measured as the R
2
 of the following regression: 
 
ri,j,t= βi,0 + βi,m rm,t + βi,j rj,t +εi,t 
 
where ri,j,t is the return of bidder i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t and rj,t is the return of industry j at time t. The lowest 33% R
2
 
firms are classified as low synchronicity, the highest 33% R
2
 firms as high synchronicity and the rest as medium The BHAR for company i is computed 
as: 
 
T
mt
T
iti RRBHAR 11 )1()1(  
where Rit is the monthly return for company i, and Rmt is the monthly return of the market index. Panel A presents 12 month BHARs for the whole 
sample, Panel B for acquisitions for private targets only, Panel C for acquisitions for private targets paid for with cash, Panel D for acquisitions for 
private targets paid for with equity, Panel E for acquisitions for public targets only, Panel F for acquisitions for public targets paid for with cash and 
Panel G for acquisitions for public targets paid for with equity. Following Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999), we use their skewness adjusted bootstrap t-
statistics procedure to compute the statistical significance of the abnormal returns (1000 replications). The number of bids for each category is reported 
next to the z-statistic. P-value are presented next to the number of observations. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and 
‗c‘, respectively. The Dif(Hiu-Liu) represents the differences in mean BHARs for 12 months post the acquisition announcement of High versus low 
information uncertainty acquisitions. The Dif(Ls-Hs) represents the differences in mean BHARs for 12 months post the acquisition announcement of 
Low versus High synchronicity acquirers. The Dif((LsHiu-HsLiu) represents the differences in mean BHARs for 12 months post the acquisition 
announcement of low synchronicity bidders subject to high uncertainty versus high synchronicity bidders subject to low uncertainty. 
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Table 5.19-Continued 
  Age 
  
  
Size 
  
  
Sigma 
  
  
Trading VO 
  
  
Panel A: Whole Sample 
  Average N p-value Average N p-value Average N p-value Average N p-value 
AllAll -8.38%
a 
5,941 0.000 -8.38%
a 
5,941 0.000 -8.02%
a 
5,734 0.000 -8.89%
a 
4,663 0.000 
AllHiu -13.30%
a 
2,032 0.000 -8.79%
a 
1,934 0.000 -13.17%
a 
1,978 0.000 -10.99%
a 
1,552 0.000 
AllLiu -6.64%
a 
1,944 0.000 -9.43%
a 
2,081 0.000 -5.07%
a 
1,813 0.000 -6.44%
a 
1,617 0.000 
Dif(Hiu-Liu) -6.65%
a 
 
0.000 0.65% 
 
0.679 -8.10%
a 
 
0.000 -4.54%
a 
 
0.005 
AllHs -8.92%
a 
1,968 0.000 -8.92%
a 
1,968 0.000 -8.71%
a 
1,892 0.000 -8.88%
a 
1,610 0.000 
AllLs -7.81%
a 
1,977 0.000 -7.81%
a 
1,977 0.000 -7.38%
a 
1,901 0.000 -8.35%
a 
1,494 0.000 
Dif(Ls-Hs) 1.12% 
 
0.453 1.12% 
 
0.453 1.34% 
 
0.368 0.52% 
 
0.754 
AllLsHiu -12.37%
a 
791 0.000 -8.61%
a 
927 0.000 -12.15%
a 
684 0.000 -11.42%
a 
730 0.000 
AllHsLiu -8.01%
a 
877 0.000 -9.64%
a 
1,220 0.000 -5.33%
a 
717 0.000 -6.47%
a 
974 0.000 
Dif(LsHiu-HsLiu) -4.36%
b 
  0.036 1.03%   0.631 -6.82%
a 
  0.010 -4.95%
b 
  0.029 
Panel B: Private Acquisitions 
Priv.All -10.60%
a 
3,478 0.000 -10.60%
a 
3,478 0.000 -10.08%
a 
3,323 0.000 -11.74%
a 
2,716 0.000 
Priv.Hiu -16.23%
a 
1,323 0.000 -11.25%
a 
1,310 0.000 -17.10%
a 
1,228 0.000 -13.24%
a 
1,080 0.000 
Priv.Liu -9.65%
a 
967 0.000 -13.32%
a 
972 0.000 -5.21%
a 
954 0.000 -8.70%
a 
726 0.000 
Dif(Hiu-Liu) -6.58%
a 
 
0.001 2.07%
 
 
0.311 -11.89%
a 
 
0.000 -4.55%
b 
 
0.037 
Priv.Hs -12.59%
a 
1,035 0.000 -12.59%
a 
1,035 0.000 -12.12%
a 
981 0.000 -13.05%
a 
828 0.000 
Priv.Ls -9.22%
a 
1,247 0.000 -9.22%
a 
1,247 0.000 -8.78%
a 
1,192 0.000 -10.19%
a 
952 0.000 
Dif(Ls-Hs) 3.37% 
 
0.104 3.37% 
 
0.104 3.34% 
 
0.108 2.86% 
 
0.213 
Priv.LsHiu -13.41%
a 
534 0.000 -9.84%
a 
640 0.001 -13.16%
a 
441 0.001 -12.60%
a 
519 0.000 
Priv.HsLiu -12.41%
a 
392 0.000 -13.40%
a 
551 0.000 -6.55%
a 
321 0.000 -8.80%
a 
422 0.000 
Dif(LsHiu-HsLiu) -1.00% 
 
0.719 3.56% 
 
0.224 -6.61%
c 
 
0.069 -3.80% 
 
0.206 
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Table 5.19-Continued 
Panel C: Private Acquisitions paid for with Cash 
Priv.CashAll -5.50%
a 
1,174 0.000 -5.50%
a 
1,174 0.000 -5.11%
a 
1,142 0.000 -4.96%
a 
953 0.001 
Priv.CashHiu -5.63%
c 
341 0.098 -6.18%
c 
307 0.072 -8.43%
a 
337 0.010 -1.00% 274 0.769 
Priv.CashLiu -7.17%
a 
465 0.000 -8.47%
a 
471 0.000 -3.84%
b 
378 0.040 -6.57%
a 
365 0.001 
Dif(Hiu-Liu) 1.54% 
 
0.651 2.29% 
 
0.516 -4.59% 
 
0.166 5.57% 
 
0.119 
Priv.CashHs -8.03%
a 
438 0.000 -8.03%
a 
438 0.000 -7.14%
a 
424 0.001 -7.35%
a 
367 0.001 
Priv.CashLs -6.98%
a 
361 0.005 -6.98%
a 
361 0.005 -7.20%
a 
350 0.003 -5.31%
c 
289 0.066 
Dif(Ls-Hs) 1.05% 
 
0.715 1.05% 
 
0.715 -0.07% 
 
0.982 2.04% 
 
0.520 
Priv.CashLsHiu -2.93% 128 0.523 -6.38% 152 0.125 -12.89%
b 
106 0.035 -4.09% 133 0.321 
Priv.CashHsLiu -8.20%
a 
219 0.000 -7.32%
a 
286 0.003 -5.10%
b 
158 0.013 -6.09%
b 
237 0.022 
Dif(LsHiu-HsLiu) 5.26%   0.277 0.94%   0.830 -7.79%   0.135 2.00%   0.658 
Panel D: Private Acquisitions paid for with Stock 
Priv.StockAll -9.64% 223 0.113 -9.64% 223 0.125 -11.80%
c 
216 0.066 -12.59%
c 
160 0.086 
Priv.StockHiu -12.34% 105 0.248 -1.43% 123 0.908 -16.55%
c 
129 0.100 -18.58% 85 0.194 
Priv.StockLiu -21.98%
a 
37 0.008 -23.17%
b 
45 0.014 -4.34% 50 0.395 -13.32% 35 0.196 
Dif(Hiu-Liu) 9.64% 
 
0.369 21.75% 
 
0.076 -12.21% 
 
0.213 -5.26% 
 
0.689 
Priv.StockHs -18.92% 60 0.305 -18.92% 60 0.321 -29.86%
a 
57 0.001 -18.69% 40 0.506 
Priv.StockLs 5.50% 79 0.586 5.50% 79 0.589 6.97% 76 0.486 0.48% 54 0.927 
Dif(Ls-Hs) 24.42% 
 
0.112 24.42% 
 
0.112 36.82%
a 
 
0.006 19.16% 
 
0.330 
Priv.StockLsHiu -6.79% 36 0.770 9.35% 58 0.498 16.26% 45 0.345 1.58% 38 0.887 
Priv.StockHsLiu -32.31%
b 
16 0.043 -26.93%
b 
29 0.044 -7.08% 19 0.499 -23.39% 18 0.198 
Dif(LsHiu-HsLiu) 25.52% 
 
0.150 36.28%
b 
 
0.048 23.34% 
 
0.264 24.97% 
 
0.281 
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Table 5.19-Continued 
Panel E: Public Acquisitions 
PublicAll -11.97%
a 
619 0.000 -11.97%
a 
619 0.000 -11.65%
a 
609 0.000 -11.55%
a 
487 0.000 
PublicHiu -20.18%
a 
179 0.000 -18.29%
a 
139 0.000 -20.42%
a 
216 0.000 -19.91%
a 
108 0.001 
PublicLiu -6.69%
a 
240 0.000 -6.59%
a 
318 0.007 -7.85%
a 
201 0.000 -7.76%
b 
251 0.012 
Dif(Hiu-Liu) -13.49%
a 
 
0.000 -11.70%
a 
 
0.008 -12.57%
a 
 
0.001 -12.15%
b 
 
0.014 
PublicHs -8.96%
a 
254 0.006 -8.96%
a 
254 0.007 -8.42%
a 
248 0.005 -7.71%
b 
207 0.028 
PublicLs -11.71%
a 
164 0.001 -11.71%
a 
164 0.001 -11.48%
a 
162 0.001 -10.84%
a 
132 0.005 
Dif(Ls-Hs) -2.76% 
 
0.475 -2.76% 
 
0.475 -3.06% 
 
0.430 -3.13% 
 
0.476 
PublicLsHiu -16.43%
b 
54 0.029 -16.60%
b 
65 0.014 -21.27%
a 
65 0.000 -17.05%
b 
53 0.029 
PublicHsLiu -6.63%
a 
127 0.008 -7.24%
b 
196 0.044 -6.92%
b 
100 0.015 -5.82% 160 0.123 
Dif(LsHiu-HsLiu) -9.80%   0.118 -9.36%   0.116 -14.35%
a 
  0.007 -11.23%   0.092 
Panel F: Public Acquisitions paid for with Cash 
Public.CashAll -8.54%
a 
248 0.000 -8.54%
a 
248 0.000 -8.37%
a 
246 0.000 -7.84%
a 
214 0.000 
Public.CashHiu -11.02%
b 
54 0.048 -9.17% 31 0.239 -13.87%
a 
77 0.000 -10.00% 36 0.129 
Public.CashLiu -5.49%
b 
110 0.032 -7.24%
a 
168 0.001 -5.36%
c 
89 0.068 -5.94%
b 
127 0.013 
Dif(Hiu-Liu) -5.53% 
 
0.378 -1.94% 
 
0.822 -8.51%
c 
 
0.084 -4.06% 
 
0.592 
Public.CashHs -7.69%
a 
131 0.001 -7.69%
a 
131 0.001 -7.73%
a 
130 0.002 -7.17%
a 
112 0.008 
Public.CashLs -1.07% 45 0.825 -1.07% 45 0.831 -1.07% 45 0.818 -0.81% 41 0.879 
Dif(Ls-Hs) 6.62% 
 
0.229 6.62% 
 
0.229 6.65% 
 
0.227 6.36% 
 
0.284 
Public.CashLsHiu -4.62% 16 0.694 -4.49% 13 0.733 -2.18% 17 0.774 0.45% 14 1.000 
Public.CashHsLiu -6.48%
b 
74 0.030 -8.16%
a 
113 0.002 -4.00% 57 0.183 -6.03%
b 
88 0.029 
Dif(LsHiu-HsLiu) 1.86% 
 
0.871 3.67% 
 
0.792 1.81% 
 
0.821 6.48% 
 
0.576 
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Table 5.19-Continued 
Panel G: Public Acquisitions paid for with Stock 
Public.StockAll -22.29%
a 
179 0.000 -22.29%
a 
179 0.000 -21.86%
a 
173 0.000 -22.91%
a 
123 0.000 
Public.StockHiu -33.90%
a 
73 0.000 -27.95%
a 
67 0.002 -34.59%
a 
73 0.000 -34.98%
b 
38 0.032 
Public.StockLiu -11.14%
b 
51 0.015 -11.55% 51 0.109 -14.87%
a 
47 0.001 -18.77%
a 
45 0.000 
Dif(Hiu-Liu) -22.77%
a 
 
0.000 -16.40%
b 
 
0.029 -19.72%
a 
 
0.001 -16.21%
c 
 
0.088 
Public.StockHs -20.22%
b 
52 0.025 -20.22%
b 
52 0.026 -18.64%
b 
49 0.046 -17.07%
c 
36 0.100 
Public.StockLs -22.50%
b 
61 0.009 -22.50%
b 
61 0.011 -22.23%
a 
59 0.010 -24.98%
c 
44 0.053 
Dif(Ls-Hs) -2.29% 
 
0.759 -2.29% 
 
0.759 -3.59% 
 
0.632 -7.91% 
 
0.393 
Public.StockLsHiu -34.48%
a 
24 0.000 -26.14%
a 
28 0.005 -36.19%
a 
25 0.000 -37.08%
c 
17 0.088 
Public.StockHsLiu -8.62% 20 0.103 -15.49%
a 
31 0.006 -19.97%
a 
13 0.001 -18.69%
a 
26 0.006 
Dif(LsHiu-HsLiu) -25.86%
a 
  0.004 -10.65%   0.232 -16.22%   0.147 -18.38%   0.115 
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Table 5.20 Long Term BHARs (36 Months) by Bidder’s Stock Price Synchronicity, Information Uncertainty and the their Interaction 
This table presents the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) for 36 months following the announcement of bids of High (Low) Uncertainty 
Acquirers, High (Low) Synchronicity Acquirers and their interaction (LsHiu and HsLiu).  Information Uncertainty (IU) is captured by four proxies. The 
33% youngest acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% oldest as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Age is 
measured as the difference between the incorporation date of the firm until the announcement date of the deal. The 33% smallest acquirers are classified 
as high uncertainty, the 33% largest as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Size is measured as the market capitalization 
(MV) of the bidding firm 20 days before the announcement date of the deal. The 33% highest sigma acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 
33% lowest sigma as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Sigma is measured by the standard deviation of daily excess 
returns 200 days before the announcement date of the deal. Finally, the 33% less active acquirers are classified as high uncertainty, the 33% most active 
as low uncertainty and the medium 33% as of medium uncertainty. Trading Volume is measured as the average of the monthly trading volume of the 
acquirer before the announcement date of the deal. Synchronicity is measured as the R
2
 of the following regression: 
 
ri,j,t= βi,0 + βi,m rm,t + βi,j rj,t +εi,t 
 
where ri,j,t is the return of bidder i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t and rj,t is the return of industry j at time t. The lowest 33% R
2
 
firms are classified as low synchronicity, the highest 33% R
2
 firms as high synchronicity and the rest as medium. The BHAR for company i is 
computed as: 
 
T
mt
T
iti RRBHAR 11 )1()1(  
where Rit is the monthly return for company i, and Rmt is the monthly return of the market index. Panel A presents 36 month BHARs for the whole 
sample, Panel B for acquisitions for private targets only, Panel C for acquisitions for private targets paid for with cash, Panel D for acquisitions for 
private targets paid for with equity, Panel E for acquisitions for public targets only, Panel F for acquisitions for public targets paid for with cash and 
Panel G for acquisitions for public targets paid for with equity. Following Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999), we use their skewness adjusted bootstrap t-
statistics procedure to compute the statistical significance of the abnormal returns (1000 replications). The number of bids for each category is reported 
next to the z-statistic. P-value are presented next to the number of observations. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ‗a‘, ‗b‘ and 
‗c‘, respectively. The Dif(Hiu-Liu) represents the differences in mean BHARs for 36 months post the acquisition announcement of High versus low 
information uncertainty acquisitions. The Dif(Ls-Hs) represents the differences in mean BHARs for 36 months post the acquisition announcement of 
Low versus High synchronicity acquirers. The Dif((LsHiu-HsLiu) represents the differences in mean BHARs for 36 months post the acquisition 
announcement of low synchronicity bidders subject to high uncertainty versus high synchronicity bidders subject to low uncertainty. 
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Table 5.20-Continued 
  Age 
  
  
Size 
  
  
Sigma 
  
  
Trading VO 
  
  
Panel A: Whole Sample 
  Average Count p-value Average Count p-value Average Count p-value Average Count p-value 
AllAll -28.97%
a 
5,189 0.000 -28.97%
a 
5,189 0.000 -28.53%
a 
5,011 0.000 -27.95%
a 
3,938 0.000 
AllHiu -35.71%
a 
1,748 0.000 -32.33%
a 
1,667 0.000 -35.85%
a 
1,738 0.000 -35.97%
a 
1,286 0.001 
AllLiu -27.19%
a 
1,763 0.000 -25.66%
a 
1,786 0.000 -29.38%
a 
1,630 0.000 -19.07%
a 
1,357 0.000 
Dif(Hiu-Liu) -8.52%
a 
 
0.002 -6.67%
b 
 
0.018 -6.47%
b 
 
0.021 -16.90%
a 
 
0.000 
AllHs -28.34%
a 
1,666 0.000 -28.34%
a 
1,666 0.000 -28.00%
a 
1,601 0.000 -26.30%
a 
1,318 0.000 
AllLs -29.72%
a 
1,763 0.000 -29.72%
a 
1,763 0.000 -28.99%
a 
1,699 0.000 -30.05%
a 
1,293 0.000 
Dif(Ls-Hs) -1.38% 
 
0.604 -1.38% 
 
0.604 -0.99% 
 
0.717 -3.74% 
 
0.201 
AllLsHiu -36.09%
a 
677 0.000 -31.13%
a 
795 0.000 -37.23%
a 
601 0.000 -39.53%
a 
600 0.000 
AllHsLiu -26.30%
a 
763 0.000 -27.30%
a 
989 0.000 -26.98%
a 
599 0.000 -22.85%
a 
786 0.000 
Dif(LsHiu-HsLiu) -9.79%
b 
  0.011 -3.83%   0.325 -10.25%
b 
  0.022 -16.68%
a 
  0.000 
Panel B: Private Acquisitions 
Priv.All -35.04%
a 
2,947 0.000 -35.04%
a 
2,947 0.000 -34.48%
a 
2815 0.000 -35.07%
a 
2,206 0.000 
Priv.Hiu -40.38%
a 
1,112 0.000 -39.52%
a 
1,099 0.000 -45.49%
a 
1,049 0.000 -42.55%
a 
857 0.000 
Priv.Liu -33.38%
a 
845 0.000 -30.70%
a 
799 0.000 -32.98%
a 
844 0.000 -23.30%
a 
573 0.000 
Dif(Hiu-Liu) -7.00%
b 
 
0.037 -8.81%
a 
 
0.009 -12.51%
a 
 
0.000 -19.26%
a 
 
0.000 
Priv.Hs -34.67%
a 
848 0.000 -34.67%
a 
848 0.000 -33.86%
a 
803 0.000 -33.31%
a 
649 0.000 
Priv.Ls -37.15%
a 
1,080 0.000 -37.15%
a 
1,080 0.000 -36.81%
a 
1,034 0.000 -37.97%
a 
795 0.000 
Dif(Ls-Hs) -2.48% 
 
0.464 -2.48% 
 
0.464 -2.95% 
 
0.399 -4.66% 
 
0.210 
Priv.LsHiu -38.20%
a 
444 0.000 -39.16%
a 
532 0.000 -45.61%
a 
375 0.000 -43.79%
a 
409 0.000 
Priv.HsLiu -30.97%
a 
324 0.000 -32.91% 420 0.146 -34.65%
a 
260 0.001 -28.17%
b 
319 0.050 
Dif(LsHiu-HsLiu) -7.23%   0.137 -6.25%   0.179 -10.96%
c 
  0.053 -15.62%
a 
  0.003 
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Table 5.20-Continued 
Panel C: Private Acquisitions paid for with Cash 
Priv.CashAll -22.95%
a 
994 0.000 -22.95%
a 
994 0.000 -23.34%
a 
968 0.000 -21.09%
a 
778 0.000 
Priv.CashHiu -22.58%
a 
285 0.002 -30.66%
a 
268 0.000 -32.37%
a 
292 0.000 -29.62%
a 
223 0.000 
Priv.CashLiu -25.02%
a 
403 0.000 -23.16%
a 
374 0.000 -24.37%
a 
330 0.000 -15.67%
a 
285 0.002 
Dif(Hiu-Liu) 2.45% 
 
0.712 -7.50% 
 
0.218 -8.00% 
 
0.182 -13.95%
b 
 
0.021 
Priv.CashHs -24.45%
a 
347 0.000 -24.45%
a 
347 0.000 -23.99%
a 
336 0.000 -21.71%
a 
278 0.000 
Priv.CashLs -23.99%
a 
318 0.000 -23.99%
a 
318 0.000 -24.81%
a 
309 0.000 -22.27%
a 
248 0.000 
Dif(Ls-Hs) 0.46% 
 
0.936 0.46% 
 
0.936 -0.83% 
 
0.886 -0.56% 
 
0.925 
Priv.CashLsHiu -19.15%
a 
110 0.058 -24.42%
a 
129 0.005 -34.24%
b 
93 0.011 -30.05%
a 
108 0.000 
Priv.CashHsLiu -18.46%
a 
180 0.000 -23.72%
a 
212 0.000 -29.53%
a 
125 0.000 -18.98%
a 
175 0.000 
Dif(LsHiu-HsLiu) -0.69%   0.941 -0.71%   0.934 -4.70%   0.639 -11.07%   0.158 
Panel D: Private Acquisitions paid for with Stock 
Priv.StockAll -54.70%
a 
204 0.000 -54.70%
a 
204 0.000 -55.10%
a 
198 0.000 -61.84%
a 
142 0.000 
Priv.StockHiu -62.17%
b 
96 0.016 -56.23%
a 
112 0.000 -61.29%
a 
115 0.000 -69.90%
c 
76 0.074 
Priv.StockLiu -52.16% 36 0.368 -60.08%
a 
43 0.005 -45.40%
a 
49 0.006 -44.56%
c 
30 0.081 
Dif(Hiu-Liu) -10.01% 
 
0.474 3.84% 
 
0.758 -15.89% 
 
0.148 -25.34%
c 
 
0.090 
Priv.StockHs -64.45%
a 
57 0.000 -64.45%
a 
57 0.000 -67.19%
a 
54 0.000 -74.37%
a 
37 0.008 
Priv.StockLs -46.82%
a 
71 0.005 -46.82%
a 
71 0.001 -46.27%
a 
69 0.003 -46.67%
c 
47 0.059 
Dif(Ls-Hs) 17.63% 
 
0.143 17.63% 
 
0.143 20.92%
c 
 
0.084 27.71%
c 
 
0.067 
Priv.StockLsHiu -56.69% 30 0.786 -53.81%
b 
51 0.044 -42.57%
c 
39 0.062 -58.81% 32 0.579 
Priv.StockHsLiu -68.23% 15 0.883 -72.00% 27 0.132 -53.51%
c 
18 0.061 -73.02% 16 0.278 
Dif(LsHiu-HsLiu) 11.54%   0.411 18.19%   0.203 10.94%   0.563 14.21%   0.467 
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Table 5.20-Continued 
Panel E: Public Acquisitions 
PublicAll -27.77%
a 
561 0.000 -27.77%
a 
561 0.000 -27.89%
a 
553 0.000 -23.37%a
a 
431 0.000 
PublicHiu -41.64%
a 
160 0.000 -35.37%
a 
130 0.000 -35.06%
a 
201 0.000 -34.07%
a 
100 0.004 
PublicLiu -21.05%
a 
226 0.000 -22.56%
a 
282 0.000 -32.61%
a 
181 0.000 -14.57%
a 
216 0.001 
Dif(Hiu-Liu) -20.59%
a 
 
0.003 -12.82% 
 
0.111 -2.45% 
 
0.707 -19.50% 
 
0.025 
PublicHs -27.95%
a 
225 0.000 -27.95%
a 
225 0.000 -27.99%
a 
220 0.000 -21.30%
a 
179 0.000 
PublicLs -24.20%
a 
156 0.000 -24.20%
a 
156 0.000 -24.02%
a 
154 0.000 -22.21%
a 
124 0.004 
Dif(Ls-Hs) 3.75% 
 
0.601 3.75% 
 
0.601 3.98% 
 
0.585 -0.91% 
 
0.910 
PublicLsHiu -37.08%
b 
51 0.023 -28.62%
b 
61 0.028 -30.16%
b 
63 0.024 -33.49%
c 
49 0.054 
PublicHsLiu -24.64%
a 
116 0.000 -24.63%
a 
168 0.000 -27.90%
a 
83 0.000 -19.49%
a 
135 0.002 
Dif(LsHiu-HsLiu) -12.44%   0.333 -3.99%   0.734 -2.26%   0.854 -14.00%   0.245 
Panel F: Public Acquisitions paid for with Cash 
Public.CashAll -17.53%
a 
220 0.000 -17.53%
a 
220 0.000 -17.53%
a 
220 0.000 -13.71%
a 
188 0.004 
Public.CashHiu -25.84%
c 
47 0.076 -26.03% 28 0.148 -25.30%
b 
73 0.024 -18.98% 32 0.157 
Public.CashLiu -15.14%
b 
101 0.011 -14.69%
b 
146 0.013 -20.90%
a 
77 0.007 -7.46% 108 0.220 
Dif(Hiu-Liu) -10.70% 
 
0.420 -11.34% 
 
0.507 -4.40% 
 
0.652 -11.51% 
 
0.380 
Public.CashHs -23.31%
a 
111 0.004 -23.31%
a 
111 0.004 -23.31%
a 
111 0.009 -16.01% 93 0.032 
Public.CashLs -11.44% 43 0.361 -11.44% 43 0.353 -11.44% 43 0.325 -14.15% 39 0.271 
Dif(Ls-Hs) 11.87% 
 
0.359 11.87% 
 
0.359 11.87% 
 
0.359 1.86% 
 
0.888 
Public.CashLsHiu -24.50% 15 0.336 -4.19% 12 0.893 -19.23% 17 0.449 -15.52% 13 0.380 
Public.CashHsLiu -20.75%
a 
68 0.010 -18.73%
b 
94 0.029 -18.80%
b 
46 0.048 -15.44% 72 0.119 
Dif(LsHiu-HsLiu) -3.76%   0.874 14.54%   0.604 -0.43%   0.983 -0.08%   0.997 
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Table 5.20-Continued 
Panel G: Public Acquisitions paid for with Stock 
Public.StockAll -42.33%
a 
168 0.000 -42.33%
a 
168 0.000 -43.18%
a 
162 0.000 -37.01%
a 
112 0.000 
Public.StockHiu -54.61%
a 
69 0.001 -43.20%
a 
64 0.005 -52.25%
a 
66 0.005 -51.50% 37 0.169 
Public.StockLiu -26.33%
b 
49 0.041 -41.81%
a 
46 0.000 -45.49%
a 
45 0.003 -23.80%
c 
40 0.055 
Dif(Hiu-Liu) -28.28%
b 
 
0.020 -1.38% 
 
0.911 -6.76% 
 
0.583 -27.70%
c 
 
0.099 
Public.StockHs -40.94% 48 0.192 -40.94% 48 0.193 -41.67% 45 0.206 -26.97% 32 0.450 
Public.StockLs -39.21%
a 
58 0.004 -39.21%
a 
58 0.003 -39.24%
a 
56 0.002 -35.79%
b 
41 0.025 
Dif(Ls-Hs) 1.73% 
 
0.894 1.73% 
 
0.894 2.43% 
 
0.859 -8.82% 
 
0.592 
Public.StockLsHiu -51.25% 22 0.285 -34.24% 27 0.160 -46.22% 23 0.280 -55.99% 16 0.486 
Public.StockHsLiu -30.87%
b 
18 0.036 -38.59%
b 
27 0.015 -41.75% 11 0.125 -30.90%
b 
22 0.044 
Dif(LsHiu-HsLiu) -20.38%   0.269 4.35%   0.797 -4.47%   0.859 -25.09%   0.132 
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6.1 Conclusion 
 
The primary aim of this thesis is to offer a behavioural approach to help explain bidding 
firms‘ abnormal returns following the announcement of a takeover bid. A great number 
of factors have been identified in the corporate finance literature as explanatory 
variables in relation to short-run bidder gains. However, there is limited evidence in the 
behavioural finance school in a M&A framework. This thesis provides an in-depth 
empirical analysis on issues related to behavioural heuristics, such as managerial 
overconfidence and investor sentiment that can affect bidder gains. 
 
The existing literature suggests that bidders‘ abnormal returns can be explained by 
factors such as the target firm‘s listing status, the method of payment used to finance 
the acquisition, a combination of these two factors as well as the bidders‘ growth 
opportunities, the bidder‘s size, the relative size of the deal and also whether the bidder 
diversifies acquiring targets within different industries/countries. 
 
Neoclassical theories suggest that takeovers are motivated by the potential creation of 
synergy gains (Jensen and Ruback (1983)). Two firms merge, or one acquires the other, 
and through economies of scale, shareholders can benefit due to potential synergy. 
Jensen (1986) develops the agency theory of takeovers and suggests that the main 
motive behind M&As is that managers chase targets to fulfil their own personal 
interests by engaging in takeovers. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) introduce the stock 
market driven acquisition motive. They suggest that managers ‗time the market‘ and 
during overvalued periods, they take advantage of their overvalued equity in order to 
acquire undervalued target firms. Another school of thought suggests that takeovers are 
driven by managerial overoptimism. Roll (1986) introduces the hubris hypothesis for 
corporate takeovers which suggests that takeovers can be motivated by an overly 
optimistic attitude of the belief that managers can create value and extract potential 
synergy gains due to their own abilities. 
 
Unlike investor overconfidence, which has been extensively examined in theoretical 
and empirical investigations, there is limited evidence regarding managerial 
overconfidence. Evidence is provided for the US market by Malmendier and Tate 
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(2008) and Hayward and Hambrick (1997). Chapter 3 of this thesis focuses on the 
effect of managerial overconfidence on UK bidding firms‘ abnormal returns earned 
around the announcement of a takeover bid. To capture overconfidence, we employ 
three hand-collected proxies, used for the first time in a UK dataset. Due to the fact that 
managerial overconfidence is a difficult behaviour to truly capture, and also for 
robustness reasons, we employ three different proxies. The stock options proxy is based 
on managers‘ compensation grants. Through annual reviews, we hand-collected data 
related to their personal portfolios and examined when they are granted the stock 
option, when they can exercise it, when they exercise it and when the option expires. 
The rationale behind the stock options proxy suggests that managers, due to the fact that 
they cannot diversify the firm specific risk that the stock options carry, should exercise 
it as soon as it is ‗in-the-money‘. Managers who hold the option until the last year 
before the expiration date are classified as overconfident. The second proxy is based on 
managers‘ acquisitiveness. Doukas and Petmezas (2007) and Billett and Qian (2008) 
claim that firms that are involved in multiple acquisitions within a short period of time 
are driven by overconfidence and self-attribution bias. These two studies examine the 
multiple acquisitiveness of firms. We argue that it might not be the same individual in 
these multiple bidders that holds the manager‘s post throughout the takeover activity of 
a specific firm. We employ a similar proxy but classify individual CEOs who perform 
five or more acquisitions within three years as overconfident. Lastly, the third proxy is 
based on how the press characterizes various managers. We collect articles that portray 
managers as ‗optimistic‘, ‗overoptimistic‘, ‗confident‘ and ‗overconfident‘ and articles 
that portray them as ‗reliable‘, ‗cautious‘, ‗conservative‘, ‗practical‘, ‗frugal‘, ‗steady‘, 
‗not confident‘ or ‗not optimistic‘. If the number of articles in the first group 
outnumbers the second, then managers are classified as overconfident. 
 
The UK M&A market is an ideal testing ground for the behavioural trait of 
overconfidence. It is the most active merger market following the US. Among European 
countries, 65% of the total takeover activity conducted takes place in the UK (Doukas 
and Petmezas (2007)). Furthermore, almost 90% of acquisitions involve private targets 
(Draper and Paudyal (2006)). Information is limited regarding privately held firm. It is 
much more difficult for managers to estimate and value private target firm and the task 
of evaluation becomes more ambiguous. Hence, overconfidence is more prominent in 
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this setting. Moreover, the vast majority of the method of payment used is cash. 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) write that overconfident managers prefer to use internal 
sources to finance takeovers. These features of the UK M&A market position such a 
database to be an ideal testing ground for the presence and effects of the human trait of 
overconfidence. 
 
The main findings suggest that overconfident managers destroy more or create less 
value than rational managers do. We control for a number of factors that have been 
proven to affect bidder gains, such as the target firms listing status (private or public), 
the method of payment used (cash, stock and mixed), the size and growth opportunities 
of the bidder, the relative size of the deal and whether the bidder diversifies across 
industries/countries. The big picture across all three proxies suggests that in the short-
run, acquisitions announced by rational managers generate higher abnormal returns than 
those announced by overconfident managers. Furthermore, the phenomenon of 
overconfidence is more prominent in portfolios such the one comprising of private 
targets, cash-financing, glamour and large bidders. As mentioned above, information is 
limited for privately held firms and managers need to involve their personal estimations 
and valuation skills to a higher degree. Besides this, glamour firms and large firms, due 
to their past successes, are more likely to be governed by managers infected by hubris. 
The business press proxy offers a similar but weaker picture, most likely due to the 
limited number of observations that were able to be collected. The pattern of rational 
versus overconfident managers is reaffirmed in the cross-sectional analysis where we 
simultaneously control for various factors that affect a bidder‘s performance. The long-
run analysis is consistent with the findings of the short-run analysis, especially for the 
stock options and multiple acquirers proxies. No significant mean differences are 
uncovered for the business press proxy. Overall, the findings provide additional support 
to the theoretical predictions of previous US studies indicating that the effect of 
managerial overconfidence on bidders‘ returns is not sensitive neither to the 
overconfidence measure nor is it limited to the US market. 
 
The hubris hypothesis as examined in Chapter 3 suggests an irrational manager-rational 
market framework. Other studies (Odean (1998)) have also suggested that investors are 
also overconfident, especially in bullish periods. Rosen (2006) argues that managers 
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may be infected with the same optimism as investors during bullish periods. As Baker 
et al. (2007, p. 48) argue, ―the irrational manager and irrational investor stories can 
certainly coexist‖. Chapter 4 examines the interaction of managerial overconfidence 
with bidders‘ performance across various market conditions. 
 
More specifically, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) present a model in which managers are 
rational and are able to take advantage of irrational markets. According to Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003), managers ‗time the market‘ to capitalise on overvalued periods, in 
which they use their overvalued equity to proceed to conduct takeover activity by 
acquiring undervalued target firms. The market driven acquisition theory is confirmed 
by the findings of Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) and Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) while 
Bouwman et al. (2009) find that takeovers announced during high valuation periods 
generate higher returns than those announced during low valuation periods. 
 
We follow Bouwman et al. (2009) to classify the market in to high, neutral and low 
valuation periods and we employ the stock options and the multiple acquirers proxy as 
described in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the empirical results strongly support the notion 
that short-run bidder gains can be well explained by the joint effect of market 
conditions and managerial (non-)overconfidence. More specifically, rational managers 
who announce takeovers during high valuation periods generate the highest abnormal 
returns for their shareholders. Rational managers assess the target firm more carefully, 
negotiate more efficiently and take advantage of market timing in order to create the 
highest possible abnormal returns for their shareholders. Conversely, the findings also 
show that overconfident managers who announce takeovers during low valuation 
periods suffer the highest losses. During depressed markets, managers are unlike to hide 
the poor quality of the deal and the possible overpayment incurred. In low valuation 
periods, conservative investors are more likely to assess the deal more carefully 
resulting in a more unfavourable reactiong to the announcement of a takeover deal by 
an overconfident manager. The univariate analysis shows that deals announced by 
rational managers in high periods are statistically different from those announced by 
overconfident managers in low periods. The high-rational vs. low-overconfident pattern 
also holds when controlling for various bidder and deal characteristics that affect 
bidders‘ performance and the differentials are even higher in portfolios in which the 
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overconfidence effect is more pronounced. Furthermore, our findings show that rational 
managers tend to generate positive abnormal returns for their shareholders irrespective 
of the market conditions. In addition, overconfident managers who announce 
acquisitions in high valuation periods do not suffer high losses. They are able to take 
advantage of the high investor sentiment and can hide possible overpayments or the low 
quality of the deal. Hence, in high valuation periods, even the stock price of 
overconfident managers is boosted by the evident high investor sentiment. 
 
The cross-sectional analysis results provide extra support to the findings of the 
univariate analysis. We simultaneously control for the managerial bias and the different 
market conditions alongside other control variables that affect bidders‘ performance in 
the short-run. The coefficient for the high valuation-rational manager dummy carries 
the most positive and statistically significant value while the low valuation-
overconfident manager dummy carries a negative and significant value. Results are, on 
large, similar when measuring overconfidence with the stock options and the multiple 
acquirers proxies. Finally, the long-run analysis provides a similar but weaker picture in 
favor of deals announced by rational managers in high valuation periods 
 
Chapter 5 offers another behavioural approach on how the market reacts under 
conditions of information uncertainty, especially in cases where investors also possess 
private information. The neoclassical approach to M&A announcements suggests that 
the market reaction should reflect the potential synergy gains following the 
announcement of a takeover (Jensen and Ruback (1983)). The market should reward 
value enhancing projects and punish takeovers with no or negative synergy gains. Fuller 
et al. (2002) and Draper and Paudyal (2008) claim that part of the market‘s reaction to 
takeover announcements is due to revaluation gains. More specifically, they suggest 
that first-order deals generate higher returns because part of the gains is due to a 
revaluation effect, mostly corrected at the first announcement. Chapter 5 offers a 
different approach to explain short-run bidder gains. Our work is motivated by the 
theoretical and empirical foundations of behavioural finance models. Odean (1998) 
claims that investors are overconfident and overestimate the precision of their 
information especially when they are personally involved in the collection process. The 
theoretical model of Daniel et al. (1998) predicts that investors are overconfident about 
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their private information and tend to attribute more weight to their private signals than 
to public ones received. Similarly, Daniel et al. (1998, 2001) claim that investors‘ 
overconfidence is magnified under conditions of information uncertainty. In the same 
respect, Zhang (2006) and Jiang, Lee and Zhang (2004) also claim investors 
overreaction is more prominent under conditions of information uncertainty. 
Specifically, Zhang (2006) finds that under conditions of information uncertainty, 
relatively ‗good‘ news generates higher abnormal returns while relatively ‗bad‘ news 
generates lower abnormal returns. He also writes that he does not control for the private 
information of the investor. Motivated by the above evidence, we investigate the 
market‘s reaction following the announcement of various takeover deals under 
conditions of information uncertainty as well as in cases where investors possess private 
information. 
 
The existing literature suggests that the target firm‘s listing status along with the 
method of payment used to finance the deal conveys various signals to the market 
regarding the bidding firm‘s intrinsic value. Travlos (1987) writes that the market 
perceives acquisitions for publicly listed targets paid for with equity as ‗bad‘ news as 
investors assume that the bidders‘ equity is overvalued. Conversely, cash offers signal 
‗good‘ news to the market about the intrinsic value of the bidding firm as investors 
consider it a signal that the bidders‘ stock price is undervalued. Additionally, Shleifer 
and Vishny (2003) also suggest that overvalued bidders are more likely to use equity to 
proceed to takeovers. On the other hand, Chang (1998) and Draper and Paudyal (2006) 
posit that takeovers for privately held targets paid for with equity signal ‗good‘ news to 
the market as the concentrated ownership of the target firm has a stronger more 
incentive to carefully evaluate the intrinsic value of the bidder before accepting a large 
amount of stock is an exchange offer. Hence, it is quite unlikely that the owners of the 
target firm will accept overvalued equity. Cash offers for private target firms are usually 
positive signals but do not reveal much information regarding the bidder‘s intrinsic 
value. In using cash to acquire a privately held firm, bidders tend to be less uncertain 
about the potential synergy gains and are confident enough to offer cash as they are not 
willing to share the potential synergy gains with the ownership of the target firm by 
creating blockholders. Therefore, a cash acquisition does not directly reveal information 
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about the value of the bidding stock but can, in general, be classified as a relatively 
positive piece of information. 
 
Motivated by the above evidence, we hypothesize that under conditions of information 
uncertainty and in times when investors possess private information, they will overreact 
and generate positive abnormal returns following the announcement of private stock, 
public cash and private cash takeover announcements (signals of ‗good‘ news) while 
the market will react negatively following public stock deals (signal of ‗bad‘ news). 
When uncertainty is low and investors are less likely to possess private information, the 
market reaction should be complete (i.e. zero abnormal returns should be earned) 
irrespective of the type of the deal announced. 
 
We employ four proxies for information uncertainty namely, age, size, sigma and 
trading volume of the bidding firm. For private information, we adopt stock return 
(non)synchronicity as introduced by Roll (1988) and further developed by Morck et al. 
(2000) and Chen et al. (2006). 
 
Our main findings suggest that bidders subject to high information uncertainty 
regarding the target generate higher abnormal returns relative to low information 
uncertainty about the bidding firm‘s value following the announcement of private 
acquisitions paid for with cash and equity and for public targets paid for with cash, 
while the opposite effect is observed for public acquisitions paid for equity. 
Additionally, when we control for the private information of the investor, we find that 
under high information uncertainty and when investors are likely to possess private 
information, the market reacts highly positively following the announcement of private 
stock, public cash and private cash deals (‗good‘ news), while it reacts highly 
negatively following takeovers for public targets paid for with equity (‗bad‘ news). 
When uncertainty is lower and investors are less likely to possess private information 
(high synchronicity), the market reaction is complete (zero abnormal returns). 
 
The empirical findings also show that the findings of Travlos (1987) and Chang (1998) 
for the method of payment in public and private acquisitions respectively hold only 
under conditions of information uncertainty. In other words, public and private 
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acquisitions paid for with cash are fundamentally different from those paid for using 
equity only under conditions of high information uncertainty. The statistically 
significant differences are mainly driven by the investor‘s overreaction to high 
uncertainty deals. This difference is amplified even more when controlling for 
investors‘ private information but only for acquisitions of public target firms. The 
reasoning offered is that public cash deals are considered as ‗good‘ news while public 
stock deals are signals of ‗bad‘ news and therefore the market overreacts in opposite 
directions. The multivariate analysis shows that the reaction is stronger towards ‗bad‘ 
signals (public stock deals). This evidence is consistent with Epstein and Schneider 
(2008) who suggest that investors react asymmetrically to news when they are 
ambiguous about the firm value. Furthermore, Bernard et al. (1997), La Porta et al. 
(1997) and Skinner and Sloan (1999) show significant differences in the markets 
response with regards to good and bad news.  
 
Additionally, we offer a different perspective to studies that examine size as a 
determining factor to value creation from M&As. Moeller et al. (2004) show that small 
bidders generate higher returns than larger bidders do and offer a number of 
explanations to justify their findings. The final empirical chapter of this thesis suggests 
that the higher returns generated by small firms may be due to the higher information 
associated with such acquirers. 
 
On the whole, Chapter 5 offers a different approach to explain the market‘s reaction 
following the announcement of takeovers. The neoclassical theory posits that the short-
run market reaction to M&A announcements reflects either potential synergy or 
revaluation gains. Our evidence suggests that there is a simple market overreaction 
driven by investor biases. Investors‘ biases increase especially with uncertainty and, 
depending on the signal conveyed by each type of takeover, investors react either 
positively or negatively. In the absence of uncertainty, the market reaction is complete. 
 
Overall, the evidence provided in this thesis provides extra evidence in the growing 
field of behavioural finance. Gervais (2009) and Subrahmanyam (2007), in their review 
papers, highlight the need for further extensive research into various behavioural 
aspects such as agent biases and other financial participants‘ biases that affect stock 
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prices. Specifically, Subrahmanyam (2007), in his concluding remarks, writes that the 
well-documented cognitive bias of overconfidence is a topic worthy of further research. 
He also notes that CEOs profiles and characteristics should be used to predict corporate 
takeovers. This thesis reinforces the idea that behavioural phenomena such as financial 
participants‘ cognitive biases can explain to a great extent the abnormal returns earned 
following takeover announcements. 
 
 
6.2 Reflective Review and Implications 
 
This thesis offers further explanations on various behavioural factors that affect short 
and long-run performance of bidding firms that engage in corporate takeovers. 
Neoclassical theories have attempted to shed light on both the factors which trigger 
M&A activity and the explanations behind takeover gains. This thesis has further 
extended both the limited studies and the theories developed within the field of 
behavioural finance. Its findings could have several implications for institutional 
investors, block holders, managers and firm owners and these will be reviewed in this 
section. 
 
One of the main conclusions discussed in this thesis concerns the proposition that 
managers who are infected by hubris end up destroying value for their shareholders. 
Institutional investors or block holders could help prevent this wealth destruction 
through imposing further restraints and monitoring closely the behaviour of CEOs who 
have a tendency to act in an overconfident manner. Furthermore, the evidence in this 
thesis shows that this managerial bias when also combined with the market‘s sentiment 
could have either destructive or very positive outcomes for the shareholders of the 
bidding firm. Therefore, it would be advisable for managers to time the market in order 
toobtain the highest possible gains for their shareholders through capitalising upon 
positive market sentiment. Lastly, we show that uncertainty triggers sentiment and 
investors react highly negatively to takeovers for listed target firms paid for with stock. 
In these circumstances, it would be wiser if managers released more information to 
increase the transparency of their firms in order to create a clearer view of their 
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company‘s fundamental value. In this way investors would be able to judge their 
decisions in a more objective way. 
 
Despite the thorough analysis on various behavioural issues which has been conducted, 
additionalinvestigation is required to provide answers to related issues. This thesis 
focuses on managerial overconfidence by examining the behaviour of CEOs. However, 
the board of each company consists of various members. The impact of each member of 
the board and how they could prevent various decisions that are not in accordance with 
shareholders‘ interests is still an open and unexplored topic. Furthermore, other 
managerial characteristics apart from overconfidence could also influence their 
decisions. For instance, Kaplan, Klebanov and Sorensen (2010) investigate a sample of 
managerial characteristics which reveal information on general ability and interpersonal 
characteristic skills. Further exploration in this field would undoubtedly prove to be 
promising.  
 
A sensitive issue on which further development is required is the validity of proxies 
used to approach managerial overconfidence. There is a lot of criticism around the 
ability of each different proxy to capture this sensitive behavioural bias. Managers 
could be interviewed through questionnaires and more precisely could be identified as 
more or less overconfident. This approach may prove fruitful in further investigations.  
 
Additionally, one of the proxies used to capture overconfidence is multiple takeovers. 
An unanswered question is the impact of one takeover bid to another and the learning 
outcomes of each deal both to the managers and investors. The findings of this thesis 
has provided many further research fields and thus undoubtedly has generated further 
stimulation to increase investigations in the area of behavioural finance.  
 
Overall, this work has not only provided findings to preoccupy and stimulate the minds 
of academicians, but it has also provided valuable information for both policy makers 
and those which govern the actions of managers. Policy makers can use the findings to 
try to further regulate the merger market and help reduce the losses incurred whilst 
shareholders can use the findings in order to assess the true performance and worth of 
the managers representing them. 
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